Term
| Katz 2-part test: to determine whether a person has a constitutionally protected expectation of privacy (& thus an unreasonable search). |
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Definition
1. Has the individual manifested a subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged search?
2. AND Is society willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable?
Held: Regardless of the location, a conversation is protected from unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment if it is made with a "reasonable expectation of privacy". Wiretapping counts as a search (physical intrusion is not necessary). 4th Amendment protects ppl not places. |
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Term
| Bond-guy brought drugs on public bus. Cop got on bus & felt up bag. Felt what felt like drugs. Opened the bag and found the brick, arrests the defendant. Bond files MTS & wins. |
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Definition
| Held: A physical manipulation of luggage to feel what’s inside is a search. Cops can use plain sight, sound & moving the object to inspect it, but manipulating it violates the rsnbl expectation of privacy. Reasoning: When there is no notice ‘subjecting them to search’ they have an objective expectation of privacy of their bags/luggage. Even touching the outside of the bag. Remedy: suppression of the evidence. Illegal search happened at the fondling of the bag. The brick inside the bag was fruit from the poisonous tree. |
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Term
| There are two ways to show unreasonable search: |
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Definition
| (1) Trespass to chattels (Jones) or property (Jardines), (2) rsnbl expectation of privacy (Katz) |
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Term
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Definition
had a search warrant but expired so it’s warrantless search. Jones drug dealer. Cops put a GPS magnet on his car & for a month monitored his movement. Determined he repeatability went to known drug dealers locations & used that info to prove he was a drug dealer.
Held: if you can show what the cop did was a trespass- then you show a violation of 4th Amend’t. This puts property rights up there w/ privacy rights. (didn’t overrule Katz bc it went on property rights alone).
Reasoning: This is a search. Found that even though he had no rsnbl expectation of privacy on the public roads, the CT doesn’t even need to address that b/c everyone recognizes the attachment of the GPS device to car as a trespass to chattel. If you can show trespass of chattel then can be suppressed (in this case car covered as “effect” under 4th A). |
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Term
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Definition
Cops see a marijuana field growing about a mile away from D’s home. Jump over fence. Get a warrant and search house.
Held: “[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area immediately surrounding the home.” |
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Term
| Dunn -- & 4 part test to decide when something is w/in curtilage: |
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Definition
Drug manufacturing was occurring in a barn on D’s property. Although parts of property was fenced (the ranch house), the barn wasnt w/in that enclosure. Cops jump the fence & go to the barn. Look through the barn door (actually a net), & see & smell meth. Get a warrant, search the barn & house. D challenges the antecedent search (w/o warrant). D argues its not an open field as in Oliver its enclosed barn. Held: For Fourth A purposes, the area surrounding a barn that is 50 yards away from the fence surrounding a house is not within the house’s curtilage. 3/4 of test is in US’ favor.
CT announces 4 part test to decide when something is w/in curtilage: (1) Proximity of other building to the house (50 yds away so in US’s favor) (2) Is it w/in the enclosure around the house? (Fence but not within that so in US’s favor) (3) What use was the outhouse being put to? (Only used for manufacturing meth so in US’s favor) (4) What steps did the owner take to keep the outhouse from public view? (Some attempts to cover it up but cops could still see through the barn’s slip & could smell the meth—this one is a bit ambiguous). |
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Term
| Airplane search: CA v. Ciraolo: |
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Definition
| 1,000 foot police overflight spotted marijuana in backyard. Held: if the cop is in a plain & navigable airspace in a fixed wing airplane you have no reasonable expectation of privacy of your yard. Reasoning: applies Katz. 1. D did have a subjective expectation of privacy b/c fence which indicated he took ‘normal precautions to maintain his privacy.’ 2. warrantless aerial observation of a person’s backyard is not a “search” the observations took place w/in public navigable airspace in a physically nonintrusive manner, from this point they saw plants readily discernible to the naked eye as weed. The public could have seen it too. Thus, society would not be willing to recognize the expectation as reasonable. So Katz Prong #2 fails. |
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Term
| Helicopter search: FL v. Riley |
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Definition
| 400 foot helicopter spying on marijuana greenhouse. Held: applies Katz to find same outcome as Ciraolo. Was legal to fly in airspace, so member of public could have observed. Reasoning: Plurality opinion-- 4 said helicopter in navigable airspace OK (even at 400 ft bc helicopters can go), never a rsnbl expectation of privacy from a helo in navigable airspace. Narrowing opinion (the 1 justice but what binds the lower courts): NOT automatically a rsnbl search just bc it’s a helicopter in navigable airspace, instead, the test is-- is it rare for a helicopter to fly that low in this particular location? (in this case it wasn’t rare but this is good for D's bc its often rare). D has burden to show that the helicopter flight was rare, not normal. But if it’s a plane in navigable airspace—no 4th amendment violation. Just a limiting rule for helicopters. |
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Term
| SEARCH- THERMAL IMAGING rule |
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Definition
| For you to be able to challenge this kind of search under the 4th A, it has to be a technology NOT in common use (binoculars don’t qualify). |
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Definition
| Cops used thermal imaging to check for heat signatures that indicated growth of weed & used this to get a warrant. D challenges warrant based on the tech. Held: when the Govt uses a device not in general public use (even if readily available), to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable w/o physical intrusion, the surveillance is a “search” and is presumptively unreasonable w/o a warrant. Reasoning: Scalia- Heat is not inherently illegal—it is presumptively legal, could be an indication of “lady of the house” taking her daily bath or whatever. The heat is emanating from the house is actually IN D’s house & the core protection of the 4th A is the home. Also, legal intimate & private activities could also produce heat & this tech was not readily available (so not w/in rsnbl expectation of privacy). |
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Term
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Definition
| Held: Garbage left in a public space for collection may be searched w/o a warrant. Reasoning: Once you place thrash on the curb (and to be picked up by someone else) it’s abandoned & you totally lose any rsnbl expectation of privacy in that garbage. Any interest he had in property was abandoned at this point. Hypo: Outcome would’ve been different had it been left within fence and on curtilage (would have been trespass to get it and also not in pubic). |
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Term
| SEARCH- PUBLIC BEHAVIOR: SC has frequently stated, "what a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of 4th Amendment Protection." But what is considered public behavior. |
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Definition
| Knotts: Cop placed beeper in D’s car and followed to cabin. No fence and outside in driveway when arrested. Held: If you drive your car on a public road you have no reasonable expectation of privacy in a car. So a cop following the person w/ a beeper on a public road not a search. Karo: Cops place beeper tracking device to illicit chemicals in car. Car went into house, car left, no beeper. Thus, the chemicals went into the house. Cops follow tracker into house. Held: although cop using beeper to follow a person on a public road is not a search, as soon as cop uses beeper to track evidence on private property (home) search in violation of the 4th A. |
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Term
| White -- snitch/informant |
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Definition
| D was talking to someone he thought was a fellow drug dealer/criminal. While sitting there incriminating himself, the informant is wearing a wire so cops are picking all of this up. Uses against him at trial. Held: No 4th amendment violation when you talk to someone & they are wearing a wire. As opposed to Katz, you don’t have expectation of privacy with conversation of another person, you voluntarily give them info. Takeaway: Under the 4th A, you cannot suppress what you say to anybody who turns out to be a snitch. Therefore, you cannot trust anyone except those with privileges and a co-conspirator has no reasonable expectation to privacy. |
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Term
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Definition
| Smith: Police installed pen register to get phone #s from D’s records w/o warrant (just looking at who called, for how long, not the contents of convo). Pen register: device used by law enforcement to determine who is calling & how long the call is. Held: No expectation of privacy for info voluntarily turned over to 3rd parties. Reasoning: A person does not have a rsnbl expectation of privacy in the phone #s he dials. It is public knowledge the phone co keeps records of ppl’s outgoing calls so when ppl make a call they are voluntarily making public who they call. Note: For 3rd parties w/ whom a customer does regular business (banks, cell phone companies, hotels, etc.) the 3rd party has a 4th Amend’t protection, but the customer has zero expectation of privacy. |
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Term
| US v. Place (dog sniff- luggage) |
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Definition
D was traveling through a public airport, had luggage & cops had rsnbl suspicion, so they could stop & frisk the outside (lesser threshold than probable cause). Cops stopped D & had a drug dog smell the outside of the luggage (if opened would have been a privacy invasion but wasn’t). Dog alerted positive for drugs giving cops PC. They obtained warrant and drugs were found in the luggage.
Held: No expectation of privacy in your suitcase in an airport if a dog smells something because according to supreme court jurisprudence dogs only smell BAD. So if they smell then PC! SC says dog sniff results are inherently criminal. Sniff tests by trained drug dogs are sui generis because they are unlikely to indicate anything other than the presence or absence of drugs.
Note: the D did win here but on seizure grounds bc they waited 90 min so it was unreasonable. Also, Bond distinguishable because something that feels like a drug is not inherently criminal. Dog sniff results are inherently criminal. |
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Term
| Caballes: (drug sniff- cars). |
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Definition
D was driving a car & cops stop him for a traffic violation so they have RS. While processing registration & license, another cop had a drug dog & ran him around the outside of the car [ten min after stop]. The dog alerts, giving them PC (so don’t need warrant) and they then search the car & find drugs.
Held: cops may have drug dogs in their car & can use them on whatever car they want & if the dog alerts they have probable cause to search your car.
Reasoning: Dog is trained to smell only one thing (bad things) & smell is in space outside of car.
Holding 2: If stopped, dog sniffs are fine on cars & luggage as long as they do the search w/in the normal course of the stop. You have 5-10 minutes to run stuff. Doing it during detention is fine but after a while it becomes an arrest. So just as long as it happens before the IRON CURTAIN CLOSES you’re ok. |
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Term
| Jardines: (drug sniff- house) |
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Definition
Dog goes up to the front door of a private residence & alerts for drugs. Gives cops PC, cops get warrant, search house, find drugs, & arrest D.
Held: CT relied on property law & HELD the implied license to walk up to your door only extends to ppl, not to trained drug dogs. So it’s a trespass of your curtilage & there's no license- thus its an unreasonable search. A dog sniff at the front door of a house where the police suspected drugs were being grown constitutes a search for purposes of the 4th. Prior dog sniff cases don’t apply to the home.
Reasoning: There was a modern constructive trespass b/c ppl don’t expect trained dogs to go up to the threshold of door & smell for drugs under the door. This is an invasion of property privacy.
Takeaway: Drug dogs can smell objects and luggage not illegally seized, can sniff legally stopped cards, but cannot sniff houses right up to the front door |
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Term
| Rodriguez v. US: (Dog Sniff – Iron Curtain Case) |
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Definition
| Apparently the wait for a dog sniff was just too long this time. Held: Absent reasonable suspicion, police extension of a traffic stop to conduct a dog sniff violates the Constitution’s shield against unreasonable seizures. Can’t stop you for too long to bring the dogs. Notes: drug dog sniffed after iron curtain fell—t/f not allowed |
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Term
| Probable Cause Standard % |
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Definition
| Probable cause is what is required for warrants & arrests. Spectrum: Scintilla (5%) Reasonable Suspicion (15-20%) Probable Cause (25%) 50.1%: preponderance of evidence Clear & convincing -- maybe 75% Beyond a reasonable doubt – 95-97%. PROBABLE: less than preponderance. Very low standard. Critics argue its easy to satisfy. Objective standard—reasonable cop. |
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Term
| Maryland v. Pringle: (this case demonstrates how LOW of a standard probable cause is). |
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Definition
| D was a passenger in car at 3:16 am in high crime area. Car is stopped for a traffic violation. Cop asks, "can I search your car?" Gets consent, opens the passenger compartment & finds 700+$ in cash & 5 baggies of cocaine that were easily assessable to all, all three were arrested. D appeals arguing there was no probable cause to arrest him. Held: Although mere presence of a guilty person is not enough for PC, must look at the totality of the circumstances, which in this case gave the cop PC (weighed in favor of PC). Note: mere proximity in high crime area, time, cash is not probable cause. But 5 baggies of cocaine is probable cause when taken w/ everything else |
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Term
| Gates: established totality of the circumstances test as an appropriate way of determining probable cause |
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Definition
| the anonymous info is sufficiently predictive & descriptive by looking at the totality of the circumstances. Facts: Police get an anonymous letter about Ds running drug deals. The letter was very specific & predictive. Cops start checking things out & got a warrant to arrest Ds when they arrive back from drug run. Ds move to suppress on the grounds that the informant was unreliable and not credibly and what was found after the fact cannot be used to determine PC. Held: Where an anonymous tip is corroborated w/ actual police findings, a “totality of the circumstances” approach is an appropriate way of determining probable cause instead of using the two-pronged test of “veracity/reliability” and “basis of knowledge” Note: when there’s enough predictive information (gathered by corroboration) consistent with guilt, probable cause may be found. Reasoning: PC is a flexible standard & the confidential informant knew details and predicated what was going to happen and cops corroborated. |
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Term
| Whren v. US -- PC is objective |
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Definition
cops saw D make a traffic violation in high crime area. Saw drugs in passenger hands. D moves to suppress, these cops were doing traffic stops as pretext should suppress.
Held: PC is an objective standard and can be triggered by objective traffic violations is enough for the stop. All it takes is an objective law violation to stop someone. The subjective intention/motivation of the police officer in stopping or arresting the D is irrelevant. As long as the cop was objectively reasonable there is probable cause. Here, the cop was objectively reasonable b/c he saw a traffic stop & a reasonable cop would stop for the same. Reasoning: Subjective motivation is unreasonable. All 4th requires is objective basis for PC (what the law enforcement knew). Note: gives cops a lot of power. It’s easy to get pulled over for violating some law, and then they can subjectively get you. |
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Term
| Devenpeck -- PC is objective |
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Definition
| Someone brings a civil suit against the cop. D was impersonating a PO and the PO realized this. The actual PO was mistaken about what the law was regarding impersonating a cop. It did violate one statute but he arrested him for violating another that it didn’t. Arrested D and eventually case gets thrown out. D then sues cop for illegally arresting him. Cop was subjectively mistaken whether the facts led to a arrest. So he didn't have subjective probable cause, but he did objectively. Held: objective probable cause is all that matters |
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Term
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Definition
| Cop sees D driving with a broken taillight. The law about cars was outdated & ambiguous, it was unclear what/how many lights were required (bc it was so old and related to carriages). So he pulls him over and saw that there were drugs in the car and arrested him (turns on the antecedent search). Held: if state law is not clear & a cop relying on that unclear law, and the law is only clarified later, cop is not held accountable. It's reasonable. |
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Definition
| Brent convinced a judge that the cop couldn’t have perceived the traffic violation from his vantage point bc traffic laws didn’t apply anywhere but public streets. Distinguishable from the other cases bc the cop HERE couldn’t come up with a reason why he stopped him (other than the traffic law which didn’t apply to private laws). Cop did not witness facts that would lead an objectively reasonable cop to believe the traffic laws were violated. Just b/c he saw a gun after doesn’t matter. No probable cause to stop the car. So now its tainted fruit from the poisonous tree. TAKEAWAY: objective cop in terms of legal implication; subjective cop in terms of the facts understood. |
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Term
| Warrant-Form requirements |
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Definition
| The 4th A requires that a warrant must describe the person, place, things to be seized w/ particularity. Must include facts establishing probable cause into a written & signed affidavit. Affidavit may be based on hearsay (Rules of Evidence do not apply). Must be timely info. Limited timeline—executed within 10 days, 45 day limit to GPS tracking device. Must issue from detached & neutral magistrate. |
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Term
| Andresen v. Maryland (what form must the warrant take?): |
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Definition
| State authorities obtained warrants to search D’s office, for papers evidencing a fraudulent sale of land. Warrant was particular, but did not cover specific type of evidence needed. There was one general clause included: "fruits, instrumentalities, evidence of the crime" language in the warrant.” Issue was whether that sentence caused the entire warrant to be invalid? D argued turned specific warrant into general warrant. Held: warrant sufficient the complexity of an illegal scheme may not be used as a shield to avoid detection under the pretense of attacking a “general” warrant. Note: that one sentence would be a general warrant by itself, but this was really a technicality. You have to read in contex |
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Term
| Groh (what form the warrant must take): |
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Definition
| Civil rights action. Cop searched house. Affidavit (but not warrant) was specific for search of ATF’s house for grenades, rocket launchers, etc.only look to the four corners of the warrant. Here, its facially invalid without an affidavit and judge didn’t attach facts in affidavit or cross-reference it. Just said, "go search that house." Held: A warrant that fails to describe with particularity the person or things to be seized is unreasonable & violates the 4th A. Note: Any evidence found would have been suppressed. It was a facially invalid warrant. |
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Term
| Warrant -- general requirements for execution |
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Definition
| the 4th A requires that the procedures which the police use in carrying out a search not be “”unreasonable.” Thus, in general, the police may not behave in an unduly intrusive manner. |
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Term
| Michigan v. Summers -- warrant execution |
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Definition
| Cops had a warrant to go to a residence to search for drugs. There were a bunch of people there other than residents. Cops ask everyone to freeze & frisk them since there was RS to believe this was a drug house (just frisked for pistols). D had something in plain view (not going into pockets) and learned he had contraband so arrest him. Held: When executing a warrant, cops are allowed to seize & detain people during the search as long as it is reasonable for 2 reasons: (1) officer safety and (2) to make sure evidence does not get destroyed. If cops have RS that a suspect is armed and dangerous, they can frisk them for the purposes of officer safety. |
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Term
| Wilson v. Arkansas -- knock & announce |
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Definition
| Common law "knock & announce" principle forms a part of the reasonableness inquiry under the 4th A. D convicted of drug related crimes after cops went thru screen door announcing themselves. CT held this isnt enough, must knock & announce their identity & purpose before entering. Search unreasonable if they don’t. Unless doing so would endanger them or lead to destruction of evidence. |
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Definition
cops had search warrant to conduct on house to get evidence about drive by shooting. Mena was detained in handcuffs during the search bc she was living at the house. Lower CT held that the use of handcuffs to detain her violated the 4th A & the officers' questioning about her immigration status during the detention constituted an independent 4th violation. SC overturns this and hold that her detention for the length of the search was consistent w/ Summers & the offers' questioning during detention didn’t violate her 4th rights.
Held: If you are lawfully detained during a drug search, cops can ask questions about anything, so long as the questioning does not extend the otherwise lawful detention. |
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Term
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Definition
| 4th A Rule that requires cops to knock & announce themselves and wait a bit before entering. |
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Term
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Definition
Police, suspecting a felony drug violation, executed a search warrant at petitioner Richards’ hotel room while failing to “knock & announce.”
Held: Not knocking & announcing is allowable under the 4th A as long as the decision to do so is reasonable under the circumstances. No blanket exception for drug cases, though bc (1) overgeneralization: not every drug investigation will pose these risks to a substantial degree (nature of drugs impossible to destroy quickly).In these situations, the asserted govt interests in preserving evidence & maintaining safety may not outweigh the individual privacy interests intruded upon by a no knock entry. (2) the reasons for creating an exception in one category can, relatively easily, be applied to others. T/F the knock & announce element of the 4th A’s reasonableness requirement would be meaningfulness. Here, But bc evidence presented to support the officers' actions in this case establishes the decision not to knock & announce was reasonable under the circumstances, ct affirms the judgment. So in further cases there will be a case by case evaluation of the manner in which a search was executed. |
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Term
| EXCEPTIONS to knock and announce rule: |
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Definition
| 1. Preventing the destruction of evidence (p. 66 of sup): officers may enter w/o identifying themselves if the circumstances pose a threat of immediate destruction of evidence. 2. Physical danger to police: the possibility of such sometimes justifies unanncounced entry (eg: cops think D has a gun & wont be taken alive). Exceptions decided case by case- duty of CT confronted w/ the question to determine whether the facts & circumstances of the particular entry justified dispensing with the knock-&-announce. |
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Term
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Definition
| The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. |
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Term
| WARRANT- UNFORESEEN CIRCUMSTANCES OR MISTAKE: |
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Definition
| Focus on what the cops did before executing the SW and what the cops did during the execution of the SW. If cops’ conduct is reasonable despite the mistake/unforeseen circumstances, search is constitutional. |
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Term
| Maryland v. Garrison -- warrant mistake/unforeseen circumstance |
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Definition
| Police obtain a search warrant to search one apartment but discover after acquiring contraband that they were in ∆ Garrison’s separate apartment. Held: The validity of a search warrant must be determined on the basis of the info that the police disclose or have a duty to disclose to a magistrate at that time, not based on after the fact realizations. A reasonable mistake in executing a warrant, as long as reasonable obtained, is fine. A good-faith, factual mistake in describing the area to be searched does not automatically invalidate a warrant. Note: they thought it was good info. Mistake doesn’t violate the 4th |
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Term
| Los Angeles County v. Rettelle Civil rights case. -- warrant mistake/unforeseen circumstance |
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Definition
| Cops obtained a warrant to search the residence of the suspects but Ps had since moved into the home. Suspects were black. Cops enter home, see naked couple sleeping and wake them up and make them put hands up. They sued, arguing that the cops had violated their rights and that the people they were looking for were black, they were white. Held: search was reasonable- officers may execute a valid warrant and act in a reasonable manner to protect themselves from harm (despite initial mistake). Reasonable in obtaining warrant, not unreasonable in detaining them 1-2 mins. Reasoning: They could have been accomplices and after cops figured it out they apologized and left. The cops made a reasonable mistake after exercising due diligence. Totality of circumstances here. The search took no more than 5 minutes before the cops apologized and left. |
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Term
| EXCEPTIONS TO SW REQUIREMENT |
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Definition
| if it’s a search, you need a search warrant for the search to be reasonable. BUT there are exceptions to the requirement. Must balance various gov’t interests v. individual rights under 4th A of privacy & property. Officer safety/preventing destruction of evidence lead in the way of exception, etc. EXCEPTIONS: 1. Exigent circumstances 2. Plain View/Sense 3. Search Incident to Arrest 4. Automobiles 5. Consent 6. Border Searches/Domestic Checkpoints 7. Special Needs Searches 8. Searches of pretrial detainees, prisoners, probationers, & parolees. |
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Term
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Definition
| Even where the search-incident-to-arrest exception to the search warrant doesn’t apply, there may be exigent circumstances that justifying dispensing w/ the warrant requirement. All based on an objective standard. Exigent Circumstances: 1) Searching in Hot pursuit for suspect 2) Preventing the imminent destruction of evidence 3) Emergency Aid 4) Office/public Safety |
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Term
| EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE- HOT PURSUIT: Warden v. Hayden: |
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Definition
| Cab driver saw another get robbed at gunpoint. Describes suspect & saw him run into house. Within a matter of minutes, cop at his door. Barges way in w/o consent, sees man pretending to be asleep who fits the description but w/o clothes. Finds gun in back of toilet and clothes in washing machine & seizes all of it. Held: Hot pursuit is an exigency which creates an exception to the warrant requirement. Speed and safety of officers & public are factors. Note: There must be immediate & continuous pursuit. ALSO, could’ve been evidence destruction & maybe public safety since he had a gun |
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Term
| Payton- hot pursuit -- routine arrest |
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Definition
| NY stat said cops can enter a residence w/o a warrant. Had PC to believe that D was a murderer. Held: routine arrest not hot pursuit. Police can’t make a warrantless & nonconsensual entry into suspect’s home for a routine felony arrest. This stat is unconstitutional & fruits suppressed. Reasoning: Cops had PC that D was a murdered but cannot enter a house just b/c there is a felon inside. Unless felon is fleeing there must be a search or arrest warrant. Gravity of the situation does not matter in decision of whether there is an exception to the warrant requirement. |
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Term
| EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE- SAFETY --- 2 |
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Definition
| Emergency aid: officers may enter a home w/o a warrant to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury. OR for Officer/public safety |
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Term
| Brigham City, UT v. Stuart: |
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Definition
| Cops saw kids drinking in backyard, fight going on inside, entered house because of fight / emergency. Held: Police may enter a home without a warrant if there is an objectively reasonable basis for believing an occupant is injured or in immediate danger. Reasoning: Cops entered the house lawfully b/c the fight created a situation where emergency aid was needed. This is an objective basis for going into help someone. Additionally, this was a lawful vantage point and they saw all of this in plain view. |
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Term
| Michigan v. Fisher: [applying Stuart]: |
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Definition
| Police receive calls that guy going crazy in house. Cops enter hear screaming inside & see blood outside. They saw D with a cut on his hand & asked whether he needed medical help—police tried to enter the house & D pointed shot gun at him. Held: cops may enter home to render emergency aid or protect an occupant from injury (objective standard). Note: irrelevant what the subjective understanding of the officer is. |
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Term
| EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE PREVENTING DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE: Kentucky v. King: |
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Definition
| Cops were running surveillance on a hotel room where there was suspected drug trafficking. Cops would have gotten a warrant but instead go with a “knock and talk.” They knock & hear shuffling. Ascertained that evidence was prob being destroyed so burst into the house w/o a warrant, seize evidence, and arrest Ds. Held: exigent circumstances (such as preventing destruction of evidence) justify a warrantless search when the conduct of the police preceding the exigency is reasonable in the same sense. |
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Term
| EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCE- LIMITS:The SC has made clear that “exigent circumstances” requires a serious enough offense to justify a warrantless entry. Welsh v. Wisconsin: |
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Definition
| Guy drives his car off road, then walks home. Police enter his house w/o a warrant & arrest him for drunk driving. Held: a noncriminal (and nonviolent) traffic offense doesn’t qualify as an exigent circumstance. There was no immediate or continuous pursuit of the D from the scene of the crime, & b/c he abandoned car & was already home there was little remaining threat to public safety. Note: CT notes that an important factor to be considered when determining whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the arrest is being made. |
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Term
| EXCEPTION TO SW REQ- PLAIN VIEW (p. 160): If cops are lawfully present in a place, they must use all of their senses. Plain View must be: |
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Definition
(1) From a lawful vantage point & (2) immediately apparent.
Eg: imagine an officer has SW to search a home for child porn. They enter & see drugs on table. They can be seized & used as evidence. In fact, don’t even need SW as long as officer is legally in place. The ‘plain view’ cases have in common: the police officer in each had prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. |
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Term
| Coolidge v. NH: provides the classic articulation of the plain view exception to the warrant requirement. |
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Definition
| Held: when the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of the evidence is supported, the seizure is also legitimate. However, plain view may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another, until something incriminating emerges. Note: plain view alone is never enough to justify the warrantless seizure of evidence |
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Term
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Definition
SC said that “even though inadvertence is a character of most legitimate ‘plain view’ seizures, it is not a necessary condition. However, it must be immediately apparent that seized item is illegal.
For example, in AZ v. Hicks: cops entered an apartment w/o warrant to investigate shots that had been fired & saw stereo equipment that they thought might be stolen merch. They didn’t have probable cause to support that thought. Cop moved the stereo and found the ID number, radioed it and found the merchandise was stolen. Held: Since he had to move it to get the # it is not immediately apparent. Since there is no such thing as a de minimus search, this is an unreasonable search. |
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Term
| Minnesota v. Dickerson (Plain Sense – other senses): |
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Definition
| Terry stop case. A police officer patted down a suspect and discovered a small amount of crack cocaine in his jacket. Held: plain view exception applies to smell & touch, not just sight, but the way he massaged the bag of crack was not plain. |
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Term
| EXCEPTION TO SW REQ- SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST: |
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Definition
| SC has repeatedly held that if you are lawfully arrested the cops may search you, your pockets/purse/immediate area, and your grab space (entrance to ur house—look in entry way closet) rationale: officer safety & prevent the destruction of evidence. Prophylactic rule for the cops. |
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Term
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Definition
| No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation. |
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Term
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Definition
| In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. |
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Term
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Definition
| for consent to be valid, must be given by somebody who has an equal or greater privacy or property interest in the place in question. (Ex: Brett has no cause of action if his wife consents to cops searching their house). |
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Definition
| Cop shows up at Rodriguez’s house, GF is there (although at that point she was is ex), never tells cop about the break up, and gives consent, provides key to search house. Held: reasonable mistakes don’t necessarily violate the 4th A—if a cop has reasonable belief that a person has authority to consent to a search, even if this belief is mistaken, the search is valid. |
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Term
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Definition
| the gov’t has broad authority to conduct warrantless searches of people, vehicles, and mail entering the border—4th A virtually does not apply here. Border search proper can occur at (1) the literal border between the U.S. and an adjacent country and (2) the international terminal of an airport in the United States. Gov’t has the ability to stop all cars at the border and conduct warrantless searches. |
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Term
| Chimel --> scope of search |
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Definition
| cops had warrant to arrest D for felony burglary. Went to house, he comes to door and they arrest him. They search him & then go upstairs to room & search drawyers, find coins that match stolen coins. MTS. Held: search was beyond the scope of the limited search incident to arrest |
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Term
| Robinson -- scope of search |
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Definition
| extends Chimel to petty MM. Held: If you are arrested for ANY crime (even speeding) they may do a search incident to arrest and go through anything in your grab space. |
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Term
| Three Elements to have a 5th Amendment Right to Silence: |
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Definition
1. There must be a testimonial statement
2. It must be something where there is a realistic possibility of incrimination
3. There must be some element (actual constructive) of compulsion
Can be invoked at any proceeding if those three things are met to protect yourself .. They cant hold against you and they have to offer immunity. |
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Term
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Definition
Schmerber v. California: blood draw is NOT testimonial. Physical evidence has no communicative aspect.
U.S. v. Wade: police line up-- requiring a suspect to participate in a police lineup does not violate the privilege against self-incrimination because it is not testimonial.
Doe v. U.S.: handwriting samples-- compelling a person's signature on a bank form was not testimonial. |
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Term
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Definition
| If property is lawfully in the possession of the police, they may inventory the contents to protect the owner’s property while it is in police possession. Prof calls them "impoundment searches" because they occur when your car is being impounded. |
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Term
| SEARCHES OF CONTAINERS IN AUTOS |
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Definition
| CA v. Acevedo: D put a container in his trunk that police suspected contained marijuana. Police stopped ∆ and searched the container, leading to ∆’s arrest. Held: if probable cause exists to search a vehicle w/o a warrant, probable cause also exists to search a container in the vehicle. Note: If in car and probable cause, can search |
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