Term
Background/Themes
Const. Myths & Realities |
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Definition
- The Constitution does not guarantee rights unless the gov. & soc. decide to grant those rights and NOT systematically violate them!
- Legal protections for rights are often very limited - right must be est.ed in law/Const. & have the resources to mobilize against it
- Rights are not immutable, usually about balancing values
- SC does not exist to protect the rights of minorities, and has historically done a worse job of doing so than Congress & state legislatures
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Term
Background/Themes
Core Constitutional Principles (3) |
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Definition
- Separation of powers
- Federalism
- Limits of gov. interference w/individual rights & liberties
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not specific/silent on many issues - many Federalists wanted the STATES to decide on disputes- FUNDAMENTAL disagreements at the federal level
- Court has only gradually assumed more power (judicial review, interpreter of Const....)
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Term
Background/Themes
Judicial Review
Structural Limits on Judicial Power |
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Definition
- Solidified by Marbury v. Madison, but that only put in on paper - long, gradual process
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- Jurisdiction
- - Only appellate jurisdiction, cannot rule on meaning of state law
- - Exceptions clause: CONGRESS changes its jurisdiction by passing laws making exceptions
- Can't offer advisory opinions, collusive suits (w/out conflict of int.s), moot cases (conflict resolved), cases w/out standing ("injury in fact")
- Legislature can overrule through Const. amendments, statute, political appt. process, # of justices, jurisdiction changes
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Can only persuade, and, well... justify
- Text does not always provide clear meanings (has to be judged)
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Term
Background/Themes
- Stare Decisis
- Intent of the Framers / Originalism |
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Definition
- "let the decision stand" - expectation of consistency, can be check on judge's personal values & provide guidance to members of other branches
- not a good starting point, but the idea is to announce interpretive princip.s
- - Limit 1: Judges have to decide whether a precedent applies
- - Limit 2: SC can overturn its precedents
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Compelling & commonsense way to interpret a text, supposedly limits "activist" judges, but...
- - Limit 1: Framers were collective body in constant disagreement (+ amendments change certain parts w/out really explaining why)
- - Limit 2: Judges are not necessarily good historians
- best understood as rhetorical tool of persuasion rather than description of how judges do/should make decisions...
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Term
Barron v. Baltimore
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- 1833, co-owner of whard made $, city made street changes - waters shallow, couldn't use wharf any more
- Barron sues on 5th Am., won $5400, reversed by appellate court and brought to SC
- SC didn't even hear Barron's side of the story
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Question: Is the 5th Amendment applicable to states?
- Holding: No, it is not applicable to the states.
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Term
Barron v. Baltimore
Reasoning
Precedents |
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Definition
- 9-1 in favor of Baltimore
- Basically said they had no jurisdiction
- Const. grants powers AND limitations to federal gov, not state gov.
- If the Const. were supposed to apply at all to the state gov.s, it would say so
- Precedent against incorporation until 14th Am.
- Was never specifically, formally overturned - just changed the way they did things
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Term
WV State Board of Ed. v. Barnette
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- 1943: Barnette wanted injunction against flag salute - palm up, almost Nazi-style
- FREE SPEECH (was free exercise of religion but dropped that b/c of sticky precedent issue w/Gobitis)
- Punishment was to expel students + fine + jail time for parents!
- Question: Is it a violation of the 1st Am. right to freedom of speech to require students to salute the flag or be punished?
- Holding: Yes, it is a violation...
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Term
WV State Board of Ed v. Barnette (1943)
Reasoning
Dissents Notes |
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Definition
- Reasoning: not participating not detrimental to other children who wanted to participate (no clear & present danger)
- - Jackson's opinion of Ct: Gobitis assumed state had the power to compel a salute, which was not necessarily true...
- Silence & physical acts also count as speech
- Formally overturns Gobitis
- Nat. survival not an issue here, nat. unity can't be forced, 14th Am. applies to state & all its creatures
- Dissent: due to unity of the state, they should be allowed to force you to salute it
- - only prob. is that it's like saluting a dictator
- - Frankfurter: WOULD side w/religious freedom, but felt that the Ct. was overstepping bounds - the legislature should decide because the Ct. doesn't have the power to be the guardian of liberty
- Notes: Black, Douglas, and Murphy changed their minds - epidemic of violent attacks on JWs became a nat'l embarassment in WWII, part of Nazi propaganda
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Term
Schenk v. US
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Sec. of CPUSA, spread pamphlets urging people to use their Const. rights against the draft
- (During WWI, free speech more restricted)
- Charged with Espionage Act of 1917
- Q: Is it a violation of the 1st Am. right to free speech to forbid a pamphlet encouraging people to avoid the draft?
- Holding: Is is not a violation...
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Term
Schenk v. US
Reasoning
Precedent! |
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Definition
- War time (bad tendency test)
- No ACTUAL effect on draft consciprtion, but creates a clear & present danger, national sec. outweighs the right to free speech here
- - depending on how you view it, they might has still used the bad tendency test (wording), even though they announce the clear & present danger precedent
- Holmes OoC.: Congress had decided to target conspiracies, not just actual interference, so no interference need be shown
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Term
Gitlow v. NY (1925)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Different from Schenk b/c war is over, state not federal law (1st case to incorporate freedom of speech), statute did not target harms caused by utternace, but all utterance of a certain type, regardless of harms
- NY Criminal Anarchy Act of 1902 prohibited advocacy of crim. anarchy, defined as efforts to overthrow gov. through violence
- Charge w/publishing Left Wing Manifesto
- State concedes that pamphlet did not lead to unlawful action!
- Q: Was the NY Criminal Anarchy Act Constitutional (according to the 1st Am.'s protection of free speech)?
- Holding: Not a violation of his free speech rights
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Term
Gitlow v. NY (1925)
Reasoning
Dissent
Precedent |
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Definition
- Sanford OoC: states can define certain types of speech as crim. if they decide such speech is harmful - once decided, ct.s should defer to legislature
- Meaning, state does not have to prove the harm for every punished utterance - does not know which "spark" will lead to a "conflagration"
- Gitlow's pamphlet has "language of direct incitment
- Holmes dissent: no clear & present danger, no evidence that anybody actually tried to DO the actions advocated
- Precedents: more restrictive application of clear & present danger - test kind of evolved to grave & probable danger through WWII & McCarthy era before they did away with it for being too restrictive
- DID incorporate free speech through the 14th Am.
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Term
Dennis v. US (1951, 6-2)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Dennis & 11 other CPUSA were charged with violating Smith Act of 1940, making it illegal to conspire to advocate overthrow of gov. by force
- - gov felt the need to nip the threat in the bud - Dennis and the others were basically meeting in somebody's garage and talking about Communism
- - imp. to Just. Dept. to get convictions upheld
- Question: Is the Smith Act a violation of the 1st Amendment right to free speech?
- Holindg: No, speech can be regulated.
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Term
Dennis v. US (1951, 6-2)
Reasoning - Vinson Plurality of Court |
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Definition
- (No Ooc!)
- No right to violent revolution in a democratic society - gov. has power to punish threats of violence (different than the American Revolution b/c that wasn't a democracy)
- Smith Act goes after "advocacy," not "discussion"
- Earlier cases: threats against gov. can be punished, even Holmes said that
- No absolutes, all concepts are relevant - way of wiggling out of clear and present danger precedent (?)
- Gov. can't wait until "putsch is about to be executed" (Read: until shit goes down...)
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Term
Dennis v. US (1951, 6-2)
Vinson Plurality Opinion & Judge Learned Hand |
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Definition
- Grave & probable danger - allows the gov. a lot more power, at least if clear and present danger is taken literally
- Gravity of the harm discounted by the probability of success - depends not jsut on how likely things are to occur, but also how bad it is
- - even if something is not that likely, if it's really bad, you don't want it to exist at all
- Includes prosecuting for advocacy of ideas that have even a small chance of producing a bad outcome (damn Commies!!)
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Term
Dennis v. US (1951, 6-2)
Vinson & Role of Judges |
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Definition
- "When facts are found that establish the violation of the statute, the protection against convinction afforded by the First Amendment is a matter of law."
- - jury initially finds the determination of those facts, apperals courts are not supposed to second-guess the facts, only make judgments about the law and whether it was applied correctly
- Meaning: there is a 2nd judgment to be made by a judge, not if the statute was violated but if the conviction should be thrown out or not based on 1st Am. protection (type of danger posed)
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Term
Dennis v. US (1951, 6-2)
Concurring Opinions
- Frankfurter
- Jackson |
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Definition
- Frankfurter: Court cannot protect rights, only Congress can judge whether speech is harmful
- Breaks w/Vinson on judicial role!
- This disagreement will be on midterm!
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Jackson: wants to narrown Vinson/Hand formula to Communism, which is a different kind of threat - old clear & present danger test isn't appropriate in this case
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Term
Dennis v. US (1951, 6-2)
Dissenting Opinions
- Black
- Douglas |
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Definition
- Black: no overt acts attempting to overthrow gov, only advocacy & abstract planning for some later date
- - Const. forbids prior restraints on speech (Blackstonian conception) -- Smith Act is preventing them for advocating ideas at all!
- Framers knew unfettered speech was dangerous, but decided to take that risk as a matter of balance - danger of ideas is irrelevant
- Bl. against Ff: Court has DUTY to reverse Congress if Congress interferes with free speech
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Douglas: More Holmesian argument, no real risk here of these ideas taking hold & being put into action
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Term
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Symbolic of change in Ct. op. - generally more permissive political environment
- State law case, KKK rally
- Q: Does the Ohio (Criminal?) Syndicalism Act violate Brandenburg's rights to free speech under the 1st & 14th Amendments?
- H: Yes, he had those rights...
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Term
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969)
Reasoning
- Black
- Douglas |
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Definition
- state can't interfere w/speech advocating harmful action, has to be "incitement to imminent lawless action"
- Black: no more clear & present danger - no balancing, you just take a risk of allowing dangerous speech
- Douglas: Ct. made mistake in earlier cases, exaggerated "puny" threats, have to show overt acts causing harm
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Formally overturned Whitney v. CA (1929)
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Term
Free Speech Doctrines, post 1960's
(4) |
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Definition
- Time/Place/Manner Restrictions
- Speech & Conduct Cases
- Categorical Approach
- Overbreadth/Chilling Effects
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no more content-based restrictions, w/very few, specific exceptions
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Term
Time/Place/Manner Restrictions
Speech & Conduct Cases |
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Definition
- OK if targeting the context in which the speechis made, not the CONTENT of it
- Privacy of own home v. averting one's eyes (If you're in public, you're probably going to have to deal with it!)
- Broadcast media treated as separate issue
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Communication is also a form of action (e.g. protests, treat action AS speech, combining pure speech + action)
- Some actions that communicate can be regulated
- But, not supposed to be content based (blurry line, e.g. draft card burning/flag burning)
- Threats blackmail, & conspiracies not protected (treated as conduct, not speech)
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Term
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Definition
- 1: Fighting words, 2: obscenity, 3: libel
- A: Fighting words - directed at the person of the hearer (direct insult/provocation, AND likely to invoke immediate violent reaction
- B: Obscenity - special, technical category (not just "dirty pictures")
- Not just indecent, but patently offensive depcitions of sexual or excretory activities/organs
- Obscene is worse - "no essential part of any exposition of ideas," "no social value" derived, "clearly outweighed by the social interest in order & morality" (-Justice Murphy, Chaplinksy v. NH, 1942)
- C: Libel: defamation of character - speaking, print, or visual media
- not really against the gov. at all, but they get invovled when there's a case, meaning the 1st Am. becomes relevant
- Previously not a defense to say that it's true, but now if you KNOW its untrue, the target is about damaging someone through the miscommunication of ideas
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Term
Cohen v. CA (1971, 6-3)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Defendant's jacket in court says "Fuck the draft"
- Cohen given a 30 day sentence, desitrubing the peace - no actual evidence that he was disturbing the peace
- Qu: is it a violation of the first amendment right to free speech to pubish a person for the workds used to convey a message?
- Holding: Yes, it is a violation...
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Term
Cohen v. CA (1971, 6-3)
Reasoning
- Harlon OoC |
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Definition
- Cohen's action does not fit in one of the proscribable categories
- - vulgar but not obscene, no offort to "conjure up... psychic stimulation"
- - not fighting words b/c it wasn't directed at any particular person
- Does not count as invasion of privacy!
- - Courtroom not the home, can avert eyes
- States can't stop expression of ideas in order to promote morality
- Tumult, discord, offense are necessary side effects of a process of open debate
- Emotive function of particular way of expressinve ideas protected by Const, not just cognitive function
- - anger is part of the system of free expression
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Term
FCC v. Pacific Foundation (1978, 5-4)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Radio station broadcasts George Carlin's "Dirty Words" at 2pm on a Tues. afternoon
- Complaint leads to FCC finding against station, threat to license renewal
- Qu: Is it a violation of the first am. right to free speech to regulate an offensive broadcast?
- Holding: No...
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Term
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1971, 6-3)
Reasoning
- Stevens plurality opinion
- Powell & Blackmun, concurring in part |
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Definition
- Stevens: partly offensive but not obscene
- Still OK to regulate b/c proadcast protections limited
- 1. Uniquely pervasive media - enters ppls' heads and lives, can't avert eyes - privacy issue
- 2. Uniquely accessible to children
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Powell/Blackmun: Stevens only sees it as shock value, no actual value - value is irrelevant, focus on time of day
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Term
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1971, 6-3)
Dissents |
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Definition
- turn off radio
- no erotic appeal to prurient interests of children
- can ban obscene but not offensive speech!
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Term
Morse v. Frederick (2007)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- sort of a modern equivalent of Tinker
- happened outside of school itself, though this doesn't seem to be important to the Ct.
- Bong hits for Jesus, parade in Alaska, students were outside of the school building
- Qu: Is it a violation of the First Am. right to free speech to regulate student speech outside of the school building?
- Holding: No, it is not... Schools can take steps to safeguard students from speechthat can be reasonablt yaken to encourage illegal drug use
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Term
Morse v. Frederick (2007)
Reasoning
- Roberts OoC
- Alito, w/Kennedy, concurrence
- Thomas, concurrence |
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Definition
- Roberts: Tinker: only suppress speech if it would disrupt work/discipline of school
- - but Fraser (1986), Ct. moved away fromt hat standard
- Schools can infringe on rights when students are in school that could not be infringed outside the school
- - Ct. tends to make exceptions for drugs & related issues
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Alito/Kennedy: cases where students comment on social/political issues would be different
- Thomas: wants to overturn Tinker, orginialist understanding of 1st Amend. does not guarantee freedom of speech for students
- - NO free speech for student, schools have tremendous discretion in imposing punishments for rule violations
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Term
Morse v. Frederick (2007)
Dissents
- Stevens
- Breyer |
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Definition
- Stevens: taking down banner was OK, but it was silly & ambiguous, not actually advocating drug use
- Beyer: no need to invent an exception to 1st Am. - single out drug advocacy = content based restriction
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Term
Overbreadth/Chilling Effects |
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Definition
- Overly broad laws have "chilling effects" on speech
- - chills people - makes them afraid, conduct regulated by law not defined precisely enough
- - if you make people afraid to speak, it impacts the system of free speech/exchange of ideas
- law can be invalid if it sweeps broadly & raises questions about whether it interferes with protected speech
- overbroad = creates reasonable FEAR of prosecution that will make ppl afraid to speak out
- overbroad laws can be challenged pre-emptively (after enactment but before prosecution)
- - threat to free expression = less of a need for standing (conduct is still affected by law)
- - can also trike down laws even if the person charged did something outside of the 1st Amendment
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Term
RAV v. St Paul, MN
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Fighting words & overbreadth
- Crime in St. Paiul to display symbol/object that "arouses anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender"
- Cross burning in yard of only black family in town, not isolated incident
- State SC ruled that it ONLY applied to fighting words (back the US SC into a corner, not supposed to reinterpret state law)
- Question: Does speech in proscribable categories receive content-based protection?
- Holding: Yes...
- - all agreed that RAV was guilty but disagreement about the law
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Term
RAV v. St Paul, MN (9-0)
Reasoning
- 2 possible responses
- Scalia |
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Definition
- Response 1: strategy in concurrence - say law should stillbe struck down for overbreadth - applies to many cases not protected by Const., but wording too broad, may chill other Cont.-protected speech
- - fairly straightforward way of ruling law unconst., no need to overturn precedent
- Response 2: Strategy in maj. op. by Scalia - extend "content" protections to hate speech, abandon long line of precedents, allows maj. to creat broader const. prot. for hate speech
- Scalia: categorical approach in precedent must be taken in context, not literally true
- - can ban ALL proscribable speech in a cat. (fighting words), but not content based (all or nothing)
- - in St. Paul, 1 side of debate has free reign but the other subject to arrest - seeking to handicap expression of particular ideas
- - HOWEVER: this isn't about the free exchange of ideas, but using 1 form of speech to silence somebody else
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Term
RAV v. St. Paul, MN (9-0)
Reasoning
- White, "concurrence" |
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Definition
- MAJOR disagreement even though it was 9-0
- Categorical approach firmly entrenched, majority revising it for no good reason
- laws banning subset of fighting words restrict social evil of hate speech w/out creating danger of driving viewpoints from marketplace
- Acc.rding to White, Scalia - "underbreadth"
- - elevates hate speech to debate!
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Term
Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993, 9-0)
Facts
Question
Holding
Reasoning |
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Definition
- Legislators take a different approach to the same problem as in RAV: sentence enhancements for existing crimes
- Good example of a legislature getting around a SC ruling indirectly, w/out a Const. Am.
- Question: Is is a violation of the 1st Amendment right to free speech to enhance sentences for crimes involving hate speech?
- Holding: It is not... (Court upheld law 9-0)
- Rehnquist: still doesn't like hate crime laws, but has no choice in this case
- Communities can make moral judgments about the motives & make that a basis for the severity of the punishment (and they do that all the time, based on what people said or what they think!)
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Term
VA v. Black (2003)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Jury instructions in law says that a factual finding that the defendant burned a cross established intimidation - defendant can introduce evidence to the contrary, but it places the burden of proof on the defendant
- Question: Is the VA law that makes it a crime to burn a cross with "an intent to intimidate a person or group of persons" a violation of the first amendment right to free speech? (Overbreadth)
- - Note: threat & intimidations are not/never were protected under free speech
- Holding: With the specific jury instructions, it is...
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Term
VA v. Black (2003)
Reasoning
- O'Connor for the Ct.
- Stevens, concurring
- Thomas, dissenting
- Scalia, dissenting
- Souter (dissenting? concurring?) |
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Definition
- O'Connor: Law is unconstitutional WITH the jury instructions (b/c of burden of proof issue)
- - Fits w/RAV b/c cross burning is a particularly virulent form of communication (different than the broader forms in RAV)
- - State targets it for intimidation, not content
- Stevens: joins O'Conor, but sticks to RAV dissent
- Thomas: dissents - cross burning is ALWAYS intimidating
- Scalia: dissent, nothing wrong with jury instructions
- Souter: too much liek RAV - can be political message, not intimidation
- Prima facie = convictions for expression that may not be intimidating
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Term
Rust v. Sullivan (1991)
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- Question: Can legislatures do something by use of funding that they couldn't do otherwise?
- Holding: Yes... (e.g., drinking age by use of highway funds, federal funds for abortion as family planning)
- Side issue regarding statutory interpretation: The Chevron Rule (1984)
- - When a statute is ambiguous, a new Pres. administration can change the meaning of the law w/out Cong. chaning the law
- - Judicial deference: Ct. can only get involved if the new interp contradicts the statute
- Rust issue: Cong. said that no fund in Sect. 1008 shall be used in programs where abortion is a method of family planning
- - Reagan: this includes counseling concerning abortion, bans recipients from activities that encourage or promote it
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Term
Rust v. Sullivan (1991)
Reasoning
- Rehnquist for Court
- Blackmun, dissenting
- Stevens, dissenting |
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Definition
- Rehnquist: goes very quickly over statutory issue - it's ambiguous & exec has broad discretion
- Free speech: OK to set precedent to refuse to fund abortions
- - no rule that gov. subsidy of some speech means gov. must subsidize all speech (e.g., Nat. Endowment for Democracy)
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Blackmun: Ct. has never before allowed content based suppression as condition for acceptance of pub. funds
- - effort to interfere w/providing truthful info, related to exercise of a Const. right (as defined by Roe v. Wade)
- Stevens: focuses on statutory question - stated purpose of law passed was to provide better education about fam. planning opt.s
- - language clearly directed at facilities that supply abortions
- - not ambiguous, gag rule contradicts law
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Term
Citizens United v. FEC
Facts
Question
Holding |
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Definition
- US law prohibits corporations & unions from using their general treasury funds to make ind. expenditures for "electioneering communication" or for speech for/against a candidate
- - upheld by Ct. in McConnell v. FEC
- Cit.s United a non-profit conserv. poli. org.
- Made film about Hillary Clinton, shown in theaters...
- Group filed lawsuit seeking declaration from lower Ct. that they were not subject to the aforementioned law
- - wanted a statutory ruling ("as applied" - otherwise Const. law cannot be used in particular instance)
- - SC asked for reargument to go beyond stat. ruling & overturn McConnell (facial challenge - law is unconst. on its face & can never be applied)
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Term
Citizens United v. FEC
Reasoning
- Kennedy, OoC
- Scalia, w/Alito & Thomas, concurring
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Definition
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Term
Citizens United v. FEC
Dissents
- Stevens, (effing LONG) dissent in part
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Definition
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