when one or more of the premises relies for its truth on the truth of the conclusion;

1. god is the author of the bible

2. the bible says god exists

3. god exists

If S is justified in believeing p,

and p entails q,

and S deduces q from p,

and accepts q as a result of this deduction,

then S is justified in believing q.

There must be a causal relation between my belief and fact.

(a) p is true

(b) S believes that p

(c) there is an appropriate causal chain connecting the facts that make p true with S's believing that p

Dualism = mind/body are separate entities; mind can exist without the body; allows for life after death

Monism = mind and body are not separate substances

Divisibility = my body is divisible, my mind is not. If the two are identical, then they have exactly the same principles (principle of indiscernibility of identicals). Therefore, the mind and body are not identical - they are two different things.

ARGUMENT: the mind is divisible and is apart of the physical brain. if you split up the brain, you split up consciousness.

Main Idea: identifies what a thing IS and what it DOES; functional concepts are defined by WHAT THEY DO.

In Favor: Lewis Functionalism

Physicalism = a version of monism; mind is something physical and not separate substance

TN = consciousness is overlooked in the physicalist explanations of the mind; consciousness is unique to everyone for we are subjective; brain states cannot be reduced to subjective experience.

Ultimately: physicalism is not false, but we still have no idea of how the mental could be physical.

PSYCHOLOGICAL CRITERION: P1 at t1 and P2 and t2 are the same person if they are psychologically continuous with one another.

Locke beleives that consciousness defines self, so if our consciousness stretches back 20 years, we are the same self as we were 20 years ago.

PERSONAL IDENTITY:

- psychological continuity + connectedness

- does not allow for fission; one-to-one

- does not allow for degrees; all-or-nothing

rejection of the only-x-and-y principle

PARFITIAN SURIVAL:

- psychological continuity + connectedness

- allows for fission; one-to-many

- allows for degrees

- acceptance of the only-x-and-y principle

Only X&Y: Whether a later individual Y is numerically the same as an earlier individual X depends only on facts about X and Y and the relationship between them.

Parfit says: "X and Y are the same person if they are psychologically continuous and there is no person contemporary with either and psychologically continuous with the other."

Personal identity is independent of bodily, brain and psychological continuity. Personal identity has nothing to do with psychological continuity, it has to do with the identity of the soul.

Dualism supports this.

The soul can move on, but it doesn't take your character.

ARGUMENT:

(1) If I continue to exist without any of the same physical stuff as my previous self, then I must have a soul.

(2) Possibly, I continue to exist but without any of the same physical stuff as my previous self.

(3) Therefore, I have a soul.

DIFFERENCE: Causal determinism, unlike fatalism, does not automatically carry the implication that human action has no influence on events and that freedom is an illusion.

Causal determinism = view that the state of the world at a given time determines the states of the world at the next moment.

Fatalism - the view that whatever will be has to be. in a sense, it threatens free will since it implies any of your actions are necessary.

In a deterministic world, your action is determined prior causes, so you couldn't have chosen to do otherwise. If your action is not determined by prior causes, then it is a chance-event, you're not acting freely here either.

Random actions are not an expression of free will because it's only a matter of chance that I don't choose otherwise, thus it is not an action made freely due to it being an accident.

You are either going to get killed by a bomb or not. If you are, then any precautions you take are superfluous. If you are not, then any of the precautions you take are ineffective. Therefore, it's pointless to take any precautions.

Premise 3 is implausible, it is not the case that if you are not going to be killed, any precautions you took were superfluous. It might be the case that the reason you weren't killed is due to the precuations.

Problem 1 = unrealistic to suppose we have control over our wants

Problem 2 = the fact that I cannot do other than what I do, do need not be a limitation on my freedom. On the contrary, it is by exercising my presumed freedom, that I rule out the possibility of my doing other than what I do. (wants don't necessarily dictate our ability to choose)

(a) we do have free will

(b) free will is not compatible with determinism

(c) determinism is therefore false

DIFFERENCE: Agent causation is not reducible to causation by events.

PROBLEM: Agent causation collapses into event causation due to going back to some event in the brain acting as the cause.

Frankfurt's version: A person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise.

In the Black wanting Jones to kill Smith example, Jones kills Smith on his own, even though Black was going to manipulate him to do so. This makes Jones morally responsible for killing Smith, since he could have chosen otherwise.