Term
| Free will is based on the concept of |
|
Definition
| could have done otherwise |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Previous states of the world determine our actions |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Both free and determined
A.J. Ayer - Freedom = causation by the self. Part of the causative process
Freedom is when internal forces have a role to play in determining actions
Freedom as freedom from constraint |
|
|
Term
| Perspectives on free will |
|
Definition
Libertarianism (no determinism)
Soft determinism (determinism and freedom - compatibilist)
Hard determinism (no free will) |
|
|
Term
| Van Inwagen's consequence argument |
|
Definition
Initial conditions and laws of nature result in the determination of every material event in the material universe
WE COULD NEVER DO OTHERWISE, THERE IS NO OPEN FUTURE
Compatibilist reply: You can only ever express free will in a single way. This does not mean that you have no agency. "If I had chosen differently then I would have acted differently." |
|
|
Term
| Harry Frankfurt's argument |
|
Definition
| Neuroscientist will raise your arm if you do not raise it yourself. You raise your arm yourself. Although you could never have not raised your arm, you still have agency. |
|
|
Term
| Daniel Dennett's position on free will |
|
Definition
"Here I stand, I can do no other" (Luther)
Your character has agency, even if the outcome is inevitable |
|
|
Term
| Addiction and compatibilism |
|
Definition
An internal constraint on freedom we would not generally want to label part of the 'self'
Also hypnosis, neurosis |
|
|
Term
| Frankfurt and second order ideas |
|
Definition
Pre-reflective first-order ideas: desire for drugs
reflective second-order ideas: I do not want to desire drugs
You are free when you act on your second-order ideas.
Issues: what happens if you endorse your first-order ideas? (Jojo: son of dictator indoctrinated in party mindset, actively endorses ideas imposed on him)
Issue: Why don't first order ideas count as the self? Conversely, are there other levels of ideas more important than second?
Issue: hypnosis/implanted ideas - are these yours? |
|
|
Term
| Gary Watson's alternative to Frankfurt's second-order ideas |
|
Definition
True self = desires in accordance with one's values/principles
Acting on one's better judgement = free will. Not doing so is weak will.
Issue: we don't choose our values /beliefs - people have stupid ones |
|
|
Term
| Another response to the drug addict problem - hard line libertarianism |
|
Definition
| We are always free to choose. |
|
|
Term
| Education vs. brainwashing |
|
Definition
What is the difference?
Education teaches us how to think, brainwashing teaches us what to think?
How can we distinguish between them? Can we do so meaningfully?
Maybe freedom is a matter of degree. |
|
|
Term
| Ultimate responsibility is based upon the principal of |
|
Definition
Agent causation - when we exercise active power, we are free.
Not caused by anything other than mental states
Acting from reason (rational power) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Van Ingwen argument: physically sourced mind would be subject to physical events outside of your control
Social political constraints (socialisation/brainwashing)
Jojo example - self-endorsed, externally sourced ideas SUSAN WOLF: this is not free. Extrinsically sourced ideas dictating attitudes |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Dignity/responsibility
Would we/could we value contra-causal free will?
Is freedom based on non-choice enough? Is compatibilism satisfying?
Daniel Dennett (a compatibilist): we don't have to choose the restaurant and menu, so long as you can choose the dish. |
|
|
Term
| Issues in personal identity |
|
Definition
Location/range (body/brain/soul)
Continuity |
|
|
Term
| Theories on seat of personal identity |
|
Definition
Body theory -> brain theory
Soul view ('simple' view)
Psychological view |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
identity resides in the body
Issues: Identity survives transplants
What about a brain transplant?
Shoemaker: Brownson case
Arrival at brain theory |
|
|
Term
| Shoemaker's 'Brownson' case |
|
Definition
| Brownson's brain is transferred into Robinson's body. Brownson wakes up in Robinson's body. But it is still Brownson. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Identity is in your BRAIN STATE - like information on a computer.
Bernard Williams' 'brain state transfer device' - the brain itself is incidental to identity.
IS THIS A PROBLEM? Dennett: yes |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Personal identity is irreducible/basic
ISSUES
Knowledge problem (Perry) - if identity is divorced from the body, bodily evidence can tell us nothing. We could never know about our own or others' identities
No reason to supposed continuity in soul - changing every five minutes?
Maybe 100 souls in the same body, thinking the same thoughts!
BASICALLY, THIS RAISES ALL SORTS OF CONCEPTUAL ISSUES. MAKES THE QUESTION A LOT MORE COMPLEX |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Personal identity consists in psychological consistency - a stream of consciousness.
We plan ahead/want to survive. Concept of personal identity stems from this. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Identity is inherent in chains of memory. Even if you don't carry memories all the way down the chain, overlapping collections of memories retain the same identity (like 'my father's axe')
CIRCULARITY OBJECTION (Bishop Butler): 'remembering' something presupposes that you were the experiencer. Language implies continuity of identity.
Shoemaker's 'Quasi-memory reply' - we have quasi-memories made into real memories BECAUSE OF CAUSAL LINKS. Causal relations between different phases of life cause the next ones. |
|
|
Term
| Possibility of psychological splitting |
|
Definition
Quantum teleportation - reconstructing physical structure elsewhere. Would the reconstruction have the same identity as the original?
Split Brains: creating two different centers of consciousness. Two identities? Are either the same person as the one who went in for the operation?
Ship of Theseus - 2x spatially, one times materially continuously
Fission A -> B + C; B = A, C = A;
B =/= C
Fusion: A + B = C. Does A / B survive?
Unintuitive |
|
|
Term
| Problems in Personal Identity |
|
Definition
Duplication - two similar people are not the same: if one died, the other would not (would they?)
Teleportation paradox - body destroyed, reassembled elsewhere. Are you the same person? Memories? What if you are duplicated twice? |
|
|
Term
| Why/are people distinct from one another? |
|
Definition
Different atoms? These are regularly replaced anyway
Hume: there is no such thing as 'you' as an identity that exists through time. We never experience one, and so shouldn't posit one. All that we experience at any given moment is a bunch of qualia. This does not imply continuity - distinct, digital parcels of information.
Don't ask "Am I the same person I used to be?", but rather "should I call myself the same person as that previous person?" |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A ship is gradually mended with all its parts eventually replaced. (like my father's axe). |
|
|
Term
| Objection to Hume's empirical account of identity |
|
Definition
| It makes to sense to talk of a sense without an experiencer. |
|
|
