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| the study of the structure and nature of the world(everything that actually exists) |
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| the study of the structure and nature of knowledge and warranted belief. |
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| a group of statements such that at least one statement (the premise) purport to provide evidence that exactly one other statement ( the conclusion) is true. |
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| an argument in which the premises are true, and the premises being true makes it so that the conclusion cant be false. |
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| Reductio ad absurdum argument |
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| argument that reduces conclusion to absurdum, unrefutable but makes no sense. |
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| the meaning expressed by a sentence in a language. |
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| a property your beliefs have when youve satisfied the relevant rationality requirement |
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| all properly non-basic beliefs are warrented in virtue of their being correctly inferred from at least one properly basic belief. |
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| the view that no human is born with mental content, thus all human beings derive mental content ultimately via sensory experiences of that type. |
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| any type of view that calls into question the standard view (that we have propositional knowledge in one or more particular domain of inquiry) |
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| F is an essential property of x if x is F, and there is no possible world where x is not F. |
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| F is an accidental property of x if x is F, but there is at least one possible world where x is not F. |
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| A person S knows that p a priori only if Ss epistemic warrant for believing that p does not require an appeal to a sensory experience. |
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| A person S knows that p a posteriori only if Ss epistemic warrant for believing that p does require an appeal to sensory experience. |
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| the FReality of an entity e is the degree or measure of reality that e has according to es category on the great chain of being if e actualy exists. |
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| the OReality of an entity e is the degree or measure of reality that the idea i represents e as according to es category on the great chain of being. |
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| an argument that is supposed to make highly probable the conclusion without the probability being equal to one. |
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| a statement s is a necessary truth iff (i) s is true and (ii) s could not have been false. |
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| a statement s is a contingent truth iff (i) s is true and (ii) s could have been false. |
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| What is Platos negative project in Meno? What is his positive project in Meno? |
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| Negative Project: empiricism is false, contrary to popular opinion, the sophists ( traveling teacher or teach you how to win any argument) are not wise and knowledgeable. Positive Project: Nativism is true, we should agree with a nativist theory of mind, genuine knowledge is possible only of the forms. |
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| What exactly is a Socratic definition? How are such things supposed to provide an answer to questions of the form what is x? |
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| The logos question: What is x? Soc. Def.= a description of the Form of x. to satisfy definition must df. Must capture all xs, only xs and not include definiendum. These answers are proposed, options to answer the question. |
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| What are the Forms according to Plato? |
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| The Forms: 1. Essences (set of essential properties) of Things, 2. Abstract Entities, 3. Natural Kinds, 4. Perfect & Flawless Models, 5. The Most Real. |
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| What is the difference between abstract and concrete entities? What is the difference between natural kinds and artefacts? |
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| Concrete Entity: if x really exits and x exists in a particular region of spacetime. Abstract Entity: if x reslly exists but doesnt exist in any particular spacetime. Natural Kinds: x exists mind-independently. Artifacts: x exists mind dependently. |
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| What is Menos second answer to Socrates question what is virtue? What are the two problems we discussed that reveal that that answer is no good? |
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| DCV: A person S is virtuous iff S has the power to rule others, tyrants may be powerful but not have virtue, then women and children may be virtuous but not have power. |
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| What exactly is Menos Paradox (of Inquiry), and what is it supposed to demonstrate? |
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| If S knows what S is looking for, or doesnt know what S is looking for, then S cannot inquire into x. |
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| What exactly is a nativist account of mental content, and what exactly is that theory supposed to explain for us? |
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| Nativism: the belief that all mental content is innate and all humans are born with all these innate principles. That humans dont experience anything new through sensory images the simply direct their focus on mental content they already had. |
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| What is the difference between strong and weak nativism? What is the difference between propositional and concept nativism? Which, if any, of these views does Plato espouse? |
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| Strong( Plato): the view that all of the mental content we will ever have is present at birth. Weak: the view that at least some mental content we will have is present at birth. Propositional: use ideas that relate concepts, if you are prop you have to be conceptual. Concept: actual ideas of something, concept of God, no knowledge but know the concept of the thing. |
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| What is Ockhams Razor? What relevance does it play in the empiricismnativism debate? Does it clearly (i.e., unquestionably) imply that empiricism is true? Why or why not? |
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| When selecting between two or more competing explanations E1 and E2, E1 is preferable to E2 if E1 is simpler than E2. It explains that empiricism is the simpler of the two arguments and that nature tends to move towards simplicity. It doesnt clearly say that empiricism is true because we dont know if all things can be held equal. |
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| What is the Socratic doctrine of recollection, and what is Socrates reason for appealing to that the doctrine? |
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| Innate ideas are not known because they have not been recollected, understanding is a matter of recollection. It helps show empiricists why we dont always have immediate access to our mental content. The view that human learning is the recollection of innate ideas that were acquired in a past life. |
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| Why exactly is The Poverty of the Stimulus Argument thought to show that some form of nativism is true? |
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| It says that there are specific abstract ideas we possess that couldnt have been attained through sensory experience, meaning there had to be some other way, innate ideas. Every sensory experience is particular /concrete and contingent, you have abstract ideas that are general and necessary. |
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| What are Descartes three goals regarding his search for a new first philosophy? What does that mean exactly? Why is Descartes so worried about Scholastic Aristotelianism as the foundation for philosophical/scientific inquiry? |
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| 1. to search for and establish the foundation for the best possible science. 2. Establish that such a foundation is possible only if the possible theories are true: nativism, rationalism, theism, substance dualism. 3. If theories exist then the envisioned foundation exists. He worries because Schol. Arist. Involves skepticism, based on empiricism. |
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| What are the three kinds of knowledge that I distinguished? What are the differences? |
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| Propositional Knowledge: knowledge that such and such is true. Procedural Knowledge: knowledge how to do such and such. Acquaintance knowledge: knowledge of such and such object. |
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| 14. What is The Traditional Analysis of Propositional Knowledge (TAK)? What is Descartes Analysis of Knowledge (DAK)? What is the difference between TAK and DAK analyses? |
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| TAK: a person s believes that proposition p is true only if i. s believes that p is true, ii. P is true, iii. Ss belief that p is epistemically warranted. DAK: S knows p iff i.S believes that p, ii. P is true, iii. S belief is EWd either via a. being an epistemically certain properly basic belief, b. being inferred from nothing but an epistemically warranted properly basic belief. |
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| 15. What is a doxastic attitude, and what are the only three such attitudes that are possible? |
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| An attitude that denoted the modal logic that studies a belief. They are S believes thatp, S suspends judgment, S disbelieves p. |
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| 16. What is the difference between a properly basic belief and a properly non-basic belief? |
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| Properly basic belief: a belief that there are no other belifs that this belief evidentially is based on. |
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| 17. Why do foundationalists think that unless there is at least one properly basic belief that no belief will |
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Definition
| be epistemically warranted? It is the chain effect, if one of the links is not warranted then the rest of the chain is falsly warranted. If a chain of beliefs terminates it has to be with a warranted belief. The source of a belief must be epistemically warranted. |
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| 18. What is The Foundational Inclusion Principle (FIP), and why does Descartes accept FIP? |
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| A belief B is properly basic iff B is certain and indubitable. Because this belief can be self-evident and support itself, then it can make the claim as a properly basic belief. Also he feels it can defend the problem with the external world and withstand any possible challenges. |
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| 19. What are the two types of certainty that we distinguished from each other? Which type is the only type that is relevant to Descartes project? |
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| Psychological: how confident one feels about the truth of the propostion. Epistemic: the propability which is the only one we have to consider for Descartes. |
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| 20. What is the difference between what I called the internal world and the external world? What is the |
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| problem of the external world? According to the philosophical skeptic, we are unable to satisfy which of the three necessary conditions for propositional knowledge? Internal world: in our mind. External World: out in the world. The problem is whether we know what we think we know, our sensory faculties operate reliably, how thins appear to be constitutes good evidence for determining how things actually are. Skeptiicism beings into question we know what we think we know. |
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| 21. What, according to Descartes, are the three stages of external world belief formation? |
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| Stage 1: S has an appearance Stage 2: S forms an appearance belief Stage 3: S forms an external world belief |
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| 22. What is the difference between broad knowledge skepticism and narrow knowledge skepticism? |
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| Broad: denies the possibility of knowledge in every domain. Narrow: denies the possibility of propositional knowledge in some particular domain. |
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| 23. What are the two types of methodological skepticism? What is the difference between them? Which |
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| type of methodological skepticism does Descartes adopt? What is the reason for his choice? Enumerative: considers each individual belief and determines whether there are rational grounds for doubting that very belief. Modular: considers each belief forming module and determines if there are ground for doubt. Descartes take the side of modular, it takes into account belief forming modules that are the basis for many beliefs. Take those down and you undermine all belief. |
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| 24. What is the theory of human cognition I called representationalism? What is the nature and function |
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| of a Cartesian idea according to representational theories of cognition? No human has direct access via the senses of the external world. Access via Cartesian ideas, which is the man in the head, watching a big screen representation. |
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| 25. What is a skeptical counterpossibility? Do such scenarios have to be plausible? Why or why not? |
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| Expresses the notion that not only are there alternative possibilities to what we take ourselves to know or justifiably believe, but that these alternate possibilities are relevant to such a degree that we must be able to rule them out. |
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| 26. What is The Skeletal Skeptical Argument, and what is it supposed to demonstrate? |
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| Formula for all skeptical arguments. Its supposed to demonstrate that S knows p. , to show if you rule out the skeptical argument, you can make the p true. |
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| 27. What is The Dream Argument and what is it supposed to show? What, if anything, does The Dream Argument accomplish? What does it not accomplish? |
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| Uses Descartes Skeletal Skeptical Argument and replaces SCP=the skeptical counterpossibility with I am dreaming and replaces p=any proposition with there is a chair in front of me. Person S cannot rule out that they are dreaming so they cant know there is a chair in front of them. Accomplishes undermining knowledge claims based on the senses and does not accomplish attacking a priori knowledge and leaves us attached to the external world. |
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| 28. What is The Evil Genius Argument, and what is it supposed to show? What, if anything, does The Evil Genius Argument accomplish? What does it not accomplish? |
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| Again using the Skeletal Skeptical Argument replaces SCP with I am being deceived by an evil genius and p with there is a chair infront of me. Person S cant know that he isnt being deceived by an evil genius so person S cant know if there is really a chair in front of him. Accomplishes detaching from the external environment and shows that it doesnt exist and undermines our having a posteriori knowledge or a priori knowledge. |
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| 29. What are the all-important differences between The Dream Argument and The Evil Genius Argument? |
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| The evil genius argument attacks both a priori and a posteriori knowledge whereas The dream argument only attacks a posteriori knowledge. |
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| 30. What are the underdetermination principles (i.e., UP1 and UP2), and what the role exactly do UP1 and UP2 play in Descartes Meditations? What is meant by the phenomenology of experience? |
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| UP1: If S believes that p on the basis of some evidence E and E does not make it more likely that p is true rather than some incompatible proposition q, then E is underdetermining with respect to p. UP2: If Ss evidence for believing that p is true is underdetermining, then S cannot be certain that some incompatible proposition q is false. In the Meditations, Descartes is showing that we cant be certain of anything and if we cant know that we are not dreaming or that we are not being deceived by an evil genius then we have no ground to belive in any of our experiences as true. Phenomenology of experience is the what-it-feels-like feature of our experiences is the only way available to S for determining if S is dreaming. But the phenomenological properties of awake experience and dream experience are qualitatively identical. |
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| 31. Does Descartes believe that he is actually subject to the evil genius skeptical counterpossibility? Why or why not? If not, they why does he discuss that skeptical counterpossibility? |
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| Descartes requires that a belief be certain and indubitable to be properly basic, and since he cant know that he isnt dreaming or that he isnt being deceived by an evil genius, Descartes suspends judgement. |
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| 33. What exactly does the statement cogito ergo sum (what we called the cogito) mean? Why exactly does Descartes think that he can be certain that the cogito is true? |
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| 'I think, therefore I am.' Descartes says that being deceived mean thinking things that are false and it sn't possible to be mistaken that one is thinking because that in itself is thinking, and if the evil demon is deceiving him, then he must exist to be deceived. |
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| 34. Given that Descartes is committed to nativism, does that imply that he also accepts Plato's doctrine of recollection? Why or why not? |
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| No, Descartes says that all evidence for thinking should be from pure reason and not from the senses or experience. Descartes is commited to nativism and rationalism. |
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| 35. What are the categories of substance (in the 'thingy' sense) that we discussed in relation to The Wax Argument? What is the all-important difference between those two views? |
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| The bundle theory view and the subsisting bearer of properties view. The difference is that the bearer of properties view states that a thing has properties, and the bundle theory states that a thing is its properties. |
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| 37. What is does the bundle theory view say that a substance is? What does a bearer of properties view say a substance is? |
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| The bundle theory states that a substance-thing is just a collection of coexisting properties. The subsisting bearer of properties view states that a substance-thing is a bearer of properties; it can have properties prededicated to it, but it cannot be prededicated of anything else. |
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| 38. What is The Argument from Change portion of The Wax Argument, and what does Descartes believes that it shows? What is the very important problem I argued Descartes' The Argument from Change involves? |
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| The argument from change states that 1) At t, Bob is cold, solid, orb-shaped, etc., whereas at t+1, Bob is warm, liquid, non-orb-shaped,etc. (sensory qualities) 2) If an object O looses a property F and continues to exist, then F is not part of O's essense. It follows that 3) none of Bob's sensory qualities are part of Bob's essense. So, I do not know Bob's essential properties via my sense perceptual faculties. |
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| 39. What is the main goal of Descartes Third Meditation? What is The Truth Principle, and what role does it serves in Descartes project? |
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| To prove the existence of God. The Truth Principle (TP) states that: for any proposition p, if S perceives that p clearly and distinctly, then S is certain that p is true. The role of TP in Descartes project is to allow him to expand what is in the foundational set and if used correctly and God exists, than he can guarantee no radical deception. |
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| 40. Does Descartes accept fideism regarding religious belief? Why or why not? |
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| No, because fideism involves believing without evidence in the face of opposition and Descartes insists that a rationally based faith must have good evidence. |
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| 41. What is The Trademark Argument for the existence of God, and why does Descartes think that it demonstrates that God exists? |
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| I have an idea of God. My idea of God has the OReality of an infinitely perfect substance. I have the FReality of a finite substance. Al finite substances have less FReality than infinite substances. The OReality of an idea can be caused only by a thing with the same or a greater degree of FReality. Hence, I cannot be the cause of my idea of God. Only a thing with the FReality infinite perfect substance can be the cause of my idea of God. God has the FReality infinite perfect substance. So, God is the cause of my idea. If x is the cause of y, then x exists. Therefore, God exists. |
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| 42. Does Descartes offer any other argument(s) for the existence of God than The Trademark Argument? If so, what argument(s)? |
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| Descartes Ontological Argument: God has all perfections. Necessary existence is a perfection. So, God necessarily exists. If x necessarily exists then x exists. Therefore, God exists. |
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| 43. What is The Causal Adequacy Principle (i.e., CAP), and what does it tell us about the source(s) of our ideas? Why does Descartes think that CAP is true? |
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| CAP: x is the cause of an idea i only if x has at least as much FReality as i has OReality. If CAP is true than only God and ourselves can cause our ideas of things, but things cannot cause our ideas of things or anything else with a higher OReality (on the Great Chain of Being). Descartes thinks that CAP is true base on Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit: Out of nothing comes only nothing. |
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| 45. What is 'The Cartesian Circle' and the problem raised by it? |
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| The circular reasoning that Arnauld's found in Descartes third meditation. Descartes is commited to the following two principles: that I know TP is true only if I know God exists and is not a deceiver, and I know that God exists and is not a deceiver only if I know that TP is true. |
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| 48. What is The Problem of Induction that Hume raises against the rationality of inductive inferences? What is The Uniformity Principle, and what exactly is that problem that Hume argues it has that is supposed to show that no inductive inference ever has any rational justification? |
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| Can't justify inductive reasoning because there in no non-question begging argument to justify induction. The uniformity principle (UP) states: the future will resemble the past. Any attempt to justify UP by an argument will always presuppose that UP is true thereby making it a circular argument. |
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| 49. What is the distinction between relations of ideas and matters of fact brought out by Hume, and which type does he say are necessary truths? |
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| Relations of Ideas: a proposition p is a relation of ideas iff p is a declarative sentence that is either intuitively certain or p is a declarative sentence that is demonstrably certain. Matters of Fact: a proposition p is a matter of fact iff p is a declarative sentence that is neither intuitively certain nor demonstrably certain. Hume says that relations of ideas are necessary truths because we know them a priori. |
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