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| Describe the theory behind the Allegory of the Line. |
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| There is a visible and intelligible world. Of the visible, we only have opinions. In intelligible, we have knowledge. Both categories are split into subcategories: illusion/beliefs, reason (respectively) |
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| Describe the theory behind the Allegory of the Cave. |
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| Plato is chained in a cave watching the shadows against the cave wall of people. There is a fire behind him. He is interested so he climbs up the stairs and sees the sun. He goes back to tell the others in the cave, but they kill him out of fear. The moral is that some people will hide in the face of knowledge and others will strive to achieve it. |
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| Which book is the Allegory of the Cave? |
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| Which book is the Allegory of the Line? |
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| Describe the 3rd meditation. |
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| Innate ideas do not depend on sense experience-a priori (prior to and independent of experience), mathematical concepts, God-substance that is infinite, eternal, all-powerful, all knowing and by which I and everything else, if anything else exists, have been created.a priori. |
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| prior to and independent of experience |
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| Describe the 4th meditation. |
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Descartes wants to clarify notion of God-God is perfect. If God is perfect, then God would not deceive me.Eliminates Demon Hypothesis (anything I know that is clear and distinct is true). Problems-Human error
What can we know? Can know I exist,
God exists,God is perfect, would not deceive me. What is clear and distinct is true.
Mathematical knowledge is clear and distinct
Only limited knowledge of world outside himself |
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| Describe the 5th and 6th Meditations. |
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Definition
Possibilities
1. That I am the cause of my ideas about physical objects and there really are none
2. God produced my ideas of phys objects and there are none
3. There are really physical objects from which I get my ideas and I don’t error in following my natural tendencies.
Eliminates number 2 because God would not deceive him.
Number 3 makes the most sense. |
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| Who wrote the Meditations? |
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| What can I know with certainty about this world? (Descartes) |
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Definition
| Physics-->extensions and motion, mathematical models. The only knowledge we attain is through reason. |
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| Anglican bishop (theological background) |
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| The things we perceive are the real things in the world |
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1710 The Principles of Human Knowledge
1715 Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous |
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| Berkeley knew God would take care of perception whether or not Berkeley was perceiving. However, one can not perceive God that way. (no one is perceiving God) |
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1. ideas can exist only in minds and must exist independent of my mind or any finite being
2. my inability to create ideas and experience whatever ideas I wish is sufficient indication that the ideas must be in and controlled by another mind |
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| Locke only knew things... |
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| knowledge through the senses |
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Definition
Socrates and Meno work through a number of possible definitions of virtue, each suggested by Meno and dismantled by Socrates. At one point, the question is raised whether it is even possible to seek for something one does not yet know (as in the case of seeking a definition of virtue), and Socrates performs a scale-model elenchus with Meno's slave to solve the problem via the theory of anamnesis.
By the end of the dialogue, the participants (which include Anytus, who enters toward the end and has a minor role) have arrived at the classic state of Socratic aporia--they still do not know what virtue is, but at least they now know that they do not know. |
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| an account of the speech Socrates makes at the trial in which he is charged with not recognizing the gods recognized by the state, inventing new deities, and corrupting the youth of Athens. Socrates' speech, however, is by no means an "apology" in our modern understanding of the word. The name of the dialogue derives from the Greek "apologia," which translates as a defense, or a speech made in defense. Thus, in The Apology, Socrates attempts to defend himself and his conduct--certainly not to apologize for it. |
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Term
| Socrates' main question in the Meno is... |
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Definition
| if virtue can be taught or if it is the result of practice. |
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Term
| What 3 things were Socrates accused of doing in the Apology? |
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Definition
| corrutping the youth, studying the sky and earth below, and not believing in the gods |
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Term
| The argument of universal doubt |
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Definition
Meditation 1-A. The dream argument:
1. I often have perceptions very much like the ones I usually have in sensation while I am dreaming.
2. There are no definite signs to distinguish dream experience from waking experience.
therefore,
3. It is possible that I am dreaming right now and that all of my perceptions are false |
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Term
| Objection to dream argument |
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Definition
meditation 1-B. Objection to the dream argument:
1. It could be argued that the images we form in dreams can only be composed of bits and pieces of real experience combined in novel ways.
therefore,
2. Although we have reason to doubt the surface perceptual qualities of our perception, we have no reason to doubt the properties that we perceive the basic components of our experience to have. (In particular, there is no reason to doubt the mathematical properties that material bodies in general have) |
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meditation 1-1. We believe that there is an all powerful God who has created us and who is all powerful.
2. He has i in his power to make us be deceived even about matters of mathematical knowledge which we seem to see clearly.
therefore,
3. It is possible that we are deceived even in our mathematical knowledge of the basic structure of the world. |
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| Objections to deceiving God argument |
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Definition
meditation 1-1. We think that God is perfectly good and would not deceive us.
2. Some think that there does not exist such a powerful God. |
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Definition
1. If it were repugnant to God's nature to deceive us, he would not allow us to be deceived at all.
2. If there is no God, we must assume the author of our being to be even less perfect, so that we have even more reason to doubt all our beliefs. |
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Definition
1. Instead of assuming that God is the source of our deceptions, we will assume that there exists an evil demon, who is capable of deceiving us in the same way we supposed God to be able
Therefore, I have reason to doubt the totality of what my senses tell me as well as the mathematical knowledge that it seems I have. |
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Term
| The Argument for our Existence (the "Cogito"): |
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Definition
Meditation 1-1. Even if we assume that there is a deceiver, from the very fact that I am deceived it follows that I exist.
2. In general it will follow from any state of thinking (e.g., imagining, sensing, feeling, reasoning) that I exist. While I can be deceived about the objective content of any thought, I cannot be deceived about the fact that I exist and that I seem to perceive objects with certain characteristics.
3. Since I only can be certain of the existence of myself insofar as I am thinking, I have knowledge of my existence only as a thinking thing (res cogitans). |
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| The Argument that the Mind is More Certainly known than the Body |
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Definition
Meditation 2-1. It is possible that all knowledge of external objects, including my body, could be false as the result of the actions of an evil demon. It is not, however, possible that I could be deceived about my existence or my nature as a thinking thing.
2. a. Even Corporeal objects, such as my body, are known much more distinctly through the mind than through the body. |
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Definition
i. All the properties of the piece of wax that we perceive with the senses change as the wax melts.
ii. This is true as well of its primary properties, such as shape, extension, and size.
iii. Yet the wax remains the same piece of wax as it melts.
therefore,
iv. Insofar as we know the wax, we know through our mind and faculty of judgment, not through our senses or imagination
b. Therefore, every act of clear and distinct knowledge of corporeal matter also provides even more certain evidence for the existence and nature of ourselves as thinking things.
Therefore, our mind is much more clearly and distinctly known to us than our body. |
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| Descartes proves God's existence and that He is not a deceiver, thereby allowing us to be sure that we are not deceived when we perceive things clearly and distinctly |
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Definition
Descartes explains the possibility of error.
A. I know that God is not a deceiver and that God also created me along with all my capacities. I also know that I am often in error. This error cannot be due to the correct operation of any faculty which God has created in me, for this would make God a deceiver. I must inquire, therefore, into how it is possible that I can err even though I am the product of a benevolent God.
B. Error is due to the concurrent operation of the will and the intellect. No error is found in the intellect. Error consists in the will, in its judgments, going beyond what the intellect clearly and distinctly perceives to be the case.
C. God cannot be blamed for giving us a free or unlimited will which it is possible for us to abuse and thereby fall into error.
D. The way to avoid error is to refrain from judgment until our intellect sees the truth clearly and distinctly. |
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| Descartes considers what properties we can know to belong to the essence of material things and also considers another way of proving God's existence by considering what properties we can know to belong to God's essence. |
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When I examine those ideas of corporeal objects that are distinct and not confused, I find that these are properties concerned with extension and duration: length, breadth, depth, size, shape, position, and movement.
1. When I discover particular things about these properties, it seems as if I am recalling something I already knew, something already within me.
2. Although they seem to be already in me, I am not the source of these ideas: they have their own immutable natures which would be the same whether or not I existed, or whether there exists any object that corresponds to these ideas.
3. Neither do these ideas come to me through the senses: I can form an idea that it is impossible to imagine or sense (such as the thousand sided figure mentioned in Meditation Six) and demonstrate many necessary truths concerning its nature. |
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