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| 1.Use the preference orderings shown in the question to fill in the matrix in Figure 8.4. Using the numbers 4, 3, 2, 1 indicate the payoffs each player receives for Civil War (Sunnis: Radical Approach; Shiites: Radical Approach). |
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| 2.Using the preference orderings shown in the question fill in the matrix shown in Figure 8.4. Using the numbers 4,3,2,1 fill in the outcome payoff for Limited Democracy (Sunnis: Moderate Approach; Shiites: Moderate Approach). |
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| 3.What is the Nash Equilibrium for the game presented in Figure 8.4 with the preference ordering used for the last two questions? |
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| A) (Radical Approach; Radical Approach) |
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| 4.Which outcome would both groups prefer to the expected outcome? |
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| 5.Using the new preference ordering for the Shiites and the same preference ordering as before for the Sunnis, fill in the matrix shown in Figure 8.4.Some form of consolidated democracy --- limited or full -- is a possible equilibrium in this modified version of the democratic consolidation game. |
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| 6.Solve the subgame on the left of Figure 8.7, where the Challenger is weak, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the expected outcome? |
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| 7.Solve the subgame on the right of figure 8.7, where the challenger is strong, as if there were no uncertainty. What is the expected outcome? |
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| 8.If the regime believes that the challenger is weak with a probability of 0.75 will it choose to do nothing, launch a party, or be indifferent? |
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| 9.If the Regime believes that the challenger is weak with a probability of 0.25, will it choose to do nothing, launch a party, or be indifferent? |
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| 10.If the regime believes that the challenger is weak with a probability of 0.50, will it choose to do nothing, launch a party, or be indifferent? |
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| 11.Solve the subgame on the left presented in figure 8.8. What is the expected outcome? |
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| C) Democratic consolidation |
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| 12.It the regime believes that the religious party is moderate with a probability of 0.8, what action will they take? |
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2-1 If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS ONLY.
($1 billion in tax revenue, public goods worth: $2000, size of winning coalition: 250,000) |
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| 2-2.Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this situation? |
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2-3.If the leader were now to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS only
($1 billion in tax revenue, public goods worth: $2000, size of winning coalition: 750,000) |
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| 2-4.Would the leader prefer to provide only public goods or only private goods in this new situation? |
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2-5.If the leader were to spend all of the tax revenue on providing private goods, what would the maximum value of the private goods be for each member of the winning coalition if we assume that they all receive the same amount? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only
($1 billion in tax revenue, size of selectorate: 50 million, winning coalition: 250,000) |
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| 2-6.How much are private goods worth to someone who is not a member of the winning coalition? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only. |
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| 2-7. What is the probability that a member of the selectorate will be a member of the winning coalition? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS only |
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| 2-8. What is the probability that a member of the selectorate will not be a member of the winning coalition? Fill in the blank using NUMBERS only. |
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| 2-9 Suppose that you, as a member of the winning coalition are thinking of defecting to the challenger. What is the (maximum) expected value of defecting to the challenger in terms of private goods? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only |
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| 2-10 Based on your answer to the previous question, how much does the political leader have to give each member of the winning coalition in terms of private goods to ensure that the members remain loyal? Fill in the blank with NUMBERS only |
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| 2-11 What is the difference between how much the political leader could give each member of the winning coalition and how much the political leaders needs to give each member of the winning coalition to ensure the members loyalty? |
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| 2-12 Now suppose that the size of the selectorate is just 1 million. Keeping everything else the same answer the following question:What is the probability that a member of the selectorate will be a member of the wining coalition? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS only |
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| 3-1 In the problems at the end of Chapter 4 you were asked to consider the children's game of Rock, Paper, Scissors. In this game, two children simultaneously choose "rock", "paper", or "scissors". Rock beats scissors, paper beats rock and scissors beat paper. Lets say that you prefer the winner in each of these pair-wise comparisons. That is you prefer rock to scissors, scissors to paper, and paper to rock. Is your preference ordering complete? |
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| 3-2. Is your preference ordering transitive? |
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3-3
How many pairwise contests does each of the finalists win? Answer with NUMBERS ONLY |
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3-4
Which voter is the median voter? Put in the letter. |
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3-5
What is the median voter's ideological position? Put in the NUMBER |
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3-6
Does the result from median voter theorem stating that parties will converge to the position of the median voter depend on whether political parties are office seeking or policy seeking? |
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3-7
Suppose that some event occurs that causes several voters to adopt more centerist positions. The new distribution of voters is shown in Figure 10.12. Where will parties P1 and P2 locate in the left-right space, given the centrist nature of the electorate? Answer with a NUMBER ONLY |
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3-8 Given that the status quo is at 2, what is the range of policy outcomes that the president prefers to the status quo?
(SQ:2, L:4, P:7)
A) 2 to 10
B) 2 to 3
C) 4 to 7
D) 3 to 7 |
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3-9 Given that the status quo is at 2, what is the range of policy outcomes that the legislature prefers to the status quo?
(SQ:2, L:4, P:7)
A) 3 to 7
B) 4 to 7
C) 2 to 6
D) 2 to 10 |
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3-10
Do the ranges of policy outcomes that the president and legislature prefer to the status quo overlap? |
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11.Given that the status quo is 2, what is the range of policy outcomes that the president prefers to the status quo?
(SQ:2, P:4, L:7)
A) 2 to 10
B) 4 to 7
C) 0 to 2
D) 2 to 6 |
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3-12
If the legislature propose a new policy and its implementation needs the president's approval, what level of public goods provision do you think the legislature will propose? Fill in the blanks with NUMBERS |
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