Warrant to arrest suspect; police search his entire home without consent

• When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search the person arrested—and the area into which an arrestee might reach—in order to remove any weapons that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect escape.
• Anything within 'immediate control,' but not any other room.

• Police arrest car passenger (with PC); they take car to station and search it there.
• This is not a search incident to arrest, but there's an exception for automobiles. Permits searches of lawfully stopped autos if police have probable cause to believe that items subject to seizure are inside.
• Mobility, possibilibility of flight and loss of evidence.
• "If an effective search is to be made, it must be made immediately without a warrant or the car itself must be seized and held . . . for whatever period is necessary to obtain a warrant."

Officers arrest Gant, detain him on site, and search his car at a distance.

• We conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a search incident to a lawful arrest when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant tot he crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle
• (Scalia) (concurring) convinces court to create new reasonableness rule for car searches

Routine inventory of parked, abandoned car that had been impounded

• It's a common practice to impound vehicles, which unmistakably points to the conclusion that inventories pursuant to standard police procedures are reasonable.

• Issuing a citation—versus a full arrest—does not authorize an officer to conduct a full search of a suspect's car

Is a search warrant required to open a locked footlocker seized at the time of arrest, when there was probable cause to believe that it contains contraband?

• Yes. Privacy interests were at stake. By placing effects inside a locker, suspects manifested an expectation that the contents would remain free from public examination. There was no exigency, so it was unreasonable for the goverment to conduct a warrantless search.
• Distinctions from automobile
• Distinctions from 'immediate control' in Chimel — objects on the person versus objects by the person.

Deals with the locker-inside-an-automobile conundrum

• Police may search without a warrant if their search is supported by probable cause.

Clothes taken from arrestee after being taken to the station

• Searches and seizures that could be made on the spot at the time of arrest may legally be conducted later when the accused arrives at the place of detention
• Police were entitled to search Edwards's clothing

Question of whether incorporation requires states to apply the exclusionary rule:

• No. The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police is basic to a free society—but, since most of the English-speaking world doesn’t have an exclusionary rule, we must hesitate to treat the exclusionary rule as an essential ingredient of the right. 

  
  

   

Overrules Weeks, requiring states to apply the exclusionary rule

•  Since the Fourth’s right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the states through the Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal Government. 
• Were it otherwise . . . the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to merit this Court’s high regard as a freedom ‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.’

Does violation of the 'knock-and-announce' rule require suppression?

• No. Attenuation occurs when, even given a direct causal connection, the interest protected by the constitutional guarantee that has been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence obtained. The interests protected by the knock-and-announce requirement are quite different—and do not include the shielding of potential evidence from the government’s eyes. The exclusionary rule is inapplicable.

·   What if an officer reasonably believes there to be an outstanding arrest warrant, but that belief turns out to be wrong because of a negligent bookkeeping error by another police employee? Does the contraband need to be excluded? We say no.

• Exclusion is not an individual right; only applies where results in deterrence
• Benefits of deterrence must outweigh costs
• Police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate/culpable such that it's worth deterring

"[T]here must be a narrowly drawn authority to permit a reasonable search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual, regardless of whether he has probable cause to arrest the individual for a crime."

Followup to Brown v. Texas — petitioner was arrested for refusing to identify himself during a Terry stop. Based on reasonable suspicion, so it was lawful

• Fourth — lawful under Terry
• Fifth — refusal to disclose one's name was not based on any appreciable fear that the name would be used to incriminate, or that it would 'furnish a link in the chain' needed to prosecute; one's name is rarely incriminating.

Custodial interrogation — without probable cause, police detained and took suspect into custody. Unlawful because the seizure was so substantial as to be equivalent to an arrest, not the minimal type of intrusion Terry permits.

·      Does the Fourth allow police to transport a suspect to the station house for fingerprinting, without his consent and without probable cause or prior judicial authorization?

• No, but it does allow fingerprinting in the field.
• Fourth might permit judiciary to authorize seizure for fingerprinting on less than PC

Overrules Olmstead re: constitutionality of wiretapping

• The Fourth protects people—and not simply areas—against unreasonable searches and seizures it becomes clear that the reach of that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclosure
• (Harlan) (concurring)  There is a twofold requirement, 
• First that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, 
• Second, that the expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’

Defendant invited undercover agent to his home in order to sell narcotics

• Lawful. Defendant's only concern was whether agent was willing purchaser who could pay agreed price and agent during neither of his visits to defendant's home saw, heard or took anything that was not contemplated by defendant as necessary part of his illegal business.

   

Radio transmitter on informant conveyed suspect's incriminating statements to police.

• We already permit police officers to record in writing things they hear as informants; it is no different when an agent:
•  (1) simultaneously records them with electronic equipment which he is carrying on his person, 
• (2) or carries radio equipment which simultaneously transmits the conversations either to recording equipment located elsewhere or to other agents monitoring the transmitting frequency.

Use of thermal imaging device to detect heat emanating from the interior of a home. Is this a search within the meaning of the Fourth?

• Yes. We think that obtaining by sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without physical intrusion into a constitutionally protected area constitutes a search—at least where the technology in question is not in general public use. 

State denies counsel to indigent defendants except in cases of murder and rape. 

• "We cannot say that teh Amendment embodies an inexorable command that no trial for any offense, or in any court, can be fairly conducted and justice accorded a defendant who is not represented by counsel."

·    `We must conclude, therefore, that the problems associated with misdemeanor and petty offenses often require the presence of counsel to insure the accused a fair trial.

Does the Fourteenth apply the Fifth Amendment's double jeopardy provisions against the states?

• No. Only incorporates tohse things that "are of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty." **No longer good law

Does the Fourteenth DPC invalidate state laws permitting a defendant's failure to explain or deny evidence against him to be commented upon by opposing counsel during trial? No, ref. to Palko.

Court uses a “totality of the circumstances” approach for seeing if probable cause exists. Requires “veracity and basis of knowledge  of the people supplying hearsay information and that there is “a fair probability that evidence will be found.”

During a chase, a suspect drops incriminating evidence. He claims it was unconstitutionally seized because it followed the officer's show of authority

• In order to qualify as an arrest or seizure, there must be physical force or submission to physical force. Outcome would have been different had drugs been discovered after officer tackled suspect.

• Permits protective sweep of all or part of the premises if police have a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts that another person might be there
• If they find any evidence during the sweep, that evidence is admissible

May police, at the time an arrested person arrive at a police station, search a shoulder bag without warrant?

• Yes. It is not unreasonable for police, as part of teh routine procedure incident to incarcerating an arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession.

•  Overrules the Gouled precedent that said police cannot seize “mere evidence” without a warrant. (Police could always seize instrumentalities of crime like guns, stolen goods and contraband).
• Police may seize "mere evidence" and introduce it into court. 

Police are lawfully on premises, but they have to move a stereo speaker to see its serial number.

Unlawful. Plain view doctrine may only be invoked if police have probable cause to believe that the item in question is evidence of a crime or is contraband.

Plain view doctrine:

• Police must be where they are lawfully
• Evidence must be discovered inadvertently
• It must be immediately apparent that the items are subject to seizure

Police have warrant that specifies only fruits, not weapons. As long as search was within scope of that authorized by warrant, it's lawful.

Hotel managers and landlords cannot give consent for police to search a person’s apartment/room without a warrant.

Defendant consents to a search of his car, but he wasn't told that he didn't have to consent

• Lawful. Police need not give Miranda-like warnings that a suspect does not have to give consent to a search. Look to totality of the circumstances' to determine if consent is freely given.

Suspect's girlfriend gives police permission to search house. 

• Lawful. Consent of one who possesses common authority over premises or effects is valid against an absent party with whom authority is shared.

Ex-girlfriend gives consent even when she may not have had common control.

• Lawful. Reasonable mistake on the part of the police re: who has apparent authority makes their consent valid.

Divorced spouses; wife consents while husband refuses on site.

• Unlawful. Based on joint tenancy and societal expectations, police cannot accept one person's consent if the other is present and actively refuses to grant consent.

Search of a car not owned by defendant

• No broadening of standing because 4th Amendment rights are personal and may not be vicariously asserted. Search of third party doesn’t violate first party’s rights.  

Police made a warrantless entry into a house where defendant was an overnight guest.

• Unlawful. The guest has a legitimate expectation of privacy; longstanding social custom. 
• Standard — expectation of privacy was rooted in understandings that are recognized and permitted by society.

Defendant was sitting in another person's house bagging cocaine; police barge in, potentially unlawfully.

• Doesn't matter; defendant had no standing. 
• Property used for commercial purposes is treated differently for Fourth Amendment purposes than residential property.”  
• Also there was no prior connection with the premises.  Thus, there is no “legitimate expectation of privacy.”

• Evidence come at by the exploitation of official illegality are excluded. 
• Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Theory: Wong Sun’s statement allowed because it is sufficiently attenuated as to dissipate the taint of the poisonous tree. 

Police forcibly seized, handcuffed, and kidnapped defendant and brought him into jurisdiction. But this doesn't bar conviction, even if it was unlawful.

First time Court prevents use of a coerced confession in a state trial.  Involved a confession obtained by brutally beating the suspect until he confessed. Used 14th Amendment Due Process to justify setting aside the conviction.

Post-indictment questioning of uneducated immigrant, including (i) eight-hour interrogation; and (ii) coercion by an officer who knew him

• Unlawful under Fourteenth DPC — Defendant's will was overborne by official pressurE

Defendant, a schizophrenic, approached police on his own volition and insisted on confessing to a crime before being read his Miranda rights

• The only issue is state compulsion to confess; even if the decision was irrational, it wasn't illegal.

Informant and petitioner held a lenghty conversation while informant was wearing a wire. Defendant had already been indicted, and counsel was not present. Unlawful:

1. Defendant had been indicted and counsel wasn't present
2. Informant was a state agent
3. He "deliberately elicited" the confession from the defendant.

 When the interrogation process shifts from investigatory to accusatory, the accused must be permitted lawyer consultation. Inquiry is accusatory when:

1.  It has narrowed to a particular suspect
2. The suspect is taken into custody
3. Police carry out a process of interrogation that leads to getting incriminating statements
4. Suspect asks for and is denied consultation with counsel
5. Police have not given warning of his right to remain silent

Prosecution may not use statements stemming from custodial interrogation unless it demonstrates use of procedural safeguards to secure privilege against self-incrimination

• You have the right to remain silent
• Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law
• You have the right to an attorney. If you can not afford an attorney, one will be provided to you by the state.

Cannot systematically subvert warnings by crafting a system where police encourage confessions, then read warnings, and then have D confess again. 

May prosecutors use the physical fruits of a suspect's unwarned but voluntary statements?

• Yes. Miranda relates to self-incrimination, which is not implicated by introduction of physical evidence resulting from voluntary statements.

Approves 20-minute detention of suspect after a traffic stop, allowing officers to conduct a limited investigation of the supsected criminal activity

Court only considers whether officer acted reasonably and diligently

Fourt permits drunk driving checkpoints — in addition to specific articulable reasonable suspicion, police may stop based on a codified policy that applies neutral criteria for stops.

Before indictment, police questioned a suspect who waived his Miranda rights. Unbeknownst to him, his sister had hired an attorney, but police kept suspect isolated.

• Miranda only protects against coercion; doesn't affect knowing, voluntary waiver of right to attorney (even if you have one but don't know it).

Brief questioning may start as Terry but turn into interrogation (Miranda) if it becomes intensive. Courts consider:

• Degree of restraint
• Kind of restraint
• Duration of questioning
• Nature of stop