Term
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Definition
| Supreme Court struck down a statute doubling the maximum punishment for crime committed with a biased motive (a hate crime), as the SC said this had to be alleged in the charging document as an element of the crime and cannot just be presented at sentencing (i.e. this element must be proven to the jury). |
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Term
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Definition
| Punishment to promote the interests of society; Not trying to deter those who cannot be deterred, includes deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation; forward-looking. Purpose of law is to maximize the interest and the happiness of society. |
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Definition
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Term
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Definition
| stop the general public from acting in the same criminal way |
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Term
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Definition
| stop the individual D from committing crime again |
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Term
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Definition
| Idea of penitentiary as a model for society, allows criminal to be remorseful and think about their crime. |
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Definition
| Removing someone from society, making society safer. |
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Term
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Definition
| Correcting past crimes, backward-looking. |
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Definition
Bringing together individuals affected by crime in order to help develop feelings of remorse, reach an
agreement as to a penalty. |
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Term
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Definition
| The 8th amendment prohibition against cruel & unusual punishment does not require proportionality between crime and sentence, just no extreme sentences that are grossly disproportionate to the crime. |
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Term
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Definition
| legislatures are given a great deal of discretion to define punishments and crimes, most legislative choices made are constitutionally permissible. |
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Term
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Definition
1. The gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty
2. Looked to sentences imposed on crimes in the same jurisdiction
3. Looks at other jurisdictions and how they punish the same crime.
4. SC defers to the legislature as they say that in this case the crime is not grossly disproportionate to the punishment. (Proportionality analysis does not have a big bite) |
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Term
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Definition
| Courts need to construe the guidelines as being guidelines rather than being mandatory. |
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Term
| THE CRIMINAL ACT: ACTUS REUS |
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Definition
There are seven requirements for punishment:
1) Past
2) voluntary
3) wrongful
4) conduct
5) specified
6) in advance
7) by statute. |
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Term
| Actus Reus - Omission - MPC |
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Definition
an omission is expressly made sufficient to find criminality by the law defining the offense, or
by a duty to perform the omitted act otherwise imposed by law. |
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Term
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Definition
| A duty can be created by a contract, a status relationship (spousal, parent/child) or by voluntarily aiding someone and then stopping. |
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Term
| constructive possession: (U.S. v. Maldonado) (Actus Reus) |
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Definition
| power/intention to exercise control or dominion over an object. |
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Term
| constructive possession: (U.S. v. Maldonado) (Actus Reus) |
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Definition
power/intention to exercise control or dominion over an object.
Jury instruction on possession: Up to jury to apply the instruction to facts of a particular case (jury just has to say guilty/not guilty, not all the elements); typically it is a jury Q if there was the intent to distribute. |
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Term
| U.S. v. Jenkins (Actus Reus) |
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Definition
| proximity to drugs does not equal possession (drugs on coffee table and D hanging out on the couch in someone else’s house). |
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Term
| Actus Reus - Voluntariness |
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Definition
| Actus reus is generally accepted as requiring a voluntary act, |
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Term
| People v. Grant (Actus Reus) |
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Definition
| general inference (a rebuttable presumption under Sandstrom v. Montana) that when someone does something that they are doing it voluntarily, but if D raises evidence suggesting that the behav was not voluntary then P still has the burden to establish more clearly that the act was indeed voluntary. |
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Term
| Actus Reus - Involuntary - MPC |
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Definition
MPC § 2.01 establishes what is not a voluntary act and then assumes that everything else is).
Emphasis on conscious control. |
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Term
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Definition
(requiring the ct to, when there are diff interpretations of a statute, to read it as favorably
to D as possible) |
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Term
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Definition
Criminal statutes should be understandable to reasonable law-abiding persons.
Prospectively: enacted in a non-retroactive fashion, in order to give people fair notice that their actions
are subject to criminal prosecution. |
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Term
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Definition
| fed cts can impose liability only for crimes defined by statute. |
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Term
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Definition
| Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law if it fails to provide notice to ordinary people of the crimes it prohibits and also authorizes and encourages arbitrary enforcement. |
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Term
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Definition
| Mens rea can be a) a notion of moral blameworthiness, being “bad”, “malicious” or “evil”, or b) the particular mental state required for an offense. Actus reus + mens rea + [attendant circumstances] + [Causation] + [Result] = criminal liability |
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Term
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Definition
| (inherently wrong – appeals to some notion of natural law), |
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Term
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Definition
| (prohibited, but not inherently wrong: traffic offenses, smuggling), often prescribed by statute. |
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Term
| Substantive Strict liability (Mens Rea) |
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Definition
| without moral culpability, liability w/o moral fault |
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Term
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Definition
| no requirement for any culpable mental state w/r to any element |
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Term
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Definition
| some elements have mental element, some don’t |
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Term
| Strict Liability - MPC (Mens Rea) |
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Definition
MPC: Strict liability offenses need to be civil, not criminal. Rejects the notion of SL and crime, where partial
SL this should be considered a civil violation. |
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Term
| Specific Intent (mens rea) |
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Definition
1. o When the actor intends a particular result or a particular consequence (over and above the “general” intent to do the basic physical act)
2. o When the actor does the physical act but has some unexecuted intent to do some further act or accomplish a future result |
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Term
| General Intent (mens rea) |
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Definition
| intent to commit some crime suffices to hold the offender criminally responsible for any harm caused |
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Term
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Definition
• MPC § 1.13(9) defines “elements: - includes conduct, attendant circs and result.
• MPC § 1.13(10) “material element” means element that does not relate to harm/justification or excuse (i.e. for example establishing venue, that the SOL has not run out, etc, don’t need mens rea for those)
• MPC §2.02(1),
o MPC gives four mental states:
• Purposely – can mean intentionally
• Knowingly – awareness that conduct will cause a result.
• Recklessly
• Negligently
o Mental state applies to each material element (illustrates moving away from SL)
o Material element includes act, attendant circs and result.
o Same mental state required for each material element.
• Difference between an act and an attendant circ: under MPC it does not matter if something is considered an act, attendant circs etc are all material elements and require mens rea (Unless the legislature specified otherwise!) |
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Term
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Definition
• A mistake could negate specific intent
• Mistake in SL makes no different
• Mistake in general intent – guilty if the mistake is unreasonable, not guilty if reasonable |
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Term
| Commonwealth v. Twitchell (mens rea) |
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Definition
| defense of not knowing the law due to an official statement is acceptable (this rule is the minority position, but also the MPC approach). |
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Term
| Capacity for Mens Rea- Voluntary Drunkenness - MPC |
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Definition
| o When recklessness establishes an element of the offense, if the actor, due to self-induced intoxication, is unaware of the risk of which he would have been if he had been sober, such unawareness is immaterial. (If you get drunk you may be reckless, being drunk does not negate recklessness). |
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Term
| Capacity for Mens Rea - Drunkenness - CPC |
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Definition
(a) Involuntary intoxication shall not be admitted to negate capacity to form any mental states
(b) If a crime is a specific intent, then there is a narrow way in which involuntary intoxication can be followed; CA not an MPC view – v. different from NJ interpretation |
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Term
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Definition
| Ties causation to mens rea, expectations – i.e. what did you think would happen? Retained liability if someone else is hurt or if the harm caused is different than expected (like transferred intent). Requires but for causation |
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Term
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Definition
1ST degree murder – intentional and premeditated/FM
2nd degree – intentional or unintentional w/ reckless indifference to human life.
(classic formulation) |
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Term
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Definition
| No degrees of M, only one. MS. Has DP and significant number of people on death row. |
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Term
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Definition
Murder – malice can be express or implied. 1st degree is a willful deliberate premeditated killing. FM is also 1st deg M. MS can be voluntary, invol or vehicular.
No intent to kill required for DP |
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Term
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Definition
No degrees of murder. MS = recklessness/under inference of extreme disturbance.
Only have M and MS.
Gets rid of the year and a day rule. |
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Term
| VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER (THEORY OF MITIGATION) - MPC |
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Definition
reasonable person v. person in that moment.
o MPC § 210 distinguishes between 1) provocation adequate at law – objective standard, and 2) was the D in question provoked – this is a reasonable person standard, although using a reasonable person is a little weird as reasonable people don’t kill!?
o Provocation under the MPC is actual physical attack, mutual combat, threat of attack, unlawful arrest, adultery or the violent assault of a relative.
o In general words do not equal provocation. However, some jurisdictions allow the use of informational words (i.e. “I killed your dog”) as adequate provocation, including the MPC. |
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Term
| UNINTENTIONAL HOMICIDE - MPC |
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Definition
risk of death = probability of harm * the gravity of the harm if there is a fire.
conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk that a material element exists or will result from his conduct,” and a “gross deviation from standard of conduct that a law-abiding person would observe in that actor’s situation.” |
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Term
| Unintentional Homocide - Cal |
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Definition
Gross negligence involves more than ordinary carelessness, inattention, or mistake in judgment. A person acts with gross negligence when:
1. He or she acts in a reckless way that creates a high risk of death or great bodily injury;
AND
2. A reasonable person would have known that acting in that way would create such a risk.
In other words, a person acts with gross negligence when the way he or she acts is so different from how an ordinarily careful person would act in the same situation that his or her act amounts to disregard for human life or indifference to the consequences of that act. |
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Term
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Definition
o Predicate felonies – many states enumerate which felonies are predicate, others say it depends on how the felony is done. Cal draws more distinctions – i.e. dangerous vs. non-dangerous, 1st vs. 2nd degree murder.
o Some Js have FM depending on if the felony took place in a dangerous way
o Sometimes FM is used to get a higher sentence or make Ds liable for DP. |
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Term
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Definition
| • MPC rejects FM in its traditional form, instead inferring a presumption of recklessness and indifference to human life when there is a death in the course of a felony, this is a rebuttable presumption |
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Term
| Theories of liability to resolve F-M cases |
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Definition
• Proximate cause theory. All felons are guilty of f-m in all cases where killing occurs during a dangerous felony. Dangerous felony creates a volatile situation in which any sort of shooting by anyone could occur. Is this logical? Is this overinclusive in light of purposes of criminal justice system?
• A “protected person” theory. Makes felons liable only where victim is an innocent person, not one of the felons. Felons assume the risk. But doesn’t the criminal law prohibit killing either good or bad people? Doesn’t this make punishment depend on fortuity of marksmanship. Since felons can’t predict who will be victims, would it serve general deterrence better to punish the killings of the guilty (co-felons) as well as the innocent?
• An agency theory, essentially adopted in Washington. Only make it f-m when the killing is in perpetration of the felony, and hence can’t apply when a non-felon does the shooting. But doesn’t this undermine goal of deterring armed robberies? Don’t felons who point guns or threaten violence commit felonies carelessly? |
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Term
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Definition
• Must be necessary to prevent imminent harm
o Must be pressing and urgent.
• Must be proportional
• Retreat vs. deadly force – jurisdictions are split as to whether someone faced with deadly force must retreat or can use force. Exception always is you don’t have to retreat from your home. |
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Term
| People v. Gleghorn (defense) |
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Definition
| Cannot have provoked the actor to harm you; an aggressor cannot use the S-D doctrine |
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Term
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Definition
| • No deadly force, be as gentle as possible; some Js allow you to threaten deadly force, but you are never allowed to use it |
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Term
| People v. Ceballos (Mistake) |
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Definition
| You have to be there to claim mistake, i.e. if you shoot someone you can say I thought they were an intruder, but you lost this defense if you are not actually there at the time when they enter |
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Term
| CHOICE OF EVILS—NECESSITY - MPC |
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Definition
Harm you are seeking to prevent must be worse than the harm you cause. There must not be a legitimate purpose to exclude the justification - i.e. you cannot have recklessly/negligently brought about the situation
• Idea that an actor should not be punished if he has no choice but to violate one of two laws |
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Term
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Definition
• Accused is laboring under a:
o Defect of reason from disease of the mind (mental illness)
o So as not to know the nature/quality of the act he was doing (cognitive incapacity)
o Or, if he did know it, that he did not know what he was doing wrong (moral incapacity) |
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Term
| ALI MPC formulation of insanity |
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Definition
• 1) No responsibility for conduct if they lack the capacity to appreciate the criminality of their conduct or to
• 2) conform their behavior to the requirements of the law |
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Term
| diminished responsibility |
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Definition
| • Use of evidence of mental abnormality or illness to show that the defendant lacked the capacity to form the required intent. California prohibits this |
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Term
| Punishment for Attempt - MPC |
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Definition
MPC §5.01(1) grades attempt as the most serious offense, except with respect to capital cases
- Requires the attendant circumstances to be taken as the D saw them |
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Term
| MENS REA FOR ATTEMPT (State v. Lyerla) |
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Definition
| General rule is you cannot convict of attempt without evidence of specific intent |
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Term
| “Last step” or “physical proximity” (Actus Reus of Attempt) |
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Definition
| must do the last step towards completion of crime. Variant = “Dangerous proximity” – vary how close to last step, depending upon gravity and probability of offense. |
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Term
| “Last step” or “physical proximity” (Actus Reus of Attempt) |
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Definition
| must do the last step towards completion of crime. Variant = “Dangerous proximity” – vary how close to last step, depending upon gravity and probability of offense. |
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Term
| “Last step” or “physical proximity” |
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Definition
| must do the last step towards completion of crime. Variant = “Dangerous proximity” – vary how close to last step, depending upon gravity and probability of offense. |
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Term
| Indispensable element (Actus Reus of Attempt) |
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Definition
| not guilty if there is an element indispensable to the crime that is not yet under the D’s control. |
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Term
| Probable desistance” or “but-for-interruption (Actus Reus for Attempt) |
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Definition
| convict if D would complete the crime but for some interference. Try to look at whether the ordinary person (!!), not necessarily the D, would desist. |
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Term
| Abnormal step (Actus Reus - Attempt) |
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Definition
| convict if the D crosses some boundary that a law-abiding person would not cross |
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Term
| Unequivocal intent (Actus reus for attempt) |
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Definition
| attempt is committed when the D’s conduct clearly manifests intent to commit a crime. |
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Term
| MPC (Actus Reus - Attempt) |
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Definition
| substantial step” that strongly corroborates criminal purpose, i.e. matches criminal intent (this avoids the prosecution of innocent people) Conduct that is not insufficient as a matter of law; conduct is not considered alone, but in light of other circumstances (and thus sends case to the jury) – enumerates a number of instances, which could count as substantial steps |
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Term
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Definition
| a complete and voluntary renunciation of criminal purposes, not voluntary if it is just something that comes up to persuade the D to stop after the criminal conduct has begun (i.e. crime = too hard), MPC only gives abandonment if the D would have gotten moral credit for abandoning. |
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Term
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Definition
| • People v. Staples, Cal. Ct. App. 1970 (p.655). D preparing to rob a bank crossed the line by drilling holes in the floor of an apartment he had rented above a bank vault. The CA position is the majority position – there is no affirmative defense of abandonment |
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Term
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Definition
• Invites, requests, commands, hires or encourages another to engage in criminal activity
• Renunciation of solicitation of the crime under the U.S.C statute is if the D actually stops the commission of the crime (and he didn’t do it just to postpone until a later date or to get someone else to do the crime), then D has an affirmative D of renunciation |
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Term
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Definition
| believing something is criminal when it is actually not, but back to the legality principle – we cannot punish people no matter how culpable or dangerous their thoughts are if their conduct itself is not criminal. |
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Term
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Definition
| Intentionally assists the principal to engage in the criminal conduct by aiding, abetting, encouraging, advising or soliciting |
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Term
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Definition
• Does the accomplice have 2 different states of mind:
o The intent to assist the primary party to engage in the conduct that forms the basis of the offense AND
o The mental state required commission of the offense, as provided in the definition of the substantive crime
• Think about this as duel intent (2 elements of mens rea)
• Accomplice generally only found guilty if he has a shared purpose with the principal, not just knowledge of the offense. |
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Term
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Definition
| Accomplice w/ purpose of promoting the commission of the offense (seems to require promoting offense w/ the purpose of the offense be committed – which seems to require community of intent w/ the perpetrator) MPC has a purpose requirement for accomplice liability. |
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Term
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Definition
| • Utmost resistance involves showing physical force |
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Term
| Rape - Reasonable or Earnest Resistance |
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Definition
| A woman has to exert only earnest resistance and that earnest resistance does not mean utmost resistance, but rather resistance of a type reasonably to be expected from a person who genuinely refuses to participate in sexual intercourse, deviate sexual intercourse or sexual contact, under all the attendant circumstances. |
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Term
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Definition
Actus Reus (act/omission)
+
Mens Rea (mental state)
+
[Attendant Circumstances]
+
[Causation] + [Result]
= Criminal Liability
(& punishment, unless excused or justified |
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