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What is the definition of the Totalitarian system and how you can trace it in different spheres of social development? (This slide has Nicholas I info but use information you learn from Stalin's Modernization to argue this in relation to the Soviet Union) |
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Definition
TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM IN RUSSIA
definition: it is a form of state, defined by total control of the state over all spheres of social life: economy, politics, ideology; 2) in economy- 3) in politics-
3) in intellectual life: 4) in providing order in the state: a) creating the system of total police shadowing- b) cruel repressions c) bureaucratization- 5) militarization-
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Soviet Union and Germany relations in 1920s-1930s |
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Definition
II. WORLD IN 1925-1933: PRO- GERMAN ORIENTATION IN THE USSR. 1) middle of the 1920s- stable economic development in the capitalist world, and successes of NEP in the USSR; 2) 1929-1933- deep economic crisis, and NEP is closed in the USSR; by 1928 the Soviet Union began to dictate not only in domestic policy, but over the World Communist movement; 3) 1920s- part of “White emigration” began to be more active; it hoped to restore the old regime through NEP, but was deeply disappointed by its end; 4) since 1925- a series of treaties on neutrality with neighbor countries: Turkey, Germany, Iran; Lithuania; Afghanistan; 5) 1932-1933- with Finland; Latvia; Estonia; Poland; France, etc. This was the USSR”s search of new allies, because of the conception: the new war against the USSR will be started by the members of Cordial Entante (Allies in WWI), first of all France, and the first countries to begin will be Poland and Romania, and 3 Baltic states
USSR-GERMANY IN 1922-1933. 1) 1922- Rapallo (Italy) peaceful treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia; 2) 1926- treaty of non-aggression and neutrality for 5 years, prolonged in 1931; 3) since the middle of 1920s- military- strategic cooperation between 2 countries: a) training bases for preparing German pilots in Lipetsk; tankers near Kazan; in Saratov- station to use military poisonous materials; b) for 6-8 years up to 80 German officers passed the training period in the USSR; the Germans generals from Headquarters attended the Red Army maneuvers; Soviet commanders passed training in Germany- all of them were repressed later; 4) since 1932- after the USSR and Poland signed Pact of non-aggression the Soviet- German relations decreased; 5) 1933- Hitler came into power; definition of fascism: a social and political movement of the right with populist elements, grew out of 19th century racism and extreme nationalism(based on national, ethnic, or economic insecurity)
SECURITY IN EUROPE AND WAY TO WWII: “PRO-DEMOCRATIC LINE IN USSR- ORIENTING ON THE ALLIANCE WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE”- 1933- 1938
1) beginning of the 1933: the USSR launches the convention of defining aggressor; cold attitude of the main powers, but neighbor countries signed it; 2) USSR-Germany: a) January 1933- Hitler came into power; b) in the autumn all the military bases on the USSR territory were liquidated; 3) 1934- USSR enters League of nations- 1919- 1939 (in 1933 Japan and Germany dropped League) 4) 1935- USSR signs Treaties about mutual aid (including limited military aid) with France and Czechoslovakia; special French initiative; 5) March 1938- Hitler invaded Austria; USSR stays for holding an Assembly of the European states against Hitler’s aggression and calls for collective declaration; 6) September 30, 1938- Munich appeasement agreement: a)signed by British and French Prime ministers- Chamberlain and Daladier with Hitler and Mussolini; b) 20% of Czechoslovakia territory with 25% of the population and a half of heavy industry was taken from it- Sudetes area; c) in spring 1939 Germany occupied all the country; USSR put 30 divisions, aviation, tanks on its Western borders, but was never asked for aid; d) Historic significance: == Britain and France lost about 35 Checks divisions + military plants “Skoda”; == USSR lost the only one ally from its Western neighbors;
IV. FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT: FROM INCREASE TO DECREASE (focus on Germany)
1) If 1920s were the period of fast development, in 1930s its amount decreased significantly; *Main partners among the developed countries are: Germany + Great Britain +USA; 2) USSR-Germany trade relations: a) 1920s-1930s- active stage; b) 1933-1940- decreasing; c) 1940- Germany is number 1 again *Main exports: grain; oil; cotton and its backtracks (initial material to produce gunpowder); forestry; *Main imports from Germany: machinery and equipment; metal of high quality;
USSR LEADERSHIP ATTITUDE TO FASCISM UP TILL MARCH 1939:
a) Fascism is one of the varieties of imperialism, and any imperialist partners are unacceptable; b) for the Alliance with moderate western bourgeois democracies in order to prevent the fascist aggression- Minister of foreign Affairs- Litvinov; all key Marshals; 4) 1935- 7th Congress of Comintern and its historic significance (reviewing the policy towards fascism): a) new policy of United Popular Front (this policy helped to stop fascist movement in France); b) gave the definition of fascism as the dictatorship of the most reactionary groups of financial and monopolist capital, openly terrorist dictatorship; c) switch to create antifascist democratic regimes- Governments of the Popular fronts, where the issue of relationships between the Communists and Social-Democrats was reviewed in favor of cooperation (temporary)
VI. MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT OF AUGUST 1939 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
1) a military mission from Britain and France: to discuss a threat to Poland and a possible military alliance against Germany: a) but its members didn’t have authorization to make a decision; b) this mission didn’t want to let USSR to use Polish territory in case of war against Germany; 2) since May 1939- USSR is getting closer to Germany: Stalin’s Double game 3) August,23, 1939- Treaty of non-aggression between USSR and Germany for10 years: main body and secret protocols-
a) Part of Poland (former Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia) + 4 Baltic states (Finland; Lithuania; Latvia; Estonia) + Bessarabia (part of Romania) were admitted as the sphere of Soviet interests; b) Historic significance of the Treaty: c) 3 variants to explain USSR’s position: == “Stalin didn’t have other solution”: he was afraid that Britain, France, and Germany will be united against USSR, and Japan will attack from the East (counter argument: Stalin was interested in new territories); ==to come to am agreement with Western powers- Britain and France (not was meant for by the rank of participants; didn’t propose any territories, nothing soft a danger of joint war with Germany against USSR); == keeping neutrality for the USSR for some time”: to delay the war on 1,5-2 years, i.e. not earlier than summer 1942; and Hitler was not ready for war with USSR in 1939, the main aim for him was France; b) Consequences of the treaty:
==let Hitler to start the WWII in the most convenient conditions;
== USSR became a real co-participant of Nazi aggression (economic aid to Germany and participation in catching foreign territories); == a stroke for antifascist forces all over the world; == treaty not delayed the war for USSR, but made it even closer 3)September 1, 1939- German troops entered Poland from the West; September 17, Red Army entered Poland from the East 4) summer 1940- 3 Baltic countries and Bessarabia were incorporated into the USSR (scenario in Baltic countries: 1st step: sending a limited military contingent, 2d step; supervising “free” democratic elections, Popular fronts came into power- mainly communists, that proclaimed Soviet power; 3d step- incorporating the country by “its own will”) 5) November 1940 Stalin sent Molotov back to Berlin to negotiate new conditions with Hitler: a) Hitler’s proposal for USSR to join the Alliance of Germany, Italy and Japan for the possibility to expand USSR towards Indian Ocean, catching Iran, etc. ; b) Stalin’s response: Finland + union with Bulgaria + military base in Istanbul area and in straits + possibility to expand towards Indian ocean; Hitler didn’t answer: plan “Barbarossa” to attack the Soviet Union had been already approved
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II. WORLD IN 1925-1933: PRO- GERMAN ORIENTATION IN THE USSR |
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Definition
1) middle of the 1920s- stable economic development in the capitalist world, and successes of NEP in the USSR; 2) 1929-1933- deep economic crisis, and NEP is closed in the USSR; by 1928 the Soviet Union began to dictate not only in domestic policy, but over the World Communist movement; 3) 1920s- part of “White emigration” began to be more active; it hoped to restore the old regime through NEP, but was deeply disappointed by its end; 4) since 1925- a series of treaties on neutrality with neighbor countries: Turkey, Germany, Iran; Lithuania; Afghanistan; 5) 1932-1933- with Finland; Latvia; Estonia; Poland; France, etc. This was the USSR”s search of new allies, because of the conception: the new war against the USSR will be started by the members of Cordial Entante (Allies in WWI), first of all France, and the first countries to begin will be Poland and Romania, and 3 Baltic states |
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USSR-GERMANY IN 1922-1933 |
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Definition
1) 1922- Rapallo (Italy) peaceful treaty between Germany and Soviet Russia; 2) 1926- treaty of non-aggression and neutrality for 5 years, prolonged in 1931; 3) since the middle of 1920s- military- strategic cooperation between 2 countries: 4) since 1932- after the USSR and Poland signed Pact of non-aggression the Soviet- German relations decreased; 5) 1933- Hitler came into power; |
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SECURITY IN EUROPE AND WAY TO WWII: “PRO-DEMOCRATIC LINE IN USSR- ORIENTING ON THE ALLIANCE WITH BRITAIN AND FRANCE”- 1933- 1938 (The all the stuff with the invasion of czechoslovakia, etc.) |
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Definition
1) beginning of the 1933: the USSR launches the convention of defining aggressor; cold attitude of the main powers, but neighbor countries signed it; 2) USSR-Germany: a) January 1933- Hitler came into power; b) in the autumn all the military bases on the USSR territory were liquidated; 4) 1935- USSR signs Treaties about mutual aid (including limited military aid) with France and Czechoslovakia 5) March 1938- Hitler invaded Austria; USSR stays for holding an Assembly of the European states against Hitler’s aggression and calls for collective declaration; 6) September 30, 1938- Munich appeasement agreement: a)signed by British and French Prime ministers with Hitler and Mussolini; b) 20% of Czechoslovakia territory with 25% of the population and a half of heavy industry was taken from it- Sudetes area; c) in spring 1939 Germany occupied all the country; USSR put 30 divisions, aviation, tanks on its Western borders, but was never asked for aid; d) Historic significance: == Britain and France lost about 35 Checks divisions + military plants “Skoda”; == USSR lost the only one ally from its Western neighbors;
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IV. FOREIGN TRADE DEVELOPMENT: FROM INCREASE TO DECREASE (focus on Germany) |
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Definition
1) If 1920s were the period of fast development, in 1930s its amount decreased significantly; *Main partners among the developed countries are: Germany + Great Britain +USA; 2) USSR-Germany trade relations: a) 1920s-1930s- active stage; b) 1933-1940- decreasing; c) 1940- Germany is number 1 again *Main exports: grain; oil; cotton forestry; *Main imports from Germany: machinery and equipment; metal of high quality; |
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VI. MOLOTOV-RIBBENTROP PACT OF AUGUST 1939 AND ITS CONSEQUENCES |
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Definition
1) a military mission from Britain and France: to discuss a threat to Poland and a possible military alliance against Germany: a) but its members didn’t have authorization to make a decision; b) this mission didn’t want to let USSR to use Polish territory in case of war against Germany; 2) since May 1939- USSR is getting closer to Germany: Stalin’s Double game 3) August,23, 1939- Treaty of non-aggression between USSR and Germany for10 years: main body and secret protocols-
a) Part of Poland (former Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia) + 4 Baltic states (Finland; Lithuania; Latvia; Estonia) + Bessarabia (part of Romania) were admitted as the sphere of Soviet interests; b) Historic significance of the Treaty: c) 3 variants to explain USSR’s position: == “Stalin didn’t have other solution”: he was afraid that Britain, France, and Germany will be united against USSR, ==to come to am agreement with Western powers- Britain and France == keeping neutrality for the USSR for some time”: to delay the war on 1,5-2 years, b) Consequences of the treaty:
==let Hitler to start the WWII in the most convenient conditions;
== USSR became a real co-participant of Nazi aggression (economic aid to Germany and participation in catching foreign territories); == a stroke for antifascist forces all over the world; == treaty not delayed the war for USSR, but made it even closer 3)September 1, 1939- German troops entered Poland from the West; September 17, Red Army entered Poland from the East 4) summer 1940- 3 Baltic countries and Bessarabia were incorporated into the USSR 5) November 1940 Stalin sent Molotov back to Berlin to negotiate new conditions of alliance with Hitler: BUT Hitler didn’t answer: plan “Barbarossa” to attack the Soviet Union had been already approved |
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Historical significance of Great Patriotic War as part of WWII. |
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Definition
HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF GREAT PATRIOTIC WAR AS PART OF WWII.
1 )Price of victory: a) Soviet side- 27 million people, i.e. 14 % of prewar population + 18 million wounded and disabled (among them 10-13 million military men) = indirect losses-15 million people; these are the latest data provided under M.Gorbachev and base on archive studies; compare with 7 million provided by Stalin and 20 million provided by N.Krushchev b) in comparison with Germany- 7 million people, i.e. about 10% population, including against USSR-2,5-3 million of people 2 )Reasons for losses: a) Stalin’s elimination of large part of officers and generals just before the war; b) Stalin's believe that Hitler will not start the war in June 1941, so the Red Army was not ready to withstand the enemy; c) Stalin and some commanders’ errors in leading the military operations; d) dominated attitude to a human being in the USSR victory by ANY MEANS; 3) Reasons for victory: a) selflessness and self-denial of people (it was a justified war for the existence of the state and the people, not just for socialism- because of the fascist theory of racial supremacy- plan “OST”); b) USSR managed finally to produce 2 times more weapons despite basing only on 60-% of industrial potential at the beginning: == higher level of mobilization of all resources on needs of the war;
== labor intensity; == American add through Land-lease (cars; tanks; food; metallurgy industry equipment- about 30% of all machines during the war); == Hitler's underestimation of Soviet military potential; c) geographical factor: Hitler underestimated it and overestimated his efforts in the plan of Blitzkrieg d) Military leadership: == at the beginning of the war Soviet leadership was definitely weaker than German, but during the war it was the increase of military art; == victory with high degree of losses; == Stalin commanded the first 2 years, but than let the capable generals- G.Zhukov; Vassilevsky; K.Rokossovsky; Konev do it after Stalingrad battle; e) Political leadership. Relations among Nations: == Clash of 2 Totalitarian regimes- USSR with its ideological Dictatorship and Germany- with its National Supremacy ideology; Role of German theory of racial supremacy was a challenge to Russia’s national and state existence; == Totalitarian regime in conditions of war: the idea of a wise leader put people together, but the backside of it: detraction; suppression of initiative, suspiciousness and fear == service of some Soviet people in German Army (800,000 people); == relations among nations within USSR: good- hearted relations among peoples (going deep back to history + Bolsheviks policy of creating national autonomies after October overturn), BUT secret resettlement of peoples (Crimea Tartars; Kalmyks, Chechens, etc. to Kazakhstan and Siberia); == war for Soviet people - for Homeland and better life after the war; from Stalin’s-for power and its spread over new territories e) Alliances: predominance of Anti-Hitler Coalition: == by human and technical resources; == it was the alliance with democratic goals, not communist ones; == Soviet-German front was the main during the whole war, but not all German army was there- 2/3 or 70-72% of it; the other part was on other fronts- in Africa; Western Europe, realized occupational functions; == most of all American add on Land-Lease on sum of more than 10 billion dollars: 15-20% of planes and tanks; more than 400,000 cars; 40% of all explosives; more than 40% of Aluminum; about 100% of Optic aims
HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF WWII (SEPTEMBER,1 1939- SEPTEMBER,1 1945) a) liberation of Europe from “1000-year Reich”-a Hitler’s racial chimera; b) Victory over Germany and Japan provided the development of national movements in the red of countries in Asia and Africa which led to create a red of new independent states; c) USSR became one of 2 superpowers. World was split in 2 blocks and “Cold war” started; d) contradictions: victory over Nazism and the apogee of Stalinism (a new wave of terror, iron curtain; isolation from world cultural achievements; chauvinism= ultra nationalism; arms race, etc);ruin of Soviet people hopes to change life in the USSR e) Red Army liberated some European countries from Fascism, BUT Stalinist pattern of socialism began to be constructed in them, not democratic development
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Price of victory in World War II: |
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Definition
1 )Price of victory: a) Soviet side- 27 million people, i.e. 14 % of prewar population + 18 million wounded and disabled b) in comparison with Germany- 7 million people, i.e. about 10% population |
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Definition
2 )Reasons for losses: a) Stalin’s elimination of large part of officers and generals just before the war; b) Stalin's believe that Hitler will not start the war in June 1941, so the Red Army was not ready to withstand the enemy; c) Stalin and some commanders’ errors in leading the military operations; d) dominated attitude to a human being in the USSR victory by ANY MEANS; |
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Reasons for victory In World War II |
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Definition
3) Reasons for victory: a) selflessness and self-denial of people (it was a justified war for the existence of the state and the people, not just for socialism- because of the fascist theory of racial supremacy- plan “OST”); b) USSR managed finally to produce 2 times more weapons despite basing only on 60-% of industrial potential at the beginning: == higher level of mobilization of all resources on needs of the war;
== labor intensity; == American add through Land-lease ; == Hitler's underestimation of Soviet military potential; c) geographical factor: Hitler underestimated it and overestimated his efforts in the plan of Blitzkrieg d) Military leadership: == at the beginning of the war Soviet leadership was definitely weaker than German, but during the war it was the increase of military art; == victory with high degree of losses; == Stalin commanded the first 2 years, but than let the capable generals- G.Zhukov; Vassilevsky; K.Rokossovsky; Konev do it after Stalingrad battle; e) Political leadership. Relations among Nations: == Clash of 2 Totalitarian regimes- Role of German theory of racial supremacy was a challenge to Russia’s national and state existence; == Totalitarian regime in conditions of war: the idea of a wise leader put people together, but the backside of it: detraction; suppression of initiative, suspiciousness and fear == war for Soviet people - for Homeland and better life after the war; from Stalin’s-for power and its spread over new territories e) Alliances: predominance of Anti-Hitler Coalition: == by human and technical resources == Soviet-German front was the main during the whole war, but not all German army was there- 2/3 or 70-72% of it; the other part was on other fronts- == most of all American add on Land-Lease on sum of more than 10 billion dollars: |
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HISTORIC SIGNIFICANCE OF WWII (SEPTEMBER,1 1939- SEPTEMBER,1 1945) |
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Definition
a) liberation of Europe from “1000-year Reich”-a Hitler’s racial chimera; b) Victory over Germany and Japan provided the development of national movements in the red of countries in Asia and Africa which led to create a red of new independent states; c) USSR became one of 2 superpowers. World was split in 2 blocks and “Cold war” started; d) contradictions: victory over Nazism and the apogee of Stalinism (a new wave of terror, iron curtain; isolation from world cultural achievements; chauvinism= ultra nationalism; arms race, etc);ruin of Soviet people hopes to change life in the USSR e) Red Army liberated some European countries from Fascism, BUT Stalinist pattern of socialism began to be constructed in them, not democratic development |
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3 possible ways of development after Stalin’s death and key moments of softening Stalinism, realized by Nikita Khrushchev |
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Definition
I. DOMESTIC POLICY AND SOCIAL-ECONOMIC REFORMS IN KHRUSHCHEV'S PERIOD (1955- 1964)
1) USSR after Stalin’s death in 1953: 3 possible ways of development a) to continue Stalinist repressions and seriously threaten life and well-being of millions of people and even small nations within USSR; b) Some softening of Stalinist politics preserving the general political course; c) Turn to radical getting rid of Stalin’s heritage in all spheres of social life
KHRUSHCHEV'S CHOICE- SECOND WAY: SOFTENING STALINIST POLITICS
1) First steps: a) release of repressed: == GULAG- State system of detention camps- was liquidated; from 2,5 million of camps population about a third were political prisoners == in 1957 different small nations within USSR were restored in rights and let to return to their native places- Crimean Tartars; Kalmyks, Chechens, etc. b) turn to solve the sharpest agrarian issues; c) release of dogmatic pressure in cultural development;
3) 20TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN1956-THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT IN 1953-1985
a) Khrushchev's report “About Cult of Personality and its consequences” on a closed session of the congress (First edited in the USSR only in 1989, under M.Gorbachev). Main theses: == in the name of the Party Khrushchev stated that Stalin is the organizer and mastermind of terror; == he dethroned the myth of Stalin as a “genius military Commander”; == he launched the thesis about collective leadership in the party opposite to the cult of one person; All this speech was a kind of a bomb explosion in the soviet society and in the Communist parties abroad, provoking massive going out of the Communist parties members abroad; == Khrushchev was persuaded that the regime, created in the USSR is right, it is necessary only to put another emphases
Conclusion: == Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin was a courageous and brave action, that was not supported by neither other leaders nor by common communists; == at the same time his criticism did not touch the sense of Totalitarian regime, created in the USSR after October revolution; the idea of World socialist revolution remained the main and out of criticism. == Special resolution on his report established official frames to the criticism of Stalin and was directed to resist the threat to spread criticism on Communist Party and socialist regime. == The main issue for Khrushchev was to save socialism from Stalin’s deformations, to realize “cosmetic repair” of socialism. The same idea will be shared by Mikhail Gorbachev during perestroika in 1985-1991; == 20th congress did not lead and could not lead to break of stalinist system, but it was the first stroke on it, prolog of its inevitable ruin; b) possibility to get rid of Stalinist heritage in politics did not mean to liquidate command- administrative system
RESULTS OF KHRUSHCHEV’S POLITICAL COURSE: PRESERVING STALINIST TOTALITARIAN REGIME WITH SOME CHANGES:
1) without Stalin and without massive repressions; fear stopped chain the society; 2) KGB (Committee of State Security, Secret police) lost its unlimited rights and was put under control of the Communist Party; 3) obligatory “unanimity of ideas” was preserved, and it was called “moral-political unity of the Soviet people”, but narrow frames of allowed in science, literature, arts somehow were enlarged (so called “policy of thaw”);
4) Communist Party failed with the first line of defense- Stalinist and kept the last one-Leninist (Mikhail Gorbachev during his perestroika period- i.e. reforms- in 1985- 1991 will try to keep Leninist line, having changed it some, creating a new and 3d line of defense- Socialist-Democratic; but his policy will be condemned to fail, because his proclaimed policy of glasnost- openness- and freedom of speech and press will lead to the failure of the Communist Party)
5) then main reason of successes in reforms- an attempt to partly revive the economic management instead of political pressure (reforms were started in agriculture and found massive support of population); 6) Economic initiatives: reasons of failure- a) main reason- economic reforms were not followed by democratization of the political system in the USSR. Having ruined the system of repressions, reforms did not touch its base- state command- administrative(bureaucratic) system, which in reality substituted economic decisions by administrative; in 5-6 years the reformers themselves and a hug administration- nomenclature- began to screw the reforms; b) chaotic, no-systematic superficial character of the reforms; these were cosmetic reforms; the last chance to change the socialist regime in the USSR
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DOMESTIC POLICY AND SOCIAL-ECONOMIC REFORMS IN KHRUSHCHEV'S PERIOD (1955- 1964) (3 different paths Krushchev could have taken) |
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Definition
1) USSR after Stalin’s death in 1953: 3 possible ways of development a) to continue Stalinist repressions and seriously threaten life and well-being of millions of people and even small nations within USSR; b) Some softening of Stalinist politics preserving the general political course; c) Turn to radical getting rid of Stalin’s heritage in all spheres of social life |
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KHRUSHCHEV'S CHOICE- SECOND WAY: SOFTENING STALINIST POLITICS |
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Definition
KHRUSHCHEV'S CHOICE- SECOND WAY: SOFTENING STALINIST POLITICS
1) First steps: a) release of repressed: == GULAG- State system of detention camps- was liquidated; == in 1957 different small nations within USSR were restored in rights and let to return to their native places- Crimean Tartars; Kalmyks, Chechens, etc. b) attempted to solve the sharpest agrarian issues; c) release of dogmatic pressure in cultural development; |
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3) 20TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN1956-THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT IN 1953-1985 |
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Definition
3) 20TH CONGRESS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE SOVIET UNION IN1956-THE MOST IMPORTANT EVENT IN 1953-1985
a) Khrushchev's report “About Cult of Personality and its consequences” on a closed session of the congress ==Stalin is the organizer and mastermind of terror; == he dethroned the myth of Stalin as a “genius military Commander”; == he launched the thesis about collective leadership in the party opposite to the cult of one person; All this speech was a kind of a bomb explosion in the soviet society and caused many in foreign communist parties abroad to leave the party; == Khrushchev was persuaded that the regime, created in the USSR is right, it is necessary only to put another emphases |
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Conclusion of the 20th Congress (Secret Speech)
(What did his reforms not do, what did Krushchev want to do, and what happened with the economy?) |
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Definition
Conclusion: == Khrushchev’s criticism of Stalin was a courageous and brave action, that was not supported by neither other leaders nor by common communists; == at the same time his criticism did not touch the sense of Totalitarian regime, created in the USSR after October revolution; the idea of World socialist revolution remained the main and out of criticism. == The main issue for Khrushchev was to save socialism from Stalin’s deformations, to realize “cosmetic repair” of socialism. The same idea will be shared by Mikhail Gorbachev during perestroika in 1985-1991; == 20th congress did not lead and could not lead to break of stalinist system, but it was the first stroke on it, prolog of its inevitable ruin; b) possibility to get rid of Stalinist heritage in politics did not mean to liquidate command- administrative system |
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RESULTS OF KHRUSHCHEV’S POLITICAL COURSE: PRESERVING STALINIST TOTALITARIAN REGIME WITH SOME CHANGES: (What happened re: repressions, kgb, party ideological defense, ideology, why was the policy a success, what was the problem with economic reforms) |
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Definition
RESULTS OF KHRUSHCHEV’S POLITICAL COURSE: PRESERVING STALINIST TOTALITARIAN REGIME WITH SOME CHANGES:
1) without Stalin and without massive repressions; fear stopped chain the society; 2) KGB lost its unlimited rights and was put under control of the Communist Party; 3) obligatory “unanimity of ideas” was preserved, and it was called “moral-political unity of the Soviet people”, but narrow frames of allowed in science, literature, arts somehow were enlarged (so called “policy of thaw”);
4) Communist Party failed with the first line of defense- Stalinist and kept the last one-Leninist
5) then main reason of successes in reforms- an attempt to partly revive the economic management instead of political pressure (reforms were started in agriculture and found massive support of population); 6) Economic initiatives: reasons of failure- a) main reason- economic reforms were not followed by democratization of the political system in the USSR. Having ruined the system of repressions, reforms did not touch its base- state command administrative(bureaucratic) system, which in reality substituted economic decisions by administrative; in 5-6 years the reformers themselves and a hug administration- nomenclature- began to screw the reforms; b) chaotic, no-systematic superficial character of the reforms; these were cosmetic reforms; |
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