Term
| What is an irresistible impulse and what jurisdictions recognize it as a defense in criminal cases? |
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Definition
| Irresistible impulse is a form of insanity defense focusing on the actor's inability to control his or her conduct. It is added in some jurisdictions as a "volitional" test to the common law M'Naughton "cognitive" definition, and a form of it was adopted by the Model Penal Code. It fell out of favor in many jurisdictions, including federal courts, in the 1980s. |
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Term
| What is diminished capacity and do Mississippi or federal courts recognize the defense? |
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Definition
| Diminished capacity is a defense where a defendant shows he or she lacked the mental ability to have a particular mental state required for a crime but does not necessarily meet the jurisdiction's definition of criminal insanity. It is rejected in Mississippi and in federal courts. |
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Definition
| Unlike accomplice liability, conspiracy requires specific intent to commit the offense which is the goal of the conspiracy. [See People v. Swain |
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Definition
| Stuper would not be guilty on a theory that she was a principal because she was not physically present and did not perform the acts that are prohibited by the aggravated DUI crime. Nor was Baker an innocent agent whose acts could be imputed to Stuper. But there may be liability based on an accessory theory. If Mississippi follows the majority approach, an accomplice may be guilty of a completed crime that requires only negligence if he or she has the mental state required for the crime and intentionally aids another to commit it. [See State v. Foster |
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Definition
| Intent to kill is good evidence of malice. |
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Definition
| There is no manslaughter under traditional common law doctrines because there was no actual provocation or heat of passion. The killing was apparently done coolly and with deliberation. Even if there was actual provocation, the walk on the beach provided a cooling off period during which a reasonable person's passion would have cooled and would prevent manslaughter mitigation. |
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Definition
| Defendant should raise self defense because she may have needed to kill the victim to avoid death or serious injury, but she will face a major problem in showing the threat of injury or death was imminent since she had temporarily incapacitated the victim. In some jurisdictions, the battered spouse syndrome has been received as a defense under circumstances where the killer believed the threat was imminent. Necessity or choice of evils should be raised, but will not apply if the defendant was able to escape on the boat safely. And this last defense was not recognized in old English decisions. |
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Term
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Definition
| Causation would be satisfied under the Model Penal Code even though the actual result was not contemplated because it differed from the intended result only in the respect that a different person or different property was injured or that the injury was less serious than that which was designed or contemplated. |
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Definition
| First, the absence of a victim might provide a defense of impossibility, which the Model Penal Code rejects. [The defendant is guilty because he satisfied the requirements of "attempt" either in doing everything he though necessary to accomplish the crime or in engaging in a substantial step.] Second, ignorance of the law is no excuse. [None of the extremely limited exceptions under the Code apply.] |
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Definition
| Mississippi requires only a cautionary jury instruction in cases based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony but it recognizes such testimony as sufficient to support a conviction |
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Definition
| Murder conviction is affirmed; attempt murder is reversed. There is sufficient evidence of implied malice from Killer's "depraved heart" or "abandoned and malignant mind." But attempt murder at common law [in the majority of jurisdictions] requires the specific intent to kill, which is absent. |
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Definition
| Murder conviction is affirmed; attempt murder is reversed. There is ample evidence to support a finding that Killer was reckless, disregarding a significant and unjustifiable risk of death of which he was aware, under circumstances manifesting extreme disregard for value of human life. But there is no evidence that it was Killer's purpose to cause death, which the Model Penal Code requires for attempt murder. |
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Definition
| The merger doctrine at common law prevents application of the felony murder theory where the assault crime is not independent but is included in fact in the homicide. |
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Definition
| The Model Penal Code recognizes a defense of withdrawal that is motivated by a complete and voluntary abandonment. An accomplice must take steps to render prior assistance ineffective (which may be established by the facts). A conspirator must thwart the conspiracy (which may not be established). |
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Definition
| The statement is wrong. Although in some jurisdictions uncorroborated accomplice testimony is insufficient, such testimony is admissible and sufficient everywhere when corroborated. Moreover, Mississippi permits convictions based on uncorroborated accomplice testimony, but it requires cautionary instructions when the testimony is uncorroborated. |
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Definition
| Defendant does not have a defense of self-defense because he was the initial aggressor. But where the victim aggravated the level of violence requiring the initial aggressor to respond with deadly force in necessary self defense, then the initial aggressor will qualify for "imperfect self-defense" and the resulting homicide can be mitigated from murder to manslaughter. |
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Definition
| There is no attempted murder because Mississippi attempt requires specific intent, and there was no specific intent to kill the victim. |
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Definition
| To satisfy causation under the Model Penal Code, for crimes based on recklessly or negligently, the resulting death must have been within the scope of the risk of which the actor was aware of should have been aware. |
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Definition
| In addition to defenses to the elements that the prosecution must prove--specific intent to steal and knowledge of value of $500--at common law, intoxication is a defense to a specific intent crime when it negatives the mens rea for the crime, and larceny is a specific intent crime at common law. |
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Definition
| The instruction does not correctly define Mississippi's insanity defense which 1) requires the prosecutor to prove the absence of insanity beyond a reasonable doubt, 2) defines cognition as the capacity to realize and appreciate rather than know, and 3) requires that insanity result from a mental disease or defect. |
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| Under the Model Penal Code protective force is justifiable only when the actor believes such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting himself against unlawful force on the present occasion. Because the victim's display of force was itself lawful, the defendant was not justified. (Note: "not the aggressor" limitation is common law.) |
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Definition
| Both the Mississippi and federal insanity defenses are based on McNaughton and contain a cognitive definition of insanity, but both expand the "know" language of McNaughton to "appreciate." Federal law requires the existence of a "severe" mental disease or defect. Federal law requires the defendant to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, while Mississippi law requires the state to prove its absence beyond a reasonable doubt. |
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Term
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Definition
| Capital murder in Mississippi does not require premeditation and deliberation. |
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Term
The Model Penal Code provides:
Simple Assault. |
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Definition
| A person is guilty of assault if he...attempts by physical menace to put another in fear of imminent serious bodily injury. |
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Term
| The necessity defense is available for |
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Definition
| kidnapping, assault, felonious restraint (all of which require levels of culpability above recklessness). Defendant believed it was necessary to use force, and the harms sought to be avoided by these crimes are less than the death that he sought to prevent. Only for crimes of recklessness or negligence would necessity be unavailable in the event that defendant's own recklessness or negligence brought about the circumstances requiring the choice. |
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Definition
| In Mississippi, an accomplice to robbery would be liable for capital murder for the death caused in the commission of the robbery. |
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Definition
| At common law, an accomplice to the inherently dangerous felony or robbery would be liable for murder under the felony murder theory for any death caused in the commission of the robbery. (Foreseeability is not required.) |
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Term
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Definition
| a conspirator must have the specific intent or purpose of furthering the conspiracy. Though providing help with knowledge of the criminal object is not enough, this behavior provides sufficient evidence from which the factfinder may infer the necessary purpose. |
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Term
| Robbery liability on an accomplice theory |
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Definition
| At common law the majority of jurisdictions require the accomplice to have the true purpose of aiding the principal. Mere presence and even knowledge that one's acts are helping would not be enough. A minority requires only knowledge |
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Term
| Robbery liability on an accomplice theory under the Model Penal Code |
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Definition
| requires a finding that Frank had the purpose or promoting or facilitating Jesse's robbery. Knowledge is not enough. |
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Term
| Theft or larceny at common law is |
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Definition
| the taking and carrying away of personal property of another with the intent to steal under circumstances that constitute a tort. |
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Term
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Definition
| only an intent to kill, not premeditation or deliberation |
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