Term
| What is the difference between token and type? |
|
Definition
| A 'token' is roughly a single, individual thing you can point to. A 'type' is roughly a category, a 'bucket' which can hold several tokens. The word 'Pete' contains 4 tokens of letters, but only 3 types of letters - it has two tokens of type 'e.' |
|
|
Term
| What are the conditions of Goldman's causal account of knowledge? |
|
Definition
| S knows p iff 1) S believes p, 2) p is true, 3) [blank, Goldman doesn't think justification is necessary for knowledge], and 4) p causes S's belief that p (or there is an appropriate causal connection between p and S's belief that p). |
|
|
Term
| What does it mean to be an externalist about knowledge? |
|
Definition
| Externalism claims that we don't need to know that we know in order to know. |
|
|
Term
| What are the two kinds of counterexamples? |
|
Definition
1) showing that the conditions are not individually necessary - give an example of a thing that is intuitively C (the concept we are trying to define), but is missing one or more of the allegedly necessary conditions.
2) showing that the conditions are not jointly sufficient - give an example of a thing that meets all of the conditions that are allegedly jointly sufficient, but is intuitively not C.
If you have an inconsistent set of premises, what does that mean about the premises?
It means that at least one of the premises must be false. |
|
|
Term
| What four things can make an argument by analogy stronger? What four things can make an argument by analogy weaker? |
|
Definition
An argument by analogy has the following form:
P1) Object A has properties P, Q, R.
P2) Objects B, C, D have properties P, Q, R.
P3) Objects B, C, D, has property X.
C) Object A probably has property X. |
|
|
Term
| 4 things that can make an argument by analogy stronger: |
|
Definition
1) More similarity between the things being compared (A, B, C, D), in terms of both quality and quantity. (More and more important properties P, Q, R.)
2) Less dissimilarity between the things being compared, in terms of both quality and quantity. (For example of a dissimilarity, B,C,D might have property Y and A doesn't.)
3) More diversity of examples (B,C,D)
4) A weaker conclusion. (The argument is stronger because the argument has less work to do.) |
|
|
Term
Describe and provide the objections to:
Theatetus' 1st account of knowledge |
|
Definition
The 'list': Knowledge is geometry, cobblery, other crafts and sciences, etc.
Objections: not evaluative, not unified, is implicitly circular. |
|
|
Term
| Theatetus' 2nd account of knowledge |
|
Definition
Knowledge is perception. X is knowledge iff x is perception.
Objections: Perception is not sufficient for knowledge. We have perceptions in dreams, but these are not knowledge.
Perception is not necessary for knowledge. Memorized knowledge is not perception, but is knowledge.
There is a mis-match in the number of tokens of perception and the tokens of knowledge. I know that a table is here (1 token of knowledge), but I use different senses to gain this knowledge (multiple perceptions). |
|
|
Term
| Theatetus' 3rd account of knowledge |
|
Definition
Knowledge is true belief. S knows p iff 1) S believes p, and 2) p is true.
Objection: True belief is not sufficient for knowledge. You can have an accidental true belief. For example, a lawyer can trick you into forming a belief, but it is merely luck if that belief is true. |
|
|
Term
| Theatetus' 4th account of knowledge |
|
Definition
Knowledge is having a true belief and being able to 'give an account' of the belief. S knows p iff 1) S believes p, 2) p is true, and 3) S is able to give an account of p. 'Giving an account' means roughly being able to work out what the belief means - knowing what the words mean and knowing how the words come together to form a meaningful sentence.
Objection: The definition is implicitly circular since 'being able' to give an account means knowing how to give an account. |
|
|
Term
| Provide an example of a Gettier-style case. |
|
Definition
Smith has a justified belief that "Jones owns a Ford."
Therefore concludes that Jones owns a Ford, OR Brown is in Barcelona, even though Smith has no knowledge what-so-ever about the location of Brown.
Jones does not own a Ford, but Brown is in Barcelona.
Smith had a belief that was TRUE and JUSTIFIED, but is not knowledge. |
|
|
Term
| Explain the hologram-vase case, including why Goldman's account handles it correctly and the JTB account doesn't. |
|
Definition
This case has two versions. The first version is a case of knowledge - you see a vase, and form the belief that there is a vase in front of you.
The second version is a Gettier style case, where there is a JTB that isn't knowledge - you see what looks like a vase, and form the belief that there is a vase in front of you. It turns out that instead of looking at a vase, you are really looking at a hologram of a vase. However, your belief that there is a vase in front of you is true, since behind the hologram is an actual vase. So, a justified true belief, but intuitively not knowledge.
According to the JTB account, S knows that p iff 1) S believes p, 2) p is true, 3) S is justified in believing p.
According to Goldman's account, S knows that p iff 1) S believes p, 2) p is true, 3) [blank, Goldman thinks justification isn't necessary for knowledge], and 4) p causes S's belief that p.
In order to handled these two versions correctly, an account of knowledge must say why we have knowledge in the first case but not in the second case. Since both versions involve justified true belief, the JTB account correctly handles the first version, but not the second. Goldman's account handles both cases correctly. In the first version, the vase is causing the belief. In the second version, the vase is not causing the belief. The hologram is causing the belief, and the vase is not causing the hologram.
(Note that several students said on the midterm that Goldman not requiring justification is why Goldman gets this case right. Gettier-style cases show that JTB is not sufficient for knowledge. In order to handle Gettier-style cases correctly, we need to add a condition for knowledge, not necessarily take a condition away.) |
|
|
Term
Why did Goldman think justification isn't necessary for knowledge?
There are three cases where a subject intuitively has knowledge, but does not have justification (understood as being able to give a good reason for the belief).
1) Abraham Lincoln-Encyclopedia case |
|
Definition
| Years ago, a person read an encyclopedia that said Abraham Lincoln was born in 1807. The person has forgotten about the encyclopedia, but still remembers Lincoln's birth year. Intuitively, the person knows Lincoln's birth year, but the belief is unjustified. |
|
|
Term
Why did Goldman think justification isn't necessary for knowledge?
There are three cases where a subject intuitively has knowledge, but does not have justification (understood as being able to give a good reason for the belief).
2) Chicken-sexer case |
|
Definition
| Some people have learned how to look at a chick and determine the sex of the chick. According to the case, at least, these chicken-sexers are unable to say just what feature they are picking up on that allows them to do this. Intuitively, the chicken-sexers know the sex of the chick they are looking at, even though they do not have justification for this belief. |
|
|
Term
Why did Goldman think justification isn't necessary for knowledge?
3) Storm/joint-pain |
|
Definition
| Storm coming in causes the subject to have joint pain, which somehow causes the person to form the belief that a storm is coming in. (Note that the subject doesn't realize the connection between the joint pain and the belief.) This case is somewhat controversial, some people don't agree with the intuition that this is a case of knowledge. |
|
|
Term
| Why can we know that we exist even in the tricky demon case? |
|
Definition
| The tricky demon has all the powers of God, but is evil and wants to trick us. The tricky demon can even causes us to make mistakes in logic and math. However, we can still know that we exist, because we see clearly and distinctly that in order to be tricked, we have to exist. |
|
|
Term
| In Aquinas' Second Way, he makes a sub-argument for the premise that there are no infinite chains of causation. I reconstruct the sub-argument as: |
|
Definition
P1) In an infinite chain of causation, there is no first cause.
P2) If there is no first cause in a chain of causation, then there are no subsequent causes, and therefore no effect in the present.
P3) The chain of causation of the universe has an effect in the present, since things exist now.
C) The chain of causation of the universe is not an infinite one |
|
|
Term
| What objection can we make to this argument? Why is it not sound? |
|
Definition
| Answer: Aquinas is equivocating in his use of "chain of causation." In the first premise, he is talking about an infinite chain of causation. If we spell out "finite chain" in P2), the argument is no longer valid. If we force P2) to mean "infinite chain," then P2 no longer seems true. In a finite chain, if there is no first cause, then there is no cause for the second cause. In an infinite chain, the fact that there is no first cause doesn't mean that there isn't a cause for each link in the chain. The chain just goes back to negative infinity, with each link having a cause. |
|
|
Term
| What is Cleanthes' argument for the existence and nature of God? |
|
Definition
| It goes as follows: P1) The universe looks designed (it looks orderly and purpose-made). P2) Human-made artifacts look designed (orderly, purpose-made). P3) Human-made artifacts were made by beings with minds, humans. C) The universe was made by something human-like/with a mind. |
|
|
Term
| Is Cleanthes' argument for the existence and nature of God a deductive or non-deductive argument? |
|
Definition
| Cleanthes' argument is a non-deductive argument |
|
|
Term
| Cleanthes' argument for the existence and nature of God.. What more specific kind of argument is it? |
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| What are Demea's two major objections to Cleanthes' beliefs? |
|
Definition
| 1) This is a non-deductive argument, and non-deductive arguments do not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. Demea thinks that Cleanthes gives atheists too much room to doubt that God exits. 2) Demea doesn't like the conclusion, which states that God is human-like. This conflicts with Demea's mysticism, a position which claims that God is mysterious, entirely not human, and is unknowable. |
|
|
Term
| What is Philo's main objection to Cleanthes' beliefs? |
|
Definition
| Philo is willing to grant that some non-deductive arguments, such as argument by induction, give good reasons to believe the conclusion. For example, we can look at houses being built and see that they are always built by humans. When we see a unknown, fully constructed house, we can safely conclude that this house was built by a human. However (according to one interpretation), he does not think that arguments by analogy are strong enough to give good reasons to believe their conclusion. There are more dissimilarities between houses, ships, and the universe then there are between houses, and this is enough to make Cleanthes' argument too weak to support the conclusion. |
|
|
Term
| How does Cleanthes' use the Divine Voice thought experiment to respond to Philo's objection to his argument? |
|
Definition
| In the Divine Voice case, we hear a loud, melodious voice that speaks to everybody in the entire world in their own language and dialect, and imparts some deep, meaningful message. Our intuition tells us that we can conclude that whatever the source of this voice is, it may be superhuman, but it is human-like enough to have a mind. However, if Philo were correct that arguments by analogy are too weak to support their conclusions, we would not be able to say this - we might say that the voice was produced by clouds whistling. |
|
|
Term
| How does Cleanthes' use the Natural Library thought experiment to respond to Philo's objection to his argument? |
|
Definition
| In the Natural Library case, we discover a bunch of self-reproducing books written in a language we understand. While the proximate cause of each book is its parent, we can know that the ultimate source of these books (what created the first book in the lineage) was human-like enough to have a mind. That is because, when we read a book, we enter into the mind of the author. Cleanthes notes that his own argument is even stronger that this hypothetical one, since the simplest organism shows clearer signs of design than even the most epic book. |
|
|
