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| What's the Hegelian dialectic? |
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| thesis-antithesis-synthesis |
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| What's Hegel's main theory? |
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-human history=history of ‘thought’ as it attempts to understand itself and its relation to the world.
-history began with unity, but into which man, a questioning ‘I’, emerges introducing dualism and splits. |
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| -___ sees the possibility of ‘historical reconciliation’ lying in ... |
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| Hegel, the rational realization of underlying unity – the manifestation of an absolute spirit or ‘geist’ – leading to humanity living according to a unified, shared morality: the end of history. |
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Kojeve:
-synthesizes Hegel with theories of ... |
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| Define: master-slave dialectic |
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Hegel; TSelf-consciousness is thus the awareness of another’s awareness of oneself. To put it another way, one becomes aware of oneself by seeing oneself through the eyes of another. Hegel speaks of the “struggle for recognition” implied in self-consciousness. This struggle is between two opposing tendencies arising in self-consciousness—between, on one hand, the moment when the self and the other come together, which makes self-consciousness possible, and, on the other hand, the moment of difference arising when one is conscious of the “otherness” of other selves vis-à-vis oneself, and vice versa. Otherness and pure self-consciousness are mutually opposed moments in a “life and death struggle” for recognition. This tension between selves and others, between mutual identification and estrangement, plays out in the fields of social relations.
Hegel explains that the realization of self-consciousness is really a struggle for recognition between two individuals bound to one another as unequals in a relationship of dependence. One person is the master and one is the slave. The slave is dependent on the lord. Because he is aware that the lord sees him as an object rather than as a subject (i.e., as a thing, rather than as a thinking, self-aware being), the lord frustrates his desire to assert his pure self-consciousness. He is stuck in a position of reflecting on his otherness. The independent lord, on the other end, is able to negate the otherness that he finds reflected through the subordinate bondsman, since the bondsman does not appear as a conscious subject to him. As the independent and superior partner in this relationship, his otherness does not bear down on him. The lord occupies the position of enjoying his dominant status, whereas the bondsmen must continuously reflect on his status as a subordinate “other” for the lord. At the same time, the lord does not find his position completely satisfying. In negating his own otherness in the consciousness of the bondsman, in turning the bondsman into an object unessential to his own self-consciousness, he has also to deny a fundamental impulse toward recognizing the bondsman as a consciousness equal to himself. At the same time, the bondsman is able to derive satisfaction in labor, a process of working on and transforming objects through which he rediscovers himself and can claim a “mind of his own.” |
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| “Man is self-consciousness. He is conscious of himself, conscious of his human reality and dignity; and it is in this that he is essentially different from animals, which do not go beyond the level of simple sentiment of self. MAn becomes conscious of himself at the moment when - for the “first” time - he says “I.” To understand man by understanding his “origin” is, therefore, to understand the origin of the I revealed by speech. |
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