Term
tolerance argument for moral skepticism |
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Definition
- If we accept moral objectivism, then we must believe that the moral views of different people and cultures are not equally plausible
- We can be tolerant only if we believe that all moral views are equally plausible
- Conclusion: if we accept moral objectivism, then we cannot be tolerant
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Term
The disagreement argument for skepticism |
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Definition
- If there were correct answers to moral questions, there wouldn’t be a lot of disagreement about them
- But there is a lot of disagreement about moral question
- Conclusion: Therefore, there are no correct answers to moral questions—objectivism is false and skepticism is correct
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Term
moral progress problem for skepticism |
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Definition
a. We tend to think that our society and other societies have progressed over history. These progressions seem to be improvement, which also means that our morals have gotten better.
b. Many societies that used to condone slavery now condemn it (relativism would say that slavery was moral in the past because society condoned it)
d. If relativism is true, this doesn’t count as moral progress
i. In the case of relativism no one is correct, it is just a change of mind.
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Term
the moral equivalence problem for skepticism |
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Definition
a. Relativism and subjectivism mean that every moral belief if equally correct, however, some moral beliefs are clearly better than others
i. Ex: Hitler’s beliefs vs Gandhi’s beliefs
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Term
2 principles of utilitarianism |
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Definition
i. An action is right if and only if it produces the best results of all the potential actions open to you
ii. The best results are to be measure in terms of overall happiness or well-being
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Term
difficulties with utilitarianism |
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Definition
i. How do we measure well-being?
ii. Is utilitarianism too demanding?
iii. Does utilitarianism tell us to commit acts of injustice?
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Term
Kantian ethics principle: |
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Definition
a. The principle of humanity: Act so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only
i. Humanity: rational and autonomous beings
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Term
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Definition
we can deliberate about our goals and how to achieve them |
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Term
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Definition
we are each responsible for the choices we make and how we pursue our goals; we are free to choose how to act |
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Term
problems with kantian ethics |
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Definition
i. What does it mean to treat someone as as an end and not only as a means?
ii. Does Kantian ethics entail that animals and non-rational humans have no moral worth?
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Term
principles of virtue ethics |
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Definition
a. Focuses on evaluating people/character
b. There are many moral principles but ethics can’t be reduced to just one principle. There are all kinds of principles but there are no magial principles
c. being virtuous is a necessary component of a good life
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Term
principle of deterrence theory |
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Definition
We should punish people because it will incapacitate criminals and deter potential criminals
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Term
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Definition
by imprisioning or executing a criminal, we prevent that person from committing crimes in the future |
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Term
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Definition
by punishing a criminal, we prevent other people from committing crimes in the future |
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Term
the deterrence argument (and arguments against the premises) |
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Definition
- the death plenalty deters considerably more potential murderers than life imprisionment without parole does
- we ought to use whatever penalty deters the most murderers
- conclusion: therefore, we ought to use the death penalty
Argument against premises 1: research in inconclusive on whether capital punishment deters more muderers |
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Term
Principle of the Best Bet argument |
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Definition
best bet arguments offers a deterrence argument without knowing whether capital punishment actually deters
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Term
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Definition
i. worst cast scenario if we keep CP: some murderers needlessly die
ii. worst case scenario if we abolish CP: some innocents needlessly die
iii. Best Case scenario if we keep CP: some innocents are saved
iv. Best case scenario if we abolish CP: some murderers are saved
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Term
principle of retributivism |
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Definition
a. the principle of desert—people ought to be treated in the same way that they have voluntarily treated others
b. consists of two main principles:
i. we ought to punish criminals because they deserve to be punished
ii. a punishment should be proportional to the crime: more severe crimes should get more severe punishments
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Term
retributivist argument (and arguments against the premises) |
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Definition
- some criminals deserve to be killed
- therefore, laws that prohibit the death penalty prohibit killing ciminals who deserve to be killed
- laws that forbid killing criminals who deserve to be killed are morally impermissible
- conclusion: therefore, laws that prohibit the death penalty are morally impermissible
argument for Premise 1:
- eye fore an eye:
- criminals deserve that the state do to them what they have done to their victims
- some criminals have killed their victims
- conclusion: some criminals deserve to be killed by the state
- proportionality:
- the more serious the crime, themore serious the punishemtn deserved by the criminal
- there is no limit to how severe a crime can be
- conclusion: some crimes are so sever that the criminal deserves to be killed
- restitution:
- a criminal deserves whatever punishment provides restitution to the victims of the crime
- killing a murderer will provide restitution to the victim
- conclusion: some criminals deserve to be kills
Arguments against Premise 3
- a punishment is unjust to the actual victim only if the punishment is so slight that it trivializes the harm done by the murderer
- life imprisionment doens't trivialize the harm done by the murderer
- a punishment is unjust to future victimes if it fails to prevent them from becoming victims
- it's not clear whether the death penalty deters
- therefore, punishing a murdere with life imprisionment isn't unjust to the actual victim and it's not clear whether it's unjust to potential victims
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Term
bedaus's criticism of the retributivist argument |
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Definition
- any plausible system of punishment will incorporate retributive elements
- criminals deserve to be punished
- punishment should be proportional to the crim
- but these principles by themselved don't entai that murderers should be executed
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Term
argument for executing innocents |
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Definition
i. Laws that result in the death of innocent people are morally impermissible
ii. Laws that allow the death penalty result in death of innocent people
iii. Conclusion: laws that allow the death penalty are morally impermissible
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Term
race of the defendant effect |
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Definition
a. is the death penalty applied more frequently to African americans?
i. 12% of US population is black
ii. 43% of death row inmates are black
iii. however, Cassell says that we should not compare population of blacks to the percentage of black death row inmates, instead we should compare the percentage of adults charged with murder who are black and the inmates on death row who are black. In this case, 48% of adults charged with murder are black and 43% of death row inmates are black
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Term
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Definition
a. black defendants who kill white victims are more likely to receive the death penalty than white defendants who kill white victims
b. Cassell’s objection to race of the victim effect:
i. 95% of murders that are intraracial are rarely death-eligible
ii. black on white murders are more likely to have aggravating factors than black/black or white/white murders
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Term
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Definition
completed projects of which we are proud, the pursuit of our goals aesthetic enjoyments, friendships, intellectual pursuits, and physical pleasures” |
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Term
Marquis uses a sufficient condition or necessary condition in his FLO argument? |
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Definition
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Term
implications of the FLO account |
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Definition
i. It is possible that some animals have FLOWs, and if so, the FLO account entails that killing them is wrong
ii. The FLO account does not entail that euthanasia is permissible or impermissible, but it is compatible with either
iii. Uses the fallacious inference that because the fetus is a potential person, it has the rights of an actual person
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Term
major rivals of the flow account |
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Definition
i. The desire account: killing is wrong because it frustrates the victim’s strong desire to continue living
1. Marquis’s objection: its wrong to kill people who don’t desire to live, or even people who desire not to live
a. Ex: unconscious people, teenager planning to commit suicide
b. As a sufficient condition for the wrongness of killing, the desire account is fine, but not as a necessary condition
2. Marquis’s second objection: we desire life because we value the goods of life, the goods of life don’t depend on our desire for them
ii. The discontinuation account: killing is wrong because it causes the discontinuation of the victim’s present experiences, projects, and activities
1. Marquis’s objection: this account makes no reference to the value of present experiences. Maybe the person detests the current state that they are in.
a. Ex: What about a person in severe pain which can’t be relieved except by death
iii. The “value implied a valuer” objection that states: one’s future is valuable only if one values one’s own future. Fetuses cannot value their futures, therefore, their futures are not valuable to them.
1. Marquis’s response:
a. Even if I don’t value my future, someone else might
b. Your future can be valuable to you even if you don’t currently value it
i. ex: suicidal young person
iv. The contraception objection
1. The sperm or ovum has a FLO even before fertilization
2. Contraception deprives sperm and ova of their FLOs
3. If the FLO account is correct, the depriving something of its FLO is wrong
4. But it’s not wrong to use contraception
5. Conclusion: the FLO is incorrect
a. Marquis’s response: there is no non-arbitraty way to determine what has lost its FLO. In this case there is no actual FLO until the combination of the sperm and the egg..
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Term
Thompson's overall argument |
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Definition
a. Thompson argues that even if the fetus does have a right to life, it does not outweigh the woman’s right to control what happens to her body. Moreover, the fetus does not have the right to use the woman’s body unless the women explicitly granted that point
b. She looks at different reasons as to why the fetus might have a right to use the woman’s body and none of them work
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Term
arguments used by thompson |
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Definition
i. The violinist
1. The violinist has the right to life but does not have the right to use your body
2. The right to life doesn’t give someone the right to use another person’s body without their consent
ii burgaler and people seeds
1. you are partially responsbile for the burlar entering your house and taking your things
2. but you havn't given him the right do so do
iii. brothers and chocolates
2. just becuase the older brother ought to share his chocolate with the younger brother doesn't mean that the younger brother has a right to the chocolate
iv. Good Samaritan argument
1. laws do not require people to be good samaritans it only requres them to be a minimally decent samaritan
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Term
Hursthouse's argument using virtue ethics |
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Definition
i. Whether an abortion is morally permissible depends on the circumstances and your reasons for seeking the abortion
ii. If a woman decides to have an abortion in order to pursue other worthwhile pursuits, that may be the right reason
iii. But having an aborting in order to pursue some other pursuit that isn’t worthwhile may be unjust, unkind, or selfish
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Term
Warren's criteria for personhood |
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Definition
i. Consciousness, particularly the capacity to feel pain
ii. Reasoning, capacity to solve new, complex problems
iii. Self-motivated activity
iv. Capacity to communicate
v. Self-awareness
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Term
How warren applies the personhood criteria |
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Definition
1. A person doesn’t need to meet all of the criteria but it needs to meet at least some of them
2. Non-persons have no moral obligations
3. Non-persons have no moral rights |
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Term
problems with warren's personhood argument |
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Definition
1. What about sleeping people? Comatose people? Infants?
2. Potentiality argument:
a. Fetuses are potential persons
b. It is morally impermissible to kill a potential person
c. Conclusion: it is impermissible to kill a fetus
i. However, being a potential driver doesn’t give you the rights of an actual driver
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Term
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Definition
fills us in on the history of capital punishment. Opposed to capital punishment because of the least invasion argument. |
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Term
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Definition
o Best bet argument
o Should use capital punishment for Retrubutive and deterrant
o Poigman says that retribution is different than vengeance because if we were executing based off of vengeance we could only kill guilty people based on people feelings. If we forgave the murderer vengeful feelings would be erased and we should no longer kill the murderer.
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Term
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Definition
o Biased and racial of capital punishments |
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Term
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Definition
o Objects to the death penalty on the bases of administrative objections
o Arbitrarily applied
o Execution of innocents
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Term
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Definition
o Criticized the administrative objections
o He gives multiple arguments for capital punishment
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Term
3 assumptions of Shafer-Landau |
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Definition
o religious belief is necessary for oral motivation (our reading argues against this)
o god is the creator of morality (our reading argues against this)
o religion is an essential source of moral guidance (we do agree with this)
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