When a person accused of a crime is legally freed by a court generally as a result of lack of evidence. This decision cannot generally be appealed unless in a special circumstance. Refer to exculpate and exonerate

In the most usual sense of the word, is a person to whom letters of administration, that is, an authority to administer the estate of a deceased person, have been granted by the proper court. He resembles an executor, but, being appointed by the court, and not by the deceased, he has to give security for the due administration of the estate, by entering into a bond with sureties, called the administration bond. Smith v. Gentry, 16 Ga. 31; Collamore v. Wilder, 19 Kan. 78. 

A written or printed declaration or statement of facts, made voluntarily, and confirmed by the oath or affirmation of the party making it, taken before an officer having authority to administer such oath. Cox v. Stern, 170 111. 442, 48 N. E 900, 62 Am. St Rep. 3S5; Hays r. Loomis, S4 111. 18. An affidavit is a written declaration under oath, made without notice to the adverse party. Code Civ. Proc. Cal.

A description of the defendant that results from adding to his real name other names by which he is known

Lat Otherwise; at another time; in another manner; formerly.

Lat. In criminal law. Elsewhere; in another place. A term used to express that mode of defense to a criminal prosecution, where the party accused, in order to prove that he could not have committed the crime with which he is charged, offers evidence to show that he was in another place at the time; which is termed setting up an alibi. State v. McGarr.v, 111 Iowa, 709, S3 N. W. 718; State v. Child, 40 Kan. 4S2, 20 Pac. 275; State v. Powers, 72 Vt. 10S, 47 Atl. S30; Peyton v. State, 54 Neb. 188, 74 N. W. 597.

A foreigner; one born abroad; a person resident in one country, but owing allegiance to another. In England, one born out of the allegiance of the king. In the United States, one born out of the jurisdiction of the United States, and who has not been naturalized under their constitution and laws. 2 Kent, Comm. 50; Ex parte Dawson, 3 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 130; Lynch v. Clarke. 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 068; Lyons v. State, 67 Cal. 380, 7 Pac. 703.

A foreigner; one born abroad; a person resident in one country, but owing allegiance to another. In England, one born out of the allegiance of the king. In the United States, one born out of the jurisdiction of the United States, and who has not been naturalized under their constitution and laws. 2 Kent, Comm. 50; Ex parte Dawson, 3 Bradf. Sur. (N. Y.) 130; Lynch v. Clarke. 1 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 068; Lyons v. State, 67 Cal. 380, 7 Pac. 703.

Removing blame or accusation from a person. Typically for a non-criminal act, like a traffic accident. There is nothing illegal or immoral or criminal in this action. Contrast and refer to acquit and to exonerate.

To lift, remove the stain of being called out for blame, liability, or punishment. It is more than just freeing an accused person of the responsibility for a criminal or otherwise illegal or wrongful act. It is publicly stating that this accused should never have been accused in the first place. Refer to acquit and exculpate.

The direct address between the judge and the convicted defendant prior to sentencing.  During the address, the judge speaks directly to the defendant and asks if the defendant has anything to add prior to hearing the sentence.  The defendant then answers the judge and may say anything in an effort to lessen the severity of the sentence, such as an apology, an offering of remorse, or an explanation of the motivations that drove the defendant's criminal actions.

Arson, at common law, is the act of unlawfully and maliciously burning the house of another man. 4 Steph. Comm. 99; 2 Ituss. Crimes, 896; Steph. Crim. Dig. 298. Arson, by the common law, is the willful and malicious burning of the house of another. The word "house," as here understood, includes not merely the dwelling- house, but all outhouses which are parcel thereof. State v. McGowan, 20 Conn. 245, 52 Am. Dec. 336; Graham v. State, 40 Ala. 664; Allen v. State, 10 Ohio St. 300; State v. Porter, 90 N. C. 719; Hill v. Com., 98 Pa. 195; State v. McCoy, 162 Mo. 383, 62 S. W. 991. Arson is the malicious and willful burning of the house or outhouse of another. Code Ga. 18S2,

An unlawful attempt or offer on the part of one man, with force or violence, to inflict a bodily hurt upon another. An attempt or offer to beat another, without touching him; as if one lifts up his cane or his fist in a threatening manner at another; or strikes at him, but misses him. 3 Bl. Comm. 120; 3 Steph. Comm. 469. Aggravated assault is one committed with the intention of committing some additional crime; or one attended with circumstances of peculiar outrage or atrocity. Simple assault is one committed with no intention to do any other injury. An assault is an unlawful attempt, coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of another. Pen. Code Cal.

In contracts. 1. The act by which one person transfers to another, or causes to vest in that other, the whole of the right, interest, or property which he has in any realty or personalty, in possession or in action, or any share, interest, or subsidiary estate therein. Seventh Nat. Bank v. Iron Co. (C. C.) 35 Fed. 440; Haug v. Riley, 101 Ga. 372, 29 S. E. 44, 40 L It A. 244. More particularly, a written transfer of property, as distinguished from a transfer by mere delivery.

2. In a narrower sense, the transfer or making over of the estate, right, or title which one has in lands and tenements; and, in an especially technical sense, the transfer of the unexpired residue of a term or estate for life or years. Assignment does not include testamentary transfers. The idea of an assignment is essentially that of a transfer by one existing party to another existing party of some species of property or valuable interest, except in the case of an executor. Ilight v. Sackett, 34 N. Y. 447. 3. A transfer or making over by a debtor of all his property and effects to one or more assignees in trust for the benefit of his creditors. 2 Story, Eq. Jur.

The act or process of taking, apprehending, or seizing persons or property, by virtue of a writ, summons, or other judicial order, and bringing the same into the custody of the law; used either for the purpose of bringing a person before the court, of acquiring jurisdiction over the property seized, to compel an appearance, to furnish security for debt or costs, or to arrest a fund in the hands of a third person who may become liable to pay it over. Also the writ or other process for the accomplishment of the purposes above enumerated, this being the more common use of the word. Of persons. A writ issued by a court of record, commanding the sheriff to bring before it a person who has been guilty of contempt of court, either in neglect or abuse of its process or of subordinate powers. 3 Bl. Comm. 280 ; 4 Bl. Comm. 283; Burbach v. Light Co., 119 Wis. 384, 96 N. W. 829. Of property. A species of mesne process, by which a writ is issued at the institution or during the progress of an action, commanding the sheriff to seize the property, rights, credits, or effects of the defendant to be held as security for the satisfaction of such judgment as the plaintiff may recover. It is principally used against absconding, concealed, or fraudulent debtors. U. S. Capsule Co. v. Isaacs, 23 Ind. App. 533, 55 N. E. 832; Campbell v. Keys, 130 Mich. 127, 89 N. W. 720; Rempe v. Ravens, 68 Ohio St 113, 67 N. E. 282. To give jurisdiction. Where the defendant is a non-resident, or beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court, his goods or land within the territory may be seized upon process of attachment; whereby he will be compelled to enter an appearance, or the court acquires jurisdiction so far as to dispose of the property attached. This is sometimes called “foreign attachment.” Domestic and foreign. In some jurisdictions it is common to give the name “domestic attachment” to one issuing against a resident debtor, (upon the special ground of fraud, intention to abscond, etc.,) and to designate an attachment against a nonresident, or his property, as “foreign.” Longwell v. Hartwell, 164 Pa. 533, 30 Atl. 495; Biddle v. Girard Nat Bank, 109 Pa. 356. But the term “foreign attachment” more properly belongs to the process otherwise familiarly known as “garnishment.” It was a peculiar and ancient remedy open to creditors within the jurisdiction of the city of London, by which they were enabled to satisfy their own debts by attaching or seizing the money or goods of the debtor in the hands of a third person within the jurisdiction of the city. Welsh v. Blackwell, 14 N. J. Law, 346. This power and process survive in modern law, in all common-law jurisdictions, and are variously denominated “garnishment,” “trustee process,” or “factorizing.”

A delivery of goods or personal property, by one person to another, in trust for the execution of a special object upon or in relation to such goods, beneficial either to the bailor or bailee or both, and upon a contract, express or implied, to perform the trust and carry out such object, and thereupon either to redeliver the goods to the bailor or otherwise dispose of the same In conformity with the purpose of the trust. Watson v. State, 70 Ala. 13, 45 Am. Rep. 70; Com. v. Maher, 11 Phila. (Pa.) 425: McCaffrey v. Knapp, 74 111. App. 80; Krause v. Com., 93 Pa. 418, 39 Am. Rep. 702; Fulcher v. State, 32 Tex. Cr. R. 021, 25 S. W. 025. See Code Ga. 1882,

The state or condition of one who is a bankrupt; amenability to the bankrupt laws; the condition of one who has committed an act of bankruptcy, and is liable to be proceeded against by his creditors therefor, or of one whose circumstances are such that he is entitled, on his voluntary application, to take the benefit of the bankrupt laws. The term is used in a looser sense as synonymous with "insolvency.”

Process issued by the court itself, or "from the bench," for the attachment or arrest of a person; either in case of contempt, or where an indictment has been found, or to bring in a witness who does not obey the subpoena. So called to distinguish it from a warrant, issued by a justice of the peace, alderman, or commissioner.

In the common law system of the United States, a capias warrant is essentially an order to arrest and detain an individual for the purpose of guaranteeing a court appearance. The Latin term capias translates into English as for the taking of but it is not commonly associated with the seizure of property or the search of premises. A capias warrant should be considered a writ of arrest.

In most instances, a capias warrant is issued in connection with failure to appear before court in a criminal case. A defendant who fails to appear at a criminal court proceeding, for example, could expect a capias warrant to be issued for his or her arrest.

Since a capias warrant is a compelling writ, a judge or magistrate must be prudent and ensure that he or she has compelling evidence to issue such an order.

Criminal defendants who enjoy freedom thanks to having posted a monetary or signature bond are expected to appear at all scheduled court hearings. When they fail to do so, their bond may be revoked and a capias warrant may be issued. In this situation, law enforcement agencies are directed by the court to take the defendant into custody and deliver him or her to the court.

A capias pro fine occurs when a defendant has failed to comply with a court order related to a judgment. For example, a defendant expected to pay a fine or restitution could be the subject of a capias pro fine warrant, but this does not automatically imply that they must spend time at a detention center. The defendant is to be delivered directly before the judge; this gives the subject opportunity to show good cause or explain why the judgment has not been fulfilled.

Capias warrants are not limited to criminal cases. In various jurisdictions, defendants involved in traffic cases who fail to appear in court may be subject to a capias warrant if they fail to pay a fine imposed by a judge. Other jurisdictions issue capias warrants in relation to cases that originated in a civil or family division. For example, a person whose child support order falls into arrears might be compelled to appear before a magistrate by means of a capias warrant.

Sheriff and constable departments are usually tasked with executing capias warrants, although municipal, state and federal law enforcement agencies may contribute. In the case of defendants who skip on a bail bond, bounty hunters or bondsmen may seek to execute the capias warrant.

A white sheet of paper; an instrument signed, but otherwise left blank. A sheet given to an agent, with the principal's signature appended, to be filled up with any contract or engagement as the agent may see fit. Hence, metaphorically, unlimited authority.

An article of personal property; any species of property not amounting to a freehold or fee in land. People v. Holbrook, 13 Johns. (N. Y.) 94; Hornblower v Proud, 2 Barn. & Aid. 335; State v. Bartlett, 55 Me. 211; State v. Brown, 9 Baxt. (Teun.) 54, 40 Am. Rep. 81. The name given to things which in law are deemed personal property. Chattels are divided into chattels real and chattels personal; chattels real being interests in land which devolve after the manner of personal estate, as leaseholds. As opposed to freeholds, they are regarded as personal estate. But, as being interests in real estate, they are called “chattels real,” to distinguish them from movables.

A testamentary disposition subsequent to a will, and by which the will is altered, explained, added to, subtracted from, or confirmed by way of republication, but in no case totally revoked. Lamb v. Lamb, 11 Pick. (Mass.) 370; Dunham v. Averill, 45 Conn. 70, 20 Am. Rep. 042; Green v. Lane, 45 N. C. 113; Grimball v. Patton, 70 Ala. 031; Proctor v. Clarke, 3 Redf. Sur. (N. Y.) 448. A codicil is an addition or supplement to a will, either to add to, take from, or alter the provisions of the will. It must be executed with the same formality as a will, and, when admitted to probate, forms a part of the will. Code Ga. 18S2,

As distinguished from the Roman law, the modern civil law, the canon law, and other systems, the common law is that body of law and juristic theory which was originated, developed, and formulated and is administered in England, and has obtained among most of the states and peoples of Anglo-Saxon stock. Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. 674. 2. As distinguished from law created by the enactment of legislatures, the common COMMON LAW 227 COMMON PLEAS law comprises the body of those principles and rules of action, relating to the government and security of persons and property, which derive their authority solely from usages and customs of immemorial antiquity, or from the judgments and decrees of the courts recognizing, affirming, and enforcing such usages and customs; and, in this sense, particularly the ancient unwritten law of England. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Call Pub. Co., 181 U. S. 92, 21 Sup. Ct. 5G1, 45 L. Ed. 7G5; State v. Buchanan, 5 Har. & J. (Md.) 3G5, 9 Am. Dec. 534; Lux v. Ilaggin, G9 Cal. 255, 10 Pac. G74; Barry v. Port Jervis, 64 App. Div. 268, 72 N. Y. Supp. 104. 3. As distinguished from equity law, it is a body of rules and principles, written or unwritten, which are of fixed and immutable authority, and which must be applied to controversies rigorously and in their entirety, and cannot be modified to suit the peculiarities of a specific case, or colored by any judicial discretion, and which rests confessedly upon custom or statute, as distinguished from any claim to ethical superiority. Klever v. Seawall, 65 Fed. 395, 12 C. C. A. 661. 4. As distinguished from ecclesiastical law, it is the system of jurisprudence administered by the purely secular tribunals. 5. As concerns its force and authority in the United States, the phrase designates that portion of the common law of England (including such acts of parliament as were applicable) which had been adopted and was in force here at the time of the Revolution. This, so far as it has not since been expressly abrogated, is recognized as an organic part of the jurisprudence of most of the United States. Browning v. Browning, 3 N. M. 371, 9 Pac. 677; Guardians of Poor v. Greene, 5 Bin. (Pa.) 557; U. S. v. New Bedford Bridge, 27 Fed. Cas. 107. 6. In a wider sense than any of the foregoing, the “common law” may designate all that part of the positive law, juristic theory, and ancient custom of any state or nation which is of general and universal application, thus marking off special or local rules or customs. As a compound adjective “common-law” is understood as contrasted with or opposed to “statutory,” and sometimes also to “equitable” or to “criminal.”

To appropriate property to the use of the state. To adjudge property to be forfeited to the public treasury; to seize and condemn private forfeited property to public use. Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dull. 234, 1 L. Ed. 5GS; State v. Sargent, 12 Mo. App. 234. Formerly, it appears, this term was used as synonymous with "forfeit" but at present the distinction between the two terms is well marked. Confiscation supervenes upon forfeiture. The person, by his act, forfeits his property; the state thereupon appropriates it, that is, confiscates it. Hence, to confiscate property implies that it has first been forfeited ; but to forfeit property does not necessarily imply that it will be confiscated. "Confiscation" is also to be distinguished from "condemnation" as prize. The former is the act of the sovereign against a rebellious subject; the latter is the act of a belligerent against another belligerent. Confiscation may be effected by such means, summary or arbitrary, as the sovereign, expressing its will through lawful channels, may please to adopt. Condemnation as prize can only be made in accordance with principles of law recognized in the common jurisprudence of the world. Both are proceedings in rem. but confiscation recognizes the title of the original owner to the property, while in prize the tenure of the property is qualified, provisional, and destitute of absolute ownership. Winchester v. U. S., 14 Ct. CI. 48.

The act of demeaning the court, preventing justice administration, or disobeying a sentence of the court. It is criminal and can lead to fines or imprisonment.

Contumacy; a willful disregard of the authority of a court of justice or legislative body or disobedience to its lawful orders. Contempt of court is committed by a person who does any act in willful contravention of its authority or dignity, or tending to impede or frustrate the administration of justice, or by one who, being under the court’s authority as a party to a proceeding therein, willfully disobeys its lawful orders or fails to comply with an undertaking which he has given. Welch v. Barber, 52 Conn. 147, 52 Am. Rep. 567; Lyon v. Lyon, 21 Conn. 19S; Kissel v. Lewis, 27 Ind. App. 302, 61 N. E. 209; Yates v. Lansing, 9 Johns. (N. Y.) 395, 6 Am. Dec. 290; Stuart v. People, 4 111. 395; Gaudy v. State, 13 Neb. 445, 14 N. W. 143.

An agreement, upon sufficient consideration, to do or not to do a particular thing. 2 Bl. Comm. 442; 2 Kent, Comm. 449. Justice v. Lang, 42 N. Y. 496, 1 Am. Rep. 576; Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 599, 24 L. Ed. 793; Canterberry v. Miller, 76 111. 355. A covenant or agreement between two or more persons, with a lawful consideration or cause. Jacob. A deliberate engagement between competent parties, upon a legal consideration, to do or abstain from doing, some act. Wharton. A contract or agreement is either where a promise is made on one side and assented to on the other; or where two or more persons enter into engagement with each other by a promise on either side. 2 Steph. Comm. 54. A contract is an agreement by which one person obligates himself to another to give, to do, or permit, or not to do. Something expressed or implied by such agreement. Civ. Code I,a. art. 1761; Fislc v. Police Jury. 34 La. Ann. 45. A contract is an agreement to do or not to do a certain thing. Civ. Code Cal.

The right of literary property as recognized and sanctioned by positive law. A right granted by statute to the author or originator of certain literary or artistic productions, whereby he is invested, for a limited period, with the sole and exclusive privilege of multiplying copies of the same and publishing and selling them. In re Rider, 16 R. I. 271, 15 Atl. 72; Mott Iron Works v. Clow, 83 Fed. 316, 27 C. C. A. 250; Palmer v. De Witt, 47 N. Y. 536, 7 Am. Rep. 480; Keene v. Wheat- ley, 14 Fed. Cas. 1S5. An incorporeal right, being the exclusive privilege of printing, reprinting, selling, and publishing his own original work, which the law allows an author. Wharton. Copyright is the exclusive right of the owner of an intellectual production to multiply and dispose of copies; the sole right to the copy, or to copy it. The word is used indifferently to signify the statutory and the common-law right; or one right is sometimes called "copyright" after publication, or statutory copyright; the other copyright before publication, or common-law copyright. The word is also used synonymously with "literary property" 

An artificial person or legal entity created by or under the authority of the laws of a state or nation, composed, in some rare instances, of a single person and his successors, being the incumbents of a particular office, but ordinarily consisting of an association of numerous individuals, who subsist as a body politic under a special denomination, which is regarded In law as having a personality and existence distinct from that of its several members, and which is, by the same authority, vested with the capacity of continuous succession, irrespective of changes in its membership, either in perpetuity or for a limited term of years, and of acting as a unit or single individual in matters relating to the common purpose of the association, within the scope of the powers and authorities conferred upon such bodies by law. See Case of Sutton's Hospital, 10 Coke. 32; Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 657. 4 L. Ed. 629; U. S. v. Trinidad Coal Co., 137 U. S. 160, 11 Sup. Ct. 57. 34 L. Ed. 640; Andrews Bros. Co. v. Youngstown Coke Co., 86 Fed. 585, 30 C. C. A. 293; Porter v. Railroad Co., 76 111. 573; State v. Payne, 129 Mo. 468, 31 S. W. 797. 33 L. R. A. 576; Farmers' L. & T. Co. v. New York, 7 Hill (N. Y.) 2S3; State BL.LAW DICT.(2D ED.)

In practice. The judgment of a court of equity or admiralty, answering to the judgment of a court of common law. A decree in equity is a sentence or order of the court, pronounced on hearing and understanding all the points in issue, and determining the right of all the parties to the suit, according to equity and good conscience. 2 Daniell, Ch. Pr. 980; Wooster v. Handy (O. C.) 23 Fed. 50; Rowley v. Van Benthuysen,10 Wend. (N. Y.) 383; Vance v. Rockwell, 3 Colo. 243; Albert v. Alford (Tex.) 10 S. W. 814.

Decree is the judgment of a court of equity, and is, to most intents and purposes, the same as a judgment of a court of common law. A decree, as distinguished from an order, is final, and is made at the hearing of the cause, whereas an order is interlocutory, and is made on motion or petition. Wherever an order may, in a certain event resulting from the direction contained in the order, lead to the termination of the suit in like manner as a decree made at the hearing, it is called a “decretal order.”

In French law. Certain acts of the legislature or of the sovereign which have the force of law are called “decrees;” as the Berlin and Milan decrees.

In Scotch law. A final judgment or sentence of court by which the question at issue between the parties is decided.

Classification. Decrees in equity are either final or interlocutory. A final decree is one which fully and finally disposes of the whole litigation, determining all questions raised by the case, and leaving nothing that requires further judicial action. Travis v. Waters,12 Johns. (N. Y.) 508; Mills v. Iloag, 7 Paige (N. Y.) 19, 31 Am. Dec. 271; Core v. Strickler, 24 W. Va. 0S9; Ex parte Crittenden, 10 Ark. 339. An interlocutory decree is a provisional or preliminary decree, which is not final and does not determine the suit, but directs some further proceedings preparatory to the final decree. A decree pronounced for the purpose of ascertaining matter of law or fact preparatory to a final decree.1 Barb. Ch. Pr. 320, 327. Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St 520, 50 Am. Dec. 034;Wooster v. Handy (C. C.) 23 Fed. 56; Beebe v. Russell, 19 How. 283, 15 L. Ed. 008;Jenkins v. Wild, 14 Wend. (N. Y.) 543.

A sealed instrument, containing a contract or covenant, delivered by the party to be bound thereby, and accepted by the party to whom the contract or covenant runs. A writing containing a contract sealed and delivered to the party thereto. 3 Washb.Real Prop. 239. In its legal sense, a “deed” is an instrument in writing, upon paper or parchment, between parties able to contract, subscribed, sealed, and delivered. Insurance Co. v  Avery, 00 Ind. 572; 4 Kent, Comm. 452. In a more restricted sense, a written agreement, signed, sealed, and delivered, by which one person conveys land, tenements, or hereditaments to another. This is its ordinary modern meaning. Sanders v. Riedinger. 30 App. Div. 277. 51 N. Y. Supp. 937:Reed v. Hazleton, 37 Kan. 321. 15 Pac. 177; Dudley v. Sunnier. 5 Mass. 470; Fisher v.Pender, 52 N. C. 485. The term is also used as synonymous with “fact,” “actuality,” or “act of parties.” Thus a thing “in deed” is one that has been really or expressly done; as opposed to “in-law,” which means that it is merely implied or presumed to have been done.

A document that allows the transfer of a claim, be it an interest, right or title that the maker of the document may have in a property. The person granting the transfer may not have the absolute claim to the title.