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Definition
Entities of a given "higher level" kind are nothing more than collections or arrangements of entities of a different "lower level" or more "basic" kind.
To say that As reduce to Bs is to say that As are nothing more than Bs
SMART believes in this. |
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Term
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Definition
| Laws in one theory (the reduced theory) can be expressed by laws of another theory (the reducing theory) or the theoretical entities of a given "higher level science can be defined in terms of the theoretical entities of a more basic science. |
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Term
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Definition
An objection to reductionism.
Each mental kind/state is in a one:many relationship to physical kinds.
Identity is a one:one relationship
Therefore, mental kinds are not physical kinds.
Mental kinds are abstract relative to physical kinds. |
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| Grain Objection to the Multiple Realizability Thesis |
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Definition
| Of course if you characterize mental kinds coarsely and neural kinds finely, then it will turn out that they stand in a one:many relationship. Fodor says we should characterize mental kinds more finely. |
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Definition
Natural kinds are not alway physical kinds. Fodor believes that a kind needs to be explained in a set of laws-- different kinds figure in different sciences, in the laws of different scientific theories.
e.g. money in economics. |
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| Dennett's beliefs on kinds |
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Definition
| Dennett opposes Fodor and says that what Fodor thinks of natural kinds are just scientific kinds. In Dennett's mind, for something to be a natural kind, it must be a natural grouping of things: what makes the members of a kind all belong together is independent of human interests and activities. |
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| The future of psychology to Smart, a reductionist |
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Definition
| Mental phenomena are neural phenomena and the core of folk psychology will reduce to neuroscience. (Objection to this is multiple realizability) |
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| The future of psychology to Fodor, an intentional realist/non reductionist |
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Definition
| Mental phenomena exist but are not essentially neural and neither folk psychology nor scientific psychology will reduce to neuroscience. However, there will eventually be a developed scientific psychology, and thus, folk psychology will be vindicated. |
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| The future of psychology to Churchland, an eliminativist |
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Definition
| Psychology will be replaced by or eliminated in favor of neuroscience eventually. Psychology is just (completely, hopelessly) wrong-- propositional attitudes are illusions. There will never be a developed scientific psychology. |
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Term
| Folk Psychology, in a broad sense |
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Definition
| The ordinary pre-scientific menas by which we navigate our social world. |
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Term
| Fodor's view on folk psychology |
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Definition
| He's a realist about folk psychology-- folk psychology's account of our internal activities is right but its's the causal states it posits that aren't interesting from a physical perspective. Unless folk psychology turns out to be getting right what's going on iside of us, then it's wrong. |
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| Churchland's view on folk psychology |
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Definition
| If mental kinds turned out to be neural kinds, he would believe folk psychology. Right now, folk psychology is explanatorily impotent, stagnant, has intentional idioms that are systematically isolated, and is a radically inadequate account of our internal activities. It also does not map onto lower-level kinds and doesn't account for large swaths of human "mental life." That being said, Churchland is a realist about folk psychology, he's just a skeptic who says that it's inadequate. |
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Term
| Dennett's view on folk psychology |
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Definition
Ultimately, when we have a better understanding of the nervous system, we'll have a scientific psychology.
Dennett is an instrumentalist, and believes that folk psychology doesn't aim to tell the truth, it just aims to be useful-- it allows us to manipulate or predict the unobservable portions of the world.
Dennett is an interpetationalist, and believes that folk psychology, instead of trying to tell about hidden, internal activities, tries to talk about behavior. Dennett likes the Verifiability Theory of Meaning (meaning of statement is it's method of verification) but believes that the entire system of mentalistic ascriptions is what must be related to the full body of behavior instead of the piece meal production that the VTM deals with. |
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Term
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Definition
| The view according to which scientific theories purport to tell us how things really are; they aim to be true. They aim to tell us about the hidden, unobservable structures of the world. Churchland and Fodor are both realists about folk psychology. |
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Term
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Definition
| scientific theories don't aim to tell the truth, they just aim to be useful-- allow us to manipulate or predict the unobservable portions of the world. Dennett is an instrumentalist. |
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Term
| Lycan's Moorian Argument Against Eliminativism |
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Definition
When the battle is between common sense and some grand metaphysical theory, common sense should win. Numerous common-sense ascriptions are more plausible than are the purely philosophical premises of any argument designed to convince us to the contrary. In order to argue for eliminativism, you would need a philosophical premise. And, according to common sense, the eliminativist conclusion is false. Common sense always wins.
Opposes the premise that "the only real kinds are scientific kinds" |
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Term
| Fodor's beliefs on mental states |
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Definition
Fodor is an intentional realist, and believes in the language of thought hypothesis-- mental states are attitudes towards symbols in a language of thought.
He believes that there are sentences in the brain. He also believes that mental states are discrete, causally effective internal states. (e.g. taking an umbrella cause it's gonna rain is different mental state than taking an umbrella cause it's sunny.) |
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Term
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Definition
Dennett is an interpretationalist.
Interpretationalism posits that the truth of intentional statements doesn't depend on there being any discrete representation states in my bring corresponding to them or their contents.
The truth of a mental ascription depends on the usefulness of the ascription and how well it allows you to predict behavior. |
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Term
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Definition
| Cause and effect is what's important: If Bill desires to eat something, there's an internal state of Bill that's caused by a sensation of hunger and that causes food-seeking behavior. |
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Term
| Nagel's Argument: What it's like to be a bat |
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Definition
Premise 1: Facts about conscious experience are essentially perspectival-- they're facts about what it's like to BE a subject of an experience and have those experiences.
Premise 2: Facts delivered by science are objective or prespectiveless-- they go beyond any perspective, describing the things themselves. Science offers the "view from nowhere"
Conclusion: there are facts about conscious experience that science cannot deliver. Science cannot capture the subjective nature of consciousness. |
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Term
| Levine's Argument: The Explanatory Gap |
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Definition
Science can't provide facts about consciousness, facts about what it's like to be conscious. Science can't tell us WHY it's like what it's like.
So, while we can describe heat as the motion of molecules, describing heat as the firing of H fibers or feeling heat as being in functional state H, leaves something unexplained.
Phenomenal properties aren't causal properties. |
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Term
| Jackson's Argument about Conscious experience and qualia |
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Definition
Thought experiment in which woman who knows all physical facts about color but has never experienced what it is like to see red.
Supports Qualia Epiphenomenalism- qualia are just byproducts, non-causal, non-physical properties of experience.
Proof:
p1: prior to leaving b&w room, mary knows all physical facts about color vision & experience.
p2: upon leaving b&w room, mary learns a new fact-- what it's like to see red
c: there are some non-physical facts.
(Some would say that either a. Mary didn't know all physical facts or that b. Mary didn't learn a new fact, she learned a skill.) |
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Term
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Definition
| Believe there is no such things as qualia-- they don't exist. Nothing has the private, intrinsic, qualitative properties of seeming red or seeming sweet, etc. |
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Definition
| Qualia are likely to be physical, we just don't understand them because we're just primates. |
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