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P1) If x and y are identical, they share all the same properties (indiscernibility of identicals) P2)The mind has properties that the brain lacks (consciousness, intentionality, subjectivity, mental causation) C)Mind and brain are discernible Armstrong's objection: (subjectivity=I can feel pain, but you can't feel my pain: brain is objective, mind is subjective) subjectivity is wrong b/c it only states that my mind and your mind is different, it doesnt state that my mind and my brain aren't identical (introspection vs. visual, 2 diff. relations) Reply: If brain is x (objective) and mind is y (subjective), then x and y do not equal, and therefore the brain and the mind do not equal |
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C)The mind equals outward behavior plus disposition to behave. Armstrong's objection: The mind is active and dispositions are not active; therefore, mind doesnt equal outward behavior/disposition to behave. Reply: Although dispositions aren't active, physical behavior is active x=mind, y=physical behavior+disposition x=active, y=active |
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Compatibalism (soft determinism) |
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1) Determinism is true (transitive) 2) Actions are free, no coercion 3) Actions are caused by inner states Taylor's Objection: False because if actions are determined, the agents who performed them could not have done otherwise Reply: The claim "I could have done otherwise" just means " I would have done otherwise had my inner states been different" Reply inadequate: if determinism is true, we have no control over previous events that caused inner states (no control= no free will) |
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Taylor's Theory of Agency |
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1) reasons influence but do not cause actions performed by agents 2) An action is free if it is caused by the agent, and nothing caused the agent Van Inwagen's Objection: An action is not free because the decision caused the action (decisions explain action, not reasons) Reply: The agent is the agent cause of the decision to act (the agent is responsible for their actions through their decisions-causation is transitive) Reply is inadequate: In taylors argument, agent=decision, agent=action, no explanation for action, van inwagen circles to original theory |
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Principle of Alternate Possibilites: If a person is morally responsible for his or her actions, than they could have done otherwise. Frankfurts argument: False because Jones 4 ("Black" would have intervened had Jones 4 not acted in the way Black wanted him to, but Black never intervened, and Jones 4 doesnt know Black existed) is morally responsible although he still could not have done otherwise b/c "Black" would have intervened. Determinist Objection: Jones 4 is not morally responsible because previous actions caused Jones 4 to act (inner states, no free will=no moral responsibility) Compatibilist Reply: Jones 4 is morally responsible b/c even though his inner states caused his actions, the claim "I could have done otherwise" also means "I would have done otherwise had my inner states been different" (control=moral responsibility) |
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Descartes' Dream Argument |
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P1) We cannot be certain that we aren't dreaming right now P2) If so, then there are grounds for doubting all beliefs based on experience C)Doubt all beliefs based on experience Putnam's Objection: We have direct experience of our lives, which entails that we are in fact, not dreaming because in order to refer to something (such as a book), we have to have direct/indirect experience of it. Reply: Wouldn't dreaming be qualified as an indirect experience, and therefore, couldn't we refer to a book indirectly through a dream? |
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Descartes' Evil Demon Argument |
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P1) We don't know for certain that there isn't an evil demon decieving me P2) If so, we have basis for doubting all beliefs based on experience and reason C) Skeptical based on reason Putnam's Objection: No direct/indirect acquintance with an evil demon, we can't refer to it as true Reply: We have meaningful reference to this evil demon indirectly. If there is some basis of doubt, there is no foundation for knowledge. |
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P1) The claim that "I am a brain in a vat" is false, regardless of whether or not I actually am a "brain in a vat" (can only refer to something if you have indirect/direct experience of it) P2)If so, then there is no basis for thinking "I am a brain in a vat" C)No basis for skepticism (knowledge is possible) Objection: How can I believe Moses to be true when I in fact have never seen Moses and cannot prove he existed? Reply: Indirect experience-by word of communication, learned someone else's experience leads to it becoming my own experience and therefore my own knowledge |
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P1) I believe truely and with justification that someone in my office owns a ford, even though I do not know that someone owns a ford. C) If so, then knowledge isnt true, justified belief and Platos definition is false Objection: Not enough justification, source of truth and justification come from different places/illigitamate source (P1) Reply: According to Nozick, justification isn't needed for knowledge, you just have to be working correctly (the human body/mind are mechanisms that work together). And therefore you have knowledge if external conditions are satisfied. |
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P1)When the fool hears "something which nothing can greater be concieved", he understands what he hears P2)If so, it exists in his understanding P4)If it exists in his understanding, it either exists only there, or also in reality P5) It cant exist in fools understanding alone, b/c then there is limitations P6) It exists in reality P7)It is God (perfect being), God exists Objection: Throughout premises, "it" refers to "the words" and not the idea. P5 is false b/c a description can exist just in the mind. P7 is false b/c is suggests that God is part of a language and not a being Reply: Change P2 to "If so, then what is described exists in his understanding" Reply is inadequate: If change P2, according to Armstrong the mind and the body are the same and if the description exists in the mind, but not in reality, then it excludes Armstrong's idea |
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P1) Some things undergo change (accidental vs. substantial) P2) If something changes, it is caused to change by something else ( material, potentiality, formal, actuality) P3) But the chain of causes cannot go back to infinity P4) There has to be an uncaused, first cause P5) This is God, God exists Objection: P2 is false because can't we change our appearance ourselves, for example, cut off our hand, change our hair color, etc. Reply: The hand and the hair didnt change themselves, you did, which is a separate cause of the change. |
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