• 1. starts from fact that integration has advanced! (In terms of quantity & controversy)
• 2. IGs cannot explain WHY the int.s of a ountry shifts over time - analyze "grand bargains" as snapshots, not shifts over time
• 3. critique centers of 4 main points:
•  - autonomy of regional insts. (prinicpal agent problem, no way to have a complete contract, rules v. discretion)
•  - national leaders have restricted time horizons-->
•  - unintended consequences - national leaders may have clear goals but do not perfectly control the consequences of policies (e.g. tearing down tariff walls -> econ. integration)
• Chief of Gov. (COG) pref.s change (This is where IGs really need to explain better.)

Identity

What is it?

• social identity = belonging to a group, attachment (rel. b/w "me" & "us" & "them")
• Feeling, subjective, NOT cognitive/factual ("Nations as groups w/shared amnesia about their past & a common dislike of their neighbors")
• Nations are "imagined communities" 
• Multiple identities, sometimes nested
•  - Situational identities differ depending on who you're interacting with

Identity

European ID (geographic)

Importance thereof

• Difficult to create a single Eu. id
•  - 27 in EU, nearly 40 in Europe, est.ed IDs at nat. levels already
•  - little organizational focus or collective impact for non-members (?)

• ---

  Geographic id?
• De Gaulle: "Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals" (but no clear geographic boundary to the East and poli boundaries have changed many times)
• Can extend as far as: Norway (N), Cyprus/Malta (S), Portugal/Spain (W), and Russia (E)
• HUGE cultural differences!

• ---

  Importance:
•  - impact on social policies & cohesion (redistributive) - low lying fruit pretty much gone
•  - Who do we let it?

Identity

European ID (political)

Europe as a civilization

• Carolingian completion: go deep not wide!
• No common demos (civic id)
• EU Treaty: Every closer union among peopleS of Europe
• What do MSs share?
•  - liberal constitutional demo.s
•  - All market economies
•  - All Eu. (But what does that mean? Same int.s w/in EU?)

• ---

  Is Europe a coherent civilization/culture?
• Fault lines along religious grounds
• Predominantly judeo-christian w/significant minorities in France, Germany
• Europe ~ Christendom for a long time
• Nationalities still exist, powerful - but these IDs can co-exist w/a Eu. ID
• Nation then Europe ("Europe lite") + Europe then nation  = over 50% of population

Identity

Who is the other?

Turkey

• Other: has to be an out group to have an in group
• Reinforces group boundaries
• Used to be SU & Warsaw pact countries, psychological boundary shifted East after Cold War

• ---

  Turkey:
• Islamic country, not state (no sharia law)
• would need lots of representation, regional funds, economic migration could be a drain
• Politically moderate, member of NATO
• Membership neg.s began 2005
• Widespread opposition (some France, GERMANY/Merckl)

Member States

Intro/theories

• IG framework, funct.ists tend to downplay role of MSs, but provide a theory of how the state can be circumvented (?)
• Language of funct.ism (social forces, supranational inst.s, spill-over)
• Realism/IG viewpoint different:
•  - talk a lot about the end of the day
•  - states call shots
•  - states strike down bargains, define what is in nat. int., do negotiations
•  - delegate authority to international (NOT SUPRANATIONAL) inst.s - carefully monitor & control them

Member States

Germany

 - Ash Article & possible options

• possibly the only ideologically European country - see it in terms of identity, not jjust C-B analysis
• Yet, face a series of dilemmas
•  - don't take leadership seriously enough v. power hungry
•  - bad Europeans v. bad Atlanticists (w/US)
•  - too far East = "teutonic belt" in Europe
• Issues raised by Ash article:
•  - Die Mittellage: "middle layer" - not an enviable position, no clear geo boundaries to determine territory
•  - Discrepancy b/w econ & mili power ("superpower lite")
•  - commitments & econ strain (large welfare state)
•  - Conflation of Ger. & Eu. int.s: fig leaf for Ger. power or ideological commitment? (???)

• ---

  Options:
• Carolingian cooperation (deep not wide, EEC core, more voting power, fewer benefits but bigger pie piece overall, easier to get things done)
• Wider Europe, move to East (what UK wants! Ger. would want to expand more than France - farmers in E. Eu. don't compete w/Ger. industrial production, cultural ties)
• Moscow First (they have a comp adv in resources, W. Europe in capital & skilled labor - should be a great marriage!)
• World power (fix discrepancy, rearmament... but foreign policy/security among the most divisive of issues)
• What does Ash recommend? And is that important??

• most important power in the EU, at least until recently
•  - prob. the country that has USED the EU the most
• independence, puissance, grandeur
• has fared remarkably well post-WWII
•  - perm. UN Sec. Counc. seat
•  - MULTIPLE Frenchmen in major int. nat. leadership positions
•  - led CAP, creation of EMU
•  - created Eu. Council in 1974
• New challegnes posed by Ger. reunification (end of Cold War, Ger. has more room to demand things)
• IGC conferences on enlargement & challenges posed for France
•  - Franco-German coalition diluted
•  - Ger.'s influence greater in CEECs
•  - Kind of like Ger. (strong Eu.) + UK (weak inst.s)

Member States

The United "Awkward Partner" Kingdom (lol)

• Differences w/EU partners: 
•  - geography: historically, English channel plays a role, hasn't been invaded since 1066 and it shows!
•  - external ties: to Commonwealth, US, EFTA members 
• Reservations about Eu. integration
•  - social policy provisions (i.e. redistribution, legal base in earlier treaties)
•  - monetary union (econ. cycles of UK diff. from Continent, wants to control its own interest rate)
•  - foreign policy preferences (more more pro-Atlanticist)
•  - distate for Brussels bureaucracy (anti-corruption oriented)
• opposed inst. reform in direction of greater integration (wide NOT deep)
• Thatcher & Euro-rejectionism (except BIG fan of de-regulatory SEA)
• Turn towards EEC
•  - decreasing imp. of EFTA & Commonwealth
•  - increasing econ. ties w/Commonwealth
•  - higher growth rate among EU mem.s
•  - rejected for membership in earlier 60s, joined in 1973 (w/Denmark & Ireland)
• Reluctant partners
•  - still not in EMU!
•  - conserv.s in power (almost)
•  - strong anti-EU feelings in UK, esp. among conserv.s (over 45% want out!)
•  - Yet, EU inst.ly stronger than ever - so, UK wants to keep veto, slow QMV, stop social policy

SEA

Brief Aside on Pareto Efficiency (?????)

SEA

Background

• 2nd relaunching of Community
• 300 proposals (de- and re-regulation) --> HARMONIZARION
• Econ content (regulations liberalization)
•  - 300 proposals, White Paper, worked w/Brit. Cokefield
•  - goal to create an area w/out borders (free movement of goods, services, capital, labor)
•  - removal of NTBs
• political content (inst./poli. reform)
•  - intro QMV for dealing w/300 proposals
•  - before SEA, Article #100 called for unianimity (QMV politicked out after Luxembourg Compromise)
•  - mutual recognition as governing principle (Cassis de Dijon case [blackberry liqueur]) - more relaxed that harmonization, no need for ONE single standard
• - increased powers of EP (cooperation not consultation [?])

  ---

• general Europessimism (French chair crisis, oil crises, etc.)
•  - US & Europe both economically stagnated

SEA

Functionalism & Neofunctionalism

 - 4 factors emphasized by funct.ists

• A: Growing dependence on trade
• B: Global economic conditions
•  - 70's and 80's = intense econ. competition
•  - rise of east asia as powerful region in world econ
•  - econ ascendance of Japan
•  - E. Asians NICs successful producers & traders (really the only productive people at the time...)
•  - Japan & NICs only countries to increase market share in these decades - other countries not doing so hot! (Also, inherently a 0 sum thing.)
•  - by 1980, US pulling out of recession, US microprocessor producers guarding tech secrets, attempting to gain adv. over Eu.
• C: Creation of EMS (EMU forerunner, very diff. though)
•  - Proposed 1978 by Giscard D'Estaing & Helmut Schmidt
•  - Sought a "zone of monetary stability"
•  - quasi-fixed exchange rate regime beginning mid 1980s (meaning value of currency not perm. fixed in rel. to other countries but that fewer alignments would take place)
•   -F.ists: this was a period of Eu. cooperation!
• D: role of European business groups
• - businesses expected to win big through SEA
•  - barriers to exchange to be eliminated (good for prod./trade)
•  - capital to acquire a greater freedom of movement
•  - bargaining power of capital should increase relative to labor (because its relative mobility increases... though oddly enough, it took the Commission to pump up the priv. sector about it... ?)
•  - ERT (ERI?) were big fans
• E: role of Commission
•  - not passive about reform in 1980s
•  - Delors becomes President, '85
•  - very pro-intergrationist & pushed for poli-inst. components of SEA (NOT carefully monitored by nat. gov.s!!)
• 
  Impact of Single Market:
•  - Air transport (domestic markets openend to any EU-based airline in 1987)
•  - Telecommunication
•  - Electricity supply (directive adopted to liberalize nat. elec. markets over 9 yr. period)
•  - Financial services (banking, securities, insurance markets opened to competition)

Paul Pierson

Path to European Integration

4 Main Points

(Leans functionalist - historical inst.ism)

• IGists cannot explain why gaps emerge (principal agent problem)
• look at inst.s as they evolve
• Mostly funct.ist, but does focus on GOV. actions (inst.s) and COG preferences
  

  ---

• autonomous actions of Eu. inst. actors
• restricted time horizons of decision makers (at national level - relates to unintended consequences/spillover - don't think about what it will do to their country in the long run... whereas Eu. politicians will have to make reliable policy analyses & do what is in the best interest of the community)
• unintended consequences (high issue density/overload + asymmetry of information [points 1 &2] = spillover) - MSs don't have control over what is happening at the inst.s and in that aspect, this is a critique of IG
• liklihood of changed in COG pref.s over time (temporal quality, gov.s can question previous arrangements in different circumstances than their predecessors, 

Paul Pierson

Path to European Integration

Why might gaps be hard to close? (3 pt.s)

• resistance of supranational actors
• inst.al barriers to reform ("sticky" inst.s - it's REALLY hard to change the treaty if you want to give more sovereignty back to MSs [ironically, this is esp. true with unianimity])
• sunk costs of previous actions (+ path dependency!, difficult to change course half way through)
•  
• gets back to spillover - hist. inst.ism and funct.ism wouldn't be able to explain it if integration moved backwards

Thomas Risse

A Community of Europeans

• Types of identities
• primordial identity - exclusive, out group is inferior
• sacred identity - still inferior out group but possibility of conversion
• civic identity - differences but no inferiority (part of political identity)
• Interactions b/w identities
• separate
• cross cutting (think Venn diagram)
• NESTED IDENTITIES
• marble cake (being a Rhinelander IS to say you are also a particular type of Catholic)

  ---

• Cleavage line not really b/w die-hard nat.ists & die-hard Eu.s, but incl. and excl. nationalists
• Inclusive nationalists: Western, Southern
• Exclusive nationalists: Northern (incl. UK), Eastern
• primordial, low-skilled occupations tend to be less strongly in favor of EU

  ---

• Exclusive: geographic/civilizational (think Judeo-Christian approach)
• Inclusive: those + political/civic

  ---

• symbols serve as identity markers (EU flag, passport, license plates, athem [Ode to Joy. Lol.])

• civic id is possible
• US as Eu.'s other - militarily, politically, ideologically

Timothy Garton Ash

Germany's Choice

(4 options)

• Carolingian completion (deepen around Franco-German core, not wider because it's easier to get things done and you probably get more benefits - but highlights divide b/w Ger. and Fr.)
• Wider not deeper (take in countries that came in w/Nice Treaty... this is what they DID do!)
• Moscow First (marriage b/w Ger.'s capital & skills & Russia's labor & resources - but would politically distance self from W. Eu. & strained relations all around)
• World power (reassert self as superpower, rearm... but that's divisive! Every time they get more power, they really have to tie themselves more to the EU so they don't get criticized for being too assertive)

  ---

• Cue discussion of Ger. dilemma - esp. in 3rd & 4th opt.s, they get criticized no matter what they do

Andrew Moravscik

Negotiating the SEA

(IG)

• M. disagrees w/funct. interp because 
• business elites didn't really have the influence (came in too late)
• heads of state had already agreed on things about the White Paper beforehand (Fontainebleu)
• DeLors not really in charge, mostly just that he's aware of the constraints from the MSs and was the one to push them forward - didn't even get social policy
• 3 main points supporting IG perspective
• IGism (preference convergence)
• lowest common denominator bargaining (can only get above that if there's a risk of exclusion, as in Britain's fear of the "2-tiered Europe")
• limits on sovereignty transfer

  ---

• Fontainebleu: UK got what it wanted (lowest common denominator) only because Thatcher changed her mind after being threatened with the fast track Europe - agreed to at least accept some liberalization measures... whereas France lost out on the social policies that DeLors and Mitterand wanted because they were in a weaker bargaining position and NOT the LCD

Sandholtz/Zysman Article

Recasting the European Bargain

(Combination of IG and f.ist approaches)

• 3 main actors: business, Commission, MSs
• Focus on elite bargains in response to the challenges and opportuniites posed by international and domestic analyses...