Jurisdictional reform primarily initiated and driven by transnational interest groupd demanding supranational authority to reap economic benefits. Process as self reeinforcing > supranational actors would request additional powers

• impetus for integration comes from supranational or transnational actors (neofunctionalism)
• impetus for integration comes from national governments (intergovernmentalists)

1. Preferences defined as economic
2. Distributional bargaining among (economic) interest groups (either supranational or national)

more appropriate to integration of 1950s and 1980s. First part of integration was mainly economic though mainly because political integration had failed

Mainly elite driven, because: 

1. Public attitudes are superficial and incapable of providing a stable electoral incentive for party positioning
2. European Integration is a low salience topic for the public (in contrast to business groups)
3. Issues in Europe are sui generis and therefore not related to political discussion at national level

Arguments can't hold up anymore. With Maastricht, European Integration entered world of party competition, elections and referendums

Primarily measured in economic terms

• socio-tropic (country level indicators)
• subjective (household)
• subjective socio-tropic (combiation of above)

if individuals can't or don't want to make connections to economic impact, they may take cues from parties, media or other intermediary institutions

These cues include identitiy as well as economic impact

1. Identity has greater weight in public opinion than for elites or interest groups
2. Identitiy does not speak for itself in relation to most political subject, must be constructed
3. The more exclusive an individual identifies with an ingroup, the less that individual will support a jurisdiction encompassing outgroups

Identity of persons changes slower than jurisdictional reform 

1. Tension must be salient, European integration has perceptibly increases and effects have been magnifies (immigraiton, economic competition)
2. Poltical entrepreneurs must mobilize this tension

both has occured

identity is causally important if

1. an issue has opaque economic implications
2. an issues has transpartent communal implications that are
3. debated in public forums by
4. mass organizations rather than specialized interest groups

not as prevalent as expected, reaches beyond regulated capitalism and market liberalism

Association especially for parties on the tan side (traditional/authority/national), not only radical but also moderate tan which include eurosceptics.

Association weaker on gal (green/alternative/liberal) side, left-gal parties consider EU with policies of market liberalism and democratic deficit

In easter europe, tan and left go together, in western europe exact opposite

>>> in western europe euroscepticism cuts through main political parties which include eurosceptics and market liberals

1. European integration reinforces perviously less prevalent non-economic dimension, which taps values from identity
2. this intruduces salient concern which cannot be accommodated in left/right contestation. Poltical parties might be divided on such issues
3. As scope extends to non-economic issues, euroscepticism is likely to become more tan
4. Politicization is most pronounced in countries with populist tant parties

As EU is constructed consensus seeking (unanimity), minorities with intense preference have increased influence. Opponents of integration have better chances of blocking initiatives than proponents for integration.

If Eurosceptical parties gain control, this could block a reform 

1. The greater a party's potential electoral popularity, the more it is induced to inject it into competition.
2. The ability to chase votes is restrained by reputational consideration. Parties are membership organizations with durable programmatic commitments, which constrain strategic positioning
3. Leaders are reluctant to raise an issue that might divide their party. 

Especially major parties have not taken up the issue prominently

Most mainstream parties are more euro-supportive than voters and have failed to depoliticize the issue. Politicization happened mainly through oppositional parties or factions on the populist right and radical left

Domestic politics have become more tightly coupled with European outcomes. Treaty bargaining among national governments is highly constrained by a fear of referendum defeat. Due to multi-level governance, leaders have less room to manouvre.

1. Controversial referendums are likely to be suppressed by repacking reforms into smaller and less refrendum-prone bundles
2. Institutional reforms to offer more opt-outs, making it easier for sub-sets of MS to cooperate or by shifting decisions to non majoritarian regulatory agencies.