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1. According to the introductory essay in our text, an argument is
A. a fight.
B. a set of statements one of which is the conclusion the others are premises which purport to support the conclusion..
C. a formal dispute involving evidential bases including sense experience as well as more esoteric proof.
D. a disagreement
E. none of the above. |
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2. An objection to a premise is
A. a reason to think that the premise is false.
B. a reason to think that the premise is true.
C. a reasoned defense of a premise.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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3. A defense of a premise is
A. a reason to think that the premise is false.
B. a reason to think that the premise is true.
C. a reasoned objection to a premise.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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4. The introductory essay in our text evaluates an argument for the conclusion that studying philosophy is valuable .Which of the following function as presmises in that argument?
A. money can't buy happiness.
B. the instructor loves philosophy.
C. everyone loves philosophy
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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5. When a philosopher justifies a claim, she
A. gives reasons to reject the claim.
B. gives up on the idea that the claim can be clarified.
C. gives reasons to believe the claim.
D. objects to the claim.
E. none of the above. |
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6. The fact that the Gods fight among themselves and disagree with each other about many things
A. is a reason to think that Euthyphro is right when he says that piety is "that which is loved by the Gods".
B. is a reason to think that Euthyphro is wrong when he says that piety is "that which is loved by the Gods".
C. is irrelevant to the rightness or wrongness of any of Euthyphro's attempts to define piety.
D. is an argument for the conclusion that relativism about piety is impious.
E. none of the above. |
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7. Socrates is on his way to respond to the indictment that
A. he has murdered his father.
B. he has corrupted the youth of Athens.
C. he has murdered his uncle.
D. his father murdered a farm worker.
E. none of the above. |
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8. By asking for the "form" of piety, Socrates is asking for:
A. an example or set of examples of pious acts.
B. someone to tell him why anyone cares about piety.
C. a definition or account of piety itself.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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9. Which of the following best expresses Descartes’ motivation to write the Meditations?
A. Descartes was a very religious man, and he was having a crisis of faith.
B. Descartes wanted to provide a justification for the reign of Queen Christina of Sweden.
C. Descartes was bothered by the fact that many of his previously held opinions had turned out to be false..
D. Both A and B.
E. All of the above. |
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10. In Meditation I, Descartes proposes to
A. withhold assent from beliefs which are not plainly certain and indubitable.
B. recognize that all of his beliefs are plainly false.
C. attempt to secure a foundation for his beliefs.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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11. According to the dream argument in Meditation I,
A. everyone dreams in color.
B. Descartes reasons that he must withhold assent from all beliefs based on sense experience.
C. there are no definite signs to distinguish dreaming from waking.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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12. According to the evil genius argument in Meditation I,
A. Descartes discovers the indubitable truth that there is an evil genius
B. Descartes reasons that he can doubt that he exists when he is thinking
C. Descartes considers the possibility that the evil genius is deceiving him.
D. Both A and C.
E. All of the above |
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13. In Meditation II,
A. Descartes finds an indubitable belief.
B. Descartes reasons that he cannot doubt that he exists when he is thinking.
C. Descartes argues that he can be certain that he has a body.
D. Descartes shows that he knows everything there is to know about wax by consulting his sense experience.
E. Both A and B. |
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14. According to the standard or traditional conception of knowledge,
A. knowledge is impossible.
B. knowledge is justified, true, belief.
C. knowledge requires abilities that approximate the diety.
D. knowledge is the kind of thing that very few people care about.
E. All of the above. |
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15. In Meditation II,
A. Descartes finds no indubitable beliefs.
B. Descartes reasons that he cannot doubt that he exists when he is thinking.
C. Descartes argues that he can be certain that he has a body.
D. Descartes shows that he knows everything there is to know about wax by consulting his sense experience.
E. Both A and B. |
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16. According to the amended version of standard or traditional conception of knowledge, motivated by Descartes’ insistence that knowledge requires certainty
A. knowledge is impossible.
B. knowledge is conclusively justified, true, belief.
C. knowledge requires abilities that approximate the diety.
D. knowledge is the kind of thing that every person cares deeply about.
E. All of the above. |
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17. Descartes's argument in Meditation III is question-begging, because
A. the conclusion follows from the premises.
B. one premise says that anything with objective reality must ultimately be caused by something with formal reality
C. two of the premises presuppose the truth of the conclusion that he can trust that clear and distinct ideas will get him to the truth.
D. the premises of the argument purport to support the conclusion.
E. none of the above. |
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18. Descartes's argument in Meditation III is question-begging, because
A. premise one presupposes the conclusion that God exists.
B. one premise says that anything with objective reality must ultimately be caused by something with formal reality
C no premise presupposes any conclusion.
D Both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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19. According to the distinction between objective and formal reality in Descartes's Meditation III,
A nothing has both kinds of reality..
B. nothing has objective but not formal reality. y
C nothing has either kind of reality.
D anything that exists objectively must exist formally.
E. none of the above. |
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20. According to Descartes's Meditation III, one must distinguish between objective and formal reality as follows:
A a thing is objectively real just in case it exists independently of any reference to minds, while a thing is formally real just in case it exists because someone is thinking about it.
B. nothing can be both objectively real and formally real.
C objective reality involves existing as an object of thought, while formal reality involves mind-independent existence.
D both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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21. According to the clearest interpretation of Locke’s distinction between ideas and qualities,
A. both ideas and qualities exist only when someone thinks about them.
B. ideas exist in minds, and qualities exist in bodies.
C. ideas exist in bodies, and qualities exist in minds.
D. neither ideas nor qualities exist at all.
E. none of the above. |
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22. According to the clearest interpretation of Locke’s distinction between ideas and qualities,
A. neither ideas nor qualities exist at all.
B. ideas exist in minds, and qualities exist in bodies.
C. qualities cause ideas.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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23. According to Locke, examples of secondary qualities include
A. extension.
B. motion.
C. number.
D. smells.
E. none of the above. |
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24. Which of the following function as premises in Locke’s arguments for the conclusion that our perceptions are caused by external qualities?
A. our senses confirm each other.
B. one who lacks a sense organ will lack the ideas associated with that organ.
C. certainty is required for knowledge.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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25. Which of the following is not a premise in Locke’s arguments the conclusion that our perceptions are caused by external qualities?
A. our senses confirm each other.
B. one who lacks a sense organ will lack the ideas associated with that organ.
C. certainty is required for knowledge.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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26. Locke and Descartes agree that
A. knowledge requires certainty.
B. knowledge requires truth.
C. we have knowledge of our world only if we have knowledge of a mind-independent external world.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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27. According to Berkeley, the only way to answer the skeptic
A. is to reject the idea that knowledge requires truth.
B. is to reject the idea that the common sense world is a mind-independent external world.
C. is to accept the idea that God controls everything in the mind-independent external world.
D. both A and B.
E. All of the above. |
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28. According to Berkeley,
A. primary qualities are the only real qualities.
B. unicorns are as real as tables and chairs.
C. common sense objects pop in and out of existence.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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29. Berkeley
A. agrees with Descartes and Locke that knowledge requires certainty.
B. agrees with Locke that our ideas are caused by external qualities.
C. agrees with Locke and Descartes that finding an answer to the skeptic is very important.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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30. According to Berkeley:
A. Sensible qualities exist in the external world.
B. The external world consists of material objects.
C. Our minds maintain the continuity of the external world.
D We cannot have an idea of God.
E. "Sensible things" are things that are perceived mediately by the senses. |
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31. Berkeley is
A. a skeptic.
B. an idealist.
C. someone who thinks that common sense objects like tables and chairs don’t exist.
D. Both A and B.
E. None of the above. |
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32. Which claim would Berkeley reject?
A. Common sense objects like tables and chairs really do exist.
B. Common sense objects are sensible.
C. Material objects like tables and chairs really do exist.
D. Sensible objects consist of sensible qualities.
E. Both A and C. |
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33. According to Reid, a first principle is a claim that
A. one cannot deny
B. one cannot argue for
C. one must search for evidence to support it.
D. Both A and B.
E. None of the above. |
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34. According to Reid, a first principle is a claim that
A. is very hard, but not impossible, to argue for.
B. is easily argued for.
C. is very hard to believe.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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35. According to Reid, a first principle is a claim that
A. is easily argued for
B. cannot be argued for
C. is very hard, but not impossible, to argue for.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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36. Reid is
A. a skeptic
B. an idealist
C. a defender of common sense
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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37. Which of the following counts as a first principle, according to Reid?
A. Any claim made on the basis of a distinct perception can be accepted as knowledge.
B. There are cherry trees in the quad.
C. A golden mountain must be square.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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38. According to Reid,
A. our claims about our mental states are easily justified, but our claims about material objects are hard to justify.
B. neither our claims about material objects or our claims about our mental states can be justified.
C. our claims about material objects are as easily justified as our claims about our mental states.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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39. Sextus Empricus argues for skepticism on the basis of
A. the claim that nothing can be like an idea but another idea
B. the assumption that the world consists entirely of ideas
C. the claim that objects appear differently depending on the circumstances
D. Both A and B.
E. None of the above. |
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40. Sextus Empricus argues for skepticism on the basis of
A. the claim that our knowledge of our mental states is no more or less secure than our knowledge of common-sense objects.
B. the claim that objects appear differently depending on the circumstances.
C. the claim that we might be dreaming
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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41. Sextus Empricus argues for skepticism on the basis of
A. the claim that objects appear differently depending on the circumstances
B. the claim that we can’t determine which of the many different perceptions of an object is the right one
C. the claim that even when one person prefers one perception over another one, there is no reason that can be offered for the preference
D. both B and C.
E. all of the above. |
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42. Sextus Empiricus is
A. a skeptic
B. an idealist
C. a defender of common sense
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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43. According to Sextus Empiricus,
A. we can explain the many different ways an object appears to us, but we can never say how that object really is.
B. we can never know anything about the appearance or about the reality of an object.
C. we can know about the reality of an object but not about how it appears to us.
D. we can know about the reality of an object and about the many ways it appears to us.
E. none of the above. |
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44. According to Sextus Empiricus, any attempt to defend a criterion that will show which sense-impression is the “right one” will fail because
A. the defense will be self-evident, available to the natural light of reason and thus a priori
B. the defense will be impossible to understand
C. the defense will be either circular or involve an infinite regress.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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45. According to the introduction to Chapter 6, philosophers make which of the following assumptions when they deliberate about the justification of government?
A. governments employ coercive means to control their citizens.
B. governments extract economic resources from their citizens.
C. governments use force and the threat of force to restrict the behavior of citizens.
D. all of the above.
E. none of the above. |
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46. According to a social contract theory, the fundamental justification of government is traced to
A. God who anoints the ruler.
B. the social utility that each citizen realizes by being governed.
C. the consent of the citizens.
D. all of the above.
E. none of the above. |
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47. According to Hobbes, people in the state of nature
A. are always in that condition which is called war.
B. might be at peace or might be in that condition which is called war.
C. live in undeveloped conditions which are called primitive.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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48. For Hobbes, prudence means
A. glory, competition, and diffidence.
B. paying one’s bills.
C. proper action, especially regarding relations between men and women.
D. caution in particular with respect to social relations.
E. wisdom in general with regard to practical matters. |
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49. According to Hobbes, in the state of nature
A. there is no law of nature.
B. the law of nature requires that you respect the property rights of others.
C. the law of nature obligates man to seek peace.
D. all of the above.
E. none of the above. |
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50. According to Locke, people in the state of nature
A. are always in that condition which is called war.
B. might be at peace or might be in that condition which is called war.
C. live in undeveloped conditions which are called primitive.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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51. Hume argues that
A. social contract theories fail to justify government.
B. no appeal to consent will succeed in justifying government.
C. there is no justification for government.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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52. Hume argues that
A. social contract theories successfully justify government.
B. no appeal to consent will succeed in justifying government.
C. there is no justification for government.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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53. According to Locke, in the state of nature
A. one is still obligated to keep one’s promises.
B. the law of nature requires that you respect the property rights of others.
C. the law of nature obligates man to refrain from harming others.
D. all of the above.
E. none of the above. |
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54. According to Locke, once citizens have consented to the creation of a government,
A. that government can never legitimately be dissolved.
B. the only way to dissolve the government is by illegitimate force.
C. that government can be legitimately dissolved if it acts contrary to the trust of the citizens.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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55. Hume’s fundamental criticism of social contract theory
A. turns on a distinction between tacit consent and mere acquiescence.
B. argues that there is no possible justification of government.
C. rejects the claim that consent confers justification.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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56. Who would agree with the following claim? Those people who are in a state of nature are necessarily at war.
A. Locke.
B. all political philosophers.
C. Hobbes.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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57. According to egalitarianism, justice requires the following sort of distribution of social goods:
A. economic goods and other social benefits should be distributed according to the merit of individual citizens.
B. economic goods and other social benefits should be distributed equally among all citizens.
C. the government should not be involved in distributing goods, since the market should take care of that.
D. the government should decide who is in most need and distribute the goods accordingly.
E. none of the above. |
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Definition
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58. Nozick’s entitlement theory
A. emphasizes liberty and is suspicious of governmental power.
B. emphasizes equality and the importance of the equal distribution of resources.
C. rejects any appeal to property rights as relevant to the distribution of resources.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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59. According to Nozick’s view, whether some particular distribution of holdings is just depends
A. on whether the distribution satisfies a pattern.
B. only on the justice of the transactions that produced that particular distribution.
C. on whether the distribution yields equal holdings to all involved.
D. on the social status of the parties involved.
E. only on the end result. |
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60. Nozick claims that according to historical principles of justice (as opposed to end-result principles):
A. whether a distribution is just depends only on how the distribution came about.
B. a distribution can be just even if some citizen have lots while others have very little.
C. no unequal distribution can be just.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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61. Nozick claims that according to end-result principles of justice (as opposed to historical principles):
A. whether a distribution is just depends only on how the distribution came about.
B. a distribution can be just even if some citizen have lots while others have very little.
C. no unequal distribution can be just.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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62. Nozick introduces the rectification consideration when determining the principles of justice in holdings because:
A. the first two principles of justice in holdings failed to consider the fact that some people acquire things by stealing or defrauding others.
B. it is too hard to determine when someone has justly acquired something.
C. you could justly acquire something, but you still might not deserve it.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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63. Rawls defends a theory of justice
A. which is based on the social contract views of Locke and others.
B. which rejects the social contract views of Locke and others.
C. which is not really about justice at all, since it is not about criminal cases.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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64. Which of the following best captures Rawls’s idea of the original position?
A. It corresponds to an actual state of nature, probably in Africa.
B. It corresponds to the state of nature in the traditional theory of the social contract.
C. It is understood to be a purely hypothetical state.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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65. According to the second principle of justice (the difference principle),
A. no social inequality is just, since equality requires that everyone is treated equally.
B. any social inequality is just as long as they result in benefits for everyone, especially the least well-off.
C. there is no injustice in a situation where some have lots more than others, if that situation is one where everyone has more than they would have if everyone had exactly the same.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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66. Which of the following are hidden behind the veil of ignorance?
A. social class.
B. natural intelligence.
C. athletic ability.
D. economic status.
E. all of the above. |
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67. According to the Rawlsian interpretation of the priority of liberty,
A. liberty has an absolute priority and thus can never be compromised, even for a short time.
B. once the basic liberties have been established, one cannot trade one of those liberties for economic advantage.
C. considerations of liberty do not come into play until the equal distribution of resources has been realized.
D. both A and B.
E. all of the above. |
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68. According to Rawls, maximin is
A. the most reasonable alternative to the difference principle.
B. a conservative, risk-aversive principle of decision making.
C. always the best principle of rational choice.
D. the right principle of rational choice, when in the special conditions specified by the original position.
E. both B and D. |
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69. Nozick criticizes Rawls’s difference principle on the grounds of an asymmetry. Which of the following best captures that asymmetry?
A. while both the less well endowed and the more well endowed gain by cooperating with each other, if they cooperate according to the difference principle the less well endowed gain more.
B. everyone has a reason to cooperate, since everyone’s security is severely compromised in the state of nature.
C. many well endowed people make substantial contributions to charitable causes, thus redistributing their wealth according to considerations they find most compelling.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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70. According to Nozick,
A. a just distribution of resources should not try to nullify the accidents of natural endowment.
B. a just distribution of resources should magnify the accidents of natural endowment.
C. a just distribution of resources can be consistent with the accidents of natural endowment.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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71. Nozick and Rawls both believe that
A. holdings derived from the government ought to be equal, unless there is a moral reason for inequality.
B. holdings derived from free transactions between citizens ought to be equal, unless there is a moral reason for inequality.
C. there is no clear sense in which we deserve (either morally or otherwise) our natural talents and endowments.
D. both A and C.
E. all of the above. |
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72. Which of the following best captures the dialectical point of Nozick’s example about the distribution of grades?
A. deciding from behind the veil of ignorance what grade everyone should get is fair.
B. by analogy, the original position is not a good way to decide what justice requires.
C. only smart, energetic people would want to decide from behind the veil of ignorance what grade everyone should get.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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73. Which of the following claims is accepted by Nozick but rejected by Rawls?
A. citizens should pay taxes to support the government’s efforts to provide security to its citizens.
B. the government cannot legitimately tax its citizens for the purposes of redistributing resources to achieve equality according to the difference principle.
C. there should be a government to protect citizens from the dangers of the state of nature, and citizens should pay to support that government.
D. both A and C.
E. all of the above. |
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Definition
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74. Which of the following claims is accepted by Rawls but rejected by Nozick?
A. citizens should pay taxes to support the government’s efforts to provide security to its citizens.
B. the government cannot legitimately tax its citizens for the purposes of redistributing resources to achieve equality according to the difference principle.
C. there should be a government to protect citizens from the dangers of the state of nature, and citizens should pay to support that government.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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Definition
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Term
75. According to the introduction to Chapter 7, three great monotheistic religions agree that the standard conception of God claims that he is
A. all powerful, all knowing, and all good.
B. omnipotent, omnivorous, perfectly good, benevolent, merciful and just.
C. omnibus, all good, and all knowing.
D. vengeful, powerful, jealous, and just.
E. none of the above. |
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76. The cosmological argument for the existence of God
A. starts with an appeal to the many complicated cases of order and purpose in the world.
B. starts with an appeal to the simple fact that something exists.
C. concludes that God does not exist, given the undeniable fact of evil in the world.
D. relies on the PSR.
E. both B and D. |
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77. According to what our text calls the standard idea of God,
A. he is omniscient, which means that he is all powerful
B. he is perfectly good, benevolent, merciful and just.
C. he is omnipotent, which means that he is all powerful.
D. both B and C
E. both A and B. |
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Definition
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78. According to Clarke’s Cosmological argument, an independent being is
A. one who doesn’t care about anything or anyone except himself.
B. one whose existence doesn’t depend upon anything or anyone except itself.
C. one whose existence does depend upon something or someone other than itself.
D. something that cannot exist.
E. both A and B. |
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79. According to the introduction to Chapter 7, three great monotheistic religions agree that the standard conception of God claims that he is
A. omnipotent, omnivorous, perfectly good, benevolent, merciful and just.
B. vengeful, powerful, jealous, and just.
C. omnibus, all good, and all knowing.
D. sufficiently mysterious that we should not try to understand him.
E. none of the above |
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80. According to Clarke’s Cosmological argument, reality cannot consist merely of a series of dependent beings
A. because such a supposition is contradictory, suggesting both that there is an explanation and that there is not one for the whole series.
B. because the series would have no beginning in time.
C. because time has no beginning.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above, because Clarke insisted that reality does consist merely of a series of dependent beings. |
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81. The possibility that evolution can explain the existence of order is at best
A. an objection to the local but not the global version of the argument from design.
B. an objection to the global not the local version of the argument from design.
C. a defense for one of the crucial premises of the argument from design.
D. an objection to any version of the argument from design.
E. none of the above. |
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82. According to Gould, the best argument for evolution
A. appeals to examples of optimal design—like the way a butterfly can look just like a dead leaf.
B. depends on first showing that God does not exist.
C. appeals to odd arrangements, like the Panda’s “thumb”, that no sensible God would choose.
D. both A and B
E. doesn’t exist, since Darwin was a charlatan. |
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83. Hume argues that since some order has to be intrinsic,
A. it makes most sense to think that only God is intrinsically orderly.
B. no order is intrinsic.
C. it makes at least as much sense to think that the material world is intrinsically orderly as to think that God is intrinsically orderly.
D. it makes the most sense to think that both God and the material world are intrinsically orderly.
E. both A, C, and D. |
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84. According to Gould, the example of the Panda’s “thumb”
A. shows just how powerful the argument from design is.
B. shows that evolution provides an explanation as plausible as intelligent design.
C. shows that evolution provides a better explanation than intelligent design.
D. shows that Darwin was interested in only local events.
E. none of the above |
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85. The argument from design can be construed as
A. an appeal to the best explanation or as an argument by analogy.
B. an argument from first cause.
C. an objection to the possibility that God created our world.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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86. The argument from design can be construed as
A. an appeal to the best explanation.
B. an argument from first cause.
C. an argument by analogy.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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87. According to the problem of evil, there is a distinction between moral and physical evil,
A. but moral evil is irrelevant to the existence of God, since no evil is moral.
B. but God is at most responsible for physical evil, since there is no other source of responsibility for it.
C. and defenders of God’s existence need to explain both moral and physical evil.
D. and both kinds of evil are obviously perfectly consistent with God in all his glory.
E. both A and B. |
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88. For someone who has accepted the conclusion that God exists (on the basis of good reasons), the problem of evil:
A. is no problem at all, since evil is a problem only for agnostics.
B. is still a problem, but it just requires the theist to explain why God allows evil to exist.
C. is not a problem, since there is no evil.
D. is a problem.
E. both B and D. |
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89. According to the problem of evil, the distinction between moral and physical evil assumes that:
A. moral evil is the pain and suffering caused by the free choices of human beings.
B. physical evil is the pain and suffering caused by natural disasters, including diseases, earthquakes, storms, etc.
C. both moral and physical evil are caused by the free choices of human beings.
D. it is easy to explain why God allows both moral and physical evil.
E. both A and B. |
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90. For someone who is agnostic, the problem of evil:
A. provides a pretty good reason to think that God does not exist.
B. is not a problem, since there is no evil.
C. is no problem at all, since evil is a problem only for theists.
D. is a reason to think that God must exist to explain the evil.
E. both C and D. |
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91. According to the distinction between moral and physical evil,
A. but moral evil is irrelevant to the existence of God, since no evil is moral.
B. but God is at most responsible for physical evil, since there is no other source of responsibility for it.
C. and defenders of God’s existence need to explain both moral and physical evil.
D. and both kinds of evil are obviously perfectly consistent with God in all his glory.
E. both A and B. |
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92. According to Hume, the problem of evil
A. applies only to physical evil, but not to moral evil.
B. provides an excellent objection to the argument from design.
C. is easily answered by any serious theist.
D. is a problem, but only for those who have no faith.
E. both A and B. |
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93. According to Mackie, the attempt to resolve the problem of evil that explicitly denies the very existence of evil
A. is what he calls a fallacious solution.
B. is what he calls a logically adequate solution, but is one that most theists will reject because of its patent implausibilty.
C. is what he calls a logically adequate solution, because it denies one of the inconsistent claims that generates the problem.
D. is consistent with the claim that there is clear and abundant evil in the world.
E. both B and C. |
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94. According to Mackie, the attempt to resolve the problem of evil that explicitly denies God’s omnipotence
A. is what he calls a fallacious solution.
B. is what he calls a logically adequate solution, but is one that most theists will reject because it fails to attribute to God one of his defining characteristics.
C. is what he calls a logically adequate solution, because it denies one of the inconsistent claims that generates the problem.
D. is consistent with the claim that God is all powerful.
E. both B and C. |
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95. According to the problem of evil, there is a distinction between moral and physical evil,
A. but moral evil is irrelevant to the existence of God, since no evil is moral.
B. but God is at most responsible for physical evil, since there is no other source of responsibility for it.
C. and defenders of God’s existence need to explain both moral and physical evil.
D. and both kinds of evil are obviously perfectly consistent with God in all his glory.
E. both A and B. |
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96. When Mackie says, “It is sometimes suggested that evil is necessary as a counterpart to good, . . . ”
A. he is endorsing the view as an adequate solution to the problem of evil.
B. he is endorsing the view in spite of it being an inadequate solution to the problem of evil.
C. he is beginning to explain one attempt to solve the problem of evil, one that he ultimately argues is fallacious.
D. he is explaining the view that claims that evil is necessary as a means to good, as a causal mechanism to achieve good things in the world.
E. none of the above. |
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97. According to Mackie’s explanation of the free will theodicy:
A. a world that contains persons who act freely, even though that produces some evil, is a better world than one that contains only unfree persons.
B. free will cannot explain the evil because it is the source of the evil.
C. the whole idea of free will is incoherent, and so free will cannot explain evil.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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98. According to Mackie, a logically adequate solution to the problem of evil requires:
A. a world that contains persons who act freely, even though that produces some evil,becaue that is a better world than one that contains only unfree persons.
B. giving up at least one of the three inconsistent propositions that generates the problem.
C. explaining why evil is a necessary counterpart to good.
D. both B and C.
E. none of the above. |
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99. In response to the problem of evil, Hick defends the view that
A. there really is no evil.
B. God is not fully omnipotent.
C. God is not wholly good.
D. there is no genuine distinction between physical and moral evil.
E. none of the above. |
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100. In response to the problem of evil, Hick defends the view that
A. the free will theodicy can explain moral evil and the soul-making theodicy can explain physical evil.
B. the free will theodicy can explain physical evil and the soul-making theodicy can explain moral evil.
C. there is no adequate response to the problem of evil except to conclude that God does not exist.
D. Mackie is right that the free will theodicy cannot explain moral evil, but the soul-making theodicy can explain physical evil.
E. there really is no evil. |
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101. Hick’s defense of the free will theodicy
A. maintains the view that human actions are random.
B. maintains the view that to be a person is to be free.
C. assumes that God could have made people who always, necessarily acted rightly while still being free.
D. assumes that one is free only if one is free to act wrongly as well as rightly.
E. both B and D. |
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102. According to Hick’s defense of the soul making theodicy, one must first reject the claim that the divine purpose in creating the world was to create a paradise on earth. What, according to Hick, is wrong with the idea of a paradise on earth?
A. Souls are created at conception, and so it doesn’t matter what the world is like, whether it is a paradise or one disaster after another, one’s soul is determined to be whatever it is.
B. such a world would fail to promote excellent moral qualities like kindness, generosity, courage, and unselfishness.
C. since most persons need some misery, there would be misery even in paradise.
D. our current ethical concepts would have no meaning in such a world.
E. both B and D. |
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103. According to Hick’s soul making theodicy, the existence of physical evil is consistent with God’s existence. Which of the following are elements in Hick’s soul making theodicy?
A. the divine purpose in creating the world was not to create a paradise so his creatures could bask in continual pleasure.
B. the world has to have some difficulties built into it so that people can grow and acquire important second order goods like courage and fortitude.
C. the divine purpose in creating the world is to create a place where people can become something more than what they are to begin with.
D. all of the above.
E. none of the above. |
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104. According to Hick’s defense of the free will theodicy,
A. a free human action is a random event.
B. a person has to be capable of acting freely in order to satisfy the conditions of being a person.
C. God could have made people who always, necessarily acted rightly while still being free.
D. one must at least sometimes actually act wrongly in order to be free.
E. both B and D. |
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105. According to the Introduction to Chapter 8,
A. what makes a life a good life depends solely and completely on the ratio of pleasurable to painful sensations of the person living the life.
B. what makes a life a good life depends solely and completely on what the person leading the life thinks, and that person cannot be wrong.
C. there are many different answers given to the question of what makes a life a good life.
D. no clear sense can even be made of the question of what makes a life a good life.
E. none of the above. |
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If Nozick is right that there are good reasons to reject the offer to plug into the experience machine,
A. then there must be more to a good life than having pleasurable experiences.
B. then there are no good lives, since we cannot yet plug into experience machines.
C. then there are good reasons to reject the offer to plug into the experience machine.
D. both A and C.
E. none of the above. |
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According to the Introduction to Chapter 8, the view that what makes a life a good life depends solely and completely on the ratio of pleasurable to painful sensations of the person living the life is a version of
A. altruism
B. hedonism.
C. objectivism.
D. formalism.
E. none of the above. |
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Which of the following is not one of the reasons Nozick cites for rejecting the offer to plug into the experience machine?
A. we want to really do something, not just seem to ourselves that we are doing something.
B. we want to connect to some deeper reality.
C. we want to really be something, not just seem to ourselves that we are something.
D. all of the above.
E. none of the above. |
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108. According to the Introduction to Chapter 8,
A. good lives are necessarily meaningful lives.
B. good lives need not be meaningful lives.
C. no lives are meaningful, but all lives are good.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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Nagel defends the view that our lives are absurd because
A. we are but tiny specks in the infinite vastness of the universe.
B. our lives are a mere instant even on a geological time scale.
C. we can’t help but take our lives seriously while being able to take up the perspective from which our lives seem totally arbitrary.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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According to the way Nagel clarifies the concept, an absurd situation is one
A. which includes a conspicuous discrepancy between aspiration and reality.
B. which is clearly meaningless.
C. which includes active engagement in projects of worth.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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Which of the following best captures what Wolf means by “active engagement”?
A. being gripped by something; being passionate about something; being excited and involved with something.
B. being bored and alienated by something; apathetic.
C. being a political activist, fighting for the kind of liberal causes that Rawls would approve of.
D. someone who is very close to being married and working very hard to make all of the arrangements.
E. none of the above. |
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According to Nagel, the life of a mouse is not absurd, because
A. a mouse cannot speak, and therefore cannot think.
B. a mouse lacks the capacity for self-consciousness and self-transcendence, and so he cannot step back and see his life as arbitrary.
C. the life of a mouse is absurd, according to Nagel.
D. Nagel never considers the issue of whether the life of a mouse is absurd.
E. none of the above |
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Which of the following best captures what Wolf thinks characterizes a good life?
A. a life that satisfies the preferences of the person living the life, no matter what those preferences are.
B. a life full of pleasant experiences and very few painful ones.
C. a life of active engagement in worthwhile activities.
D. a life devoted to helping others.
E. none of the above. |
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Nagel thinks that an ironic response to the absudity of our lives is more reasonable than heroism or despair because
A. no one likes a whiner.
B. heroism can get you killed and despair can lead to suicide.
C. the absurdity of our lives isn’t cosmically important enough to warrant either heroism or despair.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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Which of the following best captures Wolf’s response to the objection that she has failed to defend the distinction between objectively worthwhile and objectively worthless activities?
A. since her view doesn’t depend on any particular view about what constitutes objectively worthwhile activities, as long as we all agree that there is such a distinction, she need not argue for any particular view of it.
B. she claims that she has defended the claim that there is such a distinction, but admits that she hasn’t defined “objectively worthwhile”.
C. she admits that she has no response and her defense of the distinction, in general and in particular, will have to wait for another day.
D. both A and B.
E. none of the above. |
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