Church of Power

Financing the Church in Medieval Europe

Sources of Church Wealth (8)

• Tithing (but ppl can easily hide money)
• Bequests (often one lump sum, usually in a will)
• Land rents (from a bequest, some goes for buildings)
• Monastic production (piety, vows of poverty)
• Fees for services (life cycle, judicial)
• Sale of indulgences & religious offices - simony
• Manipulation of usury laws
• State support

Church of Power

Principal Agent Problem

Simony & tax farming

• Principle agent problem: how to ensure that "far flung" agents behaved according to the dictates of the Vatican when transportation was difficult & communication was very slow
• Simony solved this problem by contracting the collection of tithes and allowing the office holder to be the residual claimant (bid up the price to what they actually think its WORTH)
• Opened the door to corruption & provoked the Ch. of Piety to push back (but STARTED with only allowing knowledgeable bidders)

Church of Power

Monastic Orders & Tax Farming

• often moved from self-sufficiency to produceing & selling agri. surplus
• double deal for Church of Power (great advertising + proceeds go back to church)
• orders faced opposition from bishops & lay clergy (more financially well-off, sometimes clashed w/other orders)
•      - Vatican regulated these orders like franchises, guaranteeing them territory & extracting revenue

Church of Power

Clerical Celibacy & Church Assets

Purgatory, Indulgence, and Price Discrimination

• dates back to 1139, common practice of primogeniture - church lost lots of its physical assets if the 1st son did not follow his father's profession
• 2nd Lateran Council (1139), celibate clergy become part of Canon Law, allowing a legal mechanism for the Church to retain its assets

• ---

  Rejected by Protestant reformers in 16th century
• Indulgences sold as means of reducing time in purgatory & practice expanded to include deceased relatives
•      - priced according to how much one was willing to pay & required secret confessions

• Excessive interest - roots in Old Testament but developed during medieval period
• Vatican is both a lender and a borrower (trusted MORE than anyone else!), enforcing usury laws when it borrows and relaxing them when it lends
• Functions as "financial glue" of a fragmented medi. Eu. & provided judicial means of enforcing contracts across geo. boundaries

Religious Conflict & the Crusades

• Not just a "lust for booty"
• Risky & expensive (esp. for nobles)
• Eu. economy growing little in 11th & 12th cen.s
• Spain was not a theater of Crusades despite being wealthy
• primarily motivated for religious reasons
•      - ppl encroaching in YOUR reli. territory
• A conflict b/w 2 exclusive religions is likely to creat "collateral damage" among ppl not ass.ed w/the conflict
•    - Each wil try to purify/unify itself internally
•    - Stark: witchcraft trials/pogroms
•    - happens in modern pol.s too!
•    - mobilizing indiv.s against an ex. threat --> quelling internal threats
•    - Where central authority was weaker, collateral damange was greater

Christianity & Rise of the West

Reasons for Eu. Success

• Eur. success did not come from Prot. Reformation & work ethic (rel. = minor role!)
•  
• political fragmentation/weakness
• rise of free imperial cities
• rise f guilds & other interest groups
• plagues, free labor, free trade, dispersed wealth (laborers = bargaining power, wages rise)

Christianity & Rise of the West

Religous (church) factors (5)

• Church financing & governance provided the glue to prevent total anarchy
• Banking & judicial system - 3rd party dispute resolution
• Justification of private prop. rights, trade, profit, & legal equality - how entrepreneurs became new sources of wealth regardless of life station
• Primogeniture - as opposed to Muslim system of splitting up capital - allows a business owner to slowly work up to mass production
• Christianity & science - not antithetical but complimentary - large proponent of scientific advancement in Middle Ages

Christianity & the Rise of the West

Medieval Religion & Science

• Teleological - theology of progress
• Christianity asserts God as a rational being, thus rationality (reason) needed to understand His handiwork
• Scholasticism & first universities arise in mid-12th cen., sponsored by Church, more about creating knowledge than recieving it, happening in free cities outside of the monarchical power structures
• Galileo: attacked Church when it was facing an increasingly strong Prot. movement (criticized his patronage)

Church & State in the Western Hemisphere

Central Questions

• Papacy acts as international arbitrator through 1400s but...
•    - secular gov.s growing stronger
•    - discord w/in the church (schismatic rumblings, papal intrigue)
•    - Pope Alexander VI in weak bargaining position (went through a battle to get there and owed favors)
•    - and now the CS bargain is largely dictated by the state

Church gets:

• Access to new mission fields (Americas)
• Funding & protection from competitors

• Church of Piety mounts a challege to the way conquistadors were treating the natives - doesn't help conversions
•    - 1st few decades are HARD! Only the very pious come
• Leyes Nuevas (New Laws) 1542 - outlaws slavery & other abuses
• Jesuit reducciones (late 1500s-1767)
•    - tended to treat ppl better, were out there to save ppl, eventually kicked out for not playing nice with the state
• By mid-late 1500s, RCC becomes placid state church, starts attracting C. of Power members

• some lower-level clergy join the fight (Padre Hidalgo)
• but manny royal-appointed bishops flee (esp. when it looks like they'll lose)
•    - these were the people that had punished the colonials during the inquisition
• LARCC faces a leadership vaccuum!
•    - can't be a priest until the bishop gives you a blessing
• Although many of the early LA revolutionaries were "Enlightenment liberals" & had anti-clerical tendencies, they still acknowledge the importance of the LARCC
•    - ppl still loyal to local priests
•    - Bolivar (Columbia) was careful to say nothing about rel. in const.
•    - later pays salary of the clery (coll. action potential!)... & confesses on his deathbed, just in case :)

• Who controls the Patronato??
• Vat. can't negotiate when the gov.s are changing all the time
• Vat. argues that it was an agreement b/w it and the Span/Port. crown thus after independence it was invalid
• New LA states pushed for a patronato nacional
• issue goes unresolved for several decades
• Has a huge effect on the strength & pastoral mission of the LARCC
• unresolved b/c of weak governance & lack of episcopal leadership

• stable gov.s start to reappear
• Expropriations - LA countries had borrowed lots of $ & can't pay it back - fiscal problems from SO much conflict!
• Problem: by mid-1800s, many LA gov.s are in financial trouble
• Solution: expropriate church wealth
•    - land and property = immediate $ + long-term growth
•    - marriage & cemeteries
•    - the registry (Spain's principal agent problem - can't have a tax system w/out bookkeeping!)
• While seen as an ideological move by liberals, conservatives never reverse the policy (Fiscal motivations! Need a tax collecting apparatus!)

• renewed C-S Bargain, Vatican can appt. bishops in most places, funded the Church, etc.
• By the late 1960s, some places begin denouncing repressive dictatorships (why?) but others did not (why not?)

• churches who critique dictatorship, capitalism, & poverty while embracing "liberation theology" & Christian Base Comm.s
•    - Antecedent: Catholic Action (response to mobilization in the secular world, takes a social form)
•    - Liberation theology blends "dependency theory" w/Christian theology
•    - Base communities are grassroots efforts to put "theory" into "praxis"

• Ideatoinal: Vat. Council II & liberation theology (but then why did only some of the bishops adopt the new way?)
• sociological: increasing poverty & repression (but this was also true in countries where the bishops weren't speaking out)
• Main Gill Thesis: Where Protestant competition was most fierce (esp. for souls of the poor), the Cath. Church was pressured to make a credible commitment to the poor
•    - compare to Catholic Action in 1900s Europe - strongest in response to stronger socialist action)

• Social anomie? - The idea that poverty/urbanization/other social dislocations push people to adopt new religions (social mores uprooted)
•    - Gill: no, the empirical data doesn't match up, plus why wouldn't you just go to the Cath. Church?
• ...
• Catholic weakness (among the poor)
•    - limited # of clergy, makes most sense to minister to the rich to be able to HELP the poor)
• Religious freedom
•    - develops by c. 1900, esp. in trade-dependent countries
•    - De facto freedom when gov.s con't want to enforce laws (not the gov.'s priority to crack down on people that are helping the poor)
• Missionary strategy
•    - no longer efficient to go to internally collapsing Asian countries
•    - Evangelize the poor! Less comfortable, but also less Catholic!
•    - Indigenize: train locals to be pastors, Prot.s have lower costs than Catholics to train their missionaries - then the movement spread like wildfire

• Ban then (19402-50s, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia)
• Beat them (physically)
• Or... join them - revelation around 1950s-60s if the other 2 options didn't work
•    - base comm.s similar to prot. missions
•    - Charistmatic Catholicism
• the Re-Evangelization of LA (Santo Domingo 1992)
•    - others come in & steal the Cath. flock
•    - credible commitment to break out of the CS bargain & help the ppl
•    - only happened in countries w/a Prot. threat

• Got there through reli. lib.! How does reli. lib. emerge?
• Through modernization/secularization?
•    - No, it's not a gradual thing like secularization theory claims (think Edict of Nantes & its revocation
• B/c it's just a good idea?
•    - No, think James Madison vs. Patrick Henry
• More as a matter of gov. regulatory policy
•    - decrease in reli. reg.s --> fewer gov. imposed costs --> more freedom
•    - not black and white, but shades of grey

• Constitutional declaration
•    - everybody has one, SOME stick to it
• Restrictions on missionaries
•    - like not allowing bibles, no preaching in public square
• Registration requirements
•    - at some point, you have to decide what is/isn't a legit religion
• Ownership/property restrictions
• Zoning regulations
•    - Residential area or remote business zone?
• Media access
•  - Can you print your own paper/have TV/radio network?
• Public displays of religion
•    - Meet in public, have symbols, advertise, loudspeakers?
• Parking
•    - esp. in urban areas
• Preferential tax status
•    - adv. for preferred church, bigger hurdle for others
• State collected taxes/tithes
• Preferential subsidation
•    - like getting your bldg. paid for
• Religion in pub. schools
•    - (at all? world religions? specific?)
• Life cycle regulations
•    - sometimes only recognized if done by 1 church
•    - ability to bury your dead
• Office-holding requirements

Religious Liberty: United States

Wall of Separation Debate

• "Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
•    - could potentially be a state church
•    - How do you allow for the free worship but not promote the establishment?
• The VA establishment debate: whether or not the VA assembly should continue to fund the Anglican Church?
•    - Meth.ists complaining, need $ for war
•    - Belief that it would collapse w/out state support
•    - Fund 1 more than others?

Religious Liberty: United States

Cases of Religious Liberty

 - Blaine Amendments

 - Locke v. Davey

• Blaine Amendments: Sen. from ME, Prot. worried about Cath.s - eliminate state funding for parochial schools
•    - failed but inspired movement in ~35 states, no state funding to further religion
• Locke vs. Davey (2004) - WA state Blaine Amendment & scholarship used for divinity school - Locke won

Religious Liberty: United States

Cases of Religious Liberty

 - McCollum v. Board of Ed (1948)

 - Abington SD v. Schempp (1963)

 - Sherbert v. Verner (1963)

• McCollum v. Board of Ed (1948)
•    - Illinois, eliminated reli. ed in pub. school (incl. Prot. Bible study)
• Abington SD v. Schempp (1963)
•    - Prayer in school, evangelical Christians start to worry about removing God from public image
• Sherbert v. Verner
•    - 7th day Adventist quit job b/c of 6 day workweek, denied for unemployment
•    4 precedents:
•    - sincere religious belief? (no vamp cults)
•    - gov. action = substantial burden?
•    - state has a compelling interest (to make her pay)?
•    - pursued in a least restrictive manner?
• (Slight reversal, tipped the balance in favor of Sherbert)

Religious Liberty: United States

Cases of Religious Liberty

 - Lemon v. Kurtzman

• Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971)
•    - tips it again towards assertive secularism
•    - reli. teachers/materials don't get funding
•    3 precedents:
•    - secular leg. purpose? (Can't promote rel.)
•    - may not advance or inhibit rel. (sticky!)
•    - avoid excessive gov. entanglement

• Smith v. Oregon (1990)
•    - Oregon unemployment & peyote
•    - in favor of Oregon, reverses Sherbert
• spawns RFRA (Religious Freedom Restoration Act)
•    - basically told the gov. to get out of the religion-deciding business
•    - lots of abuses, weird rel.s possible
• Subsequently overturned by City of Boerne v. Florence (1997)
•    - city can prevent the Church from building on their own land
• RLUPA: back to RFRA, churches have prop. rights
•    - also gives jailed ppl some reli. freedom

• Eastside Christian Assembly
• regulation happens roughly in proportion to what % your religion is of the population
• all involve property
•  - has a bigger impact on what the rel. landscape looks like
• Religious property rights, w/local gov.s increasingly reluctant to extend prop. rights for churches
•  - tax rev.
•  - public schools
•  - difficult for ind. churches to fight

• Scriptural Reasons - religion cannot flourish if people cannot meet
• Sociological Reasons
•  - credence goods (need to meet to prove value)/economies of scale arg.
•  - communal activity reinorces efficacy of credence goods
•  - regularized communal activity requires a known and easily accessible space - makes prop. very important
• Legal reasons: 1st amendment includes FIVE freedom, incl. religion and assembly (plus speech, press, and petitioning the gov.)

• Nuisances of life & slowing suburban sprawl (e.g. congestion, light, pollution) - "not in my backyard" arg.
•  - King Co. moratorium
•  - Gill Hyp. 1: restrictions on Church prop. more likely to happen in residential than business areas, ceteris paribus
•  - higher in areas w/a general distaste of rel.
• Tax revenue: businesses bring you more $
•  - Kelo v. New London (2005)
•  - imminent domain law made tax revenue a "public good"
•  - Sacred Heart Church (Enumclaw)

Religious Liberty: United States

Why restrictions on Church property? (pg.2)

• H2: gov. officials will tend to favor land that generates higher tax revenue. as such, local gov.s will be more likely to discriminate against reli. land use when faced w/alternate choices, cet. pari.
• H2A: more common when gov.s have chronic budget shortfalls
• H2B: more common where real estate is becoming less common - give remaining land to businesses to generate higher tax rev.
• H2C: gov. will yield to demands if there is a large reli. voting block that demands construction of church prop., esp. when facing competitive elections
• small, non-denom. churches at most risk

Religious Liberty: United States

• less people going to public schools --> impacts on $ given to school system (from state)
• homeschooling has become a huge industry w/co-ops
•    - parents lose ability to educate children past 4th-6th grade or so, pool resources to hire somebody, many reli-based & meet in churches
• Schools can reach out to homeschoolers OR...
• H3: In areas w/declining public school populations, due to an increase in home/private schooling, local gov.s will use the power more frequently to affect the size & use of church property, cet. pari.

Religious Liberty: United States

Bullies Against the Pulpit

• churches use RLUPA to push back
• "So sue us." -- local gov.s might be in the wrong, but have way more resources & information, favor gov. officials and "experts" at the expense of the clergy
•    - clergy not trained in county laws, gov. can wait things out
• H4: Local poli. more likely to impose restrictions on smaller churches than on large mainstream ones w/access to greater legal resouces & networks of knowledge, cet. pari.

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Central Questions

• How does an "increasingly secular" Europe accommodate a religious Muslim immigrant population that is growing faster than the indigenous pop. of Eu.?
• Why has the issue of Muslims in europe become so conflict-ridden (esp. relative to the US)?

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Demographic Delimma

• increasing socio-political conflict (clash of civilizations?)
• Demographic dilemma:
•    - rapid econ growth after WWII, significant welfare shortage in growing welfare states, decreasing fertility rate
•    - bigger burden on young ppl to provide for old (think healthcare!)

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Demographic Solution?

• Immigration! 
• right-wing nationalist parties decry imm. on one hand but also recognize the need for young workers to pay taxes
• Temporary workers? But after they've been here 5-10 years, they won't want to leave
• most immigration has come from Muslim nations, as a matter of geographic proximity

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

The Religious "Problem"

 - How do Eu. nations incorporate religious active Muslims into society?

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Key Policy Arenas (5)

• Gov. funding (no peak org/leader = can't integrate well into corporatist structure, very diff. for bureaucrats & clergy)
• Muslim org.s (hard to create one org. that speaks for everybody, too decentralized)
• Mosque construction (property rights)
• Education Policy (school funding & curriculum)
•  - many Eur. gov.s directly fund reli. schools, teach rel. classes in pub ed
• Religious symbolism (hijab, Swiss minarets)

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Fetzer & Sopher Thesis (General, Britain)

• Traditional CS arrangements in each country will affect how easily Muslims are accommodated
• similar to Kuru thesis, but diff. countries and more inst./int. based
• Britain = best, Ger. = middle, France = worst
• Britain: devolution!
•  - Mosque construction & funding for reli. schools designated by local municipalities (only need to organize a local group)
•  - hijabs not a big issue (but why?)
•  - long history of accommodating reli. min.s and relegates decisions locally despite being a unitary sys.
•    - post-war era, offered citizenship to commonwealth residents b/c they knew their empire was collapsing

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Fetzer & Sopher Thesis (Germany)

• biggest prob. has been to get corporate status (when the gov. recognizes you & will give you tax $)
• inability to do so has slowed mosque construction (but has done so for other groups too)
•    - immigrants were their labor shortage solution, needed to be attracted to Ger.
•    - supposed to be temp., most came from Turkey (assertive secularist)
•    - Islam issue didn't come up b/c that's not how state-reli. rels. worked in Turkey
•    - Muslims don't want to be seen as ethnic group, Diyanet does not represent their varying reli int.s
•    - lack of funding less a problem than lack of collective action ability
• Federalism ironically slows down corporate status
•    - no one wants to be 1st to set a precedent
• German preference for "secular Muslim" org.s has caused tension (see churches more as soc. groups than ones w/reli. ints.)
• schools & hijabs slightly problematic
•    - less so for students than pub. employees
• historical confessions (cath., luth.) favor muslim incorporation out of self-int.! (flock stealing not a big concern)

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Fetzer & Sopher Thesis (France)

• unitary sys. + aggressive laicism creates HUGE prob.s
•  - not much local decision making, what affects small areas becomes a big nat. issue
•  - means Muslims have to org. nat.lly
•  - ancien regime = strong anticlerical tendencies
• No hijabs allowed (or cross or kippah...)
•  - aimed only somewhat at Muslims b/c hijab is more ostentatious & small crosses allowed
• Near impossible to get public funding for private islamic schools
•  - but ok for Cath.s, jews
•  - unintended consequence: creating MORE cultural tension, hindering integration, Muslims try to remove themselves from the French sys.
• Building permits for mosques difficult to obtain & ironically varies by region

Religious Lib. in the New Europe

Fetzer & Sopher Thesis (Idea vs. Inst., US)

• Idea vs. int.: Kuru = idea, to be French is to be secular - Gill = structural, certain int.s determined by what your const. is

• ---

  In comp, very laissez-faire approach to rel.
•  - Muslim imm.s at or above avg. soc.-econ. status, have to have means to get here
• Soper & Monsma consider this favoring secularism, kind of assertive (PG: not really, too much sacralization) - conflictual for intergration of any sort
• All rel.s on same playing field in terms of reli. ed., prop. rights, and personal displays of reli.

Fundamentalism & Politics

Central Questions

• Why a resurgence in reli. fundamentalism, particularly in Islamic world?
• Why violence ass.ed w/Islamic fundamentalism?
• Is there something theologically inherent in Islam? (No.)

Fundamentalism & Politics

Fundamentalism Def.

generally refers to "getting back to the basics" or essentials of the faith

literal reading of sacred texts

 - controversial b/c that's the IDEA of Divinity Schools

 - intellectual interpretation = human fingerprint

 - Think stark's theory of schisms/Luther

Fundamentalism & Politics

Islamic Protestant Reformation?

Islam: A Quick Primer

• No need! Based upon a misreading of the Prot. Ref. - that WAS radical!
• Islam not a hierarchical org., already decentralized, series of schisms always

• ---

  Founded 610-632 CE, long origin over lots of conflicts
• 622: Muhammad goes to Medina & solves disputes over warring clans, issue of juris prudence becomes very imp. in Islam
• series of 4 caliphates, need leaders to take over after Muhammad's death
• succession issue after that divides Sunnis and Shi'as (but lots of other divisions after that)
• Caliphate (ruling authority) ends in 1924 w/Ataturk
•  - wanted to secularize & become Western
•  - not everyone followed it, but the closest thing to a hierarchy (esp. for the Sunnis!!)
• NOT a monolithic religion!!
•  - think Pentacostalism not Catholicism

Fundamentalism & Politics

Islam: A Quick Primer

 - Political Principles (3)

• Umma - one religious community of Muslims (not kinship or race)
•  - Mohammad in Medina
•  - transcends typical divisions
• Authority of state given by Allah, not created by humans
•  - Muhammad = reli. AND poli. leader
• Only one cetnral political-religious authority
•  - body politic = body religious!
•  - tension: decentralized AND one au.?

Fundamentalism & Politics

Islam: A Quick Primer

 - Political-Religious Unity?

 - Sects & Decentralization

• Wars of Apostasy & various civil wars
•  - lots of clans reverted to their old ways ofter Muhammad's death
•  - basically based over political authority/taxation
• Contested dynasties & caliphates
• European imperialism (mid-late 1800s through mid 1900s)
•  - Eu. calling the shots, not all actually colonies
• Fractured political unity

• ---

  sects appear over time (lots, primarily Sunnis @ ~85% and Shi'as @ ~12-13%)
• w/out modern technology, it's hard to create a unified message on ANYTHING & you get a lot of divisions & local specializations
• Sunni least structured, Shi'a more so (at least has a defined seminary path)

Fundamentalism & Politics

Juergensmeyer Thesis

• based on reli. nat.ism!
• nationalism needed for control in large moden countries
• Ruling means you have to make it easier for leaders tohave loyal followers (which is what nationalism does)
• The West had settled on secular nat.ism (and start chipping away at Ottoman Power)
• Reli. nationalists consider secular nat.ism a religion - saw it as COMPETING and were not on Ataturk's side
• Religious fundamentalism most likely to arise where there's tension
•  - Developing nat.s w/religiously active pop.s & secular rulers
•  - Places where it's difficult to define/accept the idea of a nation state (i.e. Europe drew DUMB maps!)

Fundamentalism & Politics

Explaining Fundamentalism

Piscatori Thesis

• Fragmentation & Secularism
•  - Juergensmeyer: arbitrarily-set boundaries --> reli. nat.ism becomes unifying force
• Fragmentation of reli. authority (no caliphate)
•  - -> increased comp. for reli. leadership (who's in charge?)
•  - comp. & fluidity among group ups the ante for "pluralism" (who's the "purest?")
• Sec. gov.s prevail in the post-caliphate era (Nasser, Baathists)
•  - many incapable of basic leadership
•  - attempt to co-op or control Islamic leadership (who are actually pretty good at providing social welfare in comp. to gov.)
•  - simple CS bargain, backlash from Church of Piety kind of folks
• these 2 = recipe for schisms, reformations, and radicalism!

Fundamentalism & Politics

Kalyvas Thesis

• religious structure, signaling!
• 1992 Algeria vs. 1870s Belgium
• Both have instances of anti-dem. reli. rad.s
• Key diff: Cath. Church able to CONTROL its radicals, Islamic Salvation Front couldn't
•  - due to its structural hierarchy
•  - ISF = coalition, lots of diff.s
•  - ISF spooked military, did NOT want a religious theocracy, instead a secular democracy
•  - ironic: more centralization allowed for smoother transition to democracy
• Formal reli. hierarchies:
•  - tend to be more risk-averse
•  - prefer collusion w/secular elites to max. pol. power
•  - dislike overzealous underlings who might usurp their power
• Decentralized reli. entities cannot control "purist" elements who can potentially become "spoilers"
•  - think Nader splitting 2000 vote

Fundamentalism & Politics

Gill's Added Thesis

• Socio-economic mobility
• Rapid econ growth & rise of middle class in many of these countries (overall trend w/exceptions)
• Autocratic regimes keep middle class out of power
•  - frustrated, see their glass ceiling
• Middle class seeks new avenues of power & authority
•  - influence can come in through civic, reli. orgs
• Consider Krueger & Maleckova: radicals NOT ass.ed with lowest socio-econ sectors! (Middle class has more time/$/resources to devote to a revolutionary cause)

Fundamentalism & Politics

Summary

• Fundamentalism is a type of "reformation/schism" (Church of Piety)
• Potential causual factors (w/in Islam)
•  - reli. nat.ism (as opposed to secularism & 'artificial nations')
•  - Reli. fragmentation plus competition for reli. authority, and inability to control most radical elements
•  - secular gov.s inept and/or corrupt (Glass ceiling for upwardly mobile, Islamism becomes source of authority)

Fundamentalism & Politics

Muslim Brotherhood

• Largely a reaction to fall of Ottoman caliphate & secular Eu. gov.
• Initial focus on reli. edu. but expands to poli. action & welfare
•  - doesn't go well w/ppl in power, esp. sec.
• Internationalizes early (1930s on), including Hamas in 1987
• Some elements turn violent (result of perceived glass ceiling), but renounced violence in early 1970s
•  - Pisc./Kalyvas: can't actually control radical segments, some still are violent
•  - Nasser REALLY pushed them against wall
• Sayid Qutb develops fundamentalist doctrine
•  - killed by regime, becomes martyr, radical elements promote violence in response

Fundamentalism & Politics

Al-Jama't al-Islamiyya

• Founded in 1970s in REACTION to MB moderation
• Take a much more violent path, incl. assass. of Sadat
• Heavily repressed under Mubarak & several mem.s renounce violence by late 90s
• Despite this, many mem.s help found or become connected to al-Qaeda
•  - Church of Power renounces violence, Piety breaks away again
• Reveal fractious & fluid nature of Isl. fund.ism

Fundamentalism & Politics

Al-Qaeda

• Emerges in late 80s as Arab resistance to Soviets in Afghanistan
• stated goal is to topple the "irreligious" poli. leaders in Muslim lands & reestablish caliphate
• leaders culled from upwardly mobile classes
• loose-knit pan-Islamic org. w/ties to many other Islamic groups
•  - more a brand name than a centralized org.

Fundamentalism & Politics

Grameen Bank

• Provides direct micro-financing to the ppor
• circumvents trad. village power brokers (who determined who got resources, kinda like mafia bosses)
• They looked for ways to reassert authority, losing financial (poli) power
• Start enforcing Shari'a law

Fundamentalism & Politics

Jewish Underground

• Arise from orthodox (messianic) Jewish sect, Gush Eniunim, created in early-mid 1970s by highly ed.ed reli. indiv.s
• G.E. aggressively settles West Bank & gaza - Israeli gov. not happy b/c trying to make peace w/Sadat
• In reaction to 1977 peace accords, militias begin vigilantism & terrorist acts, incl. an aborted attempt to blow up Dome of the Rock
• Does not receive pop. support & is quashed
•  - Israeli soc.-econ. environ. not condusive to these groups, few glass ceilings for the mid-upper class, radicals just make life hardfor all parties concerned

Fundamentalism & Violence

Why irresolvable conflict?

Idea of sacred space

• conflict over STUFF is easily divisible, easier to resolve than non-negotiable goods (when the value becomes 0 when divided)

• ---

  become so contested that people aren't willing to compromise as much
• noted for
•  - centrality of purpose (not just loc.)
•  - exclusivity (of access)
•  - indivisibility (value becomes near 0 when divided, hence non-negotiable, think King Solomon story)
• Indivisibility makes confict all more difficult to resolve
•  - ppl don't want to share b/c it takes away the special

Fundamentalism & Violence

• "pre-meditated attack against civilian targets, by sub-state orgs., designed to alter public op. and/or poli landscape"
• largely due to asymmetries in mili power
•  - don't have strength to win a state-to-state war

• ---

Fundamentalism & Violence

Why suicide bombing?

• rebel's rule #1: don't get caught!
•  - serious consequences, esp. for smaller groups
•  - make sense against well-defended targets b/c you won't be caught getting out
•  - make sense in certain terrains (no hiding)
• Defection constraint: incentives for defection high, anyone who gives up or gets caught will harm everybody else
• But... 
•  - afterlife promise & martyrdom
•  - Club goods
•  - strict rel.s best at providing club goods
•  - "    "   good at running militias b/c they limit free-riding; ideal for suicide missions
•     - limits outside options!
• all ways to enhance commitment - spend a lot of energy figuring who will & won't follow through/defect

Fundamentalism & Violence

The Taliban

• most effective group at solving economic & poli chaos in Afghanistan in early 1990s
•  - single toll road, single tax, in exchange for protection from OTHER roving bandits (think Olson!)
•  - replace warlords w/security forces - tight network, so you know EVERYBODY & who can be trusted
•  - also very good at jurisprudence (settling disputes)

• To what extent does a theology limit or determine soc.-econ. & poli outcomes?
•  - Econ & development? Islam & demo.?

• ---

  Developed in 1930s, gilded w/idea of "getting back" to the basics, but actually an interpretation of the fundamentals
• emphasis on islamic, not economics
•  - reaction to concern over muslim min. in greater india
•  - Muslim indebtedness to Hindus put Muslims on defensive
•  - Revitalization of Muslim identity (change terms of trade)
• Appeals to ppl w/vested int. in modified econ/poli struct.
•  - leave extensive room for econ. interp. (artisans, preachers)
• 3rd way, not just cap. (the West) & socialism (atheist)

• prohibitions on interest & islamic banking
•  - int. needed b/c there is an OC of helping somebody else, as incentive to lend in 1st place
•  - plus, if economy inflates, your $ will be worth LESS when you get it back :( - so innovative ppl won't get the money and do cool things w/it
• Early prohibitions against riba 
• Doctrine of profit sharing (shared risk, "venture capital")
• Problem with profit sharing: adverse selection problem
•  - mostly only risky endeavors will want to do venture capital, b/c ppl who know they'll do well don't want to give up that much of their profits, only a lump sum
• Actual practice far from the ideal 
•  - Murabaha = "millisecond solution" - marks up price, owns it for a millisecond, payment plan, some shared risk
•  - Ijara: lease financing, bank charges rent on physical goods, slightly more risky for banks

• Zakat (social welfare mechanism)
• historically difficult to administer, gov.s have only recently figured out how to administer income tax
• Collection problems: loopholes, evasion, and new cirsumstances (mines, tech)
• distribution problems! - ppl who are better connected tend to get more benefits, has not helped to alleviate poverty

Islamic Economics

Key Arenas (3/3)

• Islamic economic norms
• Premise: moral decline leads to econ declin (cf Christian fundamental claims)
• Principles: fairness, profit w/out greed, communitarian (altrusistic) ethos, non-ostentatious consumption
• Problems: fairnes = VERY subjective, communalism hard in large groups, information hard to centrally coordinate, human nature hard to remake esp. in bigger groups

• Not been very successful in its goals
•  - eliminating int, reducing poverty, remaking "homo economicus", offering substantive policy subscriptions
•  - but is popular and spreading. WHY?\

• ---

  Popular b/c:
• psych theories: emotional coping w/corruption, justification for poor circumstances
• econ theories: 
•  - lowers transaction costs by building networks of trust
•  - Good "marketing," reli inst. good at spreading ideas b/c of no collective action prbob.
•  - Preference falsification, but we can only see this ex post facto

Islamic Economics

Economic Underdevelopment/Kuran's Thesis

(Overview)

• Rejects "economic irrelevance" thesis - that Islam, per se, is irrelevant to growth & ppl are poor for other reason
• Partially rejects "economic adv." & "econ. disadv." theses - that things in Islamic theology & the Qu'ran naturally promote a strong econ./that Islamic doctrines naturally sink your econ/don't allow for dem
• Argues that Isl. thought is flexible & can enhance econ. development under certain circumstances, but can be limiting at other times

• Key aspect is "communalism"
•  - most effective among small groups
•  - substitutes for lack of formal contracting inst.s (so you know who you can trust)
•  - inhibits outward expansion (narrow range of transactions)
•  - "Individualistic" soc.s much better at cross-cultural trade as they have institutions
• Religion-based curriculum
•  - emphasized memorization (received knowledge) over innovation (discovered knowledge)
•  - Attacks on edu. sys. seen as attack on Islam
•  - Preference falsification takes hold
•  - Why "Islam economics" may be counterproductive

• Democracy: rulers held accountable to the ruled, power dispersed via checks & balances, basic level of indiv. civ. lib.s
• tradition of mutual consultation over leadership
• adequate checks and balances take time to develop
•  - and may be more limited than in the West

Section Notes

Religious Liberty in the US

• immigration, trade, internal migration (& War of Independence, which came later) --> reli. lib. in US
• school paryer: ex. of passive sec.isms in modern day
•  - have to think about indiv. policy areas...
• we group according to ideologies (conserv., lib.)
• Sup. Ct.: monopoly on the interp. of the Const.
•  - it won't always be so, depends on the type of gov. (Demo? C-S separation?)
• Gill/Kuru: lots of these cases happen according to the demographic changes
•  - 100 yrs ago: Non-Prot. immigration, Catholics and Jews REALLY changed the nature of the interpretation of disestablishement

Section Notes

Turkey

• Ottoman Empire emerged as a dominant Eu. power pretty late in the game
•  - expanded quickly into Ea. Eu., sieged Vienna in 17th cen.
• Musllim but VERY large min.s (Christian, Jewish, ethnic)
• Janissaries almost entirely Christian (seen w/out tribal allegiances, so stable/secure mili. force)
• Religious Org.:
•  - Islam is state rel. but Christians protected
• religiously homogenous --> cleavage pt. is HOW secular they should be
•  - at its fouding, no reason to disestablish a religion that most everybody belongs to
•  - assertive secularists from beginning, passive secularists emerged over time

Section Notes

Kalyvas

• Belgium & Algeria
• Belgium: emergence of Cath. church = conflict w/const. but go along w/the role of demo. & suppress the radicals
•  - role of reli. inst.: provides a credible commitment!
• Cath. church predictable (have made credible commitments for a long time & have 1 leader w/interests)
•  - risk averse
• Schisms & radical sects, but the reli. inst. was an intervening variable b/w ppl & pol.s

• ---

  Algeria: fighting b/w factions, FIS has radicals that it can't control
• nobody who can make a credible commitment to control the radicals b/c it was a coalition
•  - therefore, eventually banned by the mil.

Section Notes

Berman, Yeshiva

• 3 puzzles: becoming MORE stringent, increasing fertility rates, labor supply falling
•  - club good explanation
• Incentives: Yeshiva subsidized @ $400/mo.
•  - conscription deferment, only way to get out of it, until 40 (or 35 w/5 kids)
• 1: more stringent b/c subsidy demands a greater sacrifice to keep the same degree of exclusivity (and commitment, which contributes to the quality of the club good)
• 2: Why are fertility rates growing??
• 3: staying in Yeshiva longer (lower labor supply) b/c of this need for increased commitment
•  - also explains why they stay in long in Israel than Brooklyn
•  - perverse incentives, bad for the econ.

Section Notes

Islamic Economics

• 3 main pts: interest, zakat, morality
• Interest: can't have soc. w/out int.
•  - many reasons to be against usury (making something for nothing, no "love thy neighbor," etc.
• but... actually unclear WHAT the Qu'ran says
•  - idea is that riba --> EXCESSIVE debt --> slavery
• Solution? Profit & loss sharing
•  - mudaraba & musharaka ~~ venture capital, like a partnership, not based on credit, bank gets part of the profits not interest
•  - differ in how much money the entrepreneur puts in (more in musharaka), both <5% total
• However: murbaha = service charge, "millisecond solution"
•  - exact same function as interest
•  - bank buys something, sells it back at a marked-up price to the entrepreneur w/an agreement to pay it back in the future
•  - technically some risk still w/the bank but they compensate for this, too, w/late payment charges (then a refund if you pay for it on time)