Term
| What is the ancient greek notion of a soul? |
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Definition
| the soul is separate from the body |
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Term
| How does Socrates argue that philosophy is practice for death? |
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Definition
1. Death is the seperation of the soul from the body
2. philosophers shun the pleasure of the boddy
3. shunning the pleasures of the body is the same as separating the soul from the body as much as possible while still remaining alive
4. separating one's soul from one's body just is the practice of dying
5. so, philosophers practice death |
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Term
| How does Socrates argue that philosophers should look forward to death? |
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Definition
1. philosophers take pleasure in knowledge
2. all knowledge is of the forms
3. if the soul can exist without the body, death will bring knowledge of the forms
4. the soul can exist without the body
5. so, death will bring knowledge of the forms
6. so, death will bring knowledge
7. one should look forward to whatever brings one pleasure
8. so, philosophers should look forward to death |
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Term
| What is the argument of the opposites? |
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Definition
1. for anything x, which comes to have a feature f, x was once non-f
2. things come to be alive
3. to be alive is to have a soul
4. so, things come to have souls
5. it is impossible to aquire a soul, unless souls can exist apart from the body
6. so, souls exist apart from the body |
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Term
| What might be wrong with the argument from opposites? |
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Definition
| it simply assumes that souls are extra bodily components rather than arrangements of matter |
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Term
| What is the recollection argument? |
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Definition
1. when a person s apprehends one thing x and is made to think of another thing y, then s is remembering an encounter with y, or else remembering an image or parts of y
2. equality itself exist and is distinct from any group of equal things
3. when we percieve a group of equal things we are there by made to think of equality itself
4. so, we remember equality from an encounter with equality itself, or else remember an image of equality or a part of it
5. but, equality is invisible and partless
6. so, we remember equality from an encounter with it
7. as long as we have has sensory perception, we have never experience equality
8. we have had sensory perception sense birth
9. so, we encountered equality before birth
10. if we encountered equality before birth, than our soul exist before birth
11. so, our soulds exist before birth |
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Term
| What might be wrong with the recollection argument? |
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Definition
| we might have been born with the knowledge |
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Term
| What is the affinity argument? |
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Definition
1. the soul appears to share a common naturewith its objects: they are partless, invisible, and unchangable
2. the souls objects are immortal
3. if the soul and its objects share a common nature and if the objects are immortal, then there is reason to think the soul is immortal
4. so, there is reason to think the soul is immortal |
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Term
| What is simmias' proposal of the soul? |
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Definition
| lyre: its being in tune :: body: soul |
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Term
| what is the argument from degrees against simmias? |
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Definition
1. being a harmony admits of degree
2. being a soul does not admits of degree
3. so, the soul is not a harmony |
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Term
| what is the argument of unequal virtues against simmias? |
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Definition
1. if souls are harmonies and if every soul is equally a soul, then every soul is equally a harmony
2. every soul is equally a soul
3. if every soul is equally a harmony, than every soul is equally harmonized
4. is every soul is equally harmonized, than every soul is equally virtuous
5. but, not every soul is equally virtuous
6. so, souls are not harmonies |
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Term
| what might be wrong with the argument of unequal virtue? |
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Definition
| socrates is assuming that ethical harmony is the same as physical harmony |
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Term
| Whatis the mental causation argument against simmias? |
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Definition
1. a harmony of parts is affected by those parts but does not affect them
2. so, if the soul is a harmony of bodily parts, the soul is affected by the body but does not affect it
3. yet, the soul does not affect the body
4. so, the soul is not a harmony of bodily parts |
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Term
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Definition
| the soul can be immaterial and separate from the body without being immortal |
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Term
| What puzzle about numbers does socrates encounter from his youth? |
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Definition
1. it seems that the number 2 had parts
2. it seems that one of these parts are the number 1
3. there seems to be only one number 1
4. nothing can have the same part and the same time |
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Term
| What does socrates infer about the puzzle about numbers? |
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Definition
| numbers and other mathamatical objects are not physical things and that some theory in asddition to physical science is needed to solve puzzles about numbers |
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Term
| What is the difference between efficient cause and a final cause? |
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Definition
| efficient cause is the physical pushings and pullings, which consist of force being distributed through space; whereas the final cause is the purpose or the goal of the action |
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Term
| present three examples of items, and present what, according to a platonist, their efficient and final causes would be |
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Definition
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Term
| What is the different between an immanent and a transcendent characteristics? |
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Definition
| immanent properties have spacial location and are present where the property is; whereas transcendent have no spacial location, only things with that property do |
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Term
| What is the final argument? |
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Definition
1. if thing x always bring a form f with it, x cannot undergo the opposite of f
2. if x cannot undergo the opposite of f, then either x retreats safely when f's opposite approaches, or else is destroyed
3. the soul always brings life
4. so the soul cannot undergo the opposite of life
5. so, when the opposite of life approaches, the soul either retreats safely or is destroyed
6. the opposite of life is death
7. so, the soul cannot undergo death
8. so, if death approaches, the soul either retreats safely or is destroyed
9. to be destroyed when death approaches is the same as undergoing death
10. so, the soul is not destroyed when death approaches
11. so, the soul safely retreats when death approaches
12. if the soul retreats when death approaches, than the soul is immortal
13. so, the soul is immortal |
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Term
| What might be wrong with the final argument? |
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Definition
| premise 9 suggests that given souls are animaters, death is the same as the loss of one. |
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Term
| what is the doctrine of the resurrection of the dead? |
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Definition
| people are material bodies, which after their apparant distinction wil live through divine action |
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Term
| What is resurrection through reassembly (RTR)? |
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Definition
| through divine action the parts of a living being, which the being had at death, are restored to a living state |
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Term
| what is the continuity argument against RTR? |
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Definition
1. if RTR is true, than no person alive after the resurrection will be alive as a result of biological processes that occured before the resurrection, and every person alive after the resurrection will be alive as a result of divine action.
2. if each post resurrection is alive as a result of divine action and not as a result of biological processes, than nobody survives the resurrection
3. but, if resurrection happens, RTR is fale
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Term
| What is the destructibility argument against RTR? |
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Definition
1. if RTR is true, than our world cannot have contained destructable matter
2. but destructable matter is possible
3. so, RTR is not true |
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Term
| What is the argument from perimortem overlap against RTR? |
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Definition
1. perimortem overlap and perimortem duplication are possible
2. if RTR was true, it wouldnt be
3. so, RTR is not true |
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Term
| What is perimortem overlap? |
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Definition
| an overlapping of lives close to death |
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Term
| what is the multiplicity argument against RTR? |
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Definition
1. if RTR is true, it is possible for two distinct persons to be one x the same person
2. such a thing is impossible
3. RTR is not true |
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Term
| what is rosenbaum's argument for epicureanism? |
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Definition
1. if a state of affairs s is harmful to a person p, than s can be experience by p at some time
2. so if p's being dead is harmful to p, than p can experience p's being dead at some time
3. if p can experience a state of affairs s than s begins before p's death
4. p's being dead does not begin before p's death
5. so p cannot experience p's being dead
6. so p being dead is not harmful to p |
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Term
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Definition
| being dead is not a harm to the one who dies |
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Term
| present two of Nagel's objections to epicureanism, along with silverstein's response. |
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Definition
1. one can be harmed without experiencing it
-Rosenbaums response: for something to be a harm, it is enough that it is the sort of event which one could have experienced, harms are experiencable
2. death is a harm because it is a loss
-Rosenbaums response: even if death is a loss, it is not one that involves noticing the lack of the thing that gets lost. birth makes you lose experience of ealier event |
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Term
| present silverstein's objection to epicureanism, along with Rosenbaum's response |
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Definition
just as one can experience a spacial distant event from a spacial distance, so can one experience a temporally distant event from a temporal distance
-Rosenbaum's response: if imagining/considering an event is enough to experience it, than we can experience things that never happened, which is absurd |
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Term
| what, according to benatar, is the non-identity problem? |
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Definition
1. in order for a thing to harm a person, that thing must make the person "worse off"
2. being worse off is a relation between two states
3. so, for something to make someone worse off that person must be able to exist in the state is which they are "worse off"
4. yet, nonexistencce is not a state that one can exist in
5. so existing cannot make one "worse off"
6. so, existing cannot be a harm |
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Term
| what, according to benatar, is asymmetry? |
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Definition
| the absence of pain is good, even if nobody notices it; whereas the absence of pleasure is only bad if it is noticed |
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Term
| present two theoretical virtues, which benatar ascribes to the doctrine of asymmetry |
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Definition
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Term
| what is benatar's argument for the clain that it is better to never have been? |
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Definition
1. pleasure and pain are asymmetric
2. if pleasure and pain are asymmetric than no life that has any pain is worth beginning
3. every human life has some pain
4. so, no life is worth beginning |
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Term
| present two way that one might resist asymmetry, along with one of benatars criticisms of each |
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Definition
1. claim that the absence of pain is only good if somebody notices
-Benatar's response: if this were true it would not be legitimate/proper to refrain for a child's sake, from creating that child in a state of suffering
2. the absence of pleasure is bad eben if it is unnoticed
-Benatar's response: if this is true than we should regret for the sake of individuals who do not exist |
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