(1) Intentional

(2) Negligence

(3) Strict Liability

(4) Products Liability

(5) Nuisance

(6) Defamation

(7) Invasion of Privacy

(8) Wrongful Institution of Legal Procedings

(9) Economic Torts

(10) Wrongful Death

(1) Voluntary Act

(2) Intent

       (a) Desire to cause harm; or

       (b) K or is substantially certain that result will occur

       (c) Transfers from intended victim to actual

(3) Causation

(4) Harm

(5) Lack of Privilege or Defense

An intentional act that causes a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff or something closely connected thereto.

Offensive Contact: contact would inflict pain or impairment of any bodily f(x) or if rex person would regard it as offensive.

An intentional act that causes the plaintiff to experience a reasonable apprehension of an immediate harmful or offensive contact.

Intent: Defendant must act with desire to cause immediate battery, apprehension of immediate battery, or be substantially certain that fear of immediate battery will occur.

Intentional act that causes a plaintiff to be conined or restrained to a bounded area against plaintiff's will, and plaintiff knows of the confinement or is injured thereby.

Time is irrelevant

P is under no duty to resist iff D makes credible threat to use physical force.

P is not confied if P knows of rex means to escape.

Intentional or reckless act amounting to extreme and outrageous conduct that causes plaintiff sever mental distress.

Recklessness: defendant acts in deliberate disregard of high degree of % that emotional distress will follow.

Extreme and outrageous conduct: defendant's conduct is conduct that a civilized society would not tolderate.

Severe: distress suffered is more than rex person could be expected to endure.

Not considered extreme and outrageous except for common carriers/inkeepers, or plaintiffs with known sensitivity--e.g., children and elderly.

Trend toward permitting recovery for insults made by party in possession of authority.

D is liable iff D intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to:

(a) family member of plaintiff, where D K that P is presnet

(b) any plaintiff where emotional distress results in bodily harm

Intentional act that causes a physical invasion of P's land.

Intent: intent to cause physical invasion is sufficient. D does not need to intend to trespass or even realize that D has entered land.

Refusing to leave or refusing to remove an object from the land after P has asked invokes liability.

P's Land: rex space above and below that P could or did make use of.

Plaintiff must be in actual possession or have immediate right to possession.

Owner may not bring action unless owner is in possession.

(1) nuisance

(2) strict liability

(3) trespass to land

(1) Nominal--vindicates land possessor's rights where there is no damage

(2) General--allows possessor to recover from harm caused by trespass

(3) Punitive--where D acts willfully or maliciously

(4) Ejectment--allows P to recover possession of land if P shows title, proof of right to possess, and wrongful possession by D.

       (a) Mense Damages--compensate for loss of use of land, greater

             of rental value or benefit gained by wrongful possessor

      (b) P need not compensate D for improvements

Intentional Act by defendant that interferes with P's chattle, causing harm.

Intentional Act: D intntionally performs physical act that interferes with P's chattle.

Chattle: tangible personal property or intangible property that has physical representation

Interference: constitutes dispossession--direct interferrence with P's possession--or intermeddling--interference with chattle that does not disposses.

P must be in actual possession.

Intentional act by D that causes destruction of or serious and substntial interference with P's chattle.

Destruction/Serious and Substantial Interferrence: the exercise by D of dominion and control, more serious than trespass to chattle.

(1) wrongful acquisition--theft, embezzlement, receiving stolen property

(2) wrongful transfer--selling, misdelivering, pledging

(3) wrongful detention--withholding from owner

(4) Loss, destruction, severe damage

(5) material alteration

(6) significant misuse

P is permitted to elect recovery of fair market value at time of conversion plus consequential loss, or replevin/deinue with recovery of damages for wrongful detention.

D's offer to return chattle does not alleviate conversion and P need not accept. Can be considered for mitigation.

P must post bond against possibility that judgment is found for D.

Hearing is required before chattle is seized.

Damages are recoverable for d/dx in market value or loss of use.

Where chattle is not returned, P recovers market value at time action is commenced.

POPCANS

Privileges, Protection of Others, Defense of Poperty, Consent, Authority, Necessity, Self-Defense.

(1) a person affected by D's conduct consents;

(2) some important personal or public interest will be ptorected by D's ordinarily proibited conduct;

(3) D must act freely in order to perform essential function

D bears burden of proving privilege and that privilege was exercised in rex maner under the circumstances.

D otherwise committed intentional tort, but is not liable if P cnsented to the act which constituted the tort.

Consent must be effective and D must not exceed scope.

Consent can be express or implied.

Consent may be found as a matter of law where P is otherwise unable to consent and

(a) emerfency action is necssary to prevent P's death or serious injury; and

(b) a rex person would be expected to consent under the circumstanes; and

(c) no rex exists to believe P would not consent.

Consent is not effective if

(1) Mistake: consent is the product of mistake of fact or law as to the nature or consequence of D's act and D is aware of the mistake

(2) Fraud: consent is ineffective if it is induced by D's intentional deceit as to essential nature or consequences of his act.

(3) Duress: consent is not effective if it is induced by a threat of imminent harm to P or P's family, or by false assertion of lawful authority overP.

(4) Incapacity

(5) Violation of Criminal Statute: most treat consent as ineffective where D's conduct is criminal. All Js protect victims of crimes the statute is meant to protect.

D may defend on the ground that he used rex force to prevent P from engaging in imminent and unprivileged attack.

D may only use degree of force rex necessary to avoid harm threatened.

Self-defense cannot be used where P's conduct is privileged.

D need only rex believe that there is an imminent threat.

Some Js have duty to retreat outside the home.

3d parties injured during self-defense must establish negligence or intent to harm the 3d party.

D is entitled to defend another person from attack by P to the same extent the person would be lawfully entitled to defend himself against P.

Mistake: most Js do not allow D to avoid liability if mistaken about threat to 3d persons. Minority applies rex mistake doctrine.

D must first demand that P desist the conduct that threatens injury, unless it would be futile to make a demand.

Amount of force used by D cannot exceed that necessary to prevent threatened harm. Deadily force is never permitted.

Dogs and mechanical devices cannot be used.

D may use rex force to promptly reover personal property if tortuously dispossessed of that property.

D must be in "hot pursuit."

D must first demand that the property be returned.

If D is mistaken about his right to the property, no defense.

D may enter property, even of innocent 3d party, to recover unless the property gets there by D's fault.

Majority: D may never use force to recover land. These Js provide prompt judicial option to avoid violent confrontation.

Minority: D may use rex, non-deadly force to recover the land if promptly after discovery.

D is permitted to injur P's property if this is rex necessary to avoid a substantially greater harm to the public, himself, or his property.

Objective Standard: Rex person would believe it to be necessary.

Private: D may use defense if threatened harm is substantially greater than harm to P. D is still liable for any actual damage.

Public: D may use defense if threatened harm is severe--i.e., a disaster. D incurs no liability, even for actual damage.

Where D is a police officer acting pursuant to a duly issued warrant, valid on its fact, officer is not liable for tort of arrest.

Mistaken Identity of Arrestee: Police officer can use defense.

Entry to Private Property: D may enter P's land to effect arrest.

Misdemeanor: police officer + warrant. Only a few Js allow police offers to make misdemeanor arrests without warrant iff misdemeanor is committed in officer's presence.

Felony: police officer or private citizen with no warrant but rex belief that felony has been or will be committed.

Police officer: never liable for mistake of felony being committed or identity.

Private Citizen:

(a) mistake about commission of felony: no defense

(b) mistake of identity of person who committed felony: defense is available if D's mistake was rex.

Misdemeanor breach of the peace is treated like a felony.

Neither police officer nor private citizen is liable for arrest is breach is committed or appears about to be committed.

No liability even if mistake about commission if mistake is rex.

Shopkeeper is not liable for false imprisonment or related tort iff:

(1) Shopkeeper has rex suspicion that P has stolen goods; and

(2) Shopkeeper uses rex force to detain; and

(3) Shopkeeper detains P for rex time and in rex manner, on premises or in immediate vicinity.

D must be charged with maintaining discipline--e.g., parent or teacher.

D may use rex force, necessary to maintain discipline.

(1) Duty

(2) Breach

(3) Actual Cause

(4) Legal Cause

(5) Damages

(6) Lack of a Defense

D owes a duty only to foreseeable Ps.

Rescuers are per se foreseeable.

There is no affirmative duty to rescue or take action to aid and protect.

Once action is taken, a different duty arises.

Once D takes action, D has a duty to exercise due care. Many Js have good samaratan laws that limit liability of rescuers.

Minority: If D undertakes to act, he cannot leave P in a worse position.

Majority: a D who gratutiously promises to take action to aid has no duty to actually aid, even if P relies.

Minority: D is liable if P relies to P's detriment on D's promise to aid.

D has a duty to take affirmative action in aid of P where special relationship exists.

Special Relationship: D has a position of power over P.

(1) employer-employee

(2) common-carrier/inkeeper

(3) school-pupil

(4) parent-child

(5) business-patron; and

(6) jailer-prisoner

No duty to control 3d parties unless:

(1) a special relationship exists betwee D and 3 that imposes duty upon D to control 3d's conduct; or

(2) a secial relationship exists between D and 3d that gives 3d a right of protection.

Parents are under a duty to control minor children so as to prevent child from intentionally harming others or creating risk of bodily harm iff:

(1) Parent KOSK that he has the ability to control his minor child; and

(2) KOSK of the necessity and opportunity for exercising the control.

Master is under duty to control servant while acting outside scope of employment in order to prevent servant from intentionally harming others or creating unrex risk iff:

(a) servant is upon master's premises and is chattle or the master and;

(b) master KOSK that he has ability to control servant and opportunity for exercising such control.

Employer has duty to P to exercise rex care in hiring employees such that D may be liable if employee subsequently injures P.

Not like respondeat superior because employer is being held liable for his own negligence in hiring.

D has a duty of due care to control use of property that he permits.

e.g., auto-owner who permits family to drive his car

Some jurisdiction: D with special relationship to 3d who becomes aware of 3d's ntent to do specific harm to identified P has duty to warn P.

(1) psychotherapist-patient; and

(2) custodian-prisoner

Generally, there is no duty to protect.

Special relationship may create a duty if foreseeability is sufficient. e.g., prior similar incidents or totality of circumstances that balance degree of foreseeability against burden on defendant to protect P. 

Government acting in proprietary function: Gov will be treated as any other D for determining duty.

Gov acting in discretionary function: No duty

Gov acting in a ministerial function: there is a duty that the Gov act non-negligently.

Majority: to recover for NIED, P must:

(1) have been in zone of dange; and

(2) have suffered some accompanying physical manifestation of the emotional distress.

EXCEPTIONS:

(1) if D negligently transmits communication announcing death of a loved one; or

(2) D negligently mishandles a corpse.

Allows NIED claim if there is a preexisting duty to the D.

Have removed the requirement of physical harm where there is severe emotional distress.

harm results to a loved one. 

Elements:

(1) P was located near the scene of an accident

(2) P suffered sever emotional distress resulting from sensory and conetmporaneous observations of the accident; and

(3) P had a close relationship with the victim.

Injury is the birth of a healthy child.

Arises with negligently administered birth control.

Damages: cost of birth and cost to rectify ineffective contraceptive measures.

claim by the parents for the birth of an unhealthy child.

Physician's failure to diagnose disability in the featus.

Many courts will not recognize. If they do, the damages are extraordinary cost of having child with special needs offset by the benefits.

child's action for having been born unhealthy.

Most courts will not award damages.

If there are damages, they are for the cost of the child's special needs after the age of majority.

A person who enters the land at the D's express/implied invitation for the purpose of D's interests or activities.

D has duty to exercise rex care to prevent injuries cause by activities conducted on the land and to discover and warn of dangerous artificial/natural conditions that invitees would not be rex aware of.

Licensees are people who enter onto D's land with D's express or implied permission but who does not enter for purpose of benefitting D or D's activities.

D owes duty to exercise rex care to protect licensees from injury arising from activities conducted by D or on D's behalf. Warning is usually sufficient. D must exercise rex care to discover unknown licensees.

D must warn of known dangerous artificial conditions. But has no duty to inspect land.

A party who enters D's land without D's permission or without privilege to enter without D's knowledge. 

D has no duty of care or duty to discover unknown trespassers.

A party who enters D's land without D's permission or a privilege to enter and who D KOSK to be entering.

Most: D must exercise rex care to protect known trespasser from injuries deriving from activities conducted on land. D must warn known trespasser of dangers of which D is aware and trespasser is unaware. No duty for natural conditions. 

D KOSK that traspassers frequently enter land.

Standard of care may be higher than that for unknown trespassers. Usually that of K trespassers, even if D does not know who the individual trespassers are.

Hightened only for artifical conditions.

Applies when:

(1) Artificial condition is a foreseeable risk of unrex danger to trespassing children. D has no duty to discover. 

(2) it is foreseeable that children are likely to trespass where the artificial condition is located. Attractive nuisance.

(3) Child trespasser is unaware of the risk. No duty if child K of condition and danger.

(4) Risk of danger of artificial condition outweighs utility.

D must rex care to prevent P not on land from an injury deriving from D's activities or activities of others conducted on land.

D must exercise rex care to prevent injury from nrex dangerous artificial conditions that abut or protrude onto adjasent land.

D must exercise rex care to prevent injury to Ps on adjasent public street. In urban areas, this includes native trees.

No duty to warn or repare patent defects.

Landlord has a duty to warn tenant of latent defects or repair them. But LL has no duty to inspect for latent dangers.

LL has no duty to dangerous conditions that arise after possession unless LL has promised to repair dangerous conditions--minority (LL must K and have rex opportunity to repair).

Traditional: No duty to protect third parties.

odenr: Many Js treat 3d parties who would otherwise be licensees or invitees of tenant as though they are tenants.

No further duty except that seller must disclose dangerous hidden conditions that seller KOSK and which seller rex could anticipate purchaser will not discover. Duty continues until purchaser has rex opportunity to inspect. 

Duty extends to purchaser's invitees and licensees.

Duty continues until actually discovered if seller actively conceals dangerous condition.

Rex person standard is applies as though rex person possessed the same physical characteristics of D. 

Objective standard considering the reasonable person's experience, knowledge, and mental capacity. 

Majority: Unexcused violation conclusively establishes that D breached duty to P. 

Minority: rebuttable presumption of breach or prima facie evidence--P wins if D does not rebut but P retains the burden to offer evidence. 

D violation of criminal statute has effect of establishing standard of care when: 

(1) injury cause by D's conduct is the type the statute intended to prevent; and

(2) P is a member of the class protected by the statute; and

(3) D's violation is no excused--e.g., no violation would have resulted in greter harm or would have been impossible. Some violations cannot be excused. 

Custom is the key evidence. Standard of Care is set by professionals in good standing. If D deviates from custom, D hasw breached. If D has complied with custom, D has not breached. 

Traditional standard focused on community. Move now toward national standard. Always national standard for specialists. 

Lack of informed consent used to be considered battery. Now it is malpractice. 

But battery is still available to P if there is gross deviation from consent. 

Majority: res ipsa permits a jury to infer breach even though there is no direct evidence. 

Minority: res ipsa showing merely shifts burden to D to produce a quantum of evidence sufficient to allow a jury to find for D. If D does produce evidence, burden remains on P to establish breach. 

Minority: res ipsa shifts burden to D. 

P must establish: 

(1) Even that caused P's injury was one which would not ordinary occur in the absence of negligence (negligence need not be the only possible); and 

(2) it is more likely than not that it was D's negligence that was responsible for the injury-causing event (P has no duty to protect himself); and 

(3) P was not responsible for the event that caused injury (P is not responsible for putting hemself in the circumstances). 

D's conduct was the cause-in-fact of an event if thtat event would not have occured but for the existence of the conduct. 

D's conduct must more likely than not be the but for cause. 

D's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the injury. 

Applies where multiple D's actions each would have been sufficient to directly cause injury. 

Where P's injury arises from negligent conduct of two or more independely acting Ds, only one of whom can actually be responsible adn P is unable to establish which is in fact responsible, each D's conduct is regarded as cause-in-fact unless D can prove that he did not cause injury. 

Burden shifts to D to show no cause-in-fact. 

Determined by market share of each defendant acting independently. "Economic Benefit Theory." 

Applies only to generic drugs. 

Driver is not liable for injuries suffered by guest passenger unless driver's wrongful conduct amounted to gross neligence or recklessness. 

Does not apply to paying passenger. 

Plaintiff must show evidence from which jury may rex infer unrex conduct on part of D. 

Usually requires P to show that the item on which he fell has been there long enough that D was unrex in not discovering and remedying the dangerous condition. 

D only owes a duty of care to foreseeable plaintiffs who are in the zone of danger. 

Minority: recovery available to any person harmed due to a breach fo D's duty of care. 

Unforeseeable, intervening cause that breaks the chain of causation between initial wrongful act and ultimate injury, relieving tortfeasor of liability. 

(1) Naturaly occuring phenomena

(2) criminal acts of 3d parties

(3) intentional torts of 3d parties; or

(4) extraordinary forms of negligent conduct. 

D will be held liable for negligent efforts of P to protect life or property interests endangered by D's negligence. 

(1) force brings about a harm d/dx in kind from that which would otherwise have resulted from D's negligence; 

(2) fact that its operation or consequences thereof appears to be extraordinary and unforeseeable after the event; and

(3) the fact that the intervening force is operating independently of any situation created by D's neligence. 

Personal injury, injury to property, past amd fitire pain and suffering, medical expenses, lost wages, loss of consortium. 

No attorneys fees. 

payments made to or benefits conferred on injured plaintiff from collateral sources are not credited against tortfeasor's liability. 

Exception: payments from collateral source on behalf of P. 

Where D has been willful, wanton, or malicious in his conduct. Generally not available in negligence or contract actions. 

P is never entitled to punitive. Jury may award. 

(1) degree of reprehensibility of D's conduct considering all circumstances, including D's mental state, whether conduct was isolated or repeated, and the type of harm to P; and

(2) ratio between P's compensatory damages and amount of punitive damages; and 

(3) d/dx between punitive damage award and civil/criminal sanctions that could be imposed for comparable conduct. 

(1) Contributory Negligence

(2) Comparative Negligence

(3) Assumption of Risk

Complete Bar. 

Conduct on the part of P that falls below the standard to which he shouldconform for his own protection, and which is a legally contributing cause cooperating with the defendant's negligence in brining about P's harm. 

Contributory negligence does not bar recovery if P's theory is an intentional tort, recklessness, or strict liability. 

Emergency circumstances and rescues can be an exception. 

Similar to negligence analysis for children generally. 

Majority: apply rex child standard of child of same age, education, intelligence, and experience in same circumstances. 

Minority: <7 not capable of being negligence, 7-13 rebuttable presumption of non-negligent, 14+ child is rebuttably presumed to be capable of being negligent. 

D is not liable to P where: 

(1) P would be vicariously liable for the 3d party's negligence; or

(2) P's claim against D is completely derivative of the 3d person who was contributorily negligent (wrongful death, loss of consortium, P-spouse may be barred by other spouse's contributory negligence). Minority of states do not apply this rule. 

If injury to P could still have been avoided through a subsequent exercise of due care by D, then D had last clear chance to avoid harm and P's contributory fault is no bar. 

Provides a basis for recovery even where P is contributoraly negligent. 

Majority of jurisdictions deny P benefit of last-clear chance doctrine where D is unaware that P is in danger and P is in helpless peril. 

Helpless peril means P cannot extricate himself from danger. 

Pure: D pays however much he is responsible for

Partial: Damages are apportioned onlyif D's responsibility exceeds P's responsibility. 

Aggregate System: Pecent responsibilities of all Ds are combined and apportioned only if total exceeds P's percentage of responsibility. 

Individual Equity System: P does not recover anything if responsibility exceeds that of any single D. 

D must establish that

(1) P had knowledge of and appreciate the nature of the danger involved--subjective standard; and

(2) P appreciated the specific danger that injured him; and 

(3) P voluntarily chose to subject himself to that danger. 

Sports. 

D has no duty to be non-negligent toward P.