Term
| Every member in the federal court system is called judges |
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Definition
| With the exception of the 9 Supreme Court Justices |
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Term
| Maryland wanted to impose a tax on the Second Bank of the United States |
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Definition
| The tax is through the bank notes because each state could issue their own currency. McCulloch refused to pay the tax and refused to pay the penalties for not paying the tax |
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Term
What/ Who is the supreme authority in the federal government?
Does the Congress have implied powers? |
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Definition
| We know they have enumerated powers through Article 1 Sec 8 describes the powers given to the federal government |
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Term
| The bank of the us charter was debated and deliberated upon and therefore did not steal upon any states rights |
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Definition
Marshall much put emphasis on the deliberation of the statue through detailed history of the bills creation
Eventually the bill becomes law |
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Term
| Maryland representatives were a part of the deliberation process and the law was passed |
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Definition
| Their argument is void because the bill is now law and they had their time to fight it |
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Term
| Supreme Court Judge and Justices view on legislative history |
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Definition
| Some judges and justices will not look at legislative history |
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Term
| The issue of Sovereignty, John Marshall notes the argument of the state of Maryland |
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Definition
“The powers of the federal government are delegated by the states and must be exercised in subordination to the states”
John Marshall says the sovereign is the supreme in any body of politics |
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Term
| The people of the US are the sovereign power |
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Definition
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Term
| Marshall talks about the Constitution and how the people are the sovereign power |
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Definition
The state legislatures originally elected senators
Constitution had to be subjected to ratification by individuals from each state aka “the people”
The government comes directly from the people not the state |
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Term
| The government comes directly from the people not the state |
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Definition
| The Constitution is not a produce of the states. |
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Term
| The issue of implied powers, begins with a negative idea of the Constitution, what is not there |
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Definition
No part of the constitution excludes the use of implied powers”
AOC “if it was not expressively in the articles of confederation the congress did not have those powers”
It was in the articles of confederation but was taken out
This allows one to make this argument- there must be a reason for them to have taken it out
Breyer says that he extract value from reading the entire body of the text |
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Term
The federal government has implied powers
The federal government is supreme |
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Definition
| If there is a conflict between federal law and state law, federal law will win |
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Term
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Definition
Many cases have to do with a civil liberty of some sort
Civil liberties are protected by a combination of the 5th and 14th amendment |
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Term
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Definition
14th amendment – what the federal government finds applicable for civil liberty, the state must find it also
States held as responsible as the federal government to provide and protect civil rights |
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Term
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Definition
As long as your business can be found to have an affect on interstate commerce then you must comply with federal jurisdiction ex. Heart of Atlanta motel case
Allows the fed to regulate trade and commerce |
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Term
| The court is a reactive institution |
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Definition
It creates nothing on its own
Decides what subject matter it takes up and what it will do with that subject matter |
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Term
| The Court can ONLY hand down decisions on cases that are appealed to them |
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Definition
Original jurisdiction is very rare
Court does control its own agenda because it gets to decide which cases that are appealed to them they want to hear |
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Term
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Definition
A judge's expression of opinion on a point other than the precise issue involved in determining a case”
- Decides cases interpreting statues and or laws twice as much as it interprets cases applicable to the constitution |
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Term
| Lets the world know what kinds of cases that they would like to be brought to the court |
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Definition
| The Supreme court has discussed things such as precedents that they would like to discuss and hand down decisions upon. Such as New York Times vs. United States |
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Term
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Definition
| Constitution, Statutues/Laws, Regulations |
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Term
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Definition
Hundreds of more regulations than laws
In order to be appropriate, MUST comply with the law that it is implementing |
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Term
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Definition
| Must fit within the parameters of the Constitution |
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Term
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Definition
Fundamental law, supreme law of the land
Every regular federal or state statue must fit within the Constitution |
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Term
| FDR alters the political profile by the court packing system |
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Definition
Allowed him under certain circumstances as many as 8 or 9 appointments to the court and thus reconfigure the court
Congress rejected this idea
Supreme Court gets the message and begins ruling in favor of New Deal legislation |
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Term
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Definition
does not permit employers to work their employees from working more than 60 hours a week and more than 10 hours a day
Lochner convicted of his second violation of this law and he appeals to the US Supreme Court |
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Term
| Both the baker and the employer enjoy the liberty of contract |
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Definition
| Never says they have or are entitled to the liberty of contract |
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Term
| Both come to the bargaining table with equal intentions |
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Definition
However they were NOT of equal power and position
More likely it would be in favor of the Employer |
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Term
| Notes that there had been instances where states have limited working hours |
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Definition
Eludes to Utah regulation of mining hours.
This is constitutional because mining is a dangerous way to make a living |
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Term
| You have to have a purpose to the law as in health, safety, economic |
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Definition
| Asks if there is an interference with the right to contract |
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Term
| “This statue necessarily interferes with the right of contract between the employer and the employee” |
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Definition
Statute is unconstitutional
“There is no reasonable grounds for interfering with an individuals liberty by setting the hours of work for a bakery” |
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Term
| Notes that the State of New York doesn’t argue that special protection is necessary here and that bakers are incapable |
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Definition
| “The law must have a more direct relation to the end it sought and that end must be legitimate and appropriate” |
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Term
| There are no justifiable reasons here that violate a fundamental liberty: |
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Definition
| The liberty of right to contract |
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Term
| Does Maryland have the authority to tax the Bank under the Supremacy Clause? |
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Definition
The Supremacy Clause (Article 6 Clause 2)
The Laws of the Constitutional and the laws of the federal government are supreme laws of the land and trump or beat competing state laws
Maryland does NOT have the power to tax the bank |
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Term
| Does Congress have implied Powers? |
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Definition
Powers that are not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution but you can deduce from the Constitution these implied powers to do certain duties
Necessary and Proper Clause (Article 1 Section 8 Clause 18) |
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Term
| Necessary and Proper Clause (Article 1 Section 8 Clause 18) |
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Definition
“The elastic clause”
If the end is legitimate and the means are appropriate then it is constitutionally valid that those powers may be carried out |
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Term
| Where does the sovereignty lie in this court? |
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Definition
The Political authority of the union lies with the people of the United States not with the states that comprise it
Maryland violates this fact because the tax acted as a levy against all the people in the country
Only accountable to the people that live within that state |
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Term
| Power explicitly in Constitution: to tax, to raise an army |
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Definition
| Says nothing about stealing the mail but that derives from the law within the constitution |
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Term
| University of Missouri does not accept black students |
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Definition
| Missouri offers to Gaines that he may go to law schools of similar size, build, quality in other states like Nebraska or Oklahoma |
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Term
| What is important about Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada |
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Definition
It is the first case that the US Supreme Court began questioning whether separate but equal was constitutional
Shows the courts growing impatience with separate but equal
They believe this doctrine has run its course
In 1938 FDR in 6th year of presidency, New Deal legislation was being enacted
They effectively order that Gaines be admitted to the Missouri law school |
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Term
| “Equal legal education can only be furnished in one existing school, the petitioner must be admitted” |
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Definition
| A State court getting ahead of the federal government on separate but equal |
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Term
| Maryland also had a law school for whites but not blacks |
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Definition
| Had approved the building of a law school for blacks but never appropriated any money or drew up blueprints |
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Term
| "We can not find that an acceptable remedy is to order a separate school for blacks” |
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Definition
| Cites with favor that this case ends with the court issuing a writ of mandamus to accept Murray into the Maryland law school |
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Term
| Supreme Court has a major state appellate that Plessy is unconstitutional |
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Definition
Had the Gaines case perfectly teed up for this
Paired it with the Maryland case |
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Term
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Definition
| One of the most highly respected lawyer. The United State's lawyer in Supreme Court. Frequent participants in Certiorari |
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Term
| In order to keep their title they are very discreet in selecting cases |
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Definition
| Presidents often listen to Solictor General |
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Term
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Definition
| The court has taken this case and now briefs can come in |
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Term
| The most widely listened to is the SOLICITOR GENERAL OF THE US |
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Definition
| Represents primarily the executive branch in the Supreme Court |
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Term
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Definition
“Friend of the court”
Briefs by people who are NOT parties to the case
They are outsiders |
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Term
| Reasons for accepting Writs of Certiorari |
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Definition
1.Conflict among the lower courts
a. The court does not like uncertainty within the law
b.Very Likely to want to take this case to make sure the law is certain
i.HOWEVER the supreme court is not obligated to take this case because some cases are seen as just not as important as other cases
2. Does an issue interest a justice
3. Strategic Factor
a.Wants to get case decided now so it is harder for decisions to be overturned
b. EX. Justices may want to make decisions before a presidential election that could change the political powers in the court |
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Term
| 4 Insular Communities/ Minorities |
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Definition
| The court believes that a minority can decide if a case should not be heard |
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Term
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Definition
If 4 Justices of the Court decide they want to take a case off the cert list that case will be removed and be eligible for full examination
- Interesting because this is not a majority decision
- The court and constitution are anti majoritarian |
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Term
| When the Court accepts the cert, the parties are then instructed to come in and present oral argument before the court |
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Definition
The oral argument is counted as very little
The decisions are influenced greatly by the briefs
Mostly judges have their decisions made up when they take on a cert |
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Term
| Supreme Court never gives reason for rejection |
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Definition
it is not like a decision
8,000-10,000 cases appealed to it each year |
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Term
| Why does the Supreme Court grant or deny writ or certiorari |
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Definition
Certiorari
Comes from the state systems and can go to the SC court on grounds that it has a federal issue
Issue with a Statue or constitution
Must have gone to highest state court
It is a petition appealing to the Supreme Court
Can appeal to the SC if
The supreme court does not have to take any case it does not want to take |
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Term
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Definition
Gaines argued that his fourteeth amendment right was violated
Brought an action to the state court of the writ of mandamus
Asking the university to admit him and the court denied this writ
The court issued another writ of mandamus stating that the government would pay tuition for a law school out of state
This is a case that shows incremental cases for the court to overrule the separate but equal doctrine
sVery difficult to adhere to equal rights when segregation is legal
Starts to build the legal framework to overrule Plessy decision
This case exemplifies an Active Court |
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Term
| Many Interest Groups are like Businesses |
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Definition
They like all business run on capital
Justices are aware, and which is a reason why they do not look at demonstrations |
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Term
| FIRST NAME IN CASE IS ALWAYS THE CASE THAT LOST |
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Definition
| The Appellant or Petitioner |
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Term
| SECOND NAME IN CASE HAS ALWAYS WON |
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Definition
| The Appellee or Respondent |
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Term
| COMMERCE CLAUSE, ARTICLE 1 SECTION 8 CLAUSE 3 |
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Definition
Congress shall have the power to regulate commerce among the several states
Certain elements are intertwined with business in all of the states that ONLY the fed could be expected to regulate that activity in its entirety
This has been a questionable topic for years in the court
This power has been accepted that the government has the authority to:
1. regulate air traffic
2. security issues and the sale there of |
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Term
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Definition
To allow the federal government to ensure individuals civil rights and liberties
14th Amendment Juris Prudence
The extent to which and the conditions upon which governments on any level may in some way limit our civil liberties
Explains when Gov is allowed to limit liberties like freedom of speech, religion… |
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Term
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Definition
| If you were engaged in interstate or in an activity that was involved in interstate commerce or is affected in ANY way by interstate commerce, then the government had the right to regulate that activity |
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Term
| The congress power has outer limits shaped by the dual federalist system |
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Definition
| There must be a rational basis that an activity affect interstate commerce |
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Term
| Three Categories of Activity that Congress may regulate under Commerce Clause |
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Definition
1. Regulating the channels of Commerce
a. Highways, Canals, Waterways, Railroads, Ships, Planes, etc.
2. Instrumentalities of Commerce
a.The goods and or the people in commerce
i.Shipping the widgets – widgets are instruments and the rail road is the channel
3.Can regulate those activities that substantially affect commerce
a.A direct affect on interstate commerce
b. Also indirect
i. Ex. Labor agreements |
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Term
| Significant Effects Doctrine |
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Definition
Does it significantly affect interstate commerce
Could affect product, channel, etc. |
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Term
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Definition
| In this essay Hamilton discussed the question of whether the Supreme Court should have the authority to declare acts of Congress null and void because, in the Court's opinion, they violated the Constitution. Hamilton answered in the affirmative; such a power would tend to curb the "turbulence and follies of democracy." |
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Term
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Definition
| In arguing that the independence of judges could only be assured by making a fixed provision for their support, Hamilton made a profound and realistic social observation: "In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will." This is as true of private as of public life. |
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Term
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Definition
| prohibits the government from infringing on fundamental constitutional liberties. By contrast, procedural due process refers to the procedural limitations placed on the manner in which a law is administered, applied, or enforced. Thus, procedural due process prohibits the government from arbitrarily depriving individuals of legally protected interests without first giving them notice and the opportunity to be heard. |
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Term
| Grutter v. Bollinger Facts |
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Definition
| In 1997, Barbara Grutter, a white resident of Michigan, applied for admission to the University of Michigan Law School. Grutter applied with a 3.8 undergraduate GPA and an LSAT score of 161. She was denied admission. The Law School admits that it uses race as a factor in making admissions decisions because it serves a "compelling interest in achieving diversity among its student body." The District Court concluded that the Law School's stated interest in achieving diversity in the student body was not a compelling one and enjoined its use of race in the admissions process. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), constituted a binding precedent establishing diversity as a compelling governmental interest sufficient under strict scrutiny review to justify the use of racial preferences in admissions. The appellate court also rejected the district court's finding that the Law School's "critical mass" was the functional equivalent of a quota. |
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Term
| Grutter v. Bollinger Issue |
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Definition
| Does the University of Michigan Law School's use of racial preferences in student admissions violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964? |
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Term
| Grutter v. Bollinger Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Schools may consider race as a part of the admissions process as long as it is only one factor in an individualized process. |
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Term
| Grutter v. Bollinger Holding |
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Definition
| No. The law school in this case was conducting highly individualized reviews of each applicant, and Justice O’Connor determined that race was only one of many factors considered to determine the applicant’s eligibility. Schools have a compelling interest in having diverse student bodies, and |
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Term
| Griswold v. Connecticut Facts |
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Definition
| Appellant Griswold, Executive Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut and Appellant Buxton, a licensed physician who served as Medical Director for the League at its Center in New Haven, were arrested and charged with giving information, instruction, and medical advice to married persons on means of preventing conception. Appellants were found guilty as accessories and fined $100 each. Appellants appealed on the theory that the accessory statute as applied violated the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution. Appellants claimed standing based on their professional relationship with the married people they advised. |
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Term
| Griswold v. Connecticut Rule of Law |
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Definition
| The right of a married couple to privacy is protected by the Constitution. |
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Term
| Griswold v. Connecticut Issue |
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Definition
| Does the Constitution provide for a privacy right for married couples? |
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Term
| Griswold v. Connecticut Holding |
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Definition
| The First Amendment has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion, which although not expressly included in the Amendment, is necessary to make the express guarantees meaningful. The association of marriage is a privacy right older than the Bill of Rights, and the State’s effort to control marital activities in this case is unnecessarily broad and therefore impinges on protected Constitutional freedoms. |
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Term
| Griswold v. Connecticut Dissent |
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Definition
| Justice Stewart and Justice Black. Although the law is silly, it is not unconstitutional. The citizens of Connecticut should use their rights under the 9th and 10th Amendment to convince their elected representatives to repeal it if the law does not conform to their community standards. |
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Term
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Definition
| Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother. Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. |
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Term
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Definition
| Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment? |
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Term
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Definition
| Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. |
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Term
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Definition
The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage, deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws. The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion, except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child |
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Term
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Definition
| Justice Rehnquist. The right to an abortion is not universally accepted, and the right to privacy is thus not inherently involved in this case |
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Term
| Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey Facts |
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Definition
| A Pennsylvania abortion law permitted abortion on a married women only after having received a signed statement from the woman that she has notified her husband, except in cases of medical emergency. The woman also had the option of providing a signed statement that her husband was not the man who impregnated her; that her husband could not be located; that the pregnancy was the result of a reported sexual assault; or that notifying the husband will cause him or someone else to inflict bodily injury upon her. Physicians performing abortions without the required statement will have their licenses revoked and are liable for damages to the husband. |
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Term
| Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Requiring spousal notification prior to an abortion is unduly burdensome and unconstitutional. Requiring parental notification in the case of minors is constitutional so long as there is a medical emergency exception and a judicial bypass procedure. |
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Term
| Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey Issue |
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Definition
| Does the spousal notification requirement place an undue burden on married women who seek abortions in violation of the United States Constitution? |
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Term
| Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey Holding |
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Definition
The Court rejects the common law view of the married couple as one and finds that the spousal notification requirement is unduly burdensome and a violation of the Constitution.
Common law provided that a married woman had no legal existence separate from her husband. However, it is clear that state regulation of abortion has a far greater impact on the mother’s liberty than the fathers. Although the husband has a substantial interest in the unborn fetus, when balancing between the mother and father’s interest, the balance weighs in the mother’s favor.
It is well documented that spousal abuse occurs in a variety of different ways, and can be brought on by knowledge of pregnancy. A significant number of women would be deterred from receiving abortions under this law as if the state had completely outlawed abortion. Spousal notification would essentially enable many husbands to wield a veto over his wife’s decision.
So long as there is an adequate judicial bypass procedure permitting minors to petition a court to allow their abortions, it is constitutional to require unemancipated minors to receive parental or guardian consent. Medical emergencies are the exception. |
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Term
| Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey Dissent |
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Definition
| The spousal statute requires notification, not consent. We believe that the spousal notification statute furthers legitimate state interests, such as promoting the integrity of the marital relationship. |
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Term
| Washington v. Glucksburg Facts |
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Definition
| It is a crime to assist suicide in Washington. Petitioners are the State of Washington and its Attorney General. Respondents are physicians who practice medicine in Washington. Respondents occasionally treat terminally ill patients and claim that they would help these patients end their lives if not for Petitioners’ ban on assisted suicides. In January 1993, Respondents, along with three terminally ill patients (who have since died), and a non-profit organization that counsels people considering physician assisted suicide sued in the United Stated District Court claiming that Petitioners’ assisted suicide ban is unconstitutional. The District Court invalidated the statute. The Court of Appeals reversed, but then reversed itself en banc and affirmed the District Court. The en banc decision held that “the Constitution encompasses a due process liberty interest in controlling the time and manner of one’s death” and the state’s assisted suicide ban was unconstitutional. |
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Term
| Washington v. Glucksburg Issue |
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Definition
| Whether Washington’s prohibition against “causing” or “aiding” a suicide offends the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. |
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Term
| Washington v. Glucksburg Rule of Law |
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Definition
| The “liberty” protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution does not include the right to assist suicide. |
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Term
| Washington v. Glucksburg Holding |
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Definition
No. The en banc judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed. There is consistent and almost universal tradition that has long rejected the asserted right of assisting suicide. To hold that such a right is fundamental in nature would be to reverse centuries of legal doctrine. Therefore, assisting suicide is not a fundamental right. The Constitution requires the state ban to be rationally related to legitimate government interests. Petitioners have an “unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.” Suicide is a serious health problem. Further, Petitioners have an interest in protecting the integrity and ethics of the medical profession, as well as an interest in protecting vulnerable groups from abuse, neglect and mistakes. The ban on assisting suicide is thus rationally related to these legitimate state interests.
Concurrence. There is no generalized right to commit suicide. There is no need to address Respondent’s question whether a mentally competent person who is experiencing great suffering has a constitutionally cognizable interest in controlling the circumstances of his or her imminent death.
The majority’s holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the law addressed in the case may be invalid and thus the constitutionality of such a law could prevail in a more particularized challenge.
The legislature has more competence to address this issue than the Court.
The Court’s formulation of the “liberty” interests is incorrect. Additionally, the majority’s holding does not foreclose the possibility that some applications of the law addressed in the case may be invalid, and thus the constitutionality of such a law could prevail in a more particularized challenge. |
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Term
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Definition
| The 1897 Labor Law stated that no employee can be required or permitted to work in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or confectionery establishment more than sixty hours in a week or more than ten hours in one day, unless to make work on the last day of the week shorter. And the number of hours worked in a week could not average out to be more than ten hours per day. |
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Term
| Lochner v. NY Rule of Law |
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Definition
| The 1897 Labor Law limiting the hours that an employee in a biscuit, bread, or cake bakery or confectionery establishment may work is an abridgement to their liberty of contract and a violation of due process. |
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Term
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Definition
| Does the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment protect liberty of contract and private property against unwarranted government interference? |
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Term
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Definition
Justice Peckham opinion. This law is an abridgment to the liberty of contract and a violation of due process.
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of the “liberty” of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. No state can deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law. The right to purchase or sell labor is part of that liberty protected. The only way a state may counter this right is to show they are exercising a valid police power with their regulation. Those powers relate to the safety, health, morals and general welfare of the public.
The Court rejected the labor law justification of the statute on police power grounds because this was not a valid exercise of police power.
First, that power is extended to the protection of “public welfare” and not the readjustment of bargaining power between employees and employers. The effect of this legislation was to regulate labor conditions and not to protect workers. The effect of such statutes, not just the stated or proclaimed purpose, is determinative in whether this statute is repugnant to the United States Constitution.
Second, there is no valid health of safety rationale in this case. Bakers were not endangered like miners were in the Holden v. Hardy case. Mining is a profession that needed regulation, but this is not. The state could accomplish its goals with means that did not interfere with the freedom to contract. Because the police power exercised here is not strong, the Court suspected that there were legislative motives behind the enactment of this law. New York was using its power to upset the free market. |
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Term
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Definition
Justices Holmes, Harlan, White and Day dissenting.
J. Holmes: States may regulate life in many ways which might seem injudicious or tyrannical and which may interfere with the liberty to contract. Sunday laws and usury laws are examples. Liberty of a citizen to do as he likes so long as he does not interfere with the liberty of others to do the same, has been interfered with by school laws, the Post Office, every state or city which takes his money in taxes for purposes thought desirable which he may or may not like. The states have interfered with the liberty to contract with the prohibition of sales of stock on margins for future delivery and the eight-hour law for miners.
J. Holmes: A Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory. Finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel ought not to determine whether the statutes conflict with the Constitution. The word “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment is improperly construed when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion, unless it can be said that a rational and fair man necessarily would admit that the statute proposed would infringe fundamental traditions, which have been understood by the traditions of our people and law.
J. Harlan: If a state is to interfere with the right to contract, it may do so only if the regulation involves a state’s police power to protect the health of its citizens. The Court should not be concerned with the policy of legislation. The only question is whether the means devised by the state are germane to a valid end. |
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Term
| McCulloch v. Maryland Facts |
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Definition
| Congress chartered the Second Bank of the United States. Branches were established in many states, including one in Baltimore, Maryland. In response, the Maryland legislature adopted an Act imposing a tax on all banks in the state not chartered by the state legislature. James McCulloch, a cashier for the Baltimore branch of the United States Bank, was sued for violating this Act. McCulloch admitted he was not complying with the Maryland law. McCulloch lost in the Baltimore County Court and that court’s decision was affirmed by the Maryland Court of Appeals. The case was then taken by writ of error to the United States Supreme Court (Supreme Court). |
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Term
| McCulloch v. Maryland Issue |
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Definition
| Does Congress have the authority to establish a Bank of the United States under the Constitution? |
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Term
| McCulloch v. Maryland Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Congress may enact laws that are necessary and proper to carry out their enumerated powers. The United States Constitution (Constitution) is the supreme law of the land and state laws cannot interfere with federal laws enacted within the scope of the Constitution. |
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Term
| McCulloch v. Maryland Holding |
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Definition
Yes. Judgment reversed.
Counsel for the state of Maryland claimed that because the Constitution was enacted by the independent states, it should be exercised in subordination to the states. However, the states ratified the Constitution by a two-thirds vote of their citizens, not by a decision of the state legislature. Therefore, although limited in its powers, the Constitution is supreme over the laws of the states.
There is no enumerated power within the Constitution allowing for the creation of a bank. But, Congress is granted the power of making “all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers.” The Supreme Court determines through Constitutional construction that “necessary” is not a limitation, but rather applies to any means with a legitimate end within the scope of the Constitution.
Because the Constitution is supreme over state laws, the states cannot apply taxes, which would in effect destroy federal legislative law. Therefore, Maryland’s state tax on the United States Bank is unconstitutional. |
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Definition
| While President of the United States, John Adams (Adams) appointed several justices, including justices of the peace, in the District of Columbia. Adams signed the Commissions for these justices, but the Commissions were not delivered before his term expired. William Marbury (Marbury) was one of the justices of the peace appointed by Adams. When Thomas Jefferson (Jefferson) became President of the United States, he ordered his Secretary of State James Madison (Madison), to withhold these Commissions. Marbury brought suit directly in the Supreme Court, asking for a Writ of Mandamus to compel Madison to deliver the Commissions. |
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Definition
Is Marbury entitled to his Commission, and if so, do the laws provide a remedy?
If Marbury is entitled to a remedy, can it be in the form of a Writ of Mandamus from the Supreme Court? |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison Rule of Law |
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Definition
| If there is a conflict between any law and the U.S. Constitution, it is within the judicial power granted to the Supreme Court to determine whether the law is unconstitutional. This process is called judicial review. |
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Term
| Marbury v. Madison Holding |
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Definition
Justice John Marshall (J. Marshall) held Marbury was entitled to his Commission when Adams signed the Commissions prior to leaving office. To determine whether Marbury had a remedy, J. Marshall distinguished political acts from acts specifically required by law. J. Marshall ruled the denial of the Commission fell into the latter category and was reviewable by the courts.
The Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) determined Marbury was entitled to a remedy. However, Marbury was not entitled to a remedy in the form of a Writ of Mandamus issued by the Supreme Court. J. Marshall explained that Section: 2 of the United States Constitution (the Constitution) gives original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court only in, “[c]ases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party.” This holding was contrary to the Judiciary Act of 1789 (the Act), which did authorize the Supreme Court to issue Writs of Mandamus on behalf of any person holding office in the United States. J. Marshall therefore concluded that the part of the Act authorizing the Supreme Court to Writs of Mandamus under these circumstances was unconstitutional and that the Supreme Court did not have the authority to issue a Writ. |
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Term
| West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Wage and hour laws generally do not violate the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution (Constitution). |
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Term
| West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish Facts |
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Definition
| The Appellee was a maid who worked for less than the state minimum of $14.50 per 48-hour week. She brought suit to recover the difference in pay from the Appellant. |
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Term
| West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish Issue |
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Definition
| Is the fixing of minimum wages for women and minors constitutional? |
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Term
| West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish |
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Definition
Yes. This case overrules Adkins v. Children’s Hospital.
The exploitation of a class of workers who are at a disadvantaged bargaining position is in the best interest of the health of the worker and economic health of the community. |
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Definition
| The power of Congress to regulate activities extends only to those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. The Act neither regulates commercial activity, nor contains a requirement that the possession be connected in any way to interstate commerce. |
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Definition
| Congress passed the Act making it a federal crime “for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.” Lopez (D), a 12th grader, was convicted for carrying a concealed handgun into his high school. The Court of Appeals reversed the lower court on the grounds that the law was outside the scope of the commerce power |
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Term
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Definition
| Does the commerce power of Congress extend to activities that have no apparent connection to interstate commerce? |
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Term
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Definition
No. The Court of Appeals is affirmed.
The activity being regulated must “substantially affect” interstate commerce.
There are three broad categories of activity Congress may regulate under the commerce power. First, the channels of interstate commerce. Second, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce. Third, activities having a substantial effect upon interstate commerce.
In the instant case, only the third category applies. In order for the statute to be deemed valid, the activity must substantially affect interstate commerce. The Act is a criminal statute, which does not regulate economic activity. In passing the Act, Congress banned possession of a gun that has never traveled in, or affected, interstate commerce. Congress provided no findings in the statute showing possession of guns in schools affected commerce.
The federal government argues possessing a firearm could affect the national economy in two ways. First, by imposing high financial costs upon society through insurance. Second, by preventing individuals from traveling into areas where violent crime occurs. Thus, the government concludes, the Act substantially affects interstate commerce.
The majority rejected these arguments because under the government’s theories, there would be no limits on federal power. The commerce power would extend to any activity that leads to violent crime and any activity related to the economic productivity of individuals. Congress does not have plenary police power. Possession of a gun in a school zone is not an economic activity that affects interstate commerce. |
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Definition
(Breyer, J) Congress had a rational basis for finding a substantial connection between gun-related school violence and interstate commerce. Evidence exists that gun-related violence interferes with the quality of education in schools and education is related to economic viability.
(Souter, J) Congress had a rational basis for its conclusions. Further, gun-related violence around schools is a commercial problem. The majority wrongly believes it can justify its holding by distinguishing between commercial and non-commercial transactions. |
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Term
| Wickard v. Fillburn Facts |
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Definition
| Pursuant to the Agricultural Adjustment Act (the Act), the Secretary of Agriculture set a quota of wheat production to bring the supply of wheat into balance with the demand for it. Under the quota, every farmer was given an annual allotment of wheat he could produce. Filburn, a farmer in Ohio who raised small amounts of wheat for home consumption and for commercial use, exceeded his allotment by 239 bushels and was fined $117. Thereupon, Filburn sued the government to enjoin the enforcement of the penalty. |
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Term
| Wickard v. Fillburn Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Activities local in character that have an economic effect on interstate commerce can be regulated by Congress under the Commerce Clause. |
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Term
| Wickard v. Fillburn Issue |
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Definition
| Was the quota subjecting Filburn to wheat production restrictions unconstitutional inasmuch as Congress has no power to regulate activities local in nature? |
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Term
| Wickard v. Fillburn Holding |
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Definition
No. The lower court issuing the injunction is reversed.
The Commerce Clause undoubtedly gives Congress the power to regulate the price of wheat. This can be done by increasing the demand or decreasing the supply for it in the market. The effect of the quota is to control the supply of wheat and sustain the demand for it. To the extent that farmers could produce wheat to meet their own home needs, the demand for wheat is affected.
Although Filburn’s production alone may be trivial, the combination of the many farms’ trivial production would have a substantial effect on the market. Even if Filburn’s activity is local and although it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on commerce, without regard for whether the effect is “direct” or “indirect.” |
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Term
| Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Congress may regulate the ability of commercial institutions to deny service on the basis of race under its power to regulate interstate commerce. |
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Term
| Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States Facts |
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Definition
| Heart of Atlanta Motel had 216 rooms available to transient guests and had historically rented rooms only to white guests. Appellant solicits business from outside the State of Georgia through advertising in national travel magazines and other media. Approximately 70% of its guests are from outside the state. Appellant contends that Congress has overreached its authority under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Act. |
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Term
| Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States Issue |
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Definition
| May Congress prohibit racial discrimination in hotel lodging under the Commerce Clause? |
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Term
| Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States Holding |
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Definition
Yes. Appeals court ruling affirmed.
Congress heard testimony from many sources describing the hardships blacks face in securing transient accommodations throughout the United States. With an increasingly mobile populace, this brought increasing difficulties to many United States citizens.
It does not matter that Congress was addressing a moral issue (see the dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and the Supreme Court of the United States’ (Supreme Court) opinion in Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). What the Supreme Court is examining is Congress’ power to enact the legislation, not the impetus behind the Act. |
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Term
| NAACP v. Button Rule of Law |
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Definition
| The First Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) protects vigorous advocacy of lawful ends against government intrusion. |
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Term
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Definition
| Virginia enacted a statute that banned the “improper solicitation of any legal or professional business” and later amended it to include Chapter 33, which made the statute apply to organizations such as the NAACP. The NAACP was in the practice of meeting with parents of students that were discriminated against by Virginia public schools and supplying forms by which the parents could submit to have the NAACP litigate their claims. The Virginia’s highest court held that the Virginia branch of the NAACP was in violation of Chapter 33. |
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Term
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Definition
| Whether Virginia’s statute violates the First Amendment of the Constitution? |
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Term
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Definition
Yes. Judgment of the highest state court reversed. The activities of the NAACP, its affiliates and legal staff shown in the record are modes of expression and association protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution, which Virginia may not prohibit as improper solicitation of legal business. The First Amendment of the Constitution protects vigorous advocacy of lawful ends against government intrusion. In the context of the NAACP’s objectives, litigation is not a technique for resolving personal matters, it is a means for achieving equality in treatment for members of the Negro community. It is thus a form of political expression. Further, the statute is vague and overly broad which may result in selective enforcement against unpopular cases. The state has failed to advance any substantial regulatory interest in the form of substantive evils flowing from the NAACP’s activities, which can justify the broad prohibitions which it imposed. Therefore, Virginia’s statute viola
tes the First Amendment of the Constitution. |
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Term
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Definition
| Litigation, whether or not associated with the attempt to vindicate constitutional rights, is conduct. It is speech plus. The state may impose reasonable limitations as here. |
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Term
| Brown v. Board of Education Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Separate but equal educational facilities are inherently unequal. |
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Term
| Brown v. Board of Education Facts |
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Definition
| The Plaintiffs, various black children (Plaintiffs), were denied admission to schools attended by white children under laws that permitted or required segregation by race. Plaintiffs sued, seeking admission to public schools in their communities on a nonsegregated basis. |
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Term
| Brown v. Board of Education Issue |
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Definition
| Do separate but equal laws in the area of public education deprive black children of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution)? |
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Term
| Brown v. Board of Education Holding |
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Definition
Yes.
Chief Justice Earl Warren (J. Warren) stated that even if the “tangible” factors of segregated schools are equal, to separate black children from others of similar age and qualifications solely on the basis of race, generates a feeling of inferiority with respect to their status in the community and may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely to ever be undone. |
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Term
| Univeristy of California v. Bakke Rule of Law |
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Definition
| Although race may be a factor in determining admission to public educational institutions, it may not be a sole determining factor. |
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Term
| University of California v. Bakke Facts |
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Definition
| The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for “disadvantaged minorities.” The Respondent, when compared to students admitted under the special admissions program, had more favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing characteristic. The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program denied him equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. |
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Term
| University of California v. Bakke Issue |
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Definition
| The University of California, Davis Medical School reserved 16 spots out of the 100 in any given class for “disadvantaged minorities.” The Respondent, when compared to students admitted under the special admissions program, had more favorable objective indicia of performance, while his race was the only distinguishing characteristic. The Respondent sued, alleging that the special admissions program denied him equal protection of laws under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution. |
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Term
| University of California v. Bakke Holding |
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Definition
The special admissions program is unconstitutional, but race may be considered as a factor in the admissions process.
Justice Lewis Powell (J. Powell), writing for the court, says that the Supreme Court of the United States (Supreme Court) should not pay attention to past discrimination in reviewing the policies of the University, as this is tantamount to allowing political trends to dictate constitutional principles.
J. Powell determines that accepting a minimum number of minorities simply to reduce the traditional deficit of such individuals in the medical profession is facially unconstitutional, as it gives preference to an individual on the basis of race alone.
The major determination of the Supreme Court is whether or not racial preference may be used to promote diversity of the student body. J. Powell argues that setting aside a specified number of minority slots is not congruent to the purported goal – minority students in themselves do not guarantee a diversity of viewpoints in the educational environment. |
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Term
| University of California v. Bakke Dissent |
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Definition
Justices William Brennan (J. Brennan), Byron White (J. Brennan), Thurgood Marshall (J. Marshall), and Harry Blackmun (J. Blackmun) dissent, believing the special admissions program to be constitutional. In particular, the Justices argue that the racial classification in the present case is remedial, serves an important government objective and also substantially related to that objective and thus insulated from the Fourteenth Amendment’s general prohibition of such classifications.
J. Marshall writes separately in support of J. Brennan, J. White, J. Marshall, and J. Blackmun.
Justice John Paul Stevens (J. Stevens) dissents, citing that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits the denial of any individual on the basis of race from participation in any program receiving federal funding. J. Stevens argues that prohibiting white students from participation in the special admissions program is a direct violation of Title VI. |
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Term
| Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada Facts |
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Definition
| The Registrar at the Law School of the University of Missouri, Cy Woodson Canada, refused admission to Lloyd Gaines because he was an African-American.[1] At the time there was no Law School specifically for African-Americans within the state. Gaines cited that this refusal violated his Fourteenth Amendment right. The state of Missouri had offered to pay for Gaines’ tuition at an adjacent state’s law school, which he turned down. |
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Term
| Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada Issue |
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Definition
| In light of the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment, does Missouri violate this clause when it affords whites the ability to attend law school in state while not affording the same right to blacks and instead forcing them to attend adjacent states for their law education? |
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Term
| Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada Holding |
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Definition
| Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Hughes held that when the state provides legal training, it must provide it to every qualified person to satisfy equal protection. It cannot send them to other states, nor can it condition that training for one group of people (such as blacks) on levels of demand from that group. Key to the court’s conclusion was that there was no provision for legal education of blacks in Missouri, which is where Missouri law guaranteeing equal protection applies. To the court, sending Gaines to another state would have been irrelevant. McReynolds's dissent emphasized a body of case law with sweeping statements about state control of education before suggesting the possibility that—despite the majority opinion—Missouri couldn't still deny Gaines admission. |
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