Term
| Stimson, "Between the Campaigns" (2004) |
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Definition
| Stimson shows how public approval of Congress moves in tandem with the approval of presidents and governors. This public approval is guided by trust in government and confidence in the economy. Congress’s approval ratings are driven by how well things are going in the country. |
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Term
| Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, "What is Wrong with the American Political System?" (1995) |
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Definition
| Hibbing & Theiss-Morse argue that the American public dislikes Congress more than any other branch. States that the public dislikes the processes of government. Congress is a showcase of conflict, partisanship, and bargaining and since these processes are seen so clearly in this branch, it is disliked the most. Congress’s transparency makes it the least-liked of government institutions. |
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Term
| Robert Weisberg, “Collective vs. Dyadic Representation in Congress” (1978) |
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Definition
| Representation can either be measured by observing the congruence of legislators’ views and their districts (dyadic), or between the nation as a whole and Congress as a whole (collective). In the end, Weisberg finds we are more likely to have collective representation. |
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Term
| Robert F. Fenno Jr., “U.S. House Members in Their Constituencies” (1977): |
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Definition
| Bases his findings on extensive travels with legislators in their districts. Talks about how they develop “home styles.” According to Fenno, there are four levels of perception of the constituency: Geographic, Reelection, Primary, Personal. These are listed weakest to strongest. Home Style includes attracting and preserving the reelection base through allocation of resources, portrayal of self, and explanation of Washington activity. |
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Term
| Erikson & Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections”: |
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Definition
| Members tend to vote along party lines. During presidential election years, parties tend to perform the same in congressional election as they do in the presidential election. This is due to the coattail effect. Midterm losses for the President’s party are common, and seen as a product of ideological balancing and withdrawn coattails. Incumbents tend to win because of district partisanship, electoral selection, weak candidates, and name recognition. Political parties are the means by which constituents can electorally determine the party positions of their representatives in Congress. |
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Term
| Cox & Katz, “Elbridge Gerry’s Salamander: The Electoral Consequences of the Reapportionment Revolution” (2002) |
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Definition
| Cox and Katz argue that massive amount of reapportionment that took place after 1964 created the incumbency advantage. They state that the political orientation of the courts and state legislators are critical to redistricting.The dominant explanation for incumbency advantage is the resources that the incumbent has at his/her disposal. However critics of this advantage argue that incumbents are insulated from popular wrath and are “in bed” with special interests, they develop a special relationship with their constituents at the cost of forsaking national concerns, and the incumbency advantage has contributed to Democrats marinating majorities in the House throughout the post war era. |
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Term
| David Mayhew, “Congress: The Electoral Connection” (1975): |
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Definition
| Mayhew’s makes one basic point: members of congress are “single-minded seekers of reelection.” He argues that viewing everything congressmen do as a function of trying to get reelected leaves little about Congress unexplained. |
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Term
| Frances Lee, “Senate Representation and Coalition Building in Distributive Politics” (2000) |
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Definition
| Lee’s article addresses the fact that all states have equal representation in the Senate, regardless of population. Building on this, he argues that it is best to build a coalition of senators from small states, since federal funds will make much more impact for their smaller constituencies. |
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Term
| Smith & Gamm, “The Dynamics of Party Government in Congress”: |
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Definition
| This article is concerned with the nature of party leadership. It examines two existing theories of party leadership, conditional party government and the cooper-brady thesis, and then offers new perspectives. Conditional party government is a theory that party leadership will be strong when a party is more homogenous, and there is high polarization of the two parties. The Cooper-Brady thesis states that members’ voting patterns are mostly the result of the policy preferences of their electorate, not party leaders. In this thesis, party leaders have little influence on how members vote. |
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Term
| Cox & McCubbins, “Setting the Agenda” (2005) |
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Definition
| Cox and McCubbins argue that the majority party control the legislative agenda by delegating special agenda-setting powers to various offices (committee chairmanships, the speakership, and the Rules Committee) and by exercising party control over those offices. Effective use of these offices minimizes the number of defeats the majority party experiences on the floor. |
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Term
| Krehbiel, “Pivotal Politics” (1998): |
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Definition
This chapter discusses the spatial model of legislative policy-making in Congress. Krehbiel argues that pivotal voters in Congress are essential to understanding the causes of gridlock.
The policy sphere is unidimensional and serves as a policy space for liberal and conservative policies. Players in the policy space include lawmakers and the President. Each player has a preference on a given policy. The objective is for that player to push the policy towards his or her preferred point on the policy sphere. As always, the theory allows for an executive veto (issued by the President), and a filibuster (issued by the Senate). The pivotal politics model has the bill placed in one area on the line, and based on the preferences of the lawmakers and the President, and the special powers they yield, the bill can either move along the line, or stay at the status quo. Gridlock occurs when there is an absence of policy change in equilibrium in spite of the legislative majority that favors change. Focusing on the pivotal voters such as the person crucial ending a filibuster or overriding a veto is the proper way to study the causes and consequences of gridlock. |
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Term
| Cooper & Brady, “Institutional Context and Leadership Style” (1981) |
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Definition
| Cooper and Brady argue that the homogeneity of a party’s constituencies vary over time. The more homogenous the electoral constituency of a party, the more cohesive the party will be. In turn, a cohesive party concentrates power in the hands of central leaders. Less homogeneity in the party will lead to power being dispersed and leadership will be oriented toward bargaining and maintaining good relations within the party. |
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Term
| Evans & Grandy, “The Whip Systems of Congress”: |
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Definition
| Evans and Grandy analyze the evolution of the whip position. The position has evolved a little over time, but basically they have been in charge ensuring that enough party members are present on the floor when there is important business, conducting polls, persuading wavering party members and assisting the other party leaders in promoting the party agenda. The two parties do not ask their members the same questions. Both parties will try and avoid asking questions that will divide the membership. Usually whips counts are kept private. Now party leaders often use the whip system to "grow the vote," or gather more support for party positions on different legislation. Over the past 40 years, whip operations have become more important as a result of increased polarization in the House and Senate. Party leaders in both chambers can use an array of tactics, from persuasion and compromise to special favors and threats, to shape the voting decisions of their colleagues. |
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Term
| Aldrich & Rohde, “Congressional Committees in a Continuing Partisan Era”: |
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Definition
| Aldrich & Rohde outline that the two principle organizing structures of Congress are committees and parties. The essay outlines how committees have lost a degree of autonomy as a result of reforms in the 1970s. Power has shifted to party leadership. They employ their theory of conditional party government, which states that as the preferences of members grow more similar, members will delegate more power to their leaders. It uses this theory to explain the shift from committee power to party leadership power since the 1970s. |
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Term
| Maltzman & Smith, “Principals, Goals, Dimensionality, and Congressional Committees” (1994) |
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Definition
| Maltzman and Smith believe that committees take direction from three sources: constituencies, parent chamber, and their party. The relative importance of these principals varies across committees. The authors explore the influence of three factors on these relationships – issue salience, partisanship, and dimensionality. They offer two theories: 1.) When an issue is unidimensional, is salient to most members, and partisanship is low, the committee more accurately expresses the sentiment of its parent chamber 2.) When an issue is multidimensional, and is not salient to many members, committee members preferences are generally less congruent with their party and their chamber. |
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Term
| Shepsle & Weingast, “The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power” (1987): |
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Definition
| This paper introduces the idea of conference committee delegations as ex post vetos, and makes the claim that conference committees are the main source of Committee power. The authors highlight three mechanisms that sustain this deference: 1.) Punishment for oversteps on the part of floor members 2.) Ex ante defensive behavior 3.)Ex post defensive behavior. The authors make the argument that conference committee delegations are a post enforcement mechanism of deference because members of the originating committee usually serve on the conference committee for a respective piece of legislation. Since members on the floor know that an amendment that is unwanted by the originating committee will just get cut in the conference stage, they don’t even propose such amendments. |
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Term
| Strom, “The Return to Equilibrium” (1990): |
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Definition
| Gaining a stable, predictable outcome in a legislature operating under majority rule is not guaranteed. Strom analyzes the agenda-setting mechanisms and other processes that limit amendments and narrow the range of possible outcomes. Important features of Congress limit the range of options considered and often bias outcomes. Strom questions the conclusions of Shepsle and Weingast in the previous selection about the effectiveness of conference committees as a source of committee power. |
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