Term
| Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) |
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Definition
FACTS: South Carolina changed the restrictions so Lucas couldn't build on land he had bought 2 years before.
QUESTION: Is the construction ban depriving Lucas of all economically viable use of his property a takings calling for just compensation under the 5th and 14th Amendments?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 6-2 for Lucas.
MAJORITY: He bought it before the law. It is a big burden because it diminishes property value, which is considered a takings. They have to compensate Lucas since they changed the rules.
also 2 categories of takings: 1. physical invasion of property 2. denial of all economic or recreational benefits of property
DISSENT: State has the right to regulate property. |
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Term
| City of Boerne v. Flores (1997) |
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Definition
FACTS: San Antonio church wasn't allowed to expand because it was in a historic preservation district. City said RFRA was unconstitutional b/c it tried to override the local ordinance.
QUESTION: Did Congress exceed its 14th amendment poewrs with RFRA (subjected local ordinances to federal regulation)?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 6-2 for city.
MAJORITY: The government is prohibited from "substantially burden[ing]" religion's free exercise unless it must do so to further a compelling government interest, and, even then, it may only impose the least restrictive burden. Congress can't determine how states enforce legislation and RFRA overly restricts states' freedom. The ordinance didn't favor 1 religion over another or prohibit free exercise. |
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Term
| Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery (1988) |
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Definition
FACTS: U.S. wanted to build a road that would damage grounds used for religious rituals by Native Americans.
QUESTION: Does this violate free exercise?
CONCLUSION: No. 5-3 in favor of Lyng
MAJORITY: incidental effects, not an attempt to coerce Native Americans. Gov't couldn't operate if it had to satisfy every citizen's needs and desires. Groups don't have veto power over programs that don't prohibit free exercise.
DISSENT: It places a burden on Native American's religion. The road could have gone around. |
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Term
| Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah (1993) |
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Definition
FACTS: Church used animal sacrifice to worship and city adopted ordinances prohibiting it AFTER they found it.
QUESTION: Does the city's ordinance violate the free exercise clause?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 9-0 for church.
MAJORITY: The ordinances weren't neutral or generally applicable. They specifically targeted this church and only religious conduct was burdened. |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: Davey sued to be able to use his state scholarship to get a theology degree.
QUESTION: Does the state have to fund religious instruction if it funds secular because of free exercise?
CONCLUSION: No. 7-2 for Locke.
MAJORITY: It doesn't single out one religion and it isn't a big burden because he can still take classes and exercise his religion.
DISSENT: It was a public benefit withheld solely because of religion. |
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Term
| Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972) |
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Definition
FACTS: Yoder (amish) was prosecuted for refusing to send his kids to school through age 16. He only wanted to send them through 8th grade because of his religion.
QUESTION: Did Wisconsin's law requiring kids to go to school through 16 violate 1st amendment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. unanimous for Yoder.
MAJORITY: It violated free exercise and placed an excessive burden on Yoder. Parents have a right to oversee their children's education. Amish are law-abiding and they don't really need the extra 2 years.
DISSENT in part: Children should have say too. |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: ACLU sued counties for displaying the 10 commandments on public buildings.
QUESTION: 1. Do 10 commandment displays in public schools and courthouses violate establishment cause? 2. Was a religious purpose enough to invalidate the display?
CONCLUSION: Yes and yes. 5-4 for ACLU
MAJORITY: Won't abandon Lemon test. The secular purpose was a sham and the real purpose was religious. The concurring opinion said government and religion should be completely separate.
DISSENT: Scalia bashes Lemon. Self-preservation of the Court (because people agree with the 10 commandments and they don't want to lose legitimacy) |
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Term
| Sherbert v. Verner (1963) |
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Definition
FACTS: Sherbert (7th day adventist) was fired after refusing to work Saturday and was denied unemployment compensation by the state.
QUESTION: Did denial of compensation violate the 1st and 4th amendments?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 7-2 for Sherbert.
MAJORITY: This imposed significant burden on her free exercise right and there was no compelling state interest to do it. There is no establishment of religion in this case.
DISSENT: Shouldn't make case-by-case exceptions. Who knows if beliefs are legitimate and who defines religion? |
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Term
| West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943) |
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Definition
FACTS: School board required flag salute in school and refusal was punished by delinquency and expulsion.
QUESTION: Does this violate 1st amendment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 6-3 in favor of Barnette.
MAJORITY: It is a form of utterance and means of communicating ideas so it is a compulsory unification of opinion. State can require teaching but not compulsion to declare a belief.
DISSENT: Federal gov't shouldn't control state. The law promoted good citizenship, which was a legitimate legislative aim. |
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Term
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Definition
To decide if there is an establishment of religion:
1. Legislative purpose must be secular
2. Primary effect must not inhibit or promote religion
3. No unnecessary entanglement between public and religion |
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Term
| Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita.... (2006) |
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Definition
FACTS: Church filed to be able to use hoasca (an illegal drug) for religious ceremonies.
QUESTION: Does the gov't have to allow the use, importation (which violates a treaty) and distribution of an illegal drug because of RFRA?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 8-0
MAJORITY: Government had no compelling interest to regulate church's drug use. Because of RFRA court must look at individual free exercise claims. |
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Term
| Employment Division v. Smith (1990) |
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Definition
FACTS: 2 Native Americans got fired from their jobs at a drug rehabilitation center because they use drugs as part of their religion. They were denied unemployment compensation.
QUESTION: Does the state law (not giving them compensation) violate free exercise?
CONCLUSION: No. 6-3 for Employment Division
MAJORITY: Beliefs and professions are protected, not actions. The law is neutral and they can't allow exceptions.
DISSENT: They should make an exception in this case because of free exercise. |
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Term
| Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) |
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Definition
FACTS: A temporary injunction kept owners from building on their land for 6 years.
QUESTION: Does this require compensation under the 5th amendment's takings clause?
CONCLUSION: No. 6-3 for Planning
MAJORITY: Property value will recover after the study is over. If they didn't allow the study or placed time restrictions on it, there would never be any studies.
DISSENT: How do you define temporary? It can go too long and in 6 years they had missed opportunities. |
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Term
| Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff |
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Definition
FACTS: Hawaii passed an act to force people to resell their land because it was owned 1/2 by the gov. and 1/2 by 72 people.
QUESTION: Does this act violate public use?
CONCLUSION: No. 8-0 for Housing Authority
MAJORITY: They can do it with just compensation to reduce the concentration of ownership. This decision should be decided by state legislatures-don't want to interfere. Just because property was transferred to private people doesn't mean it only has a private purpose. NOTE: purpose, not use |
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Term
| Kelo v. City of New London (2005) |
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Definition
FACTS: New London took property to sell to private developers to help the economy of the city.
QUESTION: Does this violate the 5th amendment?
CONCLUSION: No. 5-4 for city
MAJORITY: Economic development is like other forms of public use. It doesn't just benefit private individuals. It qualifies as public use.
DISSENT: All private property is vulnerable now if it helps the economy. |
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Term
| Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004) |
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Definition
FACTS: Newdow sued because his daughter had to listen to the words "under God" in the Pledge of Allegiance (even though she didn't have to participate) in her public school. Newdow did not have custody of his daughter b/c of divorce.
QUESTION: Did Newdow have standing to challenge this? Does reading the pledge in school violate establishment?
CONCLUSION: No, N/A. 8-0 for school.
MAJORITY: He doesn't have standing. Dodges a bullet. Concurring opinions: agree, but because they believe it does not violate the establishment clause. Pledge is patriotic, not religious. (Rehnquist, O'Connor, Thomas) |
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Term
| Van Orden v. Perry (2005) |
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Definition
FACTS: Van Orden sued because 10 commandments were displayed on state capitol grounds.
QUESTION: Does a Ten Commandments monument on the grounds of a state capitol building violate the First Amendment's establishment clause?
CONCLUSION: No. 5-4 for Perry.
MAJORITY: Lemon test doesn't always apply. 10 commandments is historical. Simply having religious content doesn't promote it. Thomas concurs-Van Orden is compelled to do anything so it's not establishment. Breyer concurs-Has a secular moral message and took 40 years for objection.
DISSENT: The sole function is to display the 10 commandments, which is religious and it's on government property. |
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Term
| Zelman v. Simmons-Harris (2002) |
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Definition
FACTS: Ohio gave checks to parents to send their kids to whichever school they chose.
QUESTION: Does the school voucher program violate the establishment clause?
CONCLUSION: No. 5-4 for Zelman
MAJORITY: Lemon test-1. purpose is to advance education (NOT religious) 2. where students go is 100% choice 3. money doesn't go right from state to religious schools. The program is neutral.
DISSENT: Stevens-Any religious connotation in public life is dangerous. Souter-Money still goes to religious schools from state. |
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Term
| Santa Fe Ind. School Dist. v. Doe (2000) |
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Definition
FACTS: Student delivered prayer over PA system before a football game.
QUESTION: Does this violate establishment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 6-3 for Doe.
MAJORITY: It is public speech and it is a school event so it's like gov. endorsement of prayer at a school-sponsored event.. It doesn't matter that the student was elected because majority will win every time.
DISSENT: Majority is overly hostile to religion in public life. Content neutrality for establishment cases is new. |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: Principal (Lee) invited a rabbi to speak at middle school graduation. Prayers were recited.
QUESTION: Does this violate establishment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 5-4 for Weisman.
MAJORITY: This creates state-sponsored religion in public school. It is subtle and indirect coercion because you pretty much have to listen. Kennedy uses psychology to argue his point.
DISSENT: Scalia calls the majority "bulldozers" of the Constitution. The psychology argument is irrelevant. Coercion is force of law or threat of penalty if you don't participate. Also brings up Pledge of Allegiance as where this could go. |
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Term
| Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) |
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Definition
FACTS: Louisiana law prohibited teaching evolution without creationism.
QUESTION: Does this violate establishment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 7-2 for Aguillard.
MAJORITY: Uses Lemon: 1. No clear secular purpose 2. primary effect advanced ideas of certian religions 3. It entangles church and state because funding goes to schools to teach a religious idea. Creationism is 1 religion so it promotes Christianity. |
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Term
| Wallace v. Jaffree (1985) |
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Definition
FACTS: An Alabama law authorized teachers to conduct regular religious prayer services and activities in school classrooms during the school day.
QUESTION: Does this violate establishment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 6-3 for Jaffree.
MAJORITY: It has no secular purpose and was an endorsement of religion. O'Connor concurs-They should have allowed secular thought at the same time (don't be so obvious, stupid). |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: Statutes made state financial aid available to church-related educational institutions. In Pennsylvania, it provided financial support for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials for secular subjects to non-public schools.
QUESTION: Do the statues violate establishment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 8-0 for Lemon.
MAJORITY: Origin of the 3 prong Lemon test. 1. Legislative purpose must be secular
2. Primary effect must not inhibit or promote religion
3. No unnecessary entanglement between public and religion. In this case, there would be excessive entanglement because gov. would oversee funds going to religious schools. |
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Term
| Rosenberger v. University of Virginia (1995) |
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Definition
FACTS: University refuses to give student activities funding to a Christian magazine.
QUESTION: Did UVA violate 1st amendment rights of the magazine by denying them funding that was available to secular magazines?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 5-4 for Rosenberger.
MAJORITY: It imposed a financial burden on Rosenberger's speech and was viewpoint discrimination. They must fund the religious publication as they would others. |
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Term
| School District of Abington Township v. Schempp (1963) |
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Definition
FACTS: Students were required to read from the Bible and recite the Lord's Prayer in public school. They could be excused with a written note from parents.
QUESTION: Does this violate religious freedom of students of the 1st and 14th amendments?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 8-1 for Schempp.
MAJORITY: Gov't must be neutral and everyone has the right to choose because of free exercise. Majority forcing beliefs is establishment. This wasn't a historical study of the bible so it's not OK.
DISSENT: Free exercise and establishment often complement each other, but sometimes they conflict. |
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Term
| Everson v. Board of Education (1947) |
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Definition
FACTS: A New Jersey law allowed reimbursements of money to parents who sent their children to school (including religious) on buses operated by the public transportation system.
QUESTION: Does this violate establishment through 14th amendment?
CONCLUSION: No. 5-4
MAJORITY: Bussing is separate and not religious. The money does not support parochial schools in any way. Establishment means "setting up."
DISSENT: Bus isn't provided by gov. directly. |
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Term
| Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights (2006) |
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Definition
FACTS: The Solomon Amendment denies federal funding to law schools if they don't allow military recruiters access like other employers.
QUESTION: Does the Solomon Amendment violate the 1st amendment?
CONCLUSION: No. 8-0 for Rumsfeld.
MAJORITY: Solomon Amendment regulates conduct, not speech. Allowing recruiters does not mean university agrees with their message so it's not compelled speech. Reasonable and unambiguous conditions. |
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Term
| Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) |
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Definition
FACTS: Dale gets fired as scout leader because he is a gay activist and it goes against their message. Dale sues b/c BSA violated a public accommodations law prohibiting discrimination.
QUESTION: Does the law violate the Boy Scout's 1st amendment right of expressive association to bar gays as leaders?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 5-4 for Boy Scouts.
MAJORITY: Homosexuality is inconsistent with scout's values. Having a gay leader would send a message contradicting their message. O'Brien test doesn't apply.
DISSENT: Boy Scout bylaws aren't clear about what "morally clean and straight" means. |
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Term
| Hurley v. Irish-American GLB Group of Boston (1995) |
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Definition
FACTS: Private group refused to put gay float in their parade. Mass. state court made them.
QUESTION: Did state court violate the groups 1st amendment rights?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 9-0 for Hurley.
MAJORITY: It is private speech so it's not part of public accommodations law. Parade is a form of expression so the private group gets to choose. |
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Term
| Wisconsin v. Mitchell (1993) |
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Definition
FACTS: A group of black guys intentionally beat up a white kid because he was white. The sentence was enhanced b/c the victims were intentional by race.
QUESTION: Is the penalty enhancement prohibited by the 1st and 14th amendments?
CONCLUSION: No. unanimous.
MAJORITY: Physical assault is not expressive conduct protected by the 1st amendment. Motive plays the same role under the Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidiscrimination laws, which have been upheld. This act inflicted greater individual and societal harm because of the discrimination. |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: Johnson sets a stolen flag on fire in front of city hall to protest.
QUESTION: If flag burning protected speech by the 1st amendment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 5-4 for Johnson.
MAJORITY: It is expressive conduct with political nature. There was no threatened or real breach of peace. Gov't can't prohibit expression. Audience being offended doesn't make it unconstitutional.
DISSENT: Flag has a symbolic nature and crosses party lines so it is unique. He could have done any other form of protest. |
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Term
| Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist (1969) |
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Definition
FACTS: Students wore black arm bands to school to protest the war and refused to remove them so they were suspended.
QUESTION: Does the prohibition of being wear the bands to school violate 1st amendment?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 7-2 for Tinker.
MAJORITY: Principals lacked justification for limits. It didn't interfere with school. It was a form of speech.
DISSENT: Black. |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: O'Brien burned his draft card at a courthouse. He was convicted.
QUESTION: Was the law an infringement on his free speech?
CONCLUSION: No. 7-1 for U.S.
MAJORITY: Established O'Brien test to determine whether governmental regulation involving symbolic speech was justified. 1. The law must be within constitutional power of the gov. 2. further an important gov. interest 3. interest must be unrelated to suppression of speech 4. prohibit no more speech than is essential to further that interest. In this case- Congress has the power to raise armies. |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: Cohen wore a "F*** the Draft" jacket in a courthouse. He was arrested under a statue prohibiting disturbing the peace with offensive conduct.
QUESTION: Did the statute violate freedom of expression?
CONCLUSION: Yes. 5-4 for Cohen.
MAJORITY: The expletive wasn't directed toward anyone. People can avert their eyes. No evidence that it provoked action. The Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas).
DISSENT: It was an immature antic, more conduct than speech so unnecessary to apply 1st amendment. |
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Term
| Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire (1942) |
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Definition
FACTS: Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, called a city marshal a "God-damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist" in a public place. He was arrested and convicted under a state law for violating a breach of the peace.
QUESTION: Does the application of the statute violate Chaplinsky's freedom of speech?
CONCLUSION: No.
MAJORITY: Some forms of expression--among them obscenity and fighting words--do not convey ideas and thus are not subject to First Amendment protection. In this case, Chaplinsky uttered fighting words, i.e., words that "inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace." |
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Term
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Definition
FACTS: Williams was convicted of pandering child pornography under the PROTECT act, which he said was overly broad.
QUESTION: Does PROTECT abridge freedom of speech?
CONCLUSION: No 7-2 for U.S.
MAJORITY: The statue was not overly broad. Scalia says the speech of an individual claiming to be in possession of child pornography in this category of unprotected speech. Requirements were clear. |
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Term
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Definition
When government takes:
1. private property for
2. public use with
3. just compensation |
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Term
| How to Amend the Constitution |
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Definition
Step 1: May be proposed -by 2/3 vote of both houses -by a national constitutional convention requested by legislatures of 2/3 of states
Step 2: May be ratified -by legislatures of 3/4 of states -by conventions called for the purpose in 3/4 of states |
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Term
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Definition
-for everyone: knowledge that info was false, reckless disregard for the truth
-for public figures: actual malice |
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Term
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Definition
| 1. plaintiff has to have suffered an injury 2. connection between injury and cause 3. likely that injury will be remedied by hurting cause |
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Term
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Definition
ripeness=case is ready and something has happened
mootness=doesn't matter |
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