1.  
   1. Describes unit of analysis, guides questions-evidence-and variables, not a history of analysis or policy prescriptions. Highlights some processes and not others.
   2. Three Levels:

                                                               i.      Individual: Personality, perceptions of Decision Makers – to explain why events happen.

1.      Strengths: Individuals makes some difference – otherwise be no point in elections or protests, provides a more detailed explanation of events.

2.      Allows for variation among individuals.

3.      Faults: obscures broader forces globally

                                                             ii.      State/Domestic Level: focus of inquiry for most contemporary scholars intern., Inside out view of why events happen, 

1.      State Factors: ruling class, economy, system, etc = reasons why or why not.

2.      STRENGTHS WEAKNESSES

                                                            iii.      System Level: Outside-in approach, explain how external forces affect domestic decisions,

Strengths Weaknesses

use 3 –6 levels, more levels = better quality.

            Realism and Neorealism:

                        Realism: Individual is afraid and selfish, powerseeking, states act in national interest – “power” = material resources. Need to harm/coerce other states. International system is anarchic: no authority hierarchy. #Concern = insecurity due to anarchy – balancing state powers and deterance

4 Assumptions from Thucydides: History of the Peloponnesian War

            1.state is principle actor in war and politics in general

1. state is unitary actor, no one within state goes against decisions
2. state’s decision makers are rational actors – pursuit of national interest

Security Issues: increase domestic capability + econ. Powers + alliances

1. Individual Level of Analysis: 1^st has to identify which indiv. Are relevant to how/why decisions are made.
   1. Policy elites/leader/opinion leader of movement, celebrities, and MASS PUBLICS (protest movements) when leaders/indiv. Matter is intern. Politics, indiv.
   2. Have a greatest effect  WHEN INSTITUTIONS are weak.
   3.  – weak impedeing institutions are in autocracies, change in regime, criseses,
   4. Individuals = indep. Variable X, Outcome is dependent variable Y. 
   5. What factors actually act on individuals-many hypotheses:

                                                               i.      Personal Psycology (favorite of indiv. Analysis) of leaders

                                                             ii.      Role of personal background

                                                            iii.      Gender

                                                           iv.      Personal health history

How does Personal Psychology affect Decisions?

1.      how they aquire info.

2.      how they process info

3.      influence how they act (standard operating procedures, personal operating code.

Waltz: 1^st image: Individual can’t explain decision of war, domestic – System level is his favorite. Why discounted? Why the best?

Waltz: 1. Flawed Nature of Man = war, therefore we can improve the nature of man: Waltz commentary on the problems with this theory:

-         1^st image analystic, degree of domestic, - pins on small # of traits, of individual or states. Claim that war is not a politicol problem = not true. Shortage of Systematic attempts to relate behavior knowledge – lack of modern social science tools.

can’t end war completely, but can we have less of it? Must understand causes of war to explain peace.

Politicol phil. Is relevant to international studies b/c no order means no liberty, life more important that freedom.

You can say a theory is wrong if following it doesn’t = predicted result. BUT can’t prove it true. Empirical approach is necessary but not enough – can’t use correlation of events.

So- what?

            2 addit. Ways to accept/reject PRESCRIPTIONS:

1.      if based on flawed analysis, unlikely to be right

2.      has to be logically related to its analysis, solun. Must address what is identified (why reform states if men are evil?)

Complicating factor: May need all three Images (levels) to be accurate. *to understand one cause’s consequences, may have to understand its relation to other causes.

Estimating Merit:

1.      can final solution be used, how?

2.      does prescription attack assigned causes?

3.      adequate image? (ignored other important causes?)

4.      How will trying the solution affect other goals?

Outline: Theorhetical implications and cosequences of MOST USED levels: international, and state.

3 Capabilities: Descriptive, Explanatory, Predictive

            Descriptive: Systemic Level is more comprehensive than national or sub-st, but those are more detailed.

            Audience: policy makers want predictions of other countries actions while scholars interested in whole system.

Can’t argue for one level exclusively.

There is a preliminary conceptual issue – solve before researching

International System is Changing: nation state could disappear as an actor

Is there a diff. Between Intl. Relations and Comparative FP?

You can’t combine conclusions from the systematic and sub systemic levels.

I. Requirements of an Anlytical Model:

1.      How the model can be used

2.      requirements to be used these ways

3.      accurate description of the phenom.

4.      explain relationships within the phenom (more important that descript)

5.      promise of a reliable prediction

II. Level of Analysis: Internation System (Systematic) most comprehensive, only way to see the whole, BUT loses detail.

1.      tends to be deterministic: exaggerates international system’s impact on actors- assumes high level of uniformity in fp of actors: assumed all act on interest defined by power. This is bad for CASUAL statements, adequate for correlative statements on stimuli.

III:State Level: Very Complex Methodologically

Strength: analyzing actor differences- valid generalizations of comparative nature (systematic usually does gross comparisons based on crude data)

Weaknesses:

1.opposite distortion of systematic: exaggerates differences among ACTORS, MORE DANGEROUS than homogeneity b/c comparison contract only come from observed uniformities leads to PTOLEMAIC PAROCHIALISM: observer applies virtues to own nation and vices to others.

2.      Can only apply “decision-making approach” within own framework.

3.      Raises ? of goals, purposes, and motivation: Western Philosophy leans to “goal seeking approach”

a.       Do indiv. Speaking for the state have concrete goals? DO they choose their own goals or are they forced into certain goals by history etc? (Freewill v. Determinism.)

b.      How and Why Certain Goals? (ignored in system world)

                                                                                                   i.      Goals and Motivations are both dependent and independent variables

c.        Look at Factors: influence on actors OR how actors PERCEIEVE those factors.

                                                                                                   i.      Incompatible assumptions – different models of behavior

1.      quasi deterministic

2.      only reality in the phenomenal: detected by the senses. Unfelt forces do not exist-if believe this, then tend to use this to explain behavior. BUT can we observe/analyze perceptions? Also affects who we study, a uniform state or agglomeration? Institutions can’t perceive.

·        State Strength and Stability: not military, but strength compared to own society?

·        Domestic Politics: can shape international politics by influencing choices of leaders (their social class, party etc) War creates internal/external results – Domestic society is affected, therefore influences the decision to go to war.

o       How might state strength over society affect the War decision?:

§         Defense of state: set institution making and roles. Cousner: strength in relation to society. Domestic society can restrain foreign affairs.

§         Ideal Strong and Weak States

·        Weak: totally controlled by interest groups, benefits small group not society as a whole)

·        Strong: few constraints can act in national interest.

·        Theories of State Stability on International Politics: Stability – how fragmented/fractured a society is. (religion, ethnicity, language etc). How? More divided – might be hesistant to war, Diversionary War – if divided – start war to distract society through united war effort.

·        2^nd Module: Influence of Domestic Regime Type: READING

o       Key Reading Points: in all readings – regime type matters in the choice to war.

o       Autocracy or Democracy? Are Institutional bodies (especially the executive) elected by people, military, or 

o       Doyle/Lane readings argued about DEMOCRATIC PEACE THEORY

§         Democracy V. Democracy Conflict: probability of war is low, doesn’t mean that democracies are inherently less/more peaceful or aggressive.

§         Democracy V. Autocracy: probability is higher. Reason why is disputed but the evidence shows this relationship.

·        Mayor: Autocracy: 3 types

1.      Dictator: 1 person

2.      Military

3.      Single Party Democracies (not a single indiv)

§      Advocates: military less likely to go to war. REASONS:

O: Role of Culture at the Domestic Level: 2 definitions

1.      Behavior: customary social forms, material traits of a group, or actual ideas ppl. Hold, shared attitudes/values.

a.       Cultural Differences are more fundamental that differences among regime types. It explains political + economic outcomes/choices because it underpins all behavior. Also, these differences are more immutable/less compromisable than economic differences.

b.      Cultural Causes of War:

1.      Some cultures are more warlike

2.      Cultural Division is a cause for conflict-ultimately war: Therefore, not policy based but more fundamental = more bloody/violence based.

The International System

General Structural Explanations:

1.      Explain how states behave, not indiv. Motives

2.      Structural theories give little weight to human motives b/c the PRESSURE OF THE SYSTEM overrides variation at the domestic/individual level.

Definition of System: 1. comprised of units, 2. defined by rules that govern interaction – can be INFORMAL rules (norms, patterns of interaction among states over time.)

Assumptions:

1. States are main actors in international politics
2. States are unitary actors – like a single decision maker makes the policy, a useful simplification
3. States are in Anarchy (NOT chaos): it’s the order, no CENTRAL COERCVIE authority/arbitrator of events.
4. Implications: this is a self-help world can only count on self for help
5. States want to survive: maintain sovereignty
6. States are rational actors: limited concept (gaols aren’t always rational) they have goals and use strategies to achieve them as efficiently as possible.

Auxilliary Assumptions:

1.      All states have some military capability

2.      States can NEVER be certain about the intentions of others ex. Could change in the future.

Structural Theorists: Key Questions: Why states seek power, what power, why states cause war.

 Variable: military power

Look at all assumptions plus variable of military power = all together = military

Three things from Class: one from readings

1. States Seek Power, as a goal within itself, but as a way to ensure survival – disagreement on how much power they seek to aquire.
   1. Waltz: only sufficient power NOT maximun power.
   2. Maresheimer: (tragedy of…) States try to maximize power – unbridled competition for power – in military policies, budget, alliances.
2. Aggressive actions come from the structure of the system – not states or individuals.
3. Balance of Power Vs. System Polarity: some system analysts see BP as key (can be military and economic + population + technology)
   1. 2 key attributes of powers,

                                                               i.      # of powers

                                                             ii.      distribution of military capabilities,

1.  
   1. Great Power = reasonable prospect to defend itself without allies
   2. Polarity: # of great powers within the system.
   3. BP Theorists focus on whether Bi or Multi is more stable:

                                                               i.      2 key VARIABLES:

1.      Polarity

2.      Dist. Of military capability among great powers

Balanced System = Equal, Unbalance =

All Agree that a successful balance of power reduces war – but disagree what a successful balance is.

§         Bipolar are less war prone (Back to the Future reading)

§         Multipolar are more Stable – easier deterance through coalitions, harder to initiate war b/c too much divided attention, easier to trade off in diff. Issue areas – reduces pressure for war.

Factor: distribution of capabilities:

1.      balances system (any type) is preferable b/c inequalities increase the potential for strongest to pursue hegemony.

2.      unbalanced = less war prone: strongest feel secure – feel no need for war, dominant powers can also intervene to stop wars in lesser states.

John J Mearsheimer: READING Structural Realism

Contents: Why do states want power? How much is Enough? What causes great power wars?

            Summary: States care about balance of power-compete for it at expense or not to lose it, BECAUSE: International System Structure FORCES this.

Differences among Structural Realists:

1.      Defensive Realists: structural factors limit amount of power a state can gain, which alienates security competition.

2.      Offensive Realists: System Encourages States to want more (including HEGEMONY) which tends to ^ security competition.

Realists: Power is currency of international politics: must have substantial power and not let other states get too much.

Realists divided over: Why do states want power?

a.       classical realists: human nature, power is an end in itself

b.      structural (neo): structure of international system forces states – self-defense: IGNORES: 1. cultural differences 2. regime differences b/c system creates the SAME incentives.

Defensive: WALTZ is a defensive realist: System punishes states who try to gain too much power, hegemony is especially bad.

Offensive: Mearsheimer: gaining as much power as possible is the best way to survive

What is Power: the material capabilities a state controls. 1. tangible military assets 2. LATENT POWER: socio-economic stuff that builds military power: wealth, population.

Why do States Want Power? 5 assumptions, when combined then at each other’s expense. (lecture)

-States are always significantly afraid of eachother: this is shown by SECURITY DILEMA (herz 1950) Zero Sum World: when a state gains security, another loses it.

How Much Power is Enough?

            Offensive: always need more

            Defensive: Waltz’ “appropriate amount of power” due to three factors

1.      if one state is too powerful, balancing happens through coalitions

“offense-defense” balance indicates how hard to get territory/win battle. If offense will pay-often in defender’s favor-therefore offenders will lose many wars. Even if feasible, costs outweigh benefits.

2.      Can’t subdue conquered.

3.      Hard to exploit modern indust. Econ. B/c technology needs freedom

THEREFORE: should be fewer great power wars and NO central (world wars.)

            Offensive Rebuttal:

1.      balancing = inefficient for coalit., gives aggressors oppt. To attack

2.      threatened states “pass the buck”: don’t help coalition to fight aggressor

3.      history: agressors win more wars. U.S. had hegemony once.

BOTH AGREE on NUCLEAR: Only good for offense when ONE state has it

4.      states can have more benefits in wining wars, don’t HAVE to occupy.

Waltz: his international political theory must be supplemented by separate FP theory to explain misguided state behavior. THEREFORE: Defensive realists have to combine domestic + system level theories.

Offensive Realists: Rely on only on structural arguments – but have to explain strategically “foolish moves” likelihood of war determined by # of great powers, distribution of power, changes in distribution of power.

Polarity of the System:

Is Bipolarity more War prone?

            Bipolarity = Less: Three arguments

1.      more war opportunity in multipolarity

2.      greater equality in bp b/c multipol. Raises chances of unequal population and wealth.

War is Inevitable.

Norman Angell: war doesn’t pay mankind

Key to looks at assumptions behind models: applicable and academic

3^rd Image: Key: everyone’s policy depends on everyone else’s, constant possib. Of war when 2+ states pursue own interest with no higher auth. To protect them (some argue won’t happen will all-democracies)

No War When: the min. interests of states in self-preserv = the max interest of all – and each could fully  rely on others to follow strictly.

Emphazing one image distorts but not excludes the other 2.

Effects from 3^rd Image Concentration:

            Can’t go back to state of nature, so govt. = conditions for peace

            World Govt = no war:

1.      practically it would need a lot of force to create.

2.      all would die or hate it

3.      no int. wars, but weak govt. = civil wars

4.      1^st 2 images say “no imperfections of sep state = no wars, like society of perfect christians = no violence, *Trivial b/c no possible to achieve or fails before time + force can do it. *Contrary view: no single isolateable cause that be eliminated or controlled. *all causes may be interrelated

5.      prescriptions from single image are incomplete b/c based on PARTIAL analysis. Need others. 1^st: image change from men to socities to states 2^nd: men make states AND states make men 3^rd: states are shaped by international environ.

1^st and 2^nd compared to 3^rd.

 3^rd: pacification of one state can lead to ^ war chances. Rousseau’s explanation of war origins is final b/c of his framework theory allows any accident to cause war doesn’t look to motivation or circumstance (still necessary to explain individual acts ) * Framework is cause: then it is permissive, underlying cause of war. Reoussea war occures b/c there’s nothing the stop them (3^rd) the IMMEDIATE CAUSES of war are in 1^st and 2nd images reasons specific to occasion: special circumstances)

Prescription: if we can identigy war causing acts, modify state/individual behavior

1.      distorts role of internat. Environ., if some improve others will take advantage

2 Points omitted from 1^st and 2^nd image prescriptions:

1.      effects may have one + causes, removing 1 = no solution. Error: identifying one cause when there are 2+

2.      fixing one cause while ignoring others makes it worse.: introduces role of third image: permissive cause to international environ.

Ex. War B/c state A wants something B has

            Desire of state A = efficient cause

            Nothing to stop A from assuming risks of war = Permissive Cuase

Ex. State A attacks to weaken B, b/c fears future B

            Efficient cause is derived from permissive cause

*immediate causes of war are trivial: rarely whole story “long antagonisms express themselves in trifles”

*Tech. Will never end wars.

1.      fear causes temptation to use weapons even if 2+ states have it.

2.      mutual fear of big weapons = more small wars

WHY?: FEAR = WORLD PEACE only when peace-wish is in/uniformly expressed in policies of all states.

Jay + Hamilton: separate sovereign states = constant possibility of war, 3^rd image = theory behind it.

3^rd Image Natural Conclusions: World Govt. solves war, need realism besides morality.

Need 1^st + 2^nd to know forces that determine policy, need 3^rd image to access importance/predict results of forces.

Great powers always seek more power: hegemony.

Conclusion: structure causes drive for hegemony, not an inherent will. Motive is survival-in anarchy causes aggression. States not more or less aggressive based on econ/polit systems. Only differentiates between states with power: treats states alike otherwise.

Why States Pursue Power:

5 assumptions: alone do not cause aggression, together creates THREE general behavior patters: Fear, Self-Help, Power Maximization.

Fear: never trivial. To a great power, any great power can be an enemy

            Why: capacity + motive to attack is possible, absence of central authority, no mechanism to punish agressors.

            Political Antagonism Intense b/c stakes are high in war.

Self Help: can only depend on themselves. Can still be alliances (temporary, convenient, not ever sure).

            Power maximization: only ensure survival thru hegemony

Bigger power gap – less likely to be war.(Immanuel kant)

Zero Sum mentality: will hurt relationships with other states to gain power. Using econ., diplomatic, and mility to shift BP.

COUNTER TO WALTZ: Appropriate amount of power fails b/c

1.      difficult to know how much power is needed, b/c power calculations don’t say which side wins a war (strategy = 1 way a weaker state can win)

2.      difficult to predict changes in BP in the future

*States also think defensively, to stop other states from gaining at their expense.

“Security Dilemma”: basic logic of offensive: zero sum world herz.

Relative V. Absolute Power:

States that max relative power: concerned with dist. Of material capabilities, will give up large power give for smaller national gains if it gave rival states even more power.

States that max absolut: only care about increasing own power. Not motivated by BP.power is end itself, not a means of survival.

States are rational in pursuing power: consider the BP first etc

• states make mistakes based on incomplete info.

Rivals lie about themselves

Don’t know how powerful own military strength is, or adversaries strength.

Unsure of enemy’s resolve

COUNTER TO WALTZ: Defensive say offense fails:

            Systematic factors DO constrain aggression, esp. thru balancing by threatened states. But exaggerated. History says no.

Hegemony’s Limits: a state can be more powerful than others but not a hegemon if other great powers.

Global hegemony impossible, except nuclear superiority.

1.      distance of oceans

U.S. is only regional hegemon. All can strive for.seek to stop other great powers in other regions from being hegemons.so those states in those regions will focus on fighting eachother. US = offshore balancer.

Ideal situation: regional hegemon. Peer competition removes status quo power.

Power and Fear:

Amount of fear matters b/c determines level of security competition/chance of war

Causes of fear:

            Military power, uncertainty of intentions, anarchy: can’t explain variation.

            More power = more fear.

Potential Vs. Actual Power.

            Potential: population size, wealth: build military power

            Actual: army (ist in conquering + occupying), air + naval. Therefore KEY to power is LAND POWER.

Power affects Fear 3 Ways:

1.      fear of nukes = reduces war likely b/c immediate retaliation

2.      large bodies of water

3.      distrib. Of power. Most fear = unbalanced multipolarity. (potential hegemon)

 *potential hegemon: enough actual/potential power to dominate/control all other states. Beat all one by one, or beat a bunch at a time. + a large gap between 1^st and 2^nd place.

4.      bipolar = least fear. B/c a rough balance of power.

States therefore focus on offensive capabilities, not state intentions. B/c unknowable.

Great powers also pay attention to potential power.

Hierarchy of State Goals:

1. survival

or ideology or human rights: can help power or have no effect.

Creating World Order: World peace thru intern. Govt.

World powers don’t do this for its own sake. Internat order at any time is a byproduct of self behavior of system’s great powers.

             Why? 1. unlikely to agree on general formula for peace

1. can’t put aside power considerations and work b/c can’t be sure it will succeed: failure = high price.

Cooperation among States:

Diff. To achieve and sustain: 2 reasons: relative gain concerns and cheating

            Have to think about pfofit distribution. Absolute (max own profits) or relative gains (look at profits compared to others.) Pie.

            Cheating:

Minghst: Individuals

            Which Individuals matter: constructivists: individuals matters. Realists: no

When do elites have a stronger effect? What circumstances make actors behave diff?

Individual Action have effect when atleast 1 pf:

1.      unstable, young, collapsed politicol institutions.

2.      few institutional restraints, dictatorships free from soicietal input + opposition.

3.      periphial isse, issue is not routine (no standard operating procedures), ambigious situation and unclear info., crisis situation

4.      personality characteristics = 2 orientations: 1 high nationalism, strongly believe in own ability to control events, strong need for power, low levels of conceptuals complexity, ^ distrust of others = independent orientation to foreign affairs. 2. low nationalism, little belief in ability to control events, need for affiliation, high levels of conceptual complexity, low distrust = participatory.

Person. Characteristics affect dictator leadership more than democratic leader b/c no institutional checks.

Individual Decision making:

Belief system = integrated set of perceptions used to handle info.

Info Processing Mechanisms:

            Cognitive Consistency: select/amplify info that supports existing beliefs.

            Base on Past Events: looks for details similar to past, ignore differences

            Similar details = EVOKED SET.

Mirror Images: own actions good moral just, enemy’s = opposite. Exacerbates conflicts.

Group think: specific to small groups: desire for unanimity stops realistic analysis.excessive optimism, illusion of invulnerability, morality and enemy is evil, pressure on dissenters.

Satisficing: large groups = good enough solution

Jervis: make assumptions/beliefs explicit, aware of problems of looking at data accord. To own theory, look at info. Differently.

Private Individuals: play a role in Track 2 diplomacy: non. Govt. individ handle conflict resolution. Direct mediation, or sustained dialogue (influence public opinion). Famous ppl. Can galvanize issue but affect policy little. Also: marginalized group influence.

Mass Publics:

Same physc. Tendencies of small groups/indiv.

1.      elites/masses act the same b/c share common psych/biological characteristics

“territorial imperative” frustration-aggression syndrome. BUT not all act on these. So, can’t explain extreme variation.

Gender differences: men;power seeking, women:consensus building

2.      diff. Opin/attit general/specific about fp and ir.opinion polls effect elites

3.      Dominant moods from opinion polls (even auth. Need legit). Referendum, Usually not direct effect on elite policy.

4.      uncontrolled by formal instit. Can have effect regardless.

Mass actions by leaderless public. For own polit/econ welfare.mirror internal challenges to polit/relig. Elite.

Constructivists: indiv = important.

WALTZ READING CH. 2: 1^st IMAGE:

1.st image: important cause of war from nature/behavior of man who is selfishness, misdirection, and stupidity. Rest are secondary and related to this.

Assumption: if this causes war, peace is thru teaching men, or readjusting them.

Prescriptions: educate the public. Give them something else to do besides fight.

Peace is Thru Changing men: common to all.

Optimism V Pessimism (in all images):

            Pessimism: reality is flawed

            Optimism: reality is good, society basicly harmonious.

Must consider that an image can be faulty.

Optimists: Niebuhr: assumed progress is in a straight line, each advance has a potential for evil and good. Man is finite with infinite desires. Seat of evil is in the self.St Augustine, Spinoza, Hans Morgenthau.

Spinoza: desire to survive a fact-end of EVERY act is survival.

Week Three Reading:

Doyle: liberalism and world politics 1986

Argue against liberal claim that democracies have more peaceful intentions and restraint.

Against: Schumpeter: democratic capitalist, Machiavelli: classical republican, Kant: liberal republican.

Liberal states are: peaceful, prone to war, Kant: made a separate peace and also found liberal reasons for aggression. Differences are in the conceptions of citizen and state.

Liberal: individual freedom, polit. Participation, private property, equal opp.

Schumpeter’s person: rationalized, homogenious in pursuing material interests, individualized, democratized. Interests in peaceful trade, therefore they and the state they control are pacifistic.

Schumpeter believes certain states are war prone-military. Capitalism and democracy are forces for peace. Only war profiteers and military aristocrats gain from

wars. World politics are homogenized, ppl are homogenized-no one would pursue war to keep one minority group in power, no-noneconomic objects for indiv. Or states. (glory, prestige)

Machiavelli’s person: diverse and unequal in goals,  Both extending rule of elite or stopping state’s polit. Collapse = imperial expansion. Republics are best for imperial expansion-best at survival too. Need expansion to survive. B/c Other states threaten us so.

Kant:

Zone of Peace: “pacific union” among liberal societies. A separate peace among them, they are restrained. Evidence is not direct: we can consider that atleast a separate peace among liberal states only.

diverse in goals, individualized, rationalized, **capable of appreciating moral equality of all individuals-treat other indiv. As ends not means. State governed by law as a republic.Can have world peace b/c use democratic caution/appreciate democratic rights of other republics-b/c derived from the repress. Of our foreign/moral equals (UNLIKE MACHIAVELLI). Stay in state of war with Non-republics-b/c not constrained by representation-protect/forcible promote democracy/rights b/c don’t represent the ppl. Haven’t the right to non-interference. (UNLIKE SCHUMPETER)

Liberal states invade weak nonliberal states and display striking distrust in dealings with powerful nonliberal states. Statists (realistics) and Machiavelli can’t   account for this.

Kants says no pertpetual peace until states sign 3 “definitive articles”. 1> civil constit = republican. 2. pacific union has peace among free states, protects rights of free state. 3^rd. cosmopolitan law limited to universal hospitality. Men can be understanding devils and achieve perpetual peace. International law garuntees respect. Warns that liberals will be tempted to fight unjust wars for popular liberal ideals.

Nuclear peace limited to super powers.(crystal ball effect to constrain miscalulation) technology and crises. 

BUT to restrain liberal imprudence (aggressive or passive) threatens liberal pacification- improving strategy and constraining intervention seem to need a stronger executive + polit. Culture indifferent to universal indiv. Rights.-this could in turn break constit. Garuntees, respect for rep. Govt., and pacific union of liberal states.

No single constitutional, international, or cosmopolitan source is alone sufficient,

but only together they connect the characteristics of liberal polities and economies with sustained liberal peace.

            Republican restraints introduce hesitation

International law guarantees respect:

Presumption of amity; nonliberals suffer from a presumption of enmity. Both presumptions may be accurate but also self confirming

Cosmopolitan: = material incentives thru free trade.

The promise of perpetual peace, the violent lessons of war, and the experience

of a partial peace prove the need/possibility of world peace and are reasons for moral citizens and statesmen to pursue it.

LAYNE: Kant or Can’t: Myth of Democratic Peace:

Is democratic peace theory or realism is a better predictor of international outcomes.

2 Theories: 1. (fails) institutional restraints (public opinion/checks/balances) 2. dem. Norms/culture.

Tests realism vs. democratic peace theory on 4 case studies. Realism is Superior.

Case for Democratic Peace Theory:

Democracies not less war prone. Claim Democracies rarely war with eachother.”illegitimate” to use force, the nature of dem. Polit. Systems  cause #1.

Causal Logic: Instit. Restraints, and Dem. Norms/culture

1.  Constraints: Doyle: reluctant to war b/c have to answer to citizens, open debate of decision (sensitizing public/policy makers to costs),

2^nd version of Instit Constraints: Checks and Balances: executive selection, polit. Competition, FP process pluralism= more constrained less likely to war.

 2. Dem Norms/Culture: “culture/perceptions/practices” allow compromise/peaceful resolution of conflicts within countries: apply to other dem. Assume that other dems. Use pacific methods (POSITIVE PERCEPTIONS of other democ.)

Doyle: dems see eachother as dovish.

The Realist Case: Same things Over and Over Again

Continous, regular, competitive=internat. Politicol behavior. B/c states constrained by int. unchanging structure. B/C anarchic self-help relm. Has to ensure own survival, free to define own interest and choose own way of getting them. Fundamentally competitive-***domestic politics in liberal societies do not destroy/occupy the loser. 1^st goal = survival. States have internal/external balancing . Coop. Is possible, hard to sustain. Security Dilema (actions of self defense hurt another), can never be certain. Fear = normal.

***Big Difference: changes within state transform nature of int. politics. Realism: internal change has no effect on intern. System.- Waltz: competition weighs more than ideology or internal pressure. Survival/security always at risk-doesn’t matter if rival is dem.

Testing Democratic Peace Theory:

Instit constraints don’t explain b/c then dem states would be peaceful will all states.

Nor does Checks and Balances: focuses on independent variable of decisional constraints within state’s polit. Structure-not exclusive to democracies.

Must test Norms and Culture: is there something in the internal makeup of democratic states that explains democratic peace?

Dem. Peace theory predicts specific outcome and explains it-test against a case study. *process tracing method. 1. public opinion should be pacific-indicates mutual respect of democracies. 1. policy elites refrain from military threats + preparing those threats. 3. go out of way to accommodate eachother in a crisis.

Realist Explaination: 1.^important the interests seen at stake, then more likely to be based on realism than dem. Norms/culture. Vital Interests: can use threats/be unaccommodating. 2. against democracy, look at stragetegy + military capability) 3. “fighting waterbirds dilemma” appease a state, so rivals don’t take advantage.

Focused on great powers b/c IR is defined by it, diff. Applications to small powers.,

Theoretical Conclusions:

Democratic peace theory indicators didn’t play ANY role. Adverse distri. Of military capabilities (realism) explain. Dem. Peace Theory identifies correlation but not CAUSATIONal link.

Quantative support: Large N, but small # of supporting cases b/c

1.      few democracies

2.      war are rare for any country

3.      to test properly, an incident has to have a real possibility of war. Needs opportunity and reason.

War 1812, not between democracies. Civil war not between states.

Alt. Hypothesis: 2^nd image reversed.   The greater the external threat a state faces (or believes it does), the more "autocratic" its foreign policymaking process will be, and

the more centralized its political structures will be. are less likely to be democracies because such states are more likely to be involved in wars, and states that are likely

to be involved in wars tend to adopt autocratic governmental structures that

enhance their strategic posture. Realism: international systemic structure is primary in state's external behavior AND shapes domestic political system.

Policy Conclusions: Why it Matters:

Doyle made “peace zone” popular in actual policy making. Dem. Peace theory is dangerous: integral component of new putlook on intern. Politics. No need to worry about future great power threates. Causes the U.S. to undertale risky moves based on pacifying effects of democracy.

ANDRESKI 1980: On the Peaceful Disposition of Military Dictatorships.

Rise and existence have little to do with war. Emerge in countries at peace. Military Dictators = pacifists in FP. *Intrinisic incompatability between internal/external uses of armed forces: 1. more armed forces are used internally, less capable of war. 2. more intensely/recently been involved in war, less capable of internal repression. Popular support/nationalism helps. Patriotic propaganda helps war, but hurts internal oppression.

issue; it is enough to observe that these regimes are not nationalist nor militarist, and that they fit the thesis

mililtocracies are seldom externally militant.

Hungtington. Clash of Civilizations:

End of age of ideology, new axis of conflict along cultural and religious lines.

Civilizations: Western, Latin America, Orthodox, Eastern World, Muslim, Sub-Saharan Africa, cleft and lone countries.

West is naïve to promote western values: stop democratization.

Shift of economic/military/politicol power to Muslim, East Asian

China wants regional hegemony-clashes with U.S.

Islam: population jump

Russia, Japan, India: swing nations

Christianity and Islam are both: missionary, universal, teleological. = direct clashes.

2 forms of conflict: fault line are on local level-adjacent staes, or within cleft states.

2. Core State Conflicts: global level between major states of diff. Civilizations.

Conflicts result from: relative military/econ influence/power., discrimination, interventionism, different values and culture-esp when imposed

FUKUYAMA 1989 THE END OF HISTORY?

Western vistory, exhaustion of systematic alternatives.

he progression of human history as a struggle between ideologies is largely at an end, with the world settling on liberal democracy after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Fukuyama predicted the eventual global triumph of political and economic liberalism. the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government."^[

• History should be viewed as an evolutionary process
• Events still occur at the end of history
• Pessimism about man's future is warranted because of man's inability to control technology
• The end of history means liberal democracy will become the only form of government for all States. This form of government will be the last form of government.

Doesn’t imply end of international conflict per se. divided between

a part that was, historical and a part that was

! post-historical. Conflict between states still in

fhistory, and between those states and those at

;the end of history, would still be possible.

Have to play out ethnic/nationalistic clashes. Large scale wars need large states still in history.

MULLER; US AND THEM: the enduring power of ETHNIC NATIONALISM 2008

America doesn’t worry about ethnonationalism b/c willingness to fit in new country/reshape identity.

Current peaceful order of states b/c of previous violent ethnic separation. Europe states dividied enthonationally, will repeat elsewhere.

Politics of Identity:

1.One is that all people who live

within a country's borders are part of the nation, regardless of their ethnic, racial, or religious origins. This is liberal or civic

nationalism

2. the ethnonationalist idea is that

nations are defined by a shared heritage, which usually includes a common language, a common faith, and a common ethnic

ancestry. Emotive power thru concept of EXTENDED family.

Rise of Ethnonationalism: ppl take nation-state for granted, empire as anomalies: opposite is true. Enthnonationalism changed this.

Military competition – demand for resources – continual econ. Growth – mass literacy/easy communication – common language – fighting over this

“cultural capital”-some ethnic groups have longer tradition of education and opportunities-get ahead. – natural more affluent. Grouped according to language. Demanded own nation state.

Ethnonationalism has psychological and economic base.

Psychological: the rise of the modern state weakened individuals' traditional bonds to intermediate social units, by spurring social and geographic mobility and a self-help mentality, the rise of market-based economies did the same. = emotional vacuum filled by new identification along ethnic lines.

The great Trans: spread of international commerce would lead people to recognize the mutual benefits that could come from peace and trade-didn’t happen. Most of history was making state and nation congruent through ethnic cleansing.

Post War but not Post National:

After WWI: political resettlement by changing borders.

decolonization has meant ethnic disaggregation through the exchange or expulsion of local minorities.

The Balance Sheet: Less obvious costs and benefits:

the efficiencies of competitive markets tend to increase with size of market: smaller nation-states are inefficient. Loss of talented citizens. Rural wins over urbanized. Leads to more cohesion. Decades of homogeneity = willingness to work in transnational groups.

New Ethnic Mixing from voluntary emigration from poor to rich areas. No assimilation = rise of trad. Ethnationalities.

B/c enthnonationaislm is the result of parts of modernization, it will continue in new countries.Partition = most humaine.

enduring propensities of the human spirit that are heightened by the process of modern state creation,

it is a crucial source of both solidarity and enmity, and in one form or another, it will remain for many generations to come.

One can only profit from facing it directly.

Kissinger REALIST: Concert of Europe: GB, Austria, Russia

this international order, which was created more explicitly

in the name of the balance of power than any other before or since,

relied the least on power to maintain itself: too diff. To break up, and more importantly had shared values (physical and moral equilibrium)

Congress System after the Congress of Vienna, was the balance of power that existed in Europe from the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1815) to the outbreak of the First World War (1914) (age of Metternich)

Deutsch and Singer: Multipolar Power Systems and International Stability:

Multipolarity, in the short-term and “middle-term”, leads to international stability.

The independent variable is defined as the number of independent actors in the system, while

the dependent variable is defined as stability of such a system.

Conflict is mitigated in a multipolar system for two primary reasons: i) increasing

opportunities for interaction reinforce cross-cutting interest formation; ii) as national

resources of time/attention are limited, increased interaction lowers both signal/noise ratios

and the average resources available to invest in any one interaction. A minimum level of

attention is necessary to initiate conflict, and less available attention leads to less conflict.

An increase in the number of independent actors in the system increases interaction

opportunities. Cross-cutting pressures then emerge to inhibit social cleavages and reinforce

social stability. The more nations in the system, the greater the diversity of trade-offs

available to any nation. The prospects for compensation and accommodation are therefore

greatly enhanced.

Due to the fact that national attention is limited, an increase in the number of independent

actors reduces national information-processing and resource-allocating capabilities.

Assuming that a minimum level of attention is necessary for conflict, the increase in number

of independent actors is likely to have a stabilizing effect upon the system.

Assumptions

Means cannot expand in tandem with ends – means remain limited as number of potential

interactions increases (what about NSC-68?).

States must maintain high levels of attention on the activities of their rivals if they choose to

engage in an arms race. Arms racing results in conflict.

Edward Cunningham eac4@mit.edu

Alliances serve as a mitigating factor, as they limit the freedom of choice and actions

between members and non-members.

Perfect information: assumes that a rival will accurately perceive the relative and objective

costs of the other’s arms increase and respond in equal proportion. The implication is that

the resulting arms race would tend to be slower under multipolar conditions than under

bipolar ones, as the greater the number of actors, the less increase demanded by one’s

military expenditure in order to balance the increase in the rival’s arms expenditure. The cost

of such an increase can be shared throughout the multipolar system.

Deutsch & Singer qualify the argument, and state that internal characteristics do matter – if a

nation is unstable then an increase in the number of independent actors may not be

reinforce international stability. They argue that in the long run multipolarity is unstable

because i) it precludes the possibility of the creation of new states, leading to a

bipolar/unipolar world, and (2) such a world will eventually produce dramatic and

catastrophic changes.

Mearsheimer: Structural Realism 2.

What causes Great Power War?:

Security not always main reason for war – ideology/economics. Non-security motivated wars still please STRUCTURAL realists, aslong as agresspr does harm its BP. Victory always helps BP.

Cause of wars to realists: 4

            1.polarity

            2.distribution of power

            3. changes in distribution of power

            4. variation in offence-defence balance

Polarity: Bi more war prone than Multi? Modern europ. History is not clear.

Bipolarity = more peace: 3 arguments: more op. for great power to fight in multipolarity, greater equality in bi-pole-more powers = ^ disparity – stronger take advantage, multi- allows 2+ great powers to gang up., third: greater chance of miscalculation = war. More clarity with one country.

            Balancing also more efficient: have to directly confront. Multipolarity = passing the buck.

Multipolarity= More peace: 1. deterrence easier in multipol b/c more states can jump on a aggressor, inefficient sometimes-but eventually defeats aggressor. 2. less hostility in multipol b/c their attention is divided., cross-cutting cleavages mitigate conflict.

Unipole: no war b/c hegemon too powerful: 1. if hegemon feels too secure, pulls back forces allowing attacks in abandoned regions 2. large-scale social engineering.

Power Distribution: Balanced or Imbalanced Power:

One very powerful state = peace: feels secure, no need to fight for more power. Other great powers unlikely to fight . War among lesser GP’s possible. Top dog could intervene tho if it doesn’t want a change in order.

OR ^ War chances: preponderant power = potential hegemon, won’t be satisfied.

Power Shifts and War:

Focus on dynamics of balance of power, esp. significant changes in BP. Preponderant power faced with rising competitor-incentive for preventive war.

Offense-defence Balance:

Usually favors defense-therefore dampens security competition- balance = peace. Defense dominance = peace, while offense advantage = war.

Offensive realism: china = competition/war with US. Offessive realism: ultimate goal of great powers is regional hegemony. US therefore wants to stop others from eing regional hegemons. China wants to be one. Neighbors also fear it.

Defensive realism: hegemony won’t work b/c balancing coalitions will crush them. Nuclear weapons = optimistic force for peace. Benefits of expansionism in age of nationalism isn’t worth it. Besides, econ is great. Could lead to bipolarity.only agreement: structure of international system forces int. system to compete amongst themselves for power.

Mearsheimer 1990: BACK TO THE FUTURE

End of cold war scenario. Independent eastern Europe. Bipolar becomes multipolar. Argues: risks of Crisis and War dramatically increase.

No European war since 1995 b/c: 1. bipolar distri. Of military power, rough military equality of 2 poles in Europe + nuclear, decline of nationalism since 1945 in Europe. Factors of military power = most important. + domestic factors.

Removal of nuclear weapons will remove their pacifying effect.

4 Scenarios: 1. Europe Nuclear Free 2. Europe States don’t expand arsenal to compensate for departure of superpower’s weapons. 3. mismanaged nuclear proliferation: no steps to dampen risks. (ALL THREE = war risks) 4. (least dangerious is the 4^th) well managed proliferation by current nuclear powers. Deter preventive strikes, use security umbrellas to set boundaries, build deterant forces, STILL more dangerous than Cold War era. And unlikely.

Counter Arguments (3): 1. liberal international economic order will hold peace 2. liberal democracies don’t fight eachthoer, spread + future spread of democracy = peace mor elikely. 3. Europeans have learned the costs of war.

Three Prescriptions: 1. US encourge limited nuclear prolif. In Europe. 2. US don’t withdraw fully from Europe. 3^rd: US should stop hypernationalism from rising again.

Explaining the Long Peace: Military Power and Stability

3 reasons: BP of the distribution of power on continent, rough equality of military power between polar states, and nuclear weapons-deterance = more robust.

These are state characteristics: international system mor eimportant than states for peace.

Domestic factors less important: hypernationalism helped cause war, but itself caused by security competition., domestic structures now help peace.

Offensive military action is always a threat.

Anarchic system causes conflict: no higher authortity: 2 consequences: states can’t trust eachother , 2. states must self help own survival. States seek to survive by maximizing power-RELATIVE not ABSOLUTE power matters. States seek to weaken others.

Costs too high benefits too low based on 2 factors: distribution of power, nature of military power:

            Distr. Of Power: how capable of attack, can other states check it; according to polarity and relative power

            Military Power: affects costs, risks, benefits. Deter by cost of war,  weaponry favors defense-futility of aggression. OR equalizes relative power-less war chance.

Virtues of Bipolarity over Multipolarity:

Bipolar more peaceful b/c: fewer conflict dyads less poss of war, 2. fewer imbalances of power = easier detereance 3. less % of miscalulation b/c can focus on one enemy.

Lesser states: stuck in allegiance to one, more rigid so can’t play off eachother.

MultiPolar: more flexible for minor powers to manipulate, pass the buck. More chances of war. Small conflicts can escalate., power imbalance = hard to deter stonger state.

GEOGRAPHY effect: buffer states in-between, no effects in war time – but strong in peacetime,

Coordinationa Problems: 4: 1. buck passing of burdens. Common in large coalitions 2. stay on sidelines while 2 fight/weaken (or one strengthens). 3. allies won’t join till aggressor wins a bit. 4.diplomacy takes time. Aggressor can exploit time.

3^rd problem of Multipolarity: tends to foster miscalculation of resolve/strength of coal.Can push too far.coalitions shift often = constantly changing norms/agreements.

Underestimating Coalitions: # of enemies or # of allies.

Bipolar Wins all of these: efficient balancing-internally or externally, Multi-uses external. Internal is more fully under state control: therefore more efficient. Balancing problems (geography and coalitions are bypassed: therefore more % successful) Miscalculation less likely. B/c rules are settled over time.

Key ratio: ratio between leader and nearest competitor has most effect on stability.

Nuclear favor peace: create high costs, and favor deterrence. MAD also bolsters peace by clarifying the relative power of states and coalition

Hypernationalism: a nation should have own state. Other nationstates are inferior/threatening: most likely with military systems that require mass armies. Less likely with high-tech + small armies NUCLEAR DOE S THIS.

Evidence: historical corr. Of bi-polarity and more peace.

Before WW2: multipolarity undermined deterrence, miscalculations, multiplicity of conflicts, power was asymmetrical. Believed cost of war was small (NUCLEAR solves this).

German Hypernationalism due to structure: hypernationality caused by geographic insecurity of open borders.

Pg 29 competing theories.