Term
| Shenck vs. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) |
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Definition
Facts: Distrubited leaflets opposing draft, violated Espionage Act
+ There is a clear and present danger, therefore it is constitutional.
:: if the words themselves create a 'clear and present danger,' they can be restricted |
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Term
| Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939) |
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Definition
Facts: Violated statute: 'known to be a member of a gang' etc = gangster
+ in this case, the statue is well defined and understandable (illegal racing club, excess speeds, logos)
- 'with knowledge that its members' is vague |
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Term
| Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) |
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Definition
Facts: Defendant distributing religious leaflets, denounced other religions as 'racket,' used profanity while calling listener 'racketeer' and 'fascist'
+Logos are equivalent to fighting words, which incite a breach of the peace/clear and present danger (only when elements are met, which is the only time they are restricted)
:: "of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality. |
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Term
| Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948) |
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Definition
Facts: Bookdealer violated state statute: can't sell materials mostly made up of criminal content,etc
- vague
:: 'A statute is void when it permits whithin its scope the punishment of actions fairly within the protection of fair speech.'
+ Court actually addressing the issue of fair notice, which was given by the statute in this case.
:: 'some uncertainty is permissible if the statute uses words 'well understood through long use in criminal law.' |
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Term
| United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) |
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Definition
Facts: Burned his draft card.
++ gov't interest in restricting racing outweighs freedom of speech
:: '"when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important gov'tal interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on 1st Amendment freedom rights."'
-:: must, but does not, meet standards: "sufficiently justified... incidental restriction... is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of interest.' |
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Term
| Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970) |
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Definition
Facts: Defendant wore army uniform in skit protesting Vietnam, statute: can't wear uniform if not authorized - unless not trying to discredit the forces
= gov't cannot restrict simply because the speech is unfavorable |
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Term
| Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104 (1972) |
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Definition
Facts: Defendant in line of cars leaving political demonstration, stayed after was told to leave when police pulled over his 'mate.'
+ indiv's interest in expression outweighed by gov't interest
:: "interest in expression... 'miniscule' compared to... public interest in preventing expression at that time and place."
:: 'root of vagueness doctrine is a rough idea of fairness' |
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Term
| United States v. Grace, 361 U.S. 171 (1983) |
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Definition
Facts: protesters distrubuted leaflets, displayed sign on sidewalk outside U.S. Supreme Court building, violated: 'can't display blahblah on grounds of ~'
-streets, like sidewalks, are public forums for 1st amendment purposes |
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Term
| Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) |
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Definition
Facts: Junior Chamber of Commerce did not allow women full membership, court: have to, b/c the org. was a 'place of public accomadation'
:: Two types of freedom of association constitutionally protected: Intimate human relationships (family, etc) and for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment (speech, assembly, petition for redress of grievances, exercise of religion) |
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Term
| Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) |
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Definition
Facts: Burned American flag in front of chanting crowd in Dallas
+ do constitute fighting words, is not b/c society finds disagreeable
:: "when speech and non-speech elements exist, the government may regulate the conduct if it has a strong enough reason."
-reason in this case, upholding right of public to be safe, is clearly distinguishable from the reason in Johnson: society found burning flag disagreeable. (if can't do that… undermines bedrock principle of First) |
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Term
| Danskin v. San Diego Unified School District, 28 C.2dd 536 (1946) |
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Definition
Facts: Denied ACLU use of auditorium b/c wouldn't sign that: nonaffiliated with subversive political org.s.
+ does come w/in clear n' present danger |
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Term
| Sun Co. of San Bernardino v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. App. 3d 815 (1973) |
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Definition
Facts: Newspapers were prohibited by the Superior Court to publish names and photos of incarcerated witnesses in a pending case.
+ danger serious compared w/value for speech or political activity
+/-:: must consider 'seriousness of danger vs value of occasion for speech, availability of more moderate controls, specific intent w/which speech or activity is launched' |
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Term
| People v. Acuna, 14 Cal. 4th 1090 (1997) |
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Definition
Facts: specificed members of gang cannot be in public view w/other defendant'
::+ doesn't qualify as either protected form of association
:: freedom of association "does not extend to joining w/others for the purpose of depriving third parties of their lawful rights," in this case, the public's right to be protected from physical harm caused by the activities of illegal contests or exhibitions of speed.
+ when read in context as they should be... known -> reasonable degree of certainty |
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Term
| In re Englebrecht, 67 Cal. App. 4th 486 (1998) |
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Definition
Facts: Gang members cannot appear w/other members in public view or have pagers/beepers
Holding: a), ok, n) pagers/beepers is overbroad, can inc. phones, etc
+ no more than necessary to abate public nuisance, also: logos of those clubs, not overbroad, not pertaining to other logos (that are legal) |
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Term
| People v. Englebrecht, 88 Cal. App. 4th 1236 (2001) |
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Definition
Facts: can't use certain words, phrases, gestures that identify w/gang
+ injuction response to pattern of criminal conduct in the target area that amounted to a public nuisance... logos contributed to that nuisance
- ordinance isn't narrowly tailored or specific enough |
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