Mrs D and a friend visited a café. Mrs D’s friend bought her a bottle of ginger beer. The bottle was made out of opaque glass. When filling her glass the remains of a decomposed snail- which has somehow found its way into the bottle at the factory- floated out. Mrs D developed gastroenteritis as a result.

Since she has not bought the bottle of the ginger beer herself she could not make a claim in contract upon breach of warranty. She therefore brought an action against the manufacturer of the ginger beer. The House of Lord had to decide whether a duty of care existed as a matter of law.

The House of Lords held that the manufacturer owed her a duty to take care that the bottle did not contain foreign bodies which would cause her personal harm. This is known as the narrow rule- that a manufacturer of goods owes a duty of care to their ultimate consumer.

‘You must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, in law is my neighbour? The answer seems to be — persons who are so closely and directly affected by my act that I ought reasonably to have them in contemplation as being so affected when I am directing my mind to the acts or omissions which are called in question’ Lord Atkin

The case considered the liability of an auditor for financial loss suffered by investors. However, it also set out the three points which a court must consider to establish whether a duty of care exists (an account firm that did not prepare the accounts of a company property and Caparo who bought the company had a financial loss, suing for negligence). 

Caparo Criteria: In cases where no relevant precedent exists (novel situations), the court should apply three criteria to determine whether there is a duty of care.

1. Could the defendant have reasonably forseen that his or her negligence would harm the claimant?

2. Is there a sufficiently proximate relationship between the claimant and the defendany?

3. Is it fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty?

Attorney General is bringing the claim, whether the government owes a duty of care to Hartwell, in respect of police officers to whom they entrusted fire arms.  Generally the fact that a police officer has a fire arm does not put the general public in harm. As long as the risk is real, where a reasonable person would be injured, it is reasonably foreseeability (there was a breach of duty).  

Mrs Hill sued the police because according to her, they did not capture the killer of her daughter in time, and therefore they were responsible to her death as well. The courts did not want to agree as they would set a precedent and additionally the daughter was not singled out and therefore its not like the police failed to protect her (they did not have a specific duty to look after her).

"The common law does not impose liability for what are pure omissions" 

The defendants organised a disused cinema, which they were planning to convert, and some vandals broke in and set fire to it, causing a neighbouring building to be harmed. They can only do what is reasonable to prevent from other people to break in, and cannot foresee all events. Therefore they were not seen liable for the fire.

M and D were neighbours in secure local authority housing. D made numerous threats to kill M. The local authority had warned D that if he did not desist, they would take steps to evict him. They served a recovery notice which provoked D into further threats against M. The local authority had kept M informed of the steps they were taking. However, then they summoned D to a meeting at which he was again warned. After the meeting D attacked M with an iron bar on the head, causing him to die.

M’s widow and daughter claimed against the local authority  in negligence on the basis that it had been under a duty to warn M that the meeting with D was to take place so that M would have known to take steps to avoid D afterwards.

The HoL held that there was nothing to show that the local authority had made itself responsible for protecting M from the criminal acts of D, so it was not fair, just, or reasonable to infer a duty of care to warn M of the steps it was taking with regards to D. It went on to set out the situations in which there may be liability in negligence for the criminal acts of another:

-       where there is an assumption of responsibility for the victim.

It was held that a duty of care is owned to an unborn child which becomes actionable at birth. In other words, a child can sue in negligence for events occurring during its time in its mother’s womb.

13 year old boy, playing in his school, climbing a tree. He lost his foot in and fell 12 feet. He injured his hip, went to the hospital where he was examined but the hospital failed to diagnose his injury. He was told to go home, endured severe pain for 5 days before he was taken back to the hospital where an x-ray revealed the true state of injuries. He was treated as an emergency case, being operated on to repair his joint. As a result of his injury he suffered vascular necrosis (limiting the use of his hip which got worse with age). The claimant sued the health authority, who admitted they were negligent as they were under a duty which they breached (as they failed to find the injury). However even if they treated him correctly when he first came in, there was a 75% risk that he would suffer the disability in any case. In the first instance it was held that the action of the hospital denied the claimant a 25% chance of recovery. He then was given damages worth 25%. The case went to the House of Lords, who reviewed the matter of causation. They used a variation of the ‘but for’ test, as the claimant has failed to prove his case on the balance of probabilities. There was a high chance that the injury would still be high, and there should be no damages as he only proved 25% of damages. 

G went to see S about something simple, but then saying that there is a painless lump in his armpit. It was suggested in his evidence, that doctor said it was a fatty tumour which was benign. This was actually a malignant tumour, which was cancerous, but G went to another GP 9 months later and discovered it was malignant. The other doctor referred him for further investigation, which Scott should’ve done.  The question was whether there is negligence in failing to refer him in the first place. It was said that even if Scott was referred the first time, there was only ever 42% that he would’ve achieved remission. But when he was actually referred 9 months later that prospect was dropped by 25%. The House of Lords dismissed the appeal, resulting in the claimant losing the case. The probability was that he was going to go into remission anyways.

There was a pregnancy drug which some women took, which resulted in girl babies having a much higher risk of cancer during puberty. The claimants could not have established which one manufacturer made the mistake, which resulted in the Court, portioning liability according to their market share at the time.

The claimant had a premature baby, who suffered from oxygen deficiency. In monitoring oxygen levels of the baby, one of the doctors negligently failed to notice that a catheter had been wrongly inserted into a vain instead of an artery. The consequence of that was that there was an incorrect reading of the oxygen levels, ultimately resulting in the baby getting too much oxygen. The increase of oxygen led to a condition which led to the baby being almost completely blind. Did the negligent behaviour cause blindness?

Evidence suggested that there are 5 different conditions that can cause blindness, one of them being too much oxygen. The claimant could not prove that the particular action was what exactly caused the blindness, therefore no damages were awarded. Causation was not established. Since none of the potential causes was more likely to have happened than any of the others the balance of probabilities was not satisfied.

The claimant’s ship was damaged following a collision. After temporary repairs, the ship then set off on a voyage to a port in the US where permanent repairs could be carried out. During her voyage across the Atlantic the ship sustained further heavy weather damage during a storm. It was held that the defendants were not liable for the damage caused by the storm. The court held that the storm could have happened on any voyage and therefore the storm damage was not a consequence of the collision. It was unforeseeable and quite separate.

A number of claimants contracted mesothelioma (lung tumour) due to asbestos exposure. They worked for a number of employers and there wasn’t one which could take all the blame. All of them said that they were liable for the breach of care. It wasn’t possible to decide which employers exposed them to the asbestos that caused the cancer. Their type of cancer can be created by a single exposure and doesn’t develop over time. All of them increase a risk of claimants contracting it, but it wasn’t possible which of them had been responsible for the one that suddenly triggered the disease.  The House of Lords said that all of the employers were held to be liable on the basis of McGhee as they all increased the risk of getting cancer, without claimants having to prove which of the employers has been responsible for causing it.

Similar facts to the Fairchild case. The House of Lords changed its mind on how liability should be imposed on the employers saying that liability should not be joint. It should be joint and several, meaning that liability will a portioned between the defendants according to their relevant degree of contribution to the risks they created. In this case the claimant doesn’t get a portion from a company that has gone bust.

Suffering from chronic back pain, goes to the doctor and he recommends surgery. She asks him about the risks involved in the operation, he responds “Well I haven’t crippled anyone yet”, saying that there is a 1% chance for her being disables. That of course happened. She had the right to make an informed decision.  

The Court of Appeal said that the defendant was not liable here, because what happened was not the natural consequence of an overturned car. The other accident was seen as more deliberate, rather than just an error of judgment, and therefore they could not have been argued as foreseen by the defendant. The policemen were held to be liable for the second accident.

The Camden council was responsible for a water main, which caused the claimants house to flood. He was living abroad at the time, and asked for her furniture to be moved out of the house, and made arrangements for fixtures to the house. However it was left unoccupied, in which time squatters moved in and caused extensive damage to the house. The claimant brought a claim against the Council, saying that it was their responsibility. The claim failed. It was said that the Council was not responsible for squatters and unsocial behaviour.

Lord Denning said that the responsibility to keep the squatters from the house should be private company and not the council.

Because the Council had no idea that the squatters would occupy the house, and it is up to the insurance company to pay for the damages.

The claimant injured her neck due to the defendants negligence, but a short time after this the C, who wore glasses, went back to the hospital to be fitted with a surgical collar, to support her neck injury. Because of the neck collar, she had limited movement of her neck, which meant she couldn’t effectively use her glasses. After leaving the hospital, she was nervous, as she couldn’t see property, she went to her sons office, which was nearby, and asked him to take her home. The son accompanied her down the stairs in his office, and as she got to the bottom, she fell and injured both of her ankles. In this case the defendant was held liable, as it was the surgical collar impaired her ability to use the stairs, and she had to wear it because of the negligence that the defendants caused. 

Here the consequences are more serious. The claimant has his leg amputated as a result of the defendant’s negligence, and fitted with a prosthetic. He had adaptations made to his car, but they haven’t been complete and he couldn’t wear his prostheses inside the car. He had to fill his car up with gas. Without the use of his fake leg or sticks he filled the car up, using his car as support. When he was returning to his car, he tripped and fell, sustaining further injuries, causing him to be confined to a wheelchair.

It was judged that yes it was an error in judgment, but it wasn’t a break in the chain of causation. He may have contributed to his situation, which would reduce his damages, but there was still liability on the side of the defendant.

Here it was the women who claimed the damages against the defendants for causing the personality change on the man that raped them. The court said that they could not have get compensation from the rapist, so why should they be allowed to get compensation from the other man. 

The claimant was a victim of the Ladbrook disaster, suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder, and a personality change. This caused him to be more aggressive then he usually was, being incapable of holding down a job. He once got into an argument with some pedestrian, found a knife, and stabbed the person to death. He was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and committed into a mental institution. The question was whether he could claim for damages of his act, and the inability to hold down a job.  

The House of Lords said no, because he was basing his claim on an illegal act of killing someone and therefore shouldn’t be able to claim damages for that. He said that he was just claiming damages for his personality change. It was unsure whether he could do so after his imprisonment. The court said that on the basis of public policy, you cannot recover damages for what is a consequence of him having a sentence.

The Privy Council held that the correct test for remoteness is reasonable foreseeability of the kind or type of damage in fact suffered by the claimant

 A workman, employed by the defendant negligently allowed an asbestos cover to be dropped into a very hot liquid. As the cover slipped into this, it didn’t make a splash, but a few minutes later, a chemical reaction happened, splashing out burning the claimant. It was said that this would be rather hard to foresee, so damages were diminished.

The claimants husband was burnt on a lit by hot metal. At the time of the accident it was not known that he had a type of pre-malignant cancer, which was triggered by the burn, and he died from it three years later. Do you need to foresee the extent of damage? No, as long as you can foresee the actual kind of damage. “Damage by burning, or cancer were regarded as the same kind of damage, therefore the defendant was still liable because he caused personal injury”.

'egg shell rule'

·    A man has died of lung cancer, and he was a smoker but was also exposed to asbestos in his work (he worked in the Ministry of Defence). They argued that the payment should be reduced because of the smoking, as he knew that this can cause cancer. Need to look at whether there fault on the part of the claimant, which could cause of the illness. 

The court said that the explosion to asbestos was greater cause of getting cancer, but due to the smoking the damages were reduced by 20%. 

Denning said that a young girl may not be guilty of contributory negligence, an older teenager yes but not this young girl. She may not be able of realizing that there is a danger.