B has a fee simple absolute. “[A]nd his

heirs” are words of limitation, which establish the estate as a fee simple. The word “forever” is

superfluous.

C has a life estate, because the devise uses the words of limitation “for life.” Because O devises an estate of lesser quantum, a future interest is created.

A will is legally operative only at the death of the testator; therefore, O’s heirs obtain the future interest, not O. The authors of the casebook would classify the future interest in O’s heirs as a vested remainder, although some authorities would view it as a reversion.

D has a term of years tenancy for a ten year term, while O retains a future interest. The words of limitation “for 10 years” convey a term of years to D. Because O granted an estate of lesser quantum, she retains a future interest (a reversion).

Assuming E is not yet married, E has a future interest (an executory interest) and O’s heirs have a type of fee simple (a fee simple subject to an executory limitation).

O retains her fee simple. The law does not recognize conveyances to animals, regardless of the intent of the grantor. Valid grantees include, inter alia, individuals, corporations, partnerships, and trustees.

The words of limitation “until he dies” denote that B receives a life estate. Although the phrase “for life” is not used, O’s intent is clear. O retains a reversion.

The words of limitation “for life” indicate that C receives a life estate. X has an indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple.

Depending on the jurisdiction, D receives either a term of years or a fee simple. In general, the words of limitation “for 200 years” denote a term of years. Under this view, O retains a reversion because she did not convey her entire interest. However, some jurisdictions limit the duration of a term of years (e.g., to 99 years) and thus conclude that a grant for a longer period transfers a fee simple. In these states, D receives a fee simple absolute. [See e.g., Ala Code section 35-4-6.]

E has a life estate; Z has a vested remainder in a life estate; and O’s heirs receive a vested remainder in fee simple. The words of limitation “for life” indicate that E gains a life estate. Z receives a future interest; the words of limitation “for life” denote that he will obtain a life estate when his future interest becomes possessory. O’s heirs also gain a future interest (a vested remainder) because O did not devise her entire estate (life estate + life estate < fee).

 Initially, F received a life estate, as shown by the words of limitation “for life.” O retained a reversion because she did not convey her entire interest. When F conveyed her life estate to Google, Google obtained a life estate pur autre vie, a life estate measured by the life of F.

B has a fee tail and O retains a reversion. The words of limitation “and the heirs of his body” describe the estate as fee tail. O’s reversion will become possessory if and when B’s line of lineal descendants ends.

 C and her children share a fee simple absolute.

The words of limitation “and the heirs of…body” are necessary to create a fee tail.

 D and his children share a fee simple

absolute. Although the phrase “and the children of his body,” is similar to the phrase “and the

heirs of his body,” the common law required that the precise wording “and heirs of his body” be

used in order to create a fee tail.

 E and the heirs of E share a fee simple absolute.  The  words “heirs of E” are words of purchase, which denote E’s heirs as the grantees of O’s conveyance.  A fee tail would require appropriate words of limitation, such as “heirs of E’s body.”

B has a fee simple determinable, while O retains a possibility of reverter. The words of limitation “so long as” create a fee simple determinable in B. By definition, O’s interest must be a possibility of reverter.

O devises “to C and her heirs, but if Boston becomes a state then O’s heirs have the right to re-enter and retake the estate.”

C has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, while O’s heirs have a shifting executory interest. Because the defeasible fee is followed by a future interest in a third party (O’s heirs) rather than in the transferor O, C has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. Remember that because this is a devise, O cannot retain any interest; O is dead when the will becomes legally operative. The future interest in O’s heirs follows a defeasible fee in a transferee and therefore is a shifting executory interest. If Boston becomes a state, O’s heirs gain possession in fee simple absolute.

 O conveys “to D for life, then to M and her heirs while the well continues to provide water.”

 D has a life estate; M has a vested remainder in fee simple determinable; and O retains a possibility of reverter. The words of limitation “for life” identify D’s estate as a life estate. M holds a vested remainder, which will become possessory upon D’s death. The word of limitation “while” indicates that M will have a fee simple determinable when M gains possession. O retains a possibility of reverter, which automatically becomes possessory if the well stops providing water.

E has a fee simple subject to a condition subsequent, and O retains a right of entry. The words of limitation “provided that” create a defeasible fee simple in E. This defeasible fee is followed by a future interest in O, the grantor, which is a right of entry. If alcohol is ever served on the premises, O has the right to re-enter and reclaim possession.

O conveys “to the First Baptist Church provided that the land is used as a church, then to Google, Inc.” 

The First Baptist Church has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and Google has an executory interest. The words “provided that” are words of limitation creating a defeasible fee simple in the First Baptist Church. Because the defeasible fee is followed by a future interest in a third party (Google) rather than in the grantor O, First Baptist has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. Google’s future interest follows a defeasible fee in a transferee and is therefore a shifting executory interest. If the land ceases to be used as a church, Google gains possession in fee simple absolute.

A has a life estate, and B has an indefeasibly vested remainder. The words of limitation “for life” create a life estate in A. B’s future interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of A’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. It is indefeasibly vested because (a) B is ascertainable at the time of conveyance, and (b) there is no condition precedent.

C has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and D has a shifting executory interest. The words of limitation “but if” create a defeasible fee in C. Since C’s defeasible fee simple is followed by a future interest in a third party, rather than in the grantor O, C has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. Because D’s future interest follows a defeasible fee, it is an executory interest. It is a shifting executory interest because D, a transferee, will divest C, another transferee, of C’s estate.

D has a term of years, and O retains a reversion.

The words of limitation “for six months” identify the estate as a term of years. Because O

conveyed an estate of lesser quantum, O retains a reversion that will become possessory when

D’s estate ends.

E has a fee simple determinable, and O retains a possibility of reverter. The words of limitation “so long as” create a fee simple determinable. Since no other interest is created in anyone else, O retains a possibility of reverter – the future interest in a transferor that follows a fee simple determinable. No executory interest is created.

F has a life estate; G has an indefeasibly vested remainder in a life estate; and O retains a reversion. The words of limitation “for life” identify F’s estate as a life estate. G’s future interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of F’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. G’s remainder is vested because (a) G is ascertainable at the time of conveyance, and (b) there is no condition precedent. The words of limitation “for life” identify G’s estate (which will exist when his future interest becomes possessory) as a life estate. Since O has conveyed an estate of lesser quantum (life estate + life estate < fee), O retains a reversion.

 A has a life estate, and B has an indefeasibly vested remainder. The words of limitation “for life” create a life estate in A. B’s future interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of A’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. It is indefeasibly vested because (a) B is ascertainable at the time of conveyance and (b) there is no condition precedent.

 C has a life estate; D has a contingent remainder; and O has a reversion. The words of limitation “for life” identify C’s estate as a life estate. D’s future interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of C’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. It is a contingent remainder because it is subject to the condition precedent that D live to be 30 years old. O retains a reversion because O has not given away his entire interest.  Notice that D’s contingent remainder might not vest, e.g., if D dies at 29.

 O conveys “to E for life, then to F’s children and their heirs.” Assume F has never had children.

 E has a life estate; F’s children have a contingent remainder; and O retains a reversion. The words of limitation “for life” identify E’s estate as a life estate. The future interest in F’s children is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of E’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. It is a contingent remainder because F had no children at the time of conveyance, and they therefore are unascertainable. O retains a reversion.

 G has a life estate; H has a vested remainder subject to divestment; and I has an executory interest. The words of limitation “for life” identify G’s estate as a life estate. H has a remainder because (a) his interest is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of G’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. H’s remainder is vested because (a) H is ascertainable at the time of the conveyance and (b) there is no condition precedent. However, H’s remainder is subject to a condition subsequent, so it is a vested remainder subject to divestment. I has an executory interest, because it can become possessory only by divesting H.

 O conveys “to J for life, then to K for life, then to L’s children.” Assume that L is alive and has one child, M. 

 J has a life estate; K has an indefeasibly vested remainder in a life estate; L’s child M has a vested remainder subject to open; and potential future children of L have an executory interest. The words of limitation “for life” identify J’s estate as a life estate. K’s future interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of J’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interest. It is vested because (a) K is ascertainable at the time of the conveyance and (b) there is no condition precedent. The words of limitation “for life” indicate that K will gain a life estate when K’s future interest becomes possessory. M’s interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of K’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interest. It is vested because (a) M is ascertainable at the time of conveyance and (b) there is no condition precedent. However, it is subject to open because L may have more children following the conveyance. Potential future children of L have an executory interest, because they would partially divest M’s interest in order to take.

B has a life estate; M has a contingent remainder in fee simple; and O retains a reversion. Applying the rule to M’s contingent remainder, we ask if there is any possibility that this interest can vest more than 21years after the death of the last life in being. O, B, and M are the lives in being at the time of the conveyance. If they all die shortly thereafter in a common disaster, is there any possibility that M’s contingent interest might vest more than 21 years after this tragedy? No. M must necessarily be alive for her interest to vest; she can only live to be age 50 if she is alive at that

time. Therefore, there are only two logical possibilities: (1) M will live to age 50 (so her interest will vest) or (2) M will not live to age 50 (so her interest will forever fail to vest). At M’s death, one of these two things will necessarily happen. Therefore, using M as the measuring life, M’s interest is good. The rule does not apply to O’s reversion.

 A has a springing executory interest, and O retains a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. O retains present possession for the next 15 years. Because A will divest O of O’s estate, O retains a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. A’s future interest follows a defeasible fee and thus is an executory interest. Since it will divest the transferor rather than another transferee, it is a springing executory interest.

B has a life estate; C has a vested remainder in fee simple subject to an executory limitation; and Dhas a shifting executory interest. The words of limitation “for life” identify B’s estate as a life estate. C’s future interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of B’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. C’s remainder is vested because (a) C is ascertainable at the time of conveyance and (b) there is no condition precedent. The authors of the casebook are of the view that the better interpretation is that the words of limitation “but if” identify the estate C will receive when C’s remainder becomes possessory as a fee simple defeasible. Since C’s defeasible fee simple is followed by a future interest in a third party, C has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. D’s future interest is an executory interest because it follows a defeasible fee. It is a shifting executory interest because D will divest C, another transferee. [An alternative view is that the words “but if” should also apply to the time period before C’s interest becomes possessory. Under this analysis, (a) C has a vested remainder subject to divestment in fee simple subject to an executory limitation and (b) D has a shifting executory interest.]

 E has a springing executory interest in fee simple, and O retains a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. O retains possession until E marries, and therefore has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. E’s future interest becomes possessory when E marries. Since E will divest the transferor and not another transferee, it is a springing executory interest.

 O devises “to F as long as no alcohol is served on the property and if alcohol is served there, then to Alcoholics Anonymous.”

 F has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and Alcoholics Anonymous has a shifting executory interest. The words of limitation “as long as” create a defeasible fee. Since the defeasible fee is followed by a future interest in a third party, F has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation. The future interest held by Alcoholics Anonymous is an executory interest because it follows F’s defeasible fee. It is a shifting executory interest because Alcoholics Anonymous will divest F, another transferee.

G has a life estate; H has a contingent remainder; and O retains a reversion. The words of limitation “for life” identify G’s estate as a life estate. H’s future interest is a remainder because (a) it is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of G’s life estate and (b) it cannot divest any other interests. It is a contingent remainder because it is subject to the condition precedent that H become a lawyer. O retains a reversion because H’s contingent remainder may never vest.

B has a life estate; X’s heirs have a contingent remainder in fee simple; and O retains a reversion. Because the contingent remainder is in X’s heirs rather than O’s (the grantor’s) heirs, the Doctrine of Worthier Title does not apply.

Assuming that O has no children, C has a life estate; X has a vested remainder in life estate; O’s children have a contingent remainder in fee simple; and O retains a reversion. Because the contingent remainder is in O’s children rather than O’s heirs, the Doctrine of Worthier Title does not apply.

 O conveys “to D for life, then to X so long as it is used as a school, then to O’s heirs.” 

Initially, the conveyance seems to grant a life estate in D; an indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple subject to an executory limitation in X; and a shifting executory interest in O’s heirs. Here we have (1) an executory interest (2) in the grantor’s heirs. Applying the Doctrine of Worthier Title, we begin with the presumption that O does not intend to create an interest in her own heirs; instead, O intends to retain a future interest in herself. Thus, D has a life estate; X has an indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple determinable; and O retains a possibility of reverter.

City has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and H has a shifting executory interest in fee simple. Applying the rule to H’s executory interest, we ask if there is any possibility that this interest might vest more than 21 years after the death of the last life in being. H is the only life in being at the time of creation; because City is not a person, it cannot be a life in being. Is there any possibility that the executory interest might vest more than 21 years later? Of course. Suppose that H dies one day after the devise. City could use the land as a school for the next 100 years and only thereafter stop. At that point, the executory interest would become possessory in a grantee, devisee, or heir of H—almost 79 years after the perpetuities period (H’s life plus 21 years) has expired. Because the executory interest might vest outside of the period, it violates the rule and is void ab initio. Importantly, the condition subsequent (but if the land is not used as a school) is considered part of the executory interest and is also stricken from the conveyance. As a result, City receives a fee simple absolute.

O conveys “to D provided that if it ceases to be used as a church, then to G if he is living.” 

This conveyance is very similar to (2). D has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and G has a shifting executory interest in fee simple. Applying the rule to G’s executory interest, we ask: Is there any possibility that this interest might vest more than 21 years after the death of the last life in being? Because G is one of the lives in being and the executory interest can only vest, if at all, during his lifetime (then to G if he is living), there is no possibility of remote vesting. Therefore, the interest is valid.

O conveys “to E and her heirs so long as the land is used for school purposes, then to S.”

E has a fee simple subject to an executory limitation, and S has a shifting executory interest in fee simple. Applying the rule to S’s executory interest, we ask if there is any possibility that this interest might vest more than 21 years after the death of the last life in being. O, E and S are the lives in being at creation. If all three die shortly thereafter in a common disaster, is there any possibility that S’s interest might vest more than 21 years after the tragedy? Yes, of course. E’s grantee, devisee, or heir could use the land for school purposes for the next 100 years and then stop the use. At this point, the executory interest would become possessory in a grantee, devisee, or heir of S—79 years after the perpetuities period (the lives of O, E and S plus 21 years) has expired. Because the executory interest might vest outside of the period, it violates the rule and is void ab initio. It is important to remember that a durational limitation on a defeasible fee (e.g., so long as the land is used for school purposes) is considered to be part of the defeasible fee, rather than part of the executory interest.  (Compare this to (2) above, where we had a condition subsequent). When S’s executory interest is stricken, the conveyance gives E a fee simple determinable, and O retains a possibility of reverter.

F has a life estate; F’s grandchildren have a contingent remainder in life estate (assuming that no grandchildren have been born yet); and K has an indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple. Applying the rule to the contingent remainder in F’s grandchildren, we ask if there is any possibility that this interest might vest more than 21 years after the death of the last life in being. O, F, and K are the lives in being at creation. Assume that they die one year later. Is there any possibility that the contingent remainder could vest more than 21 years after their deaths? Yes. F could have a child, X, 11 months after the conveyance; X would not be a life in being for purposes of the rule. Suppose X has a child, Y (F’s first grandchild), 25 years later; at that point the future interest vests—more than four years after the perpetuities period (the lives of O, F, and K plus 21 years) has expired. Because the interest might vest outside of the period, it violates the rule and is void ab initio. As a result, F has a life estate, and K has an indefeasibly vested remainder in fee simple.

Assuming that O has no grandchildren who have reached age 21 by his death, then (1) O’s heirs receive a fee simple subject to an executory limitation and (2) the “grandchildren who reach 21” have a springing executory interest in fee simple. Applying the rule to the grandchildren’s executory interest, we ask if there is any possibility that this interest might vest more than 21 years after the death of the last life in being. Any living child or grandchild of O is a life in being at creation. Assume that they die one year later. Is there any possibility that the executory interest could vest more than 21 years after their deaths? No. Because O creates the interest in his will, all of his children will be identified by the time of his death. Therefore, they are all lives in being. No grandchild can reach age 21 more than 21 years after O’s last child’s death. Therefore, the executory interest is valid.

Assuming that O has no grandchildren who have reached age 21 at the time of the conveyance, then (1) O retains a fee simple subject to an executory limitation and (2) the “grandchildren who reach 21” have a springing executory interest in fee simple. Applying the rule to the grandchildren’s executory interest, we ask if there is any possibility that this interest might vest more than 21 years after the death of the last life in being. Any living child or grandchild of O is a life in being at creation. Assume that they die one year later. Is there any possibility that the executory interest could vest more than 21 years after their deaths? Yes. Unlike (6) where the interest was created in O’s will, here O made an inter vivos conveyance. Because O is still alive after the grant, one year later he might have another child, X, who was not a life in being at creation. Everyone alive at the time of creation could all die one week later. Thirty years later, X has a child Y (a grandchild of O). Y’s future interest would vest when he reached age 21—more than 30 years after the perpetuities period (the lives in being plus 21 years) has expired. Therefore, the executory interest violates the rule and is void ab initio. As a result, no interest is conveyed; O retains his fee simple absolute.