Term
| traditional problem of evil |
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Definition
| the problem of reconciling the belief in the existence of a perfectly good and all-powerful God with the existence of evil in the world |
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Term
| Identify and explain why the existence of evil in the world raises a problem for the existence of the theistic (or Judeo-Christian God), given the specific characteristics of this God. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain why investigating the problem of evil for the person of faith is an exercise in “faith seeking understanding.” In other words, what the point is of investigating the problem of evil for the person of faith. (You will need to explain the important phrase “faith seeking understanding” as discussed in class. To do so, you may use the analogy of a person who you love who causes you to suffer.) |
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Definition
| "faith seeking understanding" - Anselm. faith: to have faith in another person. fundamental to faith are trust, relationship and love. it makes no sense not to become closer to that person. b/c we don't understand why God allows suffering, we are farther away from him. there will be a point at which our understanding gives out, but go as far as possible. |
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Term
| point of investigating the problem of evil for the atheist (or agnostic) |
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Definition
main reason for atheism is the existence of evil
to see whether it is rational persuasive, buy the argument
to see if someone else might find it persuasive |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the difference between friendly and unfriendly atheism is. |
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Definition
friendly theism: other people might have good reasons to believe in God; Rowe
example of plane crash - can say there are legitimate reasons for thinking they are dead after plane crash, but I can't say that
unfriendly atheism: no one has good evidence for thinking God exists; Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hawkings |
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Term
| what theism is (in the technical sense used in class) |
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Definition
(restricted) theism: God exists and this God has the characteristics of the theistic God
expanded theism: restricted theism and specific views unique to that religion |
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Term
| main characteristics of the theistic (or Judeo-Christian) God |
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Definition
| omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient |
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Term
| Identify and explain what atheism is (in the technical sense that opposes theism). |
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Definition
| denial of the theistic God |
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Term
| Identify and explain what agnosticism is (in the technical sense used in class). |
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Definition
| don't know whether theistic God exists |
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Term
| Identify and explain what moral evil is. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain what natural evil is. |
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Definition
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Term
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Definition
| an attempt to offer a credible explanation as to why the theistic God would allow creatures to suffer; the heart of most theodicies: free will |
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Term
| Identify and explain what open theism is. |
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Definition
| God has granted us morally significant free will, so can't prevent evil - takes a risk that we won't chose him |
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Term
| Identify and explain the two different version of open theism that were discussed in class and how they differ on what it’s possible for the theistic God to know. |
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Definition
OT #1: God knows exactly how any of his creatures will exercise their free will
OT #2: God doesn't know exactly how any of his creatures will exercise their free will because until they choose there's nothing to know (not denying God's omniscience) |
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Term
| Identify and explain the different senses in which the two different versions of open theism claim that the theistic God takes a “risk” by creating a world with creatures who have free will. |
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Definition
risk with OT #1: not surprised, could be disappointed
risk with OT #2: could be surprised and disappointed
two kinds of risk: (1) you are surprised by results (2) you are disappointed by results |
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Term
| Identify and explain what divine providence is (as discussed in class). |
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Definition
| God exercises control over the world (in keeping with his omnipotence) using his knowledge (in keeping his own omniscience) to fulfill his divine plan (in keeping with his omnibenevolence) |
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Term
| two claims that constitute the basic free will theodicy that is at the core of many theodicies |
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Definition
(I) Even an omnipotent God can't simultaneously [logically impossible - has an internal contraction]
(i) create a world where His creatures have free will and
(ii) prevent the existence of moral and natural evil in that world
(II) A world where (a) we have free will and there is moral and nature evil is better than a world where (b) we don't have free will and there is not moral and natural evil. |
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Term
| Identify and explain the three problems that arise for the basic free will theodicy and which of the claims each of the problems arises in connection to and why. |
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Definition
(1) Focuses on I; at most, it seems to be able to explain why God can't prevent moral evil given free will, but what about natural evil?
(2) focuses on I; if God is omnipotent, then it seems to be within his power to give us free will and prevent moral/natural evil or at least limit the amount of moral/natural evil
(3) focuses on II; why think it is true? Isn't there some moral/natural evil that's so bad that free will is simply not worth it? |
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Term
| Identify and explain the two different conceptions of hell that were discussed in class. |
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Definition
(1) punishment
(2) not a place God sends us, but the absence of/continual rejection of God, one that we have freely chosen |
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Term
| Identify and explain what morally significant free will is. |
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Definition
morally significant free will: the capacity to choose between right (not to inflict suffering) and wrong (to inflict suffering)
only humans have this - God, redeemed in heaven, and angels all don't have power to sin
without this, wouldn't have ability to enter into loving relationship with God |
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Term
| Identify and explain why arguably we must understand the reference to free will in the basic free will theodicy as referring to morally significant free will in order for that basic theodicy to be even minimally plausible. |
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Definition
looks as though God could create us without free will and prevent moral evil
if we have genuine chose between good and evil, then he can't logically prevent it
if he gives us a restricted notion of free will, he could prevent moral evil, so free will theodicy fails |
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Term
| Identify and explain what three minimal claims constitute any version of an Augustinian theodicy. |
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Definition
(1) There was a time in the past during which all of humanity was morally and spiritually perfect, thereby living in perfect union with God without any moral or natural evil (not necessarily Adam & Eve)
(2) Because they misused their free will, humanity fell into a state of moral and spiritual corruption, thereby separating themselves from God and allowing moral and natural evil into the world
(3) * in response to this fall, God has instituted a plan of atonement whose goal is to restore separated humanity to union with him
Lewis, Stump and Van Inwagen |
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Term
| Identify and explain what three minimal claims constitute any version of an Irenaean theodicy. |
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Definition
(1) reject claim that humanity was every morally and spiritually perfect
(2) we've emerged out of a gradual evolutionary process to have the capacity to freely enter into a relationship with God (concerns image stage of development)
(3) now we're in the process of perfecting ourselves (likeness stage)
Hick |
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Term
| Identify and explain the main differences between Augustinian and Irenaean theodicies. |
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Definition
Augustinian theodicy - fall from a past perfection - suffering is an attempt to return to it
Irenaean theodicy - doesn't claim there was any time we were perfect - rejects idea of fall - suffering enables us to attain a future perfection that we have never had |
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Term
| Identify and explain why understanding divine omnipotence as simply the power to do anything and everything is misleading and, in particular, why understanding it in this way is problematic for the first claim of the basic free will theodicy. |
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Definition
| Even God can't make logical contradictions true - makes the first claim seem untrue if you think God can do things that are impossible - suggests that God can even create contradictions |
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Term
| Identify and explain what it is for something to be logically impossible and what it is for something to be logically possible. |
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Definition
logically impossible - has an internal contradiction
logically possible - doesn't have an internal contradiction |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the proper way of understanding divine omnipotence is understood in term of logical impossibility. |
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Definition
| the power to do whatever is logically possible |
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Term
| Identify and explain why understanding divine omnipotence doesn’t mean that God’s power is limited in any way even though there are some things that he can’t do. |
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Definition
not as though logically impossible things are possible
not as though if God were more possible, he could do it - that defines the limits of power |
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Term
| Identify and explain how understanding divine omnipotence in this way helps clarify the first claim of the basic free will theodicy and makes it arguably more credible than it otherwise would be. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain why C.S. Lewis thinks it’s logically impossible to have genuine free will in a radically unstable world. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain why C.S. Lewis thinks the byproduct of a relatively stable world of the sort that’s necessary for free will is natural evil – and so why it’s logically impossible for the theistic God to create a world where there are creatures with free will but no natural evil. |
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Definition
| why does a relatively stable world bring natural evil? large machine with lots of gears - can't prevent creatures from getting caught up in the gears sometimes b/c it's a stable configuration. can't prevent creatures from getting caught up without radically destabilizing machine |
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Term
| Identify and explain why even though C.S. Lewis has arguably show that some natural evil is a necessary byproduct of a world where there are creatures with free will he nevertheless arguably hasn’t established that all the natural evil that exists is necessary for it and why. (The point here has to do with examples of natural evil – like Rowe’s example of the fawn – where God’s interference would not contribute to the weakening of our freedom.) |
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Definition
interference with nature would destabilize world - wouldn't have free will in an unstable world - need some natural evil
arguably some cases of natural evil where it looks like God could intervene and it couldn't destabilize the world in a way that would affect our free will
shows there might be some natural evil as a byproduct, but is all of it necessary? |
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Term
| Identify and explain the particular type evil on which Rowe focuses his discussion and which our world contains in considerable abundance. (Note: This is not referring to pointless evil; it is the form of evil that we’ve been focusing our discussions on in order to avoid any problematic associations with the word “evil”.) |
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Definition
| Intense human and animal suffering |
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Term
| Identify and explain when such evil is morally justified even though it is in itself (or inherently) bad. |
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Definition
| If the intense suffering leads to some greater good, a good we could not have obtained without undergoing the suffering in question, we might conclude that the suffering is justified, but it remains an evil nevertheless. |
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Term
| Identify and explain each of the premises of Rowe’s evidential argument from evil and its conclusion. |
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Definition
(1) If the theistic God exists, then there is no pointless suffering [theological premise]
(2) There is pointless suffering. [factual premise]
(C) The theistic God does not exist. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what pointless evil is (in the specific sense that Rowe is talking about and as identified in class). |
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Definition
| an evil that God (if he exists) could have prevented without thereby losing an outweighing good or having to permit an evil equally bad or worse |
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Term
| Identify and explain what Rowe’s challenge to the theist. In other words, identify and explain what the theist needs to do in order to plausibly show that a given example of apparently pointless evil is arguably not pointless after all. |
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Definition
Rowe's Challenge: In order to successfully show that any particular example of suffering is not pointless, we have to
(a) identify some good that's plausibly worth the suffering in question
(b) credibly explain why it's not logically possible for the theistic God to prevent that suffering without sacrificing the good we've identified |
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Term
| Identify and explain why it appears that Rowe’s example of the horribly burned fawn is a case of pointless evil. |
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Definition
| Given God's omniscience and absolute power it would be child's play for him to have prevented either the fire or the fawn's being caught in fire. Moreover, it is extraordinarily difficult to think of a greater good whose realization can sensibly be thought to require God to permit the fawn's suffering. And it is just as difficult to imagine an equal or even worse evil that God would be required to permit were he to have prevented the fawn's suffering. It therefore seems altogether reasonable to think that the fawn's suffering is a pointless evil. (informally a noseeum argument) |
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Term
| Identify and explain what current condition humanity finds itself in and so the view of humanity with which Christianity starts according to Stump. |
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Definition
On Christian doctrine, all human beings are suffering from the spiritual equivalent of a terminal disease; they have a defect in the will which if not corrected will cost them life in heaven and consign them to a living death in hell. Example: parents of a child with a terminal brain disease. child rejects notion that he is sick and refused to cooperate with treatments. there are treatments that don't guarantee success and they will be painful. would you choose to give the treatments, even if they were very painful?
Adam fell. Natural evil entered the world as a result of Adam's fall. After death, depending on their state at the time of their death, human beings either go to heaven or hell. |
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Term
| Identify and explain in what sense our wills are broken according to Stump. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain how this current condition is analogous to an addict (such as an alcoholic). |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain what will happen to us unless we’re cured of this current condition. |
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Definition
| because we are like addicts, we won't be saved (hell) |
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Term
| Identify and explain what problem this current condition of humanity poses a good and loving God and what his response to this problem is. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain why Stump thinks the theistic God can’t automatically fix our wills. |
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Definition
| To remove this defect miraculously would be to force a person's free will to be other than it is, it would consist in causing a person to will freely what he ought to will. It is logically impossible for anyone to make a person freely will something and therefore even God in his omnipotence cannot directly and miraculously remove the defect in free will, without destroying the very freedom of the will he wants to fix. |
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Term
| Identify and explain why Stump thinks we can’t fix our wills on our own. (The addict analogy is helpful here.) |
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Definition
| One necessary condition of changing your life is that they willed something different from what they previously willed. But how to change the will is the problem in the first place. It is no help to be told that of course he can change his will if he just wills to change his will. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what Stump thinks is the only way for our wills to be fixed and so what Stump thinks is the foundation of a Christian solution to the problem of evil. |
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Definition
| Let a person will that God fix his defective will. In that case, God's alteration of the will is something the person has freely chosen, and God can then alter that person's will without destroying its freedom. The fixing of a defective free will by a person's freely willing that God fix his will is the foundation of a Christian solution to the problem of evil |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the two-fold psychological state is which is necessary for us to be in before we can turn to God to ask for help. |
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Definition
(i) recognize that we are irresistibly inclined to sin (i.e., that our free wills are defective)
(ii) desired to change our situation (i.e., not want our free will to be defective anymore) |
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Term
| Identify and explain why this two-fold psychological state is necessary but why it’s nevertheless not sufficient – in fact, why it can’t be sufficient. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain how both moral and natural evil contribute to entering into this two-fold psychological state. |
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Definition
| Things that contribute to a person's humbling, to his awareness and his own evil, and to his unhappiness with his present state contribute to his willing God's help. Moral and natural evil make such a contribution. Gross moral evils show us something about the nature of man and our own successful carrying out of our no doubt smaller-scaled evil wills show us that we are undeniably members of the species. Natural evil takes away a person's satisfaction with himself. Natural and moral evil serve to make make recognize their own evils, become dissatisfied with things of this world, and turn to God. |
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Term
| Identify and explain whether moral and natural evil guarantee that we enter into this two-fold psychological state. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain when, according to Stump, suffering is morally justified. |
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Definition
| The suffering of any person will be justified if it brings that person nearer to the ultimate good in a way that he could not have been without the suffering. |
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Term
| Identify and explain the greater good that Stump identifies that it’s logically impossible for the theistic God to achieve without allowing individuals to suffer. |
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Definition
| increases chances of getting into two-fold psychological state and therefore get into heaven |
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Term
| Identify and explain what Stump’s suffering principle is, using an example to illustrate. |
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Definition
| Stump's Suffering Principle: It's logically impossible for the theistic God to allow any individual to (a) undergo involuntary suffering unless (b) the suffering in question benefits that individual (at the very least) and (c) the benefit is worth that suffering |
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Term
| Identify and explain what is plausible or attractive about Stump’s suffering principle. In other words, identify and explain why denying it is arguably problematic. |
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Definition
| If you deny it, you are saying that God allows people to suffer for no reason. It is difficult to enter into a loving relationship with someone who would allow you to suffer for no reason. Being used as a tool. Does violence to the idea that a good and loving God cares for his creatures. |
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Term
| Identify and explain how Stump’s suffering principle differs from the moderate suffering principle introduced in class. |
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Definition
| moderate suffering principle: It's logically impossible for the theistic God to (a) allow an individual to undergo involuntary suffering unless (b) the suffering in question benefits at least one individual - THOUGH NOT NECESSARILY THE ONE UNDERGOING IT and (c) the suffering is worth the benefit |
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Term
| Identify and explain the instance of evil that Stump says is unquestionably the most difficult for any attempted solution to the problem of evil. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain the problem that the suffering and deaths of infants and the suffering of animals raises for Stump’s theodicy and why specifically it is a problem, given the greater good that she says that suffering serves. In other words, identify and explain why, according to Stump’s own theodicy, it looks like the suffering and deaths of infants and the suffering of animals is pointless and so why her theodicy seems to fail at least in this respect. (The point here is that there are two options – either infants and animals have free will or they don’t – and you’ll need to explain why on either option it looks like their suffering is pointless.) |
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Definition
whether infants and animals have free will or not, Stump's idea doesn't work
if they have free will - they don't have the understanding to connect the idea of suffering with defective free wills - won't get any closer to relationship with God, which is the good the suffering is supposed to accomplish
if they don't have free will - can't fix free will from becoming closer to God, also don't receive the benefit of suffering |
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Term
| Identify and explain why Stump’s commitment to her suffering principle arguably gives rise to this problem. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain the two avenues or options there are for solving this problem with Stump’s theodicy. |
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Definition
(1) reject Stump's principle that it's specific to the person who suffered
(2) articulate another good that comes from their suffering |
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Term
| Identify and explain what van Inwagen’s theodicy of natural evil is. |
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Definition
| Prior to the fall, human beings had extraordinary cognitive powers (a) that gave them the ability to avoid natural evils, (b) that depended on their union with God, and (c) were severely diminished as a result of their separation from Him (i.e., as a result of the fall) |
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Term
| Identify and explain why reflecting on the example of feral children and the example of how we acquire language (even a foreign language) arguably lends some plausibility to van Inwagen’s theodicy of natural evil and how exactly it does so. (The point here has to do with being in the divine community and that by belonging to such a community we have abilities that we otherwise lack.) |
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Definition
feral child - one who has lived in isolation from other humans, never been exposed to language
if they have grown up like this, they lose the ability to learn a language
tells us that in order to be able to speak, have to be brought up in a certain kind of community |
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Term
| Identify and explain the problem for van Inwagen’s theodicy of natural evils raised by the suffering of animals. |
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Definition
| still suffer even though they didn't have the same fall from goodness |
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Term
| Identify and explain what van Inwagen’s natural consequences theodicy is. |
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Definition
[short version] Human beings need to realize the horrendous natural consequences of their separation from God because (a) without realizing it they would never become dissatisfied with their condition and consider turning back to God and (b) the memory of these consequences will prevent a relapse once they've gained salvation.
[longer version] In order to achieve reconciliation with God, human beings need to freely choose to reconcile with him but the motive to do so is to become dissatisfied with our present condition, which isn't possible unless we first realize the horrendous natural consequences of our separation from him so an essential part of God's plan of atonement is to allow us to live with those consequences and to thereby help us become dissatisfied with our present condition - thus giving us a motive for freely choosing to reconcile with him |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the greater good that is served by the existence of evil according to van Inwagen’s natural consequences theodicy. |
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Definition
| the only motive to choose relationship with God is to be dissatisfied with current condition which isn't possible till we see how bad things really are |
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Term
| Identify and explain what van Inwagen’s theodicy of pointless evil is. |
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Definition
| There exist individual instances of suffering that are genuinely pointless but which taken together as a set serve a point - to help us become dissatisfied with our present condition...etc |
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Term
| Identify and explain how van Inwagen’s theodicy of pointless evil fits into his natural consequences theodicy. |
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Definition
in broad terms, natural consequences theodicy: we live with natural consequences of separating ourselves from him - let us figure out what it's like to live w/o God
let all the consequences go - at end of the day, hope you see how bad things really are
one of consequences of separation is pointless evil - suffering befalls people randomly and for no purpose - that's what it is to live w/o God
hopefully will cause us to be dissatisfied |
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Term
| Identify and explain how, according to van Inwagen, individual instances of evil may be genuinely pointless but nevertheless when taken together as a whole they have a point and what he claims that point is. (In answering this question, it will be helpful to think of the example, used in class, of paperclips.) |
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Definition
analogy - paperclips together weight a lot, can't take away them all
If God removed an entire set of pointless evils, he would sacrifice a greater good
could still destroyed a woodshed with them, even if you take out one paperclip - that paperclip has no point - can be taken out without sacrificing goal |
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Term
| Identify and explain what van Inwagen’s suffering principle is. |
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Definition
| It's logically POSSIBLE for the theistic God to (a) allow an individual to undergo involuntary suffering even though (b) the suffering in question benefits no one at all |
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Term
| Identify and explain how van Inwagen’s suffering principle differs not only from Stump’s suffering principle but also from the moderate suffering principle, using an example to illustrate |
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Definition
It's logically impossible for the theistic God to (a) allow an individual to undergo involuntary suffering unless (b) the suffering in question benefits at least one individual - though not necessarily the one undergoing it and (c) the suffering is worth the benefit
Van Inwagen rejects this |
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Term
| Identify and explain the problem with van Inwagen’s theodicy of pointless evil that focuses on the idea that he has failed to make room for genuinely pointless evils. |
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Definition
Even though van Inwagen tries to make room in his theodicy for genuinely pointless evils, it seems as though he fails: the evils aren't genuinely pointless after all
(each individual instance of suffering may be pointless, but together they create a greater good. As you remove evils, the last one has a point. Minimum set of pointless evils that God allows) |
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Term
| Identify and explain the problem with van Inwagen’s theodicy of pointless evil that focuses on the idea that, even if van Inwagen succeeds in making room for genuinely pointless evils, the existence of such evils would undermine our ability to enter into a loving and trusting relationship with God. |
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Definition
| Even if van Inwagen succeeds in making room for genuinely pointless evils, then it seems that a perfectly good God who allows such evils would be difficult to trust - it would be difficult to enter into a trusting and loving relationship with such a God. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what two main demands Hick claims any theodicy must meet. |
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Definition
| (1) internally coherent (2) consistent with the data both of the religious tradition on which it is based, and of the world, in respect both of the latter's general character as revealed by scientific enquiry and of the specific facts or moral and natural evil. These two criteria demand, respectively, possibility and plausibility. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what two reasons the Augustinian model is implausible according to John Hick and what’s problematic with the two reasons he identifies. |
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Definition
| (a) a fall from a past state of perfection can't be taken seriously by contemporary educated individuals - it must be considered a myth (b) the fall can't plausibly explain specifically the existence of natural evil [presupposed Augustinian theodicy takes Adam and Eve literally] |
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Term
| Identify and explain how the Irenaean theodicy re-conceives the doctrine of the Fall. |
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Definition
| No evidence at all exists of a period in the distant past when humankind was in the ideal state of a fully realized "child of God." We can accept that, so far as actual events in time are concerned, a fall from an original righteousness and grace never occurred. We must refer to the fall as the immense gap between what we actually are and what in the divine intervention we are eventually to become. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what each of the two stages of the development is according to Hick. (These are the “image” stage and the “likeness” stage, respectively.) |
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Definition
Stage 1 (image stage): The gradual evolutionary development of a distinct species, namely a species with the capacity to know and freely love God (morally and spiritually immature)
Stage 2 (likeness stage): Stage where we realize our capacity and develop it - the realization of this capacity by means of our own free choices - we choose to develop into virtuous individuals and so choose to enter into certain kinds of relationships
after stage 2, become morally and spiritually perfect but probably doesn't happen in this world |
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Term
| Identify and explain what epistemic distance is. |
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Definition
| a distance in the cognitive dimension |
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Term
| Identify and explain what Hick says the reason God created humanity at an epistemic distance is. |
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Definition
| If humans had been created in the divine presence, they would automatically be conscious of God, the limitless reality and power, goodness and love, knowledge and wisdom, towering above. In such a situation the disproportion between Creator and creatures would be so great that the latter would have no freedom in relation to God; they would indeed not exist as independent autonomous persons. In order to be a person, exercising some measure of genuine freedom, the creature must be brought into existence, not the immediate divine presence, but at a "distance" from God. The distance must be epistemic, a distance in the cognitive dimension |
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Term
| Identify and explain what Hick says the reason God created humanity as morally imperfect being who must acquire moral perfection through our own free choices. |
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Definition
| virtues that have been formed within the agent as a hard-won deposit of right decisions in situations of challenge and temptation are intrinsically more valuable than ready-made virtues created within her without any effort on her part. A moral goodness that exists as the agent's initial given nature, without ever having been chosen in the face of temptations to the contrary, is intrinsically less valuable than a moral goodness that has been built up over time through the agent's own responsible choice in the face of alternative possibilities. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the Irenaean hypothesis is. |
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Definition
| Humanity was created (a) at an epistemic distance from God since otherwise we would have no genuine freedom to choose to enter into a loving relationship with him and (b) morally imperfect since otherwise we could not attain the most valuable kind of human goodness, which requires making free and responsible choices in the face of real difficulty and temptation. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what greater good is served by allowing individuals to undergo both moral and natural evil. (In other words, what good would be logically impossible for the theistic God to achieve without permitting both moral and natural evil.) |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain what William Rowe’s main criticism of Hick’s theodicy is. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain what skeptical theism is. |
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Definition
| view that claims that it's not reasonable for us to judge whether we'd be likely to understand why the theistic God allows both moral and natural evil to exist (not in a position to see what good comes from evil - whether or not they are pointless) |
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Term
| Identify and explain what skeptical theism is, which premise of Rowe’s evidential argument from evil it targets, and what it tries to show about that premise. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain the general form that noseeum argument all have in common. |
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Definition
I. So far as we can tell, there are no _______.
II. There are no ________. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the first (and only) premise of a noseeum argument makes it more likely than not that the conclusion is true. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain why we are justified in believing the conclusion of a (good) noseeum argument even though it’s possible for that conclusion to be false – and why the possibility of it’s being false doesn’t undermine the success of a noseeum argument. |
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Definition
| fact that you looked carefully gives you good reason to think there isn't any there. makes conclusion more likely to be true than not. increases likelihood that you're right. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the general form of the nosseum assumption that underlies all versions of the noseeum argument is. |
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Definition
| More likely than not, we'd detect the item in question if it existed (what distinguishes good and bad noseeum arguments) |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the general form of the noseeum test. |
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Definition
(1) Hypothetically, suppose the item in question exists.
(2) Ask whether it would be likely that we'd detect that item |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the relationship is between noseeum arguments, the noseeum assumption that underlies them, and the noseeum test. |
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Definition
| Whether a noseeum argument is good or bad depends on whether its underlying noseeum assumption (all noseeum arguments have an underlying noseeum assumption) is true or false. If true, it's a good noseeum argument. If false, it's a bad noseeum argument. How to tell whether the underlying noseeum assumption is true or false: run the noseeum test. If it passes, it's true. If it fails, it's false. |
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Term
| Identify and explain an uncontroversial example of a good noseeum argument and what shows it’s a good noseeum argument instead of a bad one. |
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Definition
(1) After looking in the fridge, I cannot see any Coke.
(2) There is no Coke.
Good because the noseeum argument is true. |
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Term
| Identify and explain an uncontroversial example of a bad nosseum argument and what shows it’s bad noseeum argument instead of a good one. |
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Definition
(1) After looking at the handle, I cannot see any E. coli bacteria.
(2) There is no E. coli bacteria.
Bad because the noseeum argument is false. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the atheist’s (or Rowe’s) noseeum argument from evil is and what this argument is used to establish. (In other words, what the atheist’s noseeum argument from evil relationship to Rowe’s evidential argument from evil is.) |
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Definition
(1) So far as we can tell, there is no greater good that would justify the theistic God in permitting some cases of suffering (SFAWCT, there's pointless suffering).
Given (1), it's more likely than not that (2) there is no greater good that would justify the theistic God in permitting some cases of suffering (there is pointless suffering). |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the atheist’s (or Rowe’s) noseeum assumption that underlies the atheist’s noseeum argument from evil is. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain the analogy of the parent and child we gave in class is. |
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Definition
(1) So far as the child can tell, there is no greater good that would justify his parents in allowing him to suffer (his suffering is pointless)
Given (1), it's more likely than not that
(2) There's no greater good that would justify the child's parents in allowing him to suffer (his suffering is pointless) |
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Term
| Identify and explain what the parent-child noseeum argument is, what it’s underlying noseeum assumption is, and what the parent-child noseeum test is. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain exactly why the underlying parent-child noseeum assumption fails the noseeum test. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain why the parent-child noseeum argument is arguably a bad noseeum argument. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain how the parent-child analogy (and specifically the failure of the parent-child nosseum argument) calls into question the atheist’s noseeum argument. In other words, identify and explain how the parent-child analogy suggests that the atheist’s noseeum argument is a bad noseeum argument. (The relevant point here has to do with how and why the parent-child analogy suggests the noseeum assumption underlying the atheist’s noseeum argument arguably fails the noseeum test.) |
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Definition
| there is a greater good in the parent-child analogy. the parent is trying to achieve this by allowing the child to suffer. the only way to cure them is to allow them to suffer. apply idea of noseeum argument. take perspective of argument. child can't see why he is allowed to suffer b/c lacking cognitive capacity. doesn't make it more likely that there is in fact no greater good. noseeum assumption: child would detect the reason the parents are allowing him to suffer. apply that thought to atheists case. so far as we can tell, no point to our suffering. atheist assumes we would detect the reason for our suffering. suppose theistic God exists and there is a reason for suffering. it is not likely we would detect the reason we are allowed to suffer in each and every case. |
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Term
| Identify and explain what it means for a (valid) argument to be rationally persuasive. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain why, if the skeptical theist’s criticism of the atheist’s noseeum argument is successful, then the evidential argument from evil fails to be rationally persuasive. |
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Definition
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Term
| Identify and explain Rowe’s response to the parent-child analogy. In other words, identify and explain why Rowe thinks that even if we grant (for the sake of argument) that the analogy succeeds in showing that his atheist’s noseeum argument is bad, the analogy is otherwise a failure. (Here the point has to do with how we would expect a truly good and loving parent to behave in the face of a child whose suffering is incomprehensible to him or her, why the theistic God doesn’t seem to behave that way, and what appears to follow from this apparent fact.) |
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Definition
| Rowe grants that parent-child analogy shows his noseeum argument is false. But a good parent would do everything to comfort them and show their love to them. Hold their child's hand along the way. Why doesn't God do this? Since some of the suffering is incomprehensible, we need to be comforted. |
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Term
| Identify and explain the response to Rowe’s point about the failure of the parent-child analogy that’s available to the theist, namely, the response that suggests we can draw on Hick’s idea of “epistemic distance” to address Rowe’s point and how that would work. |
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Definition
| Can say Rowe is correct, but can appeal to idea of epistemic distance. Good reason for his behavior based on this. If he revealed himself, would take away our free choice to choose him. |
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Term
| Identify and explain the additional response to Rowe’s point that’s available to the theist that draws on the idea of what the theistic God has revealed to his creatures in holy scripture (at least according to the theist). |
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Definition
| Deny claim that God doesn't try to comfort us. Arguably, he does so in scripture. Says he is there and to trust him. One is granting Rowe's claim that God doesn't reveal himself. Other says God does reveal himself. |
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