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| Legitimacy flows from war, talks about roving bandits and how stationary warlords were able to consolidate power. External security becomes standing army, internal becomes police force. Need a monopoly on violence. |
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| Addresses the norm of fixed borders. Talks about empirical vs. jurisprudential sovereignty as well as de facto vs de jure sovereignty. Negative Sovereignty has been a bad thing. |
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| War has lead to taxation. There is a ratchet effect, during war taxation increases, and it tends to stay higher after war. |
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| The US can and should be imperialist in the future. Technology wont stop us, neither will globalization or norms. |
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Fixed Borders increases state instability in 4 ways:
1) States cannot be taken over by stronger ones
2) Fixed Borders allows weak states to forge internal conflicts
3) Internal conflicts lead to refugee outflows
4) Stronger states can take advantage of weak ones |
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| Inequality between rich and poor states has been growing. Divergence, Big Time |
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| Addresses the Resource Curse, and how states can overcome it. Says that the int'l community needs to provide proper incentives, and that nations need to build stabilization funds in the event of price instability. |
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States that rely on resource extraction and exports for most of its money. There are 3 effects
1) Rentier EFfect - States spend $$ to appease dissenters
2) Repression Effect - States us $$ to buy support and repress dissenters
3) Modernization Effect - States have no incentive to modernize. |
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1) Competition
2) Scientific Revolution
3) Property Rights
4) Medicine
5) Consumer Society
6) Work Ethic |
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African states are weak for 4 reasons:
1) Domestic Destiny - Lanlocked, ethnicity
2) Domestic Policy - Poor regulation, large public sector
3) External Destiny - Landlocked
4) External Policy - Currency stability, weak investment incentives |
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| The role of institutions in development. We've gone from the small Village --> Towns and Cities --> Developed States. Over this time, we've developed property rights, contract enforcement, rule of law, specialization, etc. |
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| In general corruption is bad, and resources are spent trying to root it out |
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| Anti-Corruption Mechanisms |
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| More regulation, more monitoring, harsher punishments for corruption, ombudsman, civic duty norms, limit flexibility, divide powers, only hire loyal people. |
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| Looks at the differentiation between state strength and scope, argues that strength must stay high, while scope is reduced. Praises Australia/New Zealand over post USSR Russian strategy. Also categorizes government services by transactions velocity and specificity. Hardest things to provide have high velocity and low specificity (education, courts, etc.) |
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| Uses the buzzword "Kleptocracy". Says the shift to democracy has lead many nations to become corrupt kleptocracies. Uses the computer example, Hardware is Capitalism, Communism, and a mix (most nations are capitalist), Software is rule of law, and Operating system is DOS Capital 1.0-6.0 (US is 6, China 1-4, Korea 3) |
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| Democracy may not be the way to go. Before Western-style democracy works you need strong middle class, rule of law, institutions, literacy, medicine. |
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| Its not democracy that matters, its liberalism. Democracies can be just as illiberal as authoritarian governments. There needs to be protection of property, free speech, assembly, etc, before a nation can have a functional system. |
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| Democracy is bad for business. Things like min wages, high taxation, preferential treatment to certain groups takes away from free-market efficiency, also leads to corruption. |
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Civil Wars never settle because of the Prisoner's Dillema, no way for either side to credibly commit to laying down arms. There needs to be 3rd party intervention. Can be credible with:
Large states with reputations to uphold, troops on the ground, multilateralism, formal promises/timetables |
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| Weak states have started beating strong states because of strategies. Strong states can either use direct attacks or indirect barbarism, weak states can use direct defense or indirect guerilla warfare. If two sides use same tactics, strong wins, otherwise the weak wins. |
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| Mechanization has lead to less boots on the ground when conducting COIN. This takes away from the COIN's ability to gather information, distinguish between terrorists and civilians, and no shared sense of danger. Things wont go back to old ways because of norms, casualties. |
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| Nation building is not the actual goal of occupations, just a means to an end. The actual goal is to secure interests of occupier and prevent the occupied from being unstable. either security occupations (just secure a goal), or Comprehensive occupations (more like nation building. |
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Looks at UN nation building efforts, they are beneficial b/c:
1) Can share costs/loss of lives
2) More credibility
3) Devote more resources
Steps to success:
Establish Peace --> Dispatch Peacekeeping force to keep peace --> Initiate peace building process (disarmament, demobilization, reintegration) --> Establish political reconciliation and elections. |
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Automatic democracy doesn't work, nations should establish authoritarian rule first. Can better set up institutions, pass norms down to the people. States move from de jure to "Raw Power de facto states" before eventually being "Weberian de facto states"
Steps:
Establish authority power to break down existing structures --> Establish institutions --> Being transferring power. |
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| Talks about M-Form vs. U-Form governance. Argues U-form better for nation building, creates harmonizing institutions. -Form has higher governance costs, and suffers from departmentalism. M-Form suffers from agency problems, and sets up patrimonial institutions, more info asymmetry. |
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