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No nation that lacks access to an ocean has ever projected military power worldwide.
The United States has sheltered ports on both coasts and on every continent.
Russia possesses the world's largest coastline, but its fleets are bottled up in ports that lack convenient outlets. |
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Secure locations physically separate enemies.
the British Isles(22miles west of the continent)were last successfully invaded in 1066 by William the Conqueror. Hitler's Operation Sea Lion was aborted in 1940.
Japan has never been invaded by outsiders.
The continental U.S. hasn't had any hostile forces on its land since the War of 1812. No nation has the power to invade the U.S. |
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buffer zones make impressive shields.
In the mid-1940s, Joseph Stalin swallowed six European countries(East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria) then rang down an Iron Curtain. These satellite states separated forces in NATO's center sector from the Soviet Union's nearest border by hundreds of miles. |
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Demilitarized zones or DMZs provide variable degrees of protection, depending in large part on geographical circumstances.
Since 1953, incursions across the Korean DMZ have been restricted to hit-and-run raids. No overland bypasses are available on the narrow peninsula.
Whereas enemy troops consistently circumvented the barrier between North and South Vietnam via the open flank in Laos. |
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Armed forces that do battle on more than one front at once must overcome serious problems.
Israel overcame such problems during two wars against Syria and Egypt in 1967 and 1973.
German forces fought on two fronts in WWI and four in WWII(Africa and Italy). Its forces were spread too thinly during both wars and both were lost.
Soviet leaders feared the possibility of simultaneous wars with NATO and China after the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. |
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Time, distance, and modes of transportation determine how fast forces can move from one place to another and influence abilities to perform most effectively immediately upon arrival.
It takes well condition companies longer to march 20 miles than airmobile troops in transport aircraft to cross the Atlantic;however, the marchers are likely to arrive more eager to fight as fatigue, jet lag, etc commonly afflicts flight crews that rapidly travel through several time zones, thereby disrupting their circadian rhythms.
Great distances reduce opportunities for employment of military power in emergencies.
Long lines of supply or communication increase requirements, and possibly divert combat forces for protection if exposed to enemy interdiction.
U.S. and British naval surface combatants had to escort merchant ships from the east coast and Gulf of Mexico, ,while shore bases forces conducted search and destroy patrols, to G.B. and the S.U. during WWII.
Forward deployments on friendly territory alleviate but do not eliminate quick-reaction problems. Requirements may arise in locations where no concentrations of forces exist.
Most of the half million U.S. forces that drove Iraq from Kuwait in 1991 were stationed in Germany and the U.S. when the crisis arose.
Neither the U.S. or the S.U. was well situated during the Cold War. The S.U. could swiftly crush uprisings in the satellites because of their access routes. NATO forces could only watch as the Soviets were in position to generate great combat power quickly and sustain it.
Khrushchev backed down during the Cuban Missile Crisis(1962) because his forces were remote from the Caribbean. He provided money, materials and ideals to pro-Communist regimes distant to the S.U. but avoided military involvement.
Japan and Germany had a security pact in Nov. 1940, but never formed a high command, shared plans or bases or supported each other. Their theaters were 3,500 miles apart. |
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