Term
S. Van Evera (from: Offense Defense and the Causes of War) |
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Definition
- know: offense defense theory --> shifts in offense/defense balance have large effects on the relative risks of war
- dominance of one or the other caused by aggregate of miltary gepgraphic, social, and diplomatic factors
- when offense dominates war is more likely
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Term
Waltz (from: Origins of War) |
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Definition
- is a structural (neo) realist
- classifies the causes of war into three levels of analysis
1. nature and behavior of man - selfishness, misdirected impulses, stupidity are the causes of war. Solution: men must change moral outlook and behavior
2. the internal structure of the state - bad states, unstable states cause war. Solution: reform states to be good and peaceful internally
3. structure of the international system - anarchy --> self-help (state must rely on own devices t acheive favorable outcomes) --> state will be ok with using force to acheive goals if goals>peace. Thus state action depends on circumstances in which all states exist. Solution: federation of states working towards collective security |
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Levy Ch 1: System Level Theories
Jervis
Morgenthau
Schweller
Snyder |
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Definition
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Waltz (in Levy, Causes of War) |
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Definition
- Neorealist
- emphasizes pursuit of security>power
- distribution of power is the strongest explanatory variable.
- form of balance of power theory (acc to Waltz, hegemony is rare, balacing is the norm through most of international history)
- bipolar states are more stable because: there is less uncertainty in the system, so you have less war miscalculation. (multi-p states are more unstable, and more prone to not want to pay the cost of balancing due to collective action problem, and incentive to "free ride".)
--> this was in disagreement with classical realists (Morgenthau) that multipolar systems were more stable (more possible alliances, no one wants to ficus energy on any on other state, cross cutting cleavages diffuse conflict.) |
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Term
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Definition
in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy
- theory of bureaucratic interests (sub-state)
- organizations are defined by - their mission, their seeking after influence to fulfill this mission, and their capabilities for pursuing these interests
- organizational essence = view held by the dominant group in the org about what its missions/capability should be. (describes air force, navy, army, CIA, foreign service)
- organizations try to enhance their essence
- conflicts arise over the roles and missions of difference organiztions
- organizations want to be autonomous (control budget)
- and boost morale of members in the organization to improve functioning. |
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Term
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Definition
from Rationalist Explanations for War
- human actors make decisions based on their own preferences and the constraints under which they operate, but also in their anticipations of how other states are likely to behave.
- model is based on the principle that since war is costly, it is inherently unfavorable and inefficient as a means of resolving dispute. Thus, there must be some negotiated settlement short of war that is mutually preferred to fighting.
- Fearon uses this point to begin his analysis of war through the lens of the unitary rational actor,
- he concludes that there are only three sets of conditions under with two rational unitary actors could end up in war with one another
1. private information and incentives to misrepresent that information,
2. commitment problems and
3. indivisible issues.
- If these conditions are not present, there must be a bargaining space of outcomes that are mutually preferred to war. |
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Term
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Definition
from Why Hawks Win
- two categories of counselors "hawks" (use force and coercive action) and "doves" (diplomacy and dialogue)
- modern psychology suggests that policymakers are predisposed in favor of hawkish beliefs and preferences, hawkish advice.
some biases that cause this:
- excessive optimism about own strengths and outcomes of war
- exaggeration of evil intentions of adversaries
- misjudgement of how adversaries perceive own actions
- overly sanguine when hostilities start
- overly reluctant to make concessions in negoitations
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Term
Van Evera (from Why States Believe Foolish Ideas) |
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Definition
- agrees with Waltz that states act in line with the international system but only so far as their misperceptions allow. it is the failure to self-evaluate that causes these misperceptions
- evaluative agencies are punished
evaluation makes enemies and no one wants to stand up
- war time is a good time to study this |
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Collier (from Breaking the Conflict) |
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Definition
- greed and grievance argument of civil war.
- intial circumstances = root causes
- perpetuating forces - conflict trap
- root cause is the failure of economic development that eventually spiral in to a conflict trap that has a life of its own |
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Term
Posen (from The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict) |
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Definition
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Biddle (from Seeing Baghdad, thinking Saigon) |
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Definition
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Fearon
(from Iraq's Civil War) |
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Definition
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Snyder
(from: Civil Miltary Relations and the Cult of the Offensive) |
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Definition
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Kennedy
(from The First World War and the International Power System) |
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Howard
(from The First World War: A very Short Introduction) |
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Definition
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Van Evera
(from The Cult of the Offensive and the First World War) |
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Trachtenberg
(from The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914) |
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Sagan
(from Allies Offense and Instability) |
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Lieber
(fron The New History of WWI and What it Means for IR) |
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Herwig
(from Clio Decieved) |
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Bell
(from: The Origins of the Second World War in Europe) |
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