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· a series of one or more statements called premises that are meant to support another statement called conclusion. (See valid and sound). |
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the movement from premises to a conclusion. Inference can be deductive or inductive. |
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· an argument is valid if its conclusion follows logically from its premises. Arguments are either valid or invalid; premises and conclusion are either true or false. |
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an argument is sound if it is valid and its premises are true |
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· knowledge that is based on reason, independently of experience. The ontological argument is an example of an a priori argument.
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· knowledge that is not a priori. A posteriori knowledge, though it may involve the use of reason, depends upon evidence from experience. |
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· original introduced by Kant, an analytic statement is one where the concept of the predicate is contained within the concept of the subject. For example, the statement that all bachelors are unmarried is analytic. The concept “unmarried” is contained within the concept “bachelor.” Frege generalized the notion to cover more than just subject-predicate statements. For Frege, an analytic statement is true solely in virtue of the meaning of the words in which it is expressed. Also known as a “tautology.” |
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· the opposite of an analytic statement. A synthetic statement is true partly in virtue of the meaning of the words used to express it, but also by the nature of things. A synthetic statement can be known a priori; for example, the statement that every event has a cause; or a synthetic statement can be known a posteriori; for example, snow is wet. |
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· An argument whose conclusion must be true if the premises are all true, as long as the argument is valid. |
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· An argument whose premises establish a probability (rather than a certainty) that its conclusion is true; for example, if no one has ever seen a green flamingo, then there probably are no green flamingos. The argument from design is an example of an inductive argument. |
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Ø one which could not possibly fail to be true, one whose negation is impossible. (Must be true). |
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Ø one which could have been false, one whose negation is possible inference to the best explanation (abduction): reasoning from data to (the truth of) the best explanation for that data. (Maybe be true and maybe false). |
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· An a priori argument for the existence of God stating that the very concept or definition of God automatically entails that God exists; because of the special nature of the concept, there is no way that God could fail to exist. |
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· argument for the existence of God that holds (1) every being is either a dependent being or a self-existent being; (2) not every being can be a dependent being; (3) therefore, there exists a self-existent being, who is God. |
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· inductive argument for the existence of God that cites purported examples of design in nature as proof for the existence of a designer who is God. (Also called argument from design). |
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· a being whose existence depends on nothing else and who necessary has to exist. Some people have argued that God is such a being. |
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· a being whose existence depends on something else and therefore might not have come to exist. For example, your existence was contingent on your mother having conceived. |
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problem posed for theists: If God is all-good, omnipotent (powerful, invincible) and omniscient (infinite awareness), how can his existence be compatible with the existence of evil. |
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· an attempted justification for the existence of God despite the existence of evil. |
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· Blaise Pascal’s argument that we should believe in (or “bet on”) God because the stakes are infinitely high on the side of God. The rewards for believing correctly and the penalties for wrongly not believing are high, and the costs of believing mistakenly are low. (Also called a wager argument.) |
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Theoretical (epistemic) rationality |
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Ø the practice of proportioning one’s beliefs to the strength of the evidence. |
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Practical (prudential) rationality |
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Ø the practice of performing whatever action is in one’s best self-interest. |
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· The position that denies the possibility of knowledge. A skeptic might hold that no knowledge of any sort is possible or might confine skepticism to a particular field such as ethics. |
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· This means “I think, therefore I am.” This inference played a central role in Descartes’s argument for the distinction between the mental and the physical and in his response to skepticism. |
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· Intrinsic characteristics of a physical object itself, such as solidity, extension in space (size), figure (shape), motion or rest, and number. Primary qualities are ones that objects would continue to possess even if there were no perceiving being in the world, for they are inseparable from the material object and found in every part of it. (See secondary qualities). |
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· Those qualities of an object (such as color, taste, smell, sound, warmth, and cold) that exists (according to some theories) only when actually sensed and then only “in the mind” of the one who senses them. (See also primary qualities). |
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· The theory that the objects of our knowledge have an independent existence rather than being mind-dependent. |
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Ø the mental objects directly perceived in sense perception (ex: “brown rectangle” and “hollow sound”, rather than “table”) |
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· Refutable by experience. For example, if a theory predicts that an eclipse will occur on a certain day, and then experience will refute the theory if the eclipse does not occur. |
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An inductive justification |
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Ø Induction has worked in the past (as opposed to astrology, crystal gazing, etc.); so induction will continue to work in the future. –This circular. |
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Ø Scientific predictions are more probably than other prediction (ex: astrological ones). Two variants, depending on the notion of probability used: |
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Rational Credibility (subjective probability) approaches |
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Ø Scientific predictions, while not infallible, are nevertheless rationally credible. –This presupposes a notion of inductive evidence; again circular. |
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Ø Science should not be in the business of induction, but should try to formulate powerful general hypotheses from which all past and present phenomena can be deducted. –The completely deprives science of it predictive function. |
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The pragmatic justification |
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Ø If nature is uniform, induction will work. If nature is not uniform, nothing will work. So you might as well use induction. |
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· The theory that there are only immaterial minds and their mental “contents.” The body itself is nothing but a collection of actual or possible sense-data-sights, sounds, touches, and smells. By holding that there is only mind and no matter, idealism avoids the problems of causal interaction between radically different kinds of substances. |
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· Generally, the view that there are two kinds of stuff. More specifically, “dualism” is associated with the doctrine that mental states, events, or processes are distinct from physical or material states, events, or processes. |
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· The view that mental states, events, and processes can causally affect physical states, events, and processes. |
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· The view that there is only one form of interaction between the mental and physical, that in which the physical affects the mental. In this view, the mental can never affect the physical. The mind is not itself a material thing; rather, it is a distinct but causally impotent by-product (epiphenomenon) of the world of physics. This is a kind of dualism. |
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· a kind of dualism stating that mind and body only appear to interact because of a kind of “preestablished harmony” between them, like two clocks independently striking at the same moment. Thus, because of this harmony, when I kick the table, I also feel pain; the kicking does not cause the pain. |
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· The view that everything-every object, state, event, and process – is a material object, state, event or process and nothing else. According to materialists, there is no immaterial mind or soul and thus no problem of interaction between radically different kinds of substances. (Also called physicalism). |
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· A view about the meaning of mental state term. The view claims that mental terms such as “pain,” “belief,” or “desire” are equivalent in meaning to behavioral term. This is supposed to show that mental states are dispositions to behave in certain ways. (Also called analytical behaviorism). |
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· A kind of materialism stating that mental events are simply identical to brain processes, the same way that lighting flashes are “identical” to electrical discharges. The mental event (a thought, desire, or sensation) is a brain process. |
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· Generally, the view that concepts should be defined according to their function. In cognitive theory, the view that mental states, events, and processes are “functional” states of the brain (or other hardware). Functional states of a device are those that are defined in terms of their relations to the devices input, its internal transitions, and its output. According to the functionalist, these causal relations and dispositions are what constitute the mental. |
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· The view that mental states and processes as we ordinarily conceive of them simply do not exist, in the same way as witches and phlogiston do not exist. |
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· The qualitative feels of mental experiences; the hurt of pain, the color of red, taste of wine, the scent of a rose, the longing of love, the ecstasy of an orgasm. The qualitative character of an experience is “what it is like” to have that experience. (See phenomenology). |
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Numerical identity or identity |
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Ø the relation that every object bears to itself and no other object. To be distinguished from. |
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Ø qualitative similarity (as in “identical twins”: however similar the twins are, there are two twins not one). |
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· The theory that all events, including human actions and choices, are, without exception, totally determined. |
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Soft Determinism (Compatibilism |
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· The view that holds that determinism is true and that determinism is compatible with free will and responsibility. |
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· a kind of determinist view that rejects the compatibility of determinism and free will. |
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· – in metaphysics, the theory that we possess free will and that our free will is neither determined nor the result of random chance, but instead the result of rational agency. In politics and economics, the theory that emphasizes the importance of personal liberty as opposed to state interference. Political libertarians often opposed taxation for social welfare programs as unjust intrusions into personal freedom. |
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Hard incompatibilism (Pereboom): |
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Ø the view that determinism precludes genuine freedom and there is no free will worth having. |
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Transeunt causation (Chisholm): |
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causation of an event by another event |
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Immanent causation (Chisholm) |
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causation of an event by an agent. |
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Ø circumstances beyond an agent’s control that affect how the agent or his/her actions are assessed morally. |
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· theory about the psychology of humans stating that the only thing anyone is capable of desiring or pursuing ultimately (as an end in itself) is one’s own self-interest. According to psychological egoism, people always act selfishly. If someone appears to act altruistically, that person is doing it only because taking the interest of other people is the means to promoting his or her own good; genuinely disinterested acts of benevolence do not exist. |
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· The view that to act morally, individuals should act solely so as to promote their own best interest. Ethical egoism is a moral view; it states a thesis about how humans ought to act. In this it differs from psychological egoism, which states a thesis about how humans always do act. |
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The view that ethical judgments can be true or false, but that their truth depends entirely on whether they accurately report the sentiments of those who issue the judgments. |
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Meta ethical subjectivism |
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· The view that ethical judgments are neither true nor false, they are simply expressions of commands, preferences, or emotions, and as such are not eligible candidates for truth. |
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· The view that morality is relative to a given culture; what is right in one culture may be wrong in another. For example, cannibalism might be wrong for Greeks but right for Callations. Cultural relativism goes beyond merely stating the fact that different cultures have different beliefs; it asserts that for each society, its beliefs are really right (not just believed to be right by its member). |
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· The theory that the correct way to derive a principle of justice is to decide whether it would be chosen over any alternative principle of justice that could be proposed to a group of normally self-interested, rational person. |
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· In John Rawls’s contractarian theory of justice, the veil of ignorance is what keeps the people in the (hypothetical) original position from knowing the facts (such as their race, gender, talents, and social position) about their own condition that could bias their decisions. |
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· John Rawls’s contractarian theory of justice (contractarianism), the original position is the hypothetical gathering of people in a condition of equal power and ignorance for the purpose of determining fair principles of justice for society. |
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· A type of moral theory stating that morality consists in doing one’s duty, rather than in considering the probable consequences of one’s actions, in case where duty and the promotion of good consequences come into conflict. Can be contrasted to consequentialism. An example of deontology theory is Kantian ethics. |
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· A moral directive from reason that is binding without condition; a command that applies to all rational beings, no matter what. Kant formulated the categorical imperative as: “Act only according to that maxim by which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.” |
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· An action that you should do if you want to promote some goal or end you already have. For example, if you want a good grade, you have a hypothetical imperative to study; if you want some chocolate ice cream, you have a hypothetical imperative to go to the store and buy some. Can be contrasted to a categorical imperative, which says that you should perform an action regardless of your ends. |
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· a type of moral theory stating that to act morally we must base our actions on their probable results or consequences, rather than acting out of duty, in cases where duty and promoting good consequences come into conflict. It can be contrasted with deontology. Examples of consequentialism are ethical egoism, utilitarianism, and ethical altruism. |
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· The moral theory stating that individuals should choose the act, among those available to the agent, that is likely to create the greatest amount of happiness and the least amount of pain. Each person’s (and perhaps each animal’s) pleasures and pains are to count equally; you may not count your own pleasures and pains more (or less) than anyone else’s. |
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Ø a two-person game with a payoff matrix. |
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Ø a two-tiered modification of act utilitarianism. A rule-utilitarian society first chooses those general rules of conduct (ex: do not kill) that maximize overall utility; individual actions must then follow these rules, regardless of their effects on utility. |
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