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| An argument is something that gives a reason for belief. Most of the arguments philosophers concern themselves with are deductive arguments. An argument is deductively valid (or for short, "valid") when the conclusion logically follows from its premises. It is important to note that an argument can be valid even if its premises are false. Therefore, validity is a property of the argument's form. |
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An argument is invalid when the premises are true and the conclusion false. However, an argument can be invalid even if its conclusion is true.
Example of an invalid argument:
If P, then Q.
Q.
Therefore, P. “The fallacy of affirming the consequent” |
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A valid form of argument in logic that follows:
If P, then Q. If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.
P. Socrates is a man,
Therefore, Q. Therefore, Socrates is mortal.
It is important to remember that the premises do not need to be true for the argument to be valid by modus ponens. |
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Descartes provides the dreaming argument as the second level of skeptical doubt about the external world.
The dreaming argument: Suggests I cannot know anything about the external world on the basis of perception.
An interpretation of the dreaming argument schematized:
1. If you can’t know that you are not dreaming, then you can’t know anything about the external world on the basis of perception
2. You can’t know that you are not dreaming
Therefore, 3. You can’t know anything about the external world on the basis of perception → valid by modus ponens
The dreaming argument has limited force because it does not call into question that our external world consists of physical objects that exist in both space and time.
Furthermore, we can question whether dream states can be distinguished from waking states by some “dream-like quality.” |
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| Three levels of skeptical doubt about the external world |
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Definition
René Descartes introduces the idea of skepticism of the external world in his work Meditations on First Philosophy. In Meditations, Descartes poses the question: Is our perception accurate of the external world or does our perceptual access deceive us? It is the gap between the two that is the breeding ground for Cartesian doubt. Descartes provides three levels of skeptical doubt, each one increasing in its doubt about the external world.
1. Perceptual error: Consists of illusions or hallucinations which occur occasionally; Calls into question particular beliefs about my immediate surroundings.
2. The dreaming argument: Suggests I cannot know anything about the external world on the basis of perception.
3. The evil demon argument: Calls the very existence of an external world into question. |
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| Skepticism about other minds |
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Definition
| Descartes's "cogito" argument shows that the knowledge of our own mind is quite secure but that problematizes the knowledge we know of everything outside of our minds. The skeptic about other minds denies that we have knowledge about other minds. For example, the Inverted Spectrum case suggests that we do not know that my perception of red is the same as yours. According to the Inverted Spectrum example, it is possible that whenever you see a red object, it looks to you as a green object looks to me. Furthering this idea, John Locke poses the question: If we both agree the color is red, then we both agree that the sensation is associated with red but that does not mean we experienced the same sensation. |
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| Three levels of skeptical doubt about other minds |
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Definition
1. Lies, self-deception, misunderstandings, etc- Calls into question particular beliefs about other people’s mental states
2. Systematic Deception (The Truman Show)- Suggests I cannot know anything about other people’s mental states (whether they’re happy/sad, etc.)
3. Zombies; automata (Stepford Wives) - Calls the very existence of other minds into question |
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| Behaviorism is the doctrine that mental states are simply behavioral dispositions. A behavioral disposition is a tendency to exhibit certain types of behavior under certain circumstances. For example, I will shriek in apparent pain if you pinch me. So I have a behavioral disposition to shriek when pinched. According to behaviorists, a person is in pain if and only if that person instantiates appropriate behavioral dispositions. Behaviorism offers a metaphysical theory of the mind, and thereby dissolves skepticism about other minds. |
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| Metaphysics studies the nature, constitution, and structure of reality. Philosophers frequently adopt radical metaphysical theories in order to avoid unattractive epistemological conclusions. For example, Berkeley adopted the metaphysical theory of idealism in order to avoid skepticism about the external world. |
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| Epistemology is the study of human knowledge and human justification. Epistemology also concerns itself with the nature of reasonable belief: what is reasonable to believe and what is not? A major goal of contemporary epistemology is to refute skepticism about the external world (Descarte's legacy). |
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Cartesian dualism is the doctrine that thinking beings possess immaterial souls entirely distinct from their physical bodies. According to Cartesian dualism, minds are not located in physical space although they are closely associated with bodies, that are located in physical space.
>Associated with interactionism |
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To say that a state of affairs is conceivable is to say that we can coherently think about it.
For Descartes, this means we can "clearly" and "distinctly" think about it. |
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When we say that some state of affairs is “metaphysically possible,” we are saying that this is a way the world might have been. Therefore, these state of affairs don’t in fact obtain in our world, but they could have obtained if the world had been different.
[image] |
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| The conceivability argument |
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Definition
| The conceivability argument is the argument that Descartes offers for Cartesian dualism and is formalized by: 1. If I can conceive of some state of affairs without contradiction, then that state of affairs is possible (God could bring it about). 2. I can conceive of myself as existing without my body, 3. Therefore, it is possible for me to exist without my body. 4. But it is not possible for my body to exist without my body existing 5. Hence by Leibniz’s law, I am distinct from my body. Once you grant premise 1 of the argument, the others move forward easily. |
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The amnesia argument illustrates how the slide from conceivability to possibility can generate philosophical errors.
1. If I can conceive of a state of affairs, then that state of affairs is possible. (not a possible state of affairs)
2. I can conceive of a world in which I exist but Michael Rescorla does not exist.
Therefore, 3. It is possible for me to exist without Michael Rescorla existing.
But, 4. It is not possible for Michael Rescorla to exist without Michael Rescorla existing.
Hence (by Leibniz’s law), 5. I am not Michael Rescorla.
According to Arnauld, a similar type of fallacy informs Descartes’s “conceivability argument." Examples in which something is apparently conceivable but not possible:
Arnauld’s triangle, the amnesiac professor. |
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Antoine Arnauld provides the example of Arnauld's triangle in response to Descartes's Sixth Meditation to show how the slide from conceivability to possibility produces philosophical error. Arnauld uses the triangle example to show that the mere fact that Descartes can conceive of some state of affairs does not show that the state of affairs is possible. For instance, someone might imagine a triangle such that the square of the hypotenuse does not equal the sum of the squares of the two sides. But, by the pythagorean theorem, no such triangle is possible.
>Also, the amnesia argument. |
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Definition
Every physical event has a physical cause. So every movement of my body has a physical cause. But, if a given bodily movement also has a mental cause, then the movement would be causally overdetermined.
>Causal Overdetermination is a consequence that is associated with accepting both dualism and interactionism. By accepting both dualism and interactionism, we must hold that either:
1. The mind can interfere with the physical forces impacting the body, thus violating the laws of physics, or
2. The mind simply reinforces the physical forces impacting the body, thus entailing massive causal overdetermination.
Both alternatives seem unacceptable. Thus, dualists seem forced into epiphenomenalism. But epiphenomenalism seems implausible. |
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| A doctrine proposed by Malebranche that states that the appearance of causal interaction between mind and body is some kind of systematic illusion. Occasionalism and pre-established harmony are defenses for dualism and interactionism. Occasionalism and pre-established harmony are not attractive philosophical positions; they seem more like desperate reactions to epiphenomenalism. |
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| Pre-established harmony is a doctrine proposed by Leibniz that states that the evolution of our mental and bodily states being in agreement with each other has been caused by God so that our actions co-occur. Occasionalism and pre-established harmony are defenses for dualism and interactionism. Occasionalism and pre-established harmony are not attractive philosophical positions; they seem more like desperate reactions to epiphenomenalism. |
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| Materialism is the doctrine that everything that exists is physical (material). According to materialists, the mental is not some separate realm apart from the physical. The mental is just an extremely complex manifestation of underlying physical phenomena. Materialism easily accommodates that there are causal interactions between mind and body. If the mind is just a complex physical phenomenon, then there is no mystery about how the mind can causally interact with physical entities. In other words, unlike dualism, materialism seems to avoid epiphenomenalism. |
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Unlike dualists who claim that the world contains two distinct types of stuff: physical stuff and mental stuff,
Monists claim that the world contains only one type of stuff. Some monists (idealists-Berkeley) claim that the world contains only mental stuff. Other monists (materialists) claim that the world contains physical stuff. Materialism (physicalism) and idealism are two opposing views of monism. |
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The Turing test is a test developed by Alan Turing in 1950. A machine passes the Turing test if we cannot distinguish the machine from another human being. The Turing test raises the philosophical question: if a computer passed the Turing test, would that mean that it was able to think? There are three possible views of the Turing test:
1. If a machine passes the Turing test, then it can think -
Alan Turing sometimes seems to endorse this position. But it is problematic. It basically seems to presuppose some kind of behaviorism.
2. No machine can think. A machine that passes the Turing test can only simulate thought - It seems to enshrine a very parochial kind of chauvinism about the mind.
3. If a machine passes the Turing test, then that provides us with good reason to believe that it can think -
This seems like the most plausible of the three reactions to the Turing test; It is also more plausible that machines can think or reason rather than experience emotions. Still, this provides at best a very weak reason for believing that a machine thinks.
Ex. If you take an HIV test it doesn’t necessarily mean that you have HIV, it just shows evidence that you have HIV. |
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| Proposals 1-7 about personal identity |
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Definition
Proposal 1: Person A and person B are numerically identical if and only if A has the same soul as B.
Proposal 2: Person A is numerically identical to person B if and only if A and B have the same body.
Proposal 3: Person-stage A* and person-stage B* are stages of the same person if and only if the later stage can remember events experienced by the earlier stage.
Proposal 3 Reformulated: Person-stage A* and person-stage B* are stages of the same person if and only if they belong to a chain of person-stages such that each stage can remember events experienced by the immediately preceding member of the chain.
Proposal 4: Person-stage A* and person-stage B* are stages of the same person if and only if the later stage appears to remember events experienced by the earlier stage and those apparent memories are “caused in the appropriate way."
Proposal 5: Person-stage A* and person-stage B* are stages of the same person if and only if they belong to a chain of psychologically continuous person-stages, and, moreover, there does not exist some distinct chain of psychologically continuous person-stages that include A*. Proposal 6: Person A and person B are the same person if and only if they have the same brain.
Proposal 7: A* and B* are stages of the same person if and only if they are stages of some chain of psychologically continuous person-stages and that psychological continuity is underwritten by a single brain persisting through the entire chain. |
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| Gretchen’s Kleenex box example |
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Definition
| In John Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Perry explains the relationship between personal identity and immortality using Gretchen's Kleenex box example. Gretchen offers the example of a Kleenex box that is set on fire and whose ashes are flushed down the toilet. Gretchen argues that while there could be an exactly similar Kleenex box that reappears at home, it could not be identified as the original Kleenex box because it does not share both the intrinsic and extrinsic properties of the original. According to Gretchen, although an indiscernible Kleenex box could share the same intrinsic properties as the original, such as its cardboard exterior and soft tissue interior, it could not share its extrinsic properties, such as its spatio-temporal properties, because there is but one object. Therefore, Gretchen’s Kleenex box example makes the distinction between qualitative identity and numerical identity, asserting that even exact similarity does not amount to the conception of personal identity that concerns questions of immortality. |
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| Numerical versus qualitative identity |
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Definition
1. A and B are qualitatively identical if they share exactly the same properties (they are “exactly similar” or “indiscernible.”)
2. A and B are numerically identical if they are one and the same object (A=B). For example, Superman and Clark Kent are numerically identical. However, two indiscernible pieces of chalk or two indiscernible kleenex boxes are not numerically identical but at best qualitatively identical. |
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| Intrinsic versus extrinsic properties |
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Definition
An intrinsic property is a property that a thing has of itself, independently of other things, including its context. An extrinsic property is a property that depends on a thing's relationship with other things.
Qualitatively identical objects don’t need to share both the intrinsic and extrinsic properties. They only need to share their intrinsic properties. On the other hand, numerically identical objects must share both intrinsic and extrinsic properties. |
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Definition
The clone argument pushes the boundaries of our concept of personal identity. The argument arises by supposing a scientist created a clone of you and made sure that the clone was genetically indistinguishable from you. Would that clone be you? Would you and the clone be numerically identical? The answer is no. The clone argument is schematized as:
1. I am standing at location x.
2. My clone is not standing at location x.
3. Therefore (by Leibniz’s law), I am not my clone.
You and your clone have different extrinsic properties and are thereby not numerically identical. |
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Definition
The ship of Theseus is a thought experiment that pushes the boundaries of our concept of a person. The ship of Theseus says that when a board decays, the board is replaced with a new plank of wood. When every board of wood on Theseus's ship is replaced with a new plank of wood-- is this the same ship? What kind of changes can a ship survive and still be the same ship? The ship of Theseus poses the question: What is intrinsic to us? What can change about us and still remain as ourselves?
Once Leibniz’s law is properly formulated, the law is perfectly consistent with the obvious fact that objects change over time. Leibniz's Law Reformulated to account for change over time follows: If A and B are numerically identical, then, for every time t, if A exists at time t and has certain properties at t, then B must also exist at t and must have those same properties. |
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Definition
Physical continuity - sameness of some physical entity; sameness of body or brain; an object tracing a continuous path in space and time; there can be no gap in point A to point B; For example, if an object puffs into existence somehow, we would say that that object does not possess physical continuity.
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Term
| The body switching objection |
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Definition
In John Perry's A Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality, Sam proposes the body-switching objection that is formalized by:
1. I could occupy a body distinct from my present body.
2. In such a case, person A (“me on monday”) would be numerically identical to person B (“me on Tuesday”), even though person A and person B would occupy different bodies.
Therefore, 3. Personal identity does not just amount to bodily identity.
However, just because Sam can conceive of himself occupying a body distinct from his present body does not entail that such a state of affairs is possible. We've proven this with the amnesia argument and Arnauld's triangle which object to Descartes's conceivability argument. |
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Definition
| According to Sam, a person-stage is a “time-slice” of a person, taken at a given moment. Once we accept Sam’s notion of a person-stage, we can reformulate the problem of personal identity as follows: Under what conditions are person-stage A* and person stage B* stages of the same person? Sam offers us his first version of Proposal 3: Person-stage A* and person-stage B* are stages of the same person if and only if the later stage can remember events experienced by the earlier stage. |
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| Reid’s brave officer counter-example |
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Definition
| Sam's proposal 3 is false, as is demonstrated by a famous counter-example from Thomas Reid. The argument is schematized: A = the person who was flogged B = the person who took the standard C = the person who was made a general 1. According to proposal 3, A=B and B=C; 2. It follows from logic that A=C (transitivity of identity); 3. But proposal 3 entails that A≠C; 4. This is a contradiction; Hence, proposal 3 is false. Proposal 3 Reformulated: Person-stage A* and person-stage B* are stages of the same person if and only if they belong to a chain of person-stages such that each stage can remember events experienced by the immediately preceding member of the chain. |
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| The transitivity of identity |
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Definition
| Valid inference rule in logic that states if A=B and B=C, then A=C. |
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Term
| Apparent memory “caused in the appropriate way” |
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Definition
According to David Cohen, the difference between real and apparent memory is that real memory is “caused in the appropriate way,” while apparent memory is not.
Proposal 4: A* and B* are stages of the same person if and only if the later stage appears to remember events experienced by the earlier stage and those apparent memories are “caused in the appropriate way.”
As Gretchen puts it, proponents of Proposal 4 “analyze personal identity into memory, and memory into apparent memory which is caused in the right way. A person is a certain sort of causal process.”
The key point here: Proposal 4 evades the circularity of Proposal 3 by explaining memory without invoking personal identity. (false by Reid?) |
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Term
| Chain of psychologically continuous person-stages |
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Definition
Proposal 4: A* and B* are stages of the same person if and only if they belong to a series of psychologically continuous person stages.
A crucial point: the later stage must actually remember events experienced by the earlier stage. It’s not enough merely to seem to remember those events. (Menorah Ex.) |
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| David Cohen’s menorah example |
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Definition
Menorah ex - david menorah example is best shows it can be your memory, something you experienced but its not caused in the appropriate way;
is example that you can have an apparent memory that you experienced but is not something that you actually remember / difference between seeming to remember something and actually remembering something; we need the notion of apparent memory caused in the appropriate way |
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> Shows Proposal 4 to be false (person is sort of causal process/possesses psychological continuity)
Phenomenon of duplication relates to the idea of psychological continuity.
The duplication argument assumes that if psychological continuity holds between the original person and each successor person, we get the absurd result that the successor persons are the same person as each other.
A = the magician before machine turns on B = the magician in the auditorium C = the magician in the water tank By Proposal 4, B=A and A=C. By logic (transitivity), B=C. But B is not C. They are clearly distinct (for instance, they occupy different spatio-temporal locations). This is a contradiction, so Proposal 4 is false. |
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| Brain-based psychological continuity |
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Definition
This is the concept in Proposal 7: A* and B* are stages of the same person if and only if they are stages of some chain of psychologically continuous person-stages and that psychological continuity is underwritten by a single brain persisting through the entire chain.
Brain-based psychological continuity (Proposal 7) abandons the alleged advantages of psychological continuity views.
It no longer seems so easy to acquire justified beliefs about personal identity, even about my own personal identity. (How do I know my brain hasn’t been switched?)
It no longer seems to explain why personal identity seems so important to us. (Why should I care about keeping this very brain, which I’ve never seen?)
Moreover, Proposal 7 cannot explain our intuitions about body switching. |
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| Essay question 1: What is idealism? How is it supposed to provide a response to the evil demon scenario? |
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Definition
Idealism is a metaphysical thesis proposed by Bishop Berkeley that suggests all reality is a construct out of mental phenomena. Idealism espouses the idea that "Esse est percipi" (to be is to be perceived). Therefore, the physical universe is itself a construct of our ideas. Physical objects are simply collections of ideas. Idealism is supposed to provide an answer to the evil demon scenario by arguing that there is no gap between ideas of reality and reality itself. The evil demon scenario hinges on the Cartesian doubt about our perceptual access to the external world. Idealists argue that we should remove this gap because there is no mind-independent reality that's distinct from our ideas.
A fundamental problem for idealism:
If “esse” is “percipi,” then how can an object, such as a table, exist unperceived?
When we all leave a room, does the furniture inside the room cease to exist?
Berkeley’s Rejoinder: Even when no human perceives an object, God perceives it at all times. Thus, the object continues to exist, because it consists of ideas in the mind of God.
The idealist seems to guarantee our knowledge of an external world only by insisting upon an extremely implausible view of the world. |
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| Essay question 2: What is the argument from analogy? What conclusion is it supposed to establish? |
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Definition
The argument from analogy states that two things are alike in a certain respect because they are alike in other respects.
Bertrand Russell on the argument from analogy: 1. A usually causes B, and usually only A causes B. 2. B occured. 3. Therefore, A also occurred. For example, 1. Pain usually causes pain-behavior, and usually only pain causes pain-behavior. 2. Pain-behavior occurred. 3. Therefore, pain occurred. More rigorously, (from last example): 4. But, I did not myself experience any pain. 5. Therefore, someone else experienced pain. An objection to the argument from analogy: How could it be legitimate to extrapolate from one single case, my own, to conclude that pain-behavior is in general caused by pain? What could license such a bold inference? |
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| Essay Question 3 - What is the argument from doubt? Explain how the argument involves an illegitimate use of Leibniz’s law. |
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Definition
Descartes offers the argument from doubt to strengthen Cartesian dualism and prove that his mind and body are distinct from each other.
Formalization of the argument from doubt:
1. I can doubt the existence of my brain and my body. (First meditation & evil demon)
2. I cannot doubt the existence of my mind.
3. Therefore, (by Leibniz’s law) my mind is not the same thing as my brain or body.
The formulation of Leibniz’s law that is used in this argument is: if A and B do not share all the same properties, then A and B are not the same object.
Descartes’s argument from doubt is fallacious because it involves an illegitimate use of Leibniz’s law because it is applied to an intensional state (doubt in this case but can also include belief, justification, and knowledge.)
Example of an invalid use of Leibniz’s Law:
Lex Luthor doubts that Superman exists.
Lex Luthor does not doubt that Clark Kent exists.
Therefore (by Leibniz’s Law), Clark Kent and Superman are not the same person.
This is a contradiction, therefore, we cannot legitimately employ Leibniz’s law to argue that A and B are distinct entities in cases concerned with doubt.
We have yet to isolate a compelling argument for Cartesian dualism. |
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| Essay Question 4 - What is interactionism? What is epiphenomenalism? Explain why interactionism is extremely plausible, while epiphenomenalism is extremely implausible. Then explain the doctrine of pre-established harmony, and evaluate whether this doctrine helps epiphenomenalism appear more plausible. |
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Definition
| Interactionism is the doctrine that the mind can enter into causal interactions with the physical world. The most famous example of interactionism is Cartesian dualism which argues that thinking beings' immaterial souls can interact with their physical bodies. In opposition to interactionism, the concept of epiphenomenalism states that the mind has no causal impact on one's body. Interactionism is an extremely plausible philosophical position based on our common-sense beliefs because it appears to be a feature of everyday experience. For example, the physical world influences my experience through my senses, and I often react behaviourally to those experiences. There is, therefore, a massive natural prejudice in favor of interactionism. On the other hand, epiphenomenalism is an extremely implausible philosophical position based on our intuition about the interaction between mind and body. For example, it seems like my thoughts impact my speech and my actions. Although interactionism appears more plausible, the doctrine of pre-established harmony attempts to suggest that interactionism is false and that epiphenomenalism is a less problematic philosophical position. Pre-established harmony is a concept proposed by Leibniz that states that the evolution of our mental and bodily states in agreement with each other has been caused by God so our actions co-occur. Although pre-established harmony tries to defend both dualism and epiphenomenalism, it seems to be a desperate reaction and fails to be very convincing. |
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| Essay Question 5 - Many contemporary philosophers argue that dualism leads almost inevitably to epiphenomenalism. Explain this argument as convincingly as you can. How compelling do you find the argument? |
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Definition
Explain dualism, and interactionism
Then explain the results of this (violating laws of physics & causal overdetermination)
Explain why epiphenomenalism argument is compelling but seems implausible based on our intuition and common-sense |
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| Essay Question 6 - What does it mean to claim that the mental supervenes upon the physical? How does the inverted spectrum pose a difficulty for the thesis that the mental supervenes upon the physical? |
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Definition
Supervenience is the doctrine that, if two entities share all the same physical properties, then they also share all the same mental properties.
Mona Lisa forgery example: if two paintings share all the same physical properties, then they share all the same aesthetic properties (one can’t be beautiful while the other is not).
Philosophers describe this view by saying that the mental supervenes on the physical.
In slogan form: You can’t have a change in mental states without having a corresponding change in physical states.
So, Supervenience seems like the most minimal possible form of materialism (everything that exists is physical (material)). However, the Inverted Spectrum example poses a difficulty for materialism & supervenience. According to materialism, mental states are just complex physical states. So, if two subjects are physically identical, then they must also be mentally identical. However, in the inverted spectrum there are two people (normal and abnormal) who are physically identical but mentally distinct. When normal views a strawberry, they have the sensation of red. When abnormal views the same strawberry, they have the sensation of green. Therefore, in the Inverted Spectrum example, it appears as though the mental does not supervene on the physical since they share all the same physical properties but have distinct mental properties.
>Rejoinder for the Inverted Spectrum: Only shows that normal and abnormal are conceivable. As we’ve seen, conceivability does not entail possibility.
>Nagel and the subjective character of experience; abnormal and normal have distinct mental states because of the subjective chracter of experience. Materialism does not give a satisfactory account of consciousness (the qualitative aspect of experience). |
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