Term
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Definition
Seminal Standing Case
Test: A person has standing to contest a search if:
He has a legit expectation of privacy in the invaded place.
Katz difference--this test focuses on the particular D's reasonable expectation of privacy in the subject matter, rather than a "person's" legit expectation of privacy |
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Term
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Definition
D was passenger in car. Search resulted in weapons found in glove compartment and under seat. Items used against D. D tried to suppress.
Court: D didn't prove he had legit expectation of privacy in the places searched in car, because he was not the driver. The driver did, not D. |
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Term
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Definition
D had property--drugs. D placed drugs in friend's purse. Cops searched friends purse. D didn't have a reasonable expectation of privacy in friend's purse, even though he owned the drugs.
Rule--just because you own the property that had been seized, that doesnt give you standing to contest a search, unless you had a reasonble expectation of privacy in the area searched |
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Term
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Definition
Overnight Guest in house has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home, and has standing to challenge search of house.
This is based on the valuable social custom that we are all both guests/hosts often. |
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Term
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Definition
Guests in home--not overnight. Guests packing drugs in house. PO saw this through a gap in the blinds of the house. Used info to get warrant.
Court--no standing for brief, non-overnight, non-social guests with not longterm connection to the home’s owner, even though they paid for the use of the home (with cocaine). But, this was a 5-4 case, and Kennedy's concurrence says that even non overnight guests COULD have standing, if they have substantial connections to the home. Here, they didn't have substantial connection to the home (they had only been there once)
Almost ALL social guests have a legit expectation of privacy in a host's home. |
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Term
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Definition
A person has standing to contest a search if they have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the specific area being searched.
In general, it is easier to claim standing to contest a search in someone else's home than their car.
Ownership does not give standing from that fact alone. Issue isnt whether you own the prop seized, it is if you have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the area searched. |
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Term
| Standing for unreasonable car stop as passenger |
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Definition
Brendlin v. US--a reasonable passenger in a vehicle stopped by POs is seized, for 4th Am purposes, just like the driver. Thus, a passenger has standing to contest the "seizure"/stop.
It is unclear if a passenger can challenge the subsequent search of a unreasonably seized vehicle through the fruits of the forbidden tree doctrine. |
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Term
| If D wants to contest the admissibility of evidence against her that was collected from a search of X's home, what must D show? |
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Definition
| That HER 4th am rights were violated by the search of X's home--that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy in X's home. |
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Term
| Is standing a separate issue from a normal 4th Am analysis? |
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Definition
Not after Rakas, which collapsed standing into a reasonable expectation of privacy analysis. Now courts just ask, were the movants 4th amendment rights violated.
However, just because D has standing, does NOT mean the evidence will be excluded. He still may lose on the merits of the suppression motion. |
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Term
| What does Rakas do to the Jones Standard |
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Definition
Automatic standing is no more
Legit on premises is not more |
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Term
| Hallmarks of Legit expectation of privacy in regards to standing under Rakas with respect to nonowners |
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Definition
Traditional Property Rights:
Right to exclude
Control
possessory
ownership
Social constructions
significant ties to place searched |
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Term
| Does a property interest, per se, yield a reasonable expectation of privacy in terms of Standing? |
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Definition
| no. Landlord/tenant (LL might not) and when you openly expose to public (eg open-houses) |
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Term
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Definition
| Government constitutionally required give back information seized in unlawful raid |
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Term
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Definition
| Due process applies to state cases through the 14th amendment |
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Term
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Definition
| The exclusionary rule applies to state cases through the 14th amendment |
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Term
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Definition
| Focus on people rather than places for 4th Amendment |
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Term
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Definition
| “False friends”, wired or not, are not a search |
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Term
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Definition
| No expectation of privacy in numbers dialed AND society is not prepared to recognize this as private |
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Term
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Definition
Flying at 1k ft is not a search, even within the curtilage of the home there was no expectation of privacy
Court focuses on Katz's first prong in this anaylsis--D did not cover his pot plants from public airspace view, so he had no subj expectation of privacy!
WRT the obj prong, court held that officers need not shield their eyes from activities in plain view--even those in the curtilage (so long as they are viewing it from a legal vantage point). |
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Term
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Definition
| Open fields are not protected by the 4th A |
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Term
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Definition
Curtilage is protected by the 4th A, but open fields are not (even if cops walk around no trespassing signs and rock walls)
People do not have a legit expectation of privacy in activities occuring in open fields, even if the activity occuring there could not be observed without trespassing. |
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Term
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Definition
| Use of an electronic beeper to track a container for a short time was not a search |
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Term
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Definition
| GPS tracking device on a car for a month is a search |
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Term
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Definition
| An exploratory textile search of luggage on a bus is a protected search |
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Term
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Definition
| Using sense-enhancing technology (not available to public) to inspect constitutionally protected area is a search |
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Term
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Definition
| Bringing a drug sniffing dog to the door of a home is a search |
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Term
| Dunn factors for separating Open Fields from Curtilage: |
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Definition
PENP
1. Proximity to the home
2. Enclosures
3. Nature of use
4. Precautions taken to protect from observation |
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Term
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Definition
| Corroborating only one small detail is not enough for PC w/o meeting the other parts of Aguilar |
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Term
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Definition
| PC can be established by a “totality of the circumstances” for “fair probability” (A-S test factors considered) |
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Term
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Definition
1. Informant adequately revealed “basis of knowledge” of source (How did he get info?)
2. The facts provided sufficiently to establish veracity: (Why should I believe this person?) |
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Term
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Definition
| A pretext stop is lawful as long as there is objective PC (Subjective intent does not matter) |
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Term
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Definition
| An officer does not need PC for the crime charged to make an arrest as long as PC for some offense does exist |
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Term
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Definition
| To make a search reasonable, you need a warrant backed by probable cause and issued by a magistrate |
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Term
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Definition
| Public arrest for a felony without a warrant is lawful when sufficient probable cause is present |
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Term
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Definition
| If an officer has probable cause to believe an individual has committed even a minor offense in his presence he can arrest the individual without a warrant |
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Term
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Definition
| Taking DNA at the station after an arrest (supported by PC) for a serious crime is a reasonable search |
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Term
| Independent Source Doctrine |
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Definition
Evidence that is not causally related to to governmental illegality is admissible pursuant to the independent source doctrine. Such evidence is, in effect, fruit of a non-poisonous tree.
Applies if the challenged evidence is discovered for the first time during lawful police activity.
Also applies if evidence is initially discovered unlawfully, but is later obtained lawfully in a manner independent of the original discovery.
Questions to consider:
Did the illegal entry/search cause the PO to go get a warrant? If yes, then it is poisonous fruit, if not, go on.
Was the magistrate influenced by tainted evidence on the warrant affidavit? If yes, then it is probably tainted. If no, then it is likely Independent Source.
does the warrant affidavit contain any evidence from the unlawful search/seizure? Was the magistrate's judgment tainted by that illegality? If no, then it is an independent search.
If yes, was the tainted evidence in the affidavit of such small magnitude in proportion to the lawful evidence that a warrant would have issued anyways? If yes, then evidence is likely lawful. |
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Term
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Definition
Bottom Line: If the PO's decision to seek the warrant was prompted to by what they had seen during the initial, unlawful, entry, then the evidence obtained during the second entry is not valid under the independent source doctrine. In effect, if the PO would not have applied for the warrant BUT FOR the illegal search, then the 2nd search would be a fruit of the illegality.
This standard requires a finding of the officer's state of mind before seeking the warrant. |
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Term
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Definition
Inevitable Discovery Rule: Evidence linked to an earlier illegality is admissible in a criminal trial if the prosecutor proves by a PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE that the challenged evidence ultimately or inevitably would have been discovered by lawful means.
In Dix, the corpse of the victim would have been found by the encroaching search team had the search not been called off due to the statements by D made in violation of his 6th Am rights.
Issues to consider:
Focus on putting the POs under no better position than they would have if no illegality. If it was hot out, and government illegality caused a body to be found significantly earlier than it would have been found had no illegality occurred, making the evidence recovered (the body) much more intact than it would have under the hypothetical time period surrounding hypothetical lawful search, potentially only some of the evidence will be admissible (in terms of forensic scientist evidence). |
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Term
| Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine |
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Definition
The exclusionary rule, when it applies, does not only apply to the direct products of government illegality, but also to secondary evidence flowing from the illegality. (See Nardone)
This doctrine applies to the 4th, 5th, and 6th amendments.
This doctrine rarely, if at all, applies to Miranda violations.
BE CLEAR OF WHICH POISONOUS TREE YOU ARE APPLYING, as this will have significance in the analysis. |
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Term
| Scope of the Miranda Exclusionary Rule |
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Definition
Statement made in response to Miranda violation may be used to impeach a D who testifies in conflict with custodial statement.
Because Miranda is an attempt to bar untrustworthy (compelled testimony/statements), the fruit of miranda violations in the form of other witness names to question at trial will not be tainted by potentially compelled/untrustworthy statements, as W will be present at trial and subject to cross and NOT compelled. Therefore, that type of fruit is not poisonous.
Further, if neither of the rationales upon which Miranda is based (increasing trustworthiness of D statements and detterrence)are present, the exclusionary rule is not applicable. |
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Term
| Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. US |
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Definition
"The essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall not be used before the court but that it shall not be used at all"--this plants the seeds for the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Doctrine
Also sets up the language for the independent source doctrine. |
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Term
| What is a Search, under the 4th Amendment? |
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Definition
Katz and its progeny gave us a 2 prong test to determine if a 4th amendment search occurred.
1) the Subjective Prong: Did the person exhibit and actual (subjective) expectation of privacy in the place/thing searched?
2) The Objective Prong: Is the Expectation the person exhibited one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable or legit?
If both prongs are fulfilled (answered affirmatively), then it is a search. |
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Term
| What is the legitimacy/reasonableness/justifiability analysis for Katz's objective prong? |
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Definition
The critical question is whether if, under our system of government, as reflected in the Constitution, we should impose on our citizens particular privacy risks without at least the protection of a warrant requirement.
There are 3 main factors under this anaylsis (each with sub-questions)
1) The site or nature of the intrusion is still important. What is being searched? (open fields, a home, a car, luggage, etc.)
2) The extent to which a person has taken measures to keep his info/property private is important.
Two rules flow from this:
a) a person cannot possess a reasonable expectation of privacy in that which he knowingly exposes to the public or otherwise is in plain view
b) one who voluntarily conveys info or property to another person assumes the risk that the latter individual is a gov agent or will transmit the info or property to the gov.
3) The degree of intrusion is important. How was the search conducted? (peeking through the blinds, using heat imaging tech, a drug dog, a plane etc.) |
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Term
| What is the critical focus of Katz's Subjective prong? |
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Definition
| What we knowingly expose to the public is not protected, but what a person seeks to preserve as private may--but not necessarily will--be protected |
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Term
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Definition
Assuming the risk (Hoffa v. us, and us v. white)
No search occurs if D talks to "friend" X, and X, in turn, tells D's statements to the cops.
Hoffa v. US--wen a person voluntarily speaks to another he assumes the risk they are working for the pigs.
in Katz terms: a person does not have a justifiable and constitutionally protected expectation that a person with whom he is conversing will not then or later reveal the conversation to the police. OR because D knowingly exposes his convo to another person (and therefore the public), there is no 4th protection in that convo.
The same reasoning applies to wired False Friend cases |
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Term
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Definition
Highlights Open Fields Doctrine wrt Curtilage. PO climbed over D's outer fence around his ranch and smelled drugs-a-brewin' from a barn. PO climbed another fence around the barn and peered in (w/out entering the barn).
Court held the barn, and the perimeter fence were not in the safe haven of the home or the curtilage, and therefore not subject to strict 4th am protection. |
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Term
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Definition
Non sense-enhanced aerial surveillance by the gov of activities occurring within the curtilage does not constitute a 4th AM search if
(1) the surveillance occurs from navigable, public, airspace
(2) is conducted in a physically non-intrusive manner
(3) does not reveal intimate activities traditionally connected with the use of a home or curtilage
See Ciraolo for airplane case and Riley for helicopter case |
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Term
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Definition
Dog sniffs are not a 4th amendment search, so long as
(1) they are conducted in a relatively nonobtrusive manner (ie performed from a constitutionally permissible vantage point, and do not unreasonably extend the length of the stop), and
(2) the info revealed is limited to contraband.
See Place and Caballes
In Katz terms, a D does not have a legit expectation in contraband, and because the dog can only detect contraband and not anything legit private, then a drug dog sniff is not a search. |
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Term
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Definition
When the POs use tech to gather info, Katz requires courts to consider the nature of the technology used and the place observed.
Pen registers: Smith v. MD, Pen registers are not a search, because they only disclose the fact that a number was called. Because a person doesn't have a legit expectation of privacy in that info (he turns that info over to the phone company for billing, and such, so this is like the assumption of risk cases), there is no search if the gov collects that info. Further, pen registers were widely in use (arguably).
but see the meta data cases, where the phone records/call location reveal much more about the caller than older pen reg. Are these databases more intrusive?
Electronic Tracking Devices and Beepers:
Installation of GPS and beepers raises a seizure issue. Use of such devices raises a search issue.
Use of a beeper to detect movements outside of the home is not a search, because such information can be collected from legal vantage points by officers on the street (no legit expectation of privacy). See Knotts. However a beeper which tracks movements inside the home, is a search. See Karo. Bottom line--as long as the beeper/gps only tracks movements in public places, it is not a search. Once inside a home, however, it is a search.
Thermal Imagers:
When the gov uses a device that is not in general use to explore details of the home that would previously have been unknowable without a physical intrusion, the surveillance is a search. See Kyllo. |
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Term
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Definition
If the gov uses a device that is not in general PUBLIC use, to explore details IN THE HOME that would have previously been unknowable without a physical intrusion, the surveillance is a 4th am search.
Kyllo may only apply to surveillance of the home with sense enhanced technology not in public use. |
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Term
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Definition
Not all evidence is fruit of the poisonous tree simply because it would not have come to light BUT FOR the illegal actions of the police.
Even if certain evidence is causally tied to an earlier illegality, at some point, the fruit from that poisonous tree is sufficiently untainted so as to be admissible.
How to apply: Tied to the balance of the exclusionary rule. Determine at which point the detrimental consequences of illegal police action become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.
Factors to consider:
Temporal Proximity
In Wong Sun, the POs obtained a statement from D2 in his bedroom immediately after his unlawful arrest. This evidence was suppressed because it was collected so closely to the illegal action.
Intervening Acts of Free Will
After D was released from jail from his illegal arrest, he voluntarily returned to the PO station to give another voluntary statement. This statement was not suppressed, bc the voluntary nature of D's statement rendered it sufficiently free of taint to be admissible. |
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Term
| Attenuation Connection Principle and Factors |
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Definition
Is the evidence for which suppression is sought too attenuated from the illegality to be suppressed? This is always a case by case analysis.
Factors to consider: (State has the burden)
Voluntariness of a statement is always the threshold factor, so long as the evidence concerned is testimony.
Also, the relevant starting point for any attenuation analysis is the illegality wrt the complainant's rights. The factors are always in relation to the period between the infringement of the complainant's rights (not anyone else's) and the evidence the complainant is complaining about.
Temporal Proximity: How close was the evidence received wrt the illegal act? Hella close? then it is in. Far apart? it might be out.
Were the POs directly exploiting the illegality? eg using an illegal obtained statement to make another D give a statement.
Intervening Acts/Events: The longer the causal chain, the less likely that the police saw such evidence as a product of their illegal acts. Basically, if the POs actual conduct could not be deterred by evidence exclusion, then it will not be suppressed.
Voluntary Intervening Acts: Was the evidence received after D made a voluntary act, which rendered such evidence a product of the voluntary act rather than the product of the illegality? Factors to consider about intervening acts wrt a potentially voluntary statement--what was the situation surrounding the statement: were there a bunch of officers? how coercive was the situation? etc.
Flagrancy of the PO illegality: Evidence is less likely to be free of taint if the initial illegality was deliberate, rather than accidental.
Nature of the evidence
Were there warnings given? Though this is not dispositive, it still has some effect. |
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Term
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Definition
Miranda warnings do not, alone and per se, make the act of a subsequent confession/statement a product of free will to break the causal connection between a 4th am illegality and the following evidence to adequately attenuate the taint to make it admissible.
Evidence is LESS likely to be free of taint if the initial illegality was deliberate, rather than accidental.
A flagrant violation results in greater poison, which takes longer to dissipate. Further, if the evidence is tied to egregious PO misconduct, the exclusionary rule should be applied more zealously, as egregious misconduct in greatest need of deterrence--a main function of the exclusionary rule.
Also, this case stands for the proposition that, valid Miranda warnings in themselves are not sufficient to adequately attenuate the taint of statements made in response to a unlawful arrest/seizure--even if those statements were voluntary. This is true when we consider the policies and purposes behind the exclusionary rule. If valid Miranda Warnings always attenuated the taint of an unlawful search/arrest, the exclusionary rule would not deter 4th Am violations at all, because any officer would know that any harms from a 4th violation could be promptly rectified by valid miranda warnings. |
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Term
| What interest does a search implicate? |
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Definition
| A person's privacy interest |
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Term
| What interest does a seizure of property implicate? |
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Definition
| A person's possessory interest in that property |
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Term
| What interest does a seizure of a person implicate? |
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Definition
| The seized person's liberty interest. |
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Term
| When is property seized under the 4th? |
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Definition
Tangible property is seized when there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interest in that property.
This can occur when the gov destroys property, exercises control over that property, or removes it from D's actual or constructive possession.
A house or office can be seized also, for instance when a PO secures the premises of that place.
De minimus control over property (ie briefly picking something up then putting it down) is not a seizure b/c this isn't "meaningful" interference. |
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Term
| Is placing a beeper on the outside of barrels a 4th am seizure? |
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Definition
| It could be, but it wasn't in Karo. In that case, the POs placed a beeper on the outside of some ether barrels sold to D. Because the placing of the beepers occurred before D owned the barrels, D's possessory interest wasn't interfered with. |
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Term
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Definition
WRT seizure of persons:
All passengers are seized when a car is stopped.
A person is seized by the police when the PO, by means of physical force or show of authority, terminates or restrains a person's freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.
Intentional Physical Force restraining freedom of movement=Seizure
Submitting to Show of authority resulting in restrained movement=seizure
Show of authority with no submission=no seizure |
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Term
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Definition
| When an officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen |
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Term
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Definition
Stop for a stop and frisk=seizure
intentionally shot-seizure
taken into custoy for Q'ing=seizure
" " " " for fingerprinting=seizure
Driver asked to pull over=seizure
passenger in car that is pulled over=seizure
roadblock stop=seizure
Cop accidentally runs into a person with their car in a chase=no seizure! |
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Term
| US v. Mendenhall seizure rule |
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Definition
This is generally WRT "show of authority" varieties of seizures.
A person is seized on if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave. |
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Term
| Under the Mendenhall Test, is the officer's subjective motivations to physically detain a person if they resist relevant? |
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Definition
| no, unless that intention is conveyed to the D so that a reasonable person would not feel free to leave or terminate the encounter. |
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Term
| Does brief questioning in a public place by a PO constitute a seizure? |
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Definition
| Likely not, or, at least, not by itself. We don't want to unreasonably restrain and handcuff relatively reasonable police action. |
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Term
| Under what circumstance might a reasonable person not feel free to leave a public encounter with a PO? |
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Definition
| The threatening presence of several officers, the display of a weapon, some physical touching of the D, certain language or certain tone of voice by the PO, if the PO takes possession of D's ticket and ID in an airport (see Royer) |
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Term
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Definition
| When leaving is not an option due to the nature of and place where the PO encounter occurs, the seizure question becomes: the degree to which a reasonable person in D's shoes would feel that he or she could decline the officers' requests or otherwise terminate the encounter. |
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Term
| Who is the reasonable person for seizure analyses? |
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Definition
An innocent person (see Bostick)
Age, sex, gender, and gender of the officers are not irrelevant (Mendenhall)
Should a person's race be considered? Some argue yes. Court has not decided, but Justices have mentioned it in analysis. |
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Term
| When does the pursuit of a fleeing subject constitute a seizure? |
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Definition
When the fleeing suspect submits to the PO's show of authority. See Hodari D
Therefore, no seizure occurs if a PO confronts a group of people to ask questions, and those people run. So long as the D's don't submit, the POs need no PC or RS to confront and chase. Once the chase ensues, they likely gain RS to seize--at least briefly. This is fucked. |
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Term
| What type of 4th Am feature is always dependent on probable cause for Constitutional legality? |
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Definition
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Term
| Probable Cause Definition |
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Definition
PC exists when the facts and circumstances within an officer's personal knowledge, and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are sufficient in themselves to warrant a person of reasonable caution in the belief that
1) arrest: an offense has been committed and the person to be arrested committed a crime
OR
2) Search: a specifically described item subject to seizure will be found in the place to be searched.
Shorthand: A PO has PC when he has good reason, or enough reliable info, to believe the person to be arrested committed a crime or that the search will turn up evidence of a crime in the place to be searched. |
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Term
| Do an officer's subjective motivations or beliefs come into the PC analysis? |
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Definition
| No. Even if those beliefs/motivations are pretextual or malicious. the PC standard is an objective one. See Whren v. US |
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Term
| Does an officer's skill or expertise matter when doing a PC analysis? |
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Definition
| Possibly. In determining what a man or reasonable caution would believe, courts look to the PO's expertise or specialized knowledge wrt, for instance, drug odors or criminal behavior. |
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Term
| Does an officer's skill or expertise matter when doing a PC analysis? |
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Definition
| Possibly. In determining what a man or reasonable caution would believe, courts look to the PO's expertise or specialized knowledge wrt, for instance, drug odors or criminal behavior. |
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Term
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Definition
| POs can legally arrest a D standing in the threshold of his home only upon PC. |
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Term
| What categories of evidence are subject to seizure (or can be used as the basis for a search) |
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Definition
Fruits of a crime
Instrumentalities of a Crime
Contraband
Mere evidence of a Crime (see warden v. hayden, stating that evidence may be seized if there is a nexus between the evidence and criminal activity, or if there is PC that the evidence will aid in the apprehension or conviction sought) |
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Term
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Definition
This test is not completely good law, as it has been supplanted by the Gates totality of the circumstances test. However, the Gates Test uses the Aguilar-Spinelli prongs as factors to determine the reliability of an informant's info.
This test is wrt determining reliability of hearsay information for PC basis.
1) How did the informant get the information (Basis of knowledge Prong). This prong is satisfied by a showing that the informant obtained their knowledge first-hand. This prong can be satisfied by the I directly telling the POs of their basis of knowledge, or by providing self-verifying details (such as sufficiently detailed information that the I had to have first hand knowledge)
2) The veracity Prong: proved by the I's track record, or by the reliability of the information given (statements against interest or PO corroboration of certain facts given) |
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Term
| How certain must a person of reasonable caution be before arresting a suspect or conducting a search and seizure? |
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Definition
Any definite amount of certainty has never been dictated by the Court--only that a "fair probability," "substantial basis," or "reasonable grounds" to articulate the quantum of evidence necessary to prove PC.
Basically, what is known, is that PC basis of certainty is less than reasonable doubt or preponderance of the evidence, but more than a mere hunch, bare suspicion, or reasonable suspicion. |
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Term
| If there are 2 suspects, and one is definitely guilty and one is definitely innocent, does the PO have PC to arrest or search both? |
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Definition
| Likely. This puts the level of certainty that one is subject to search or seizure at 50%, which is greater than that needed for PC. |
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Term
| If there are three suspects, and one is def subj to search, arrest, or seizure and the other 2 are definitely not, does the PO have PC to search/seize/arrest them all? |
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Definition
| Likely not--see Mallory v. US |
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Term
| If PO lawfully discovers drugs in a car containing 3 occupants, and none of the occupants confesses to ownership of the drugs, does PO have PC to arrest all 3? |
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Definition
| Likely, see MD v. Pringle. In that case, the Court found that a reasonable officer could conclude that there was PC to believe one of the occupants committed the crime of possession, either jointly or solely. |
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Term
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Definition
Searches and Seizures that are less than ordinarily intrusive may be conducted on a lesser level of suspicion than PC--a mere reasonable suspicion.
Terry Test:
A cop, without a warrant or PC, can:
Stop/seize a suspect if they have a reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot.
AND
Frisk (weapons pat down) that suspect, if they have reasonable suspicion that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous. |
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Term
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Definition
| In some cases, when the intrusion sought is especially slight and then government interest is especially high, POs may act without any individualized suspicion--as is the case with sobriety checkpoints. |
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Term
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Definition
| An arrest must always be founded on PC |
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Term
| When, and under what circumstances, can a PO arrest under the 4th? |
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Definition
A PO:
(1) may arrest a person in a public place without a warrant, even if it is practicable to secure a warrant;
(2) may not arrest a person in her home--or her temporary residence--without an arrest warrant, absent exigent circumstances or valid consent
(3) and absent exigent circumstances or valid consent, may not arrest a person in another person's home without a search, and perhaps, and arrest warrant. |
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Term
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Definition
The 4th Am prohibits warrantless, nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make routine, non-exigent, felony arrests.
In effect, to enter a suspect's home to make an arrest, a PO must (1) have a valid warrant and (2) reason to believe the suspect is inside the home. Armed with the above, the PO may search anywhere in the home the suspect may be hiding (until he's found) |
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Term
| What are the policy reasons behind the Payton rule? |
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Definition
| Req'ing a warrant to enter a home and arrest a suspect is not to protect the suspect from unreasonable seizure, but rather to safeguard the integrity of the home from entry, and the occupant's privacy therein. |
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Term
| What is the Watson-Payton distinction? |
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Definition
When is the suspect sufficiently in his home or in public to make a warrant necessary/unnecessary?
In US v. Santana, the Court held that a suspect standing in her doorway/threshold was sufficiently in a public place for purposes of the arrest warrant requirement--just as a person in her front yard would be.
This means that cops can come and knock on the door, and If D--for which there is PC to arrest--comes into the doorway then retreats into the house, the police can justify entrance on the grounds of hot pursuit.
Similarly, if the POs have PC to arrest D, they may call D to the doorway by knocking and the like, and when D comes into the doorway, they may likely arrest without a warrant--so long as the POs dont breach the doorway. |
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Term
| Types of exigent circumstances to enter a home without a warrant--as per Olson, Payton, Stuart, and Welsh |
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Definition
These may all be dependent on the crime/offense for which the suspect is sought.
Hot pursuit--if the pursuit begins in a public place like, say, a yard or the suspect's doorway, but then goes into a private residence, the PO can enter the residence in pursuit.
Evidence Will Be Destroyed:
A suspect will escape
harm will result to the police or others either inside or outside the dwelling
to render emergency assistance to an injured occupant or to protect an occupant from imminent injury |
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Term
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Definition
| A person whose home is searched for the presence of a guest is entitled, absent an emergency or consent to a prior judicial determination of PC to search the premises for the person subject to an arrest warrant. |
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Term
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Definition
If the POs are effectuating an arrest by means of an arrest warrant in the suspect's house, only an arrest warrant is necessary to enter that home.
However, if the suspect subject to the arrest warrant is a guest (even a short, overnight guest) in another's home, an arrest and a search warrant is required. |
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Term
| How long do exigent circumstances exceptions to the warrant requirement last? |
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Definition
| Only so long as the exigency lasts. |
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Term
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Definition
A PO who makes a lawful FULL CUSTODIAL arrest may conduct a contemporaneous warrantless search of:
(1) the arrestee's person
(2) the area within the arestee's immediate control (grabbing/lunging area)
(3)AND, if the arrest occurs in a home,
the PO may conduct a warrantless search of the closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack can be launched
(4) AND, if the arrest is of an occupant of a vehicle, the PO may search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, even if the arrestee does not have immediate access to it, so long as the PO reasonably believes that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be discovered there. |
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Term
| Chimel--Buie SILA rationale? |
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Definition
A custodial arrest provides the suspect with the incentive to use any avaliable weapon to resist the officer or to flee, and to destroy or conceal the evidence of the crime. Further, an in home arrest puts the PO at a dangerous disadvantage wrt potential confederates seeking to protect the arrestee.
Once this rationale is absent, SILA is void. |
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Term
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Definition
A SILA's only precondition be that it results from a lawful custodial arrest based on PC.
SILA applies to arrests in which the PO takes the suspect into full custody--ie transports the arrestee to the station for booking.
Further the Scope of SILA permits POs to search the pockets of the arrestee and to open any containers found therein. |
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Term
| If PO lawfully arrests D in his vehicle, and PO promptly and cotemporaneously tows the car to the PO impound. Can PO then search the car w/out a warrant using the SILA justification? |
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Definition
| No. For a SILA search, the actual search has to be contemporaneous to the arrest. In this case, like in Preston v. US, the gov will have to find another warrant exception (perhaps inventory search) |
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Term
| Factors for the grabbing/lunging area for SILA: |
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Definition
Whether the suspect is handcuffed
How the suspect is handcuffed
How many officers there are
How many suspects there are
Size/age/athleticism of the arrestee
Are the containers around the suspect open/shut/locked? |
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Term
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Definition
SILA--PO may conduct a warrantless search of the arrestee and the area in his immediate control/grabbing-lunging area, but POs may NOT search the entire house without a warrant or another exception.
SILA is justified in order to remove any weapons that the D might seek to use in order to resist or escape or to destroy/hide evidence. |
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Term
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Definition
Subsequently Narrowed:
All of the passenger compartment, and the containers found therein, are generally deemed to be in the driver/passenger's grabbing/lunging area for purposes of SILA.
Therefore, in all SILA cases involving autos, a PO can make a contemporaneous search of a passenger compartment of the vehicle in which the arrestee resides or previously resided, including all containers found therein. |
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Term
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Definition
Narrowed Belton/Thornton's per se allowance of SILA of autos for occupants/recent occupants. Good Law.
Rule: Chimel authorizes PO to search a vehicle incident to a recent occupant's arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search. OR
SILA is also appropriate to vehicles when it is reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle. |
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Term
| In what ways can a warrantless search of an auto be justified |
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Definition
SILA
Inventory after it has been lawfully seized/towed under the PO's Community Caretaking Function
At international borders at border checkpoints
The generalized 4th Am Auto exception |
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Term
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Definition
A PO may conduct an immediate warrantless search of an auto that she has PC to believe contains contraband, fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence if:
1) she stops the car on the highway
2) the vehicle is readily capable of use on the highway, is found in a setting that indicates the auto is being used for transportation (rather than living), and is discovered stationary in a place no reg used for residential purposes. |
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Term
| Is the Auto exception based upon an exigency? |
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Definition
| No. It once was, but now it is based on the fact that cars are readily mobile, thus capable of being taken out of jur, and there is also a lowered expectation of privacy in autos. |
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Term
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Definition
| A warrantless search of an auto that would be valid if it were conducted at the scene is also permitted if it takes place SHORTLY (a day or two later, but not a year later) thereafter away from the scene. |
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Term
| What is the central prerequisite for the Auto exception to the warrant requirement? |
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Definition
| That the search be based upon PC that fruits/instrumentalities/contraband/evidence will be found in the car. |
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Term
| If the PO has PC to search an auto for a stolen donkey, may the PO lawfully search everywhere in the car/trailer? |
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Definition
No, PC to search does not always apply to the entire auto--only where the specific evidence/fruits/instrumentalities/contraband may be found.
However, in most cases, this is not an issue, as the PO will likely have PC to look for something small--which could be found anywhere in the car. |
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Term
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Definition
| PO's with PC to search an auto at the scene where it was stopped may constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant. |
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Term
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Definition
2 justifications for the Auto exception:
Mobility is analyzed under the "turn-key readiness" of the auto. If, for instance, the auto can be made mobile by turning on the ignition (regardless that it has shades drawn, and has long been sitting) it is mobile.
All autos, due to the lesser expectation of privacy resulting from the Auto's use justifies application of the auto exception. |
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Term
| Container searches in Cars |
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Definition
| Containers--anything capable of holding something else--inside an auto (even one's belonging to a passenger) may be searched without a warrant during an otherwise lawful auto exception search. If the container may be searched at the scene, it may also be seized and searched back at HQ. |
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Term
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Definition
People have a greater expectation of privacy in containers than in their cars.
If POs have no other warrant exception, but have PC to believe there are objects subject to seizure inside a piece of luggage/locker, they may seize the container on just PC, but may not search it until they get a warrant. |
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Term
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Definition
| Luggage found in an auto was searched without a warrant but upon PC (although the PC was acquired before it was in the auto). Court found that Chadwick's reasoning did apply to containers found in cars--this is NOT good law. |
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Term
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Definition
If PC justifies the search of a vehicle (as with the Auto Exception), it justifies the search of every part of the vehicle that may conceal the object of the search--including containers found therein.
The permissible scope of a warrantless search is defined by by the object of the search and the places in which there is PC to believe that it may be found. |
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Term
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Definition
The police may search containers found in cars if their search is supported by PC.
This applies to ALL containers found in autos. This case overruled Sanders. |
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Term
| Did Acevedo ovverrule Chadwick? |
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Definition
| Not explicitly. Therefore, if a container is found outside of an Auto--Chadwick still applies (POs can seize upon PC but get a warrant to search!) |
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Term
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Definition
An article is in Plain View, and subject to warrantless seizure by a PO if the PO:
1) observes it from a lawful vantage point
2) has lawful right of access to it
3) its nature as subject to seizure is immediately apparent |
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Term
| Is the plain view doctrine relate a search function? |
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Definition
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Term
| How can an officer fulfill the 1st plain view element? |
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Definition
He may discover it during the execution of a valid search warrant
During an in home arrest pursuant to a valid arrest warrant
During one of the enumerated exceptions to the warrant req (hot pursuit, auto, consent, etc)
Not a search (no expectation of privacy) |
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Term
| What does the immediately apparent prong of the plain view doctrine entail? |
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Definition
| Upon sight and no more, the PO must have PC that the object is subject to seizure. |
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Term
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Definition
PO had to physically move an object to determine if it was subject to seizure (which wasn't allowed under the scope of the justified search--looking for weapons/suspects in the apartment). Therefore, it wasn't subject to the plain view doctrine--as its illegality wasn't immediately apparent.
Because the movement of the turntable was unrelated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, the plain view doctrine didnt apply.
"A search is a search, even if it happens to disclose nothing but the bottom of a turntable" |
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Term
| Is inadvertancy of discovery of the object a necessary condition for the plain view doctrine? |
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Definition
No--Horton v. CA.
Because the inadvertancy element would not offer D any more protection of his 4th Am rights than the other 4th rules allow, there is no purpose for it. Also, this would be a subjective standard, which we disfavor. |
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Term
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Definition
Recognizing the Plain Touch Doctrine--
The police may seize contraband detected solely through an officer's sense of touch if, analogously to plain view, the PO had a right to touch the object in question and, upon tactile observation, its ID as contraband was immediately apparent.
Facts: Terry stop/frisk by crack house. During frisk, PO felt small lump in cellophane in pocket. Not immediately realizing it as contraband, he slid it around in his fingers from outside the pocket, then reached in the pocket to check it. Court held this was unconst. under the plain touch doctrine.
However, if the PO had immediately discovered the lump was crack cocaine simultaneously with the realization that it was NOT a weapon, it could've been legit. This will be heavily dependent on the officer's recollection/testimony. |
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Term
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Definition
If contraband/fruits/instrumentalities/Evidence is found during a routine inventory search, it may be seized under the PV doctrine and admitted in trial, even without PC or a warrant.
Rationale--Inventory searches are not part of the PO's investigatory function, but are part of the PO's community caretaking function/power. Therefore, the concept of PC is inapplicable, because it is always tied to crim investigations. Also, the exclusionary rule does not adequately deter anything in this regard. |
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Term
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Definition
Auto inventories are a response to 3 public/gov interests, the combination of which outweigh any individual's right to privacy in one's car.
1) to protect police and public from dangerous instrumentalities that may be hidden in car
2) to protect police against claims of lost/stolen property
3) to protect owner's property |
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Term
| Is evidence obtained through a warrantless inventory search that was, in reality, a pretext for a criminal investigation admissible under the auto inventory search exception? |
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Definition
No. one of the requirements of the auto inventory search exception is that the inventory be standard operating procedure for the cops--that such searches are part of routine administration of the PO's caretaking duties. Because pretextual searches are, by def, not routine, they are not within this exception. See Opperman and Bertine.
However, due to the Court's inclination to disfavor looking to subj. motivations of POs (Whren), this may not be a true limitation.
Most likely, so long as there is a SOP regarding inventories, and as long as the PO is acting within that framework, they can have investigatory motivations in initiating the impoundment/SOP. |
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Term
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Definition
An inventory search must be routine or part of the PO's SOP, within their community caretaking function, to be allowed under the inventory search exception.
However, some PO discretion is allowed, so long as the discretion is based on obj. criteria (PO can choose to impund and inventory or park in gated lot and lock)
Also, the 4th does not require that the car's owner is unavailable to consent/make other protections for her car. |
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Term
| Arrest Inventory Searches |
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Definition
W/out PC or a warrant, POs may search an arrested person, as well as her personal effects, including containers, as part of a routine inventory at a PO station, incident to her booking and jailing.
See Illinois v. Lafayette |
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Term
| Warrant Requirement Exceptions Mnemonic |
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Definition
VICE TIPPS
V-Vehicle Searches
I-Inventory Searches
C-Consent Searches
E-Exigent Circumstances
T-Terry Stop/Frisk
I-sIla
P-Protective Sweeps
P-Plain View Seizures
S-Special Needs |
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Term
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Definition
Validly obtained consent justifies a PO in conducting warrantless searches with or without PC.
Consent searches are valid when,
The consent is
1) granted voluntarily, and
2) Obtained from someone with real/apparent authority to consent.
AND
3) the scope of the search must not exceed the consent granted.
So long as
4) there is NOT a presently objecting person with common authority over the property is physically present. |
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Term
| Must a consenting party KNOW they may refuse to consent? More specifically, must a PO notify D of right to refuse consent for consent to be valid? |
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Definition
| NO. In Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, the Court held that warrantless searches based upon consent may be upheld even if the consenting party doesnt know they can refuse. |
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Term
| Voluntariness/Involuntariness Burden WRT consent |
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Definition
| It is the Gov's burden to prove that consent was voluntarily given, rather than as a result of coercion or duress. |
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Term
| How is voluntariness wrt consent determined |
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Definition
By the totality of the circumstances. This is not a "reasonable person" standard. For consent to be invalid, it must be that the actual D's will was overborne. This is almost an impossible standard.
Some factors in this analysis are:
1) show of force/constructive show of force by POs--suggesting D is not free to refuse
2) Presence of large # of POs
3) Repetitive requests of consent after refusal is given
4) Personal charactersitics of D (age/sex/gender/race/education/mental state suggesting D's will was overborne by officer's. |
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Term
| Schneckloth v. Bustamonte |
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Definition
| Voluntariness for purposes of Consent Searches does not depend upon proof that D knew of his refusal right. Such knowledge, or lack thereof, is merely one factor--among many--in the totality of circumstances analysis that is appropriate for consent determinations. |
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Term
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Definition
| A consent search is invalid if it exceeds the scope of consent given. For instance, if D gives POs consent to search her car trunk, they may not look in the engine compartment without some other justification. Scope may have a subject/place/temporal boundary. |
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Term
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Definition
Judging the scope of consent granted is based upon "objective reasonableness." That is, what would a reasonable person have understood as the scope of the consent granted?
In this particular case, the Court held that the scope granted when D allowed POs to search his car also included the ability to search paper bags that might hold drugs that were found in the car.
Because the D's consent was in response to the PO asking to search the car for drugs, it was reasonable to assume that included anything in the car that might hold drugs. |
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Term
| Third Party Consent issues |
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Definition
These issues arise when X grants consent to allow POs to search premises/effects that also belong to D, and evidence found is brought against D.
If X, a person with common ownership with D, grants consent while D is absent (even if D could have easily been asked, or was away due to PO action), the consent is valid against D (Matlock) . This is due to the assumption of risk reasoning.
If X, a person with common authority over a premises with D, expressly grants consent while D, who is present, expressly refuses/objects, consent is NOT valid as to D (GA v. Randolph)--that is, the evidence obtained can't be used against him on that theory.
If X, who police mistakenly but reasonably believe has authority to grant consent, gives consent to search a premises, consent is valid against D, who has actual authority over the premises. |
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Term
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Definition
Consent from one who possesses common authority over a premises is valid against an absent, nonconsenting person with whom the authority is shared.
This is limited to situations where the nonconsenting party is not physically present.
Court focused on the Assumption of Risk rationale. |
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Term
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Definition
A warrantless search of a shared dwelling for evidence over the express refusal of consent by a physically present resident is not valid as to the nonconsenting party.
Court focued on the widely shared social expectation rationale, rather than the assumption of risk rationale.
Only applies if the non-consenter is physically present. Not if the POs take him away from the scene, he is napping in the back room, he is on the phone, etc. |
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Term
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Definition
A search based upon a reasonable mistake of fact regarding the authority of the 3rd party to give consent is a "reasonable" search within the meaning of the 4th am.
Obj Reasonableness Test: Would the facts available to the officer at the moment of consent warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the consenting party had authority over the premises? |
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Term
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Definition
A person is seized when:
• By [slightest application of] physical force, or
• By show of authority . . . to which the reasonable person submits
• His freedom of movement is restrained through means intentionally applied
• Such that
• A reasonable innocent person would have believed
• He was not free to leave . . . or otherwise terminate the encounter |
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Term
| What type of basis for a Terry stop or Terry frisk is NOT enough? |
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Definition
o Unparticularized suspicion
• Not just general bad feeling about a person
• Gotta be based on particular facts/knowledge
• It also has to be articulable—so that judge can evaluate in later proceedings
o Hunch |
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Term
| What is reasonable suspicion in Terry terms? |
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Definition
"some minimal level of objective justification"
This is less proof than PC and less than a preponderance of the evidence.
But is greater level of proof than a mere hunch, or an unarticulable suspicion. |
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Term
| Types of Info POs can use to determine Reasonable Suspicion |
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Definition
PO's knowledge/experience
Furtive behavior of suspect
Headlong Flight by a suspect
If the area is a "high crime" area
Hearsay evidence--subject to same basis of knowledge/reliability/veracity type analysis as in the PC standard, albeit a lesser quantum of proof. |
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Term
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Definition
| The indicia of reliability of a hearsay tip needed for Reasonable Suspicion is less strict than PC. In this case, the tipster's non-anonymity and minimal track record help justify this brief "search/seizure." |
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Term
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Definition
An anonymous tip with no indicia of reliability or basis of knowledge, but that was minimally corroborated by PO investigation, was sufficient (barely) to warrant the minimally intrusive stop.
The important quality of the info given/corroborated, was that it was "future," rather than past, behavior.
"When significant aspects of the caller's predictions were verified, there was no reason to believe not only that the caller was honest but also that he was well informed enough to justify the stop. |
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Term
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Definition
| An accurate description of a suspect's readily observable location and appearance will not fit the bill for Reasonable Suspicion--there must also be predictive information that the PO can verify if the informant does not supply basis of knowledge/veracity info. |
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Term
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Definition
Unprovoked Headlong flight is not enough, by itself, to create Reasonable Suspicion.
However, unprovoked headlong flight, coupled with other factors--such as the characteristic of the neighborhood--can constitute RS to justify a Terry seizure. |
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Term
| How to differentiate Terry stop from an arrest--US v. Sharpe |
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Definition
A Terry-type stop remains a Terry stop, and not an arrest, if:
(1) a PO pursues his investigation in a diligent and reasonable manner,
(2) the method of investigation is likely to confirm/dispel the officer's suspicions quickly, and
(3) the detention lasted no longer than was necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop (the length of the stop, in Sharpe, was lengthened due to evasive actions by the D)
The Court noted that, regardless if the 3 factors are fulfilled, the stop may still be a constructive arrest if it last so long is is not justified under Terry.
However, if the government interest is strong/high, the Terry seizure penumbra might encompass areas more traditionally reminiscent of an actual arrest--as would be the case at an international border or with a terrorism tip. |
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Term
| US v. Montoya de Hernandez |
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Definition
16 hr detention was not unreasonably long to constitute a constructive arrest, b/c it was D's heroic efforts of holding her bowels that led to the extended detention, and D could've chosen a shorter route (xray).
Also, the fact that this stop occurred at an international border makes the governmental interest higher, and the level of expected privacy lower--thus creating a more liberal framework for justified Terry stops (as per the JL proviso) |
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Term
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Definition
POs may, without a warrant, temporarily seize luggage on the basis of reasonable suspicion that it contains narcotics, in order to investigate the circumstances that surround that suspicion, so long as the detention is brief/minimally intrusive.
However, as in this case, the fact that the detention lasted 1.5 hours, the POs did not diligently pursue their investigation, the PO's prior knowledge of D's situation could have resulted in a less intrusive stop, all suggested that this detention was a de facto arrest, and not at Terry stop. |
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Term
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Definition
The POs may conduct a weapons search of the passenger compartment of a lawfully stopped car.
The search of the passenger compartment of an auto is permissible if the PO possess a reasonable belief/suspicion that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons--so long as that search is limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden. |
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Term
| Under Terry-Long type "frisks," what basis gives a PO RS that suspect is armed and presently dangerous/dangerous and able to gain immediate control of weapons? |
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Definition
If the PO suspects a violent crime is afoot-->the pat down/frisk is automatic
Other indicia of dangerousness |
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Term
| MD v. Buie--protective sweeps of houses |
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Definition
A protective sweep of a residence is a quick and limited search of a premises, incident to an arrest and conducted to protect the safety of POs or others.
These sweeps are narrowly tailored to visual inspections of places in which a person might be hiding.
Protective Sweeps incident to arrest are automatic--NO PC or RS needed--in areas immediately adjoining the place of arrest.
However, to protective sweep the rest of the house/area, POs need RS that the area to be swept holds an individual posing a danger to the PO or others.
A Buie-sweep is limited by: (1) only can search so long it is no longer necessary to dispel the reasonable suspicion of danger and (2) in any event no longer than it takes to complete the arrest and [safely] depart the premises. |
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Term
| Lesson to be learned from Terry and progeny when determining if a search/seizure less than a full search/seizure is justified without a warrant. |
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Definition
Focus the analysis on "reasonableness," and conduct a balancing test--weighing the Gov. interest with the type/weight of intrusion.
Terry--Officer/Cit protection outweighs brief stop/cursory pat down
Buie--protecting against increased threat to PO in home of suspect outweighs a limited/defined/cursory visual inspection for dangerous confederates.
Long--because investigative detentions of suspects in autos are inherently fraught with danger to POs and gov interest in limiting this danger is high, coupled with the limitations on car frisk (visual inspection wherever a weapon may be), make the search reasonable without PC. |
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Term
| What two actions based on RS does Terry authorize? |
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Definition
Brief Stop/seizure for investigatory purposes--RS that crime is afoot
Brief Search/Frisk for weapons--RS that suspect is armed and presently dangerous |
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Term
| Car "Frisks"/Intrusions less than searches |
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Definition
Long--POs can conduct brief protective search of car, so long as they have RS that suspect is dangerous and can immediately gain control of weapon in the car
Mimms--POs can order car suspects out of car, because the interest in PO safety is high and the intrusion is de minimis
MD v. Wilson--Just as POs can order drivers out of cars for protective purposes, they can order passengers out.
AZ v. Johnson--POs can routinely order passengers out of car after lawful stop. Once out of car, if suspect is acting fishy/dangerous, he may have RS to Terry frisk. |
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Term
| Is the existence of "less intrusive means" wrt to search/seizure a functional limitation on Terry stops/searches? |
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Definition
Minimally. This limitation is usually in relation to time. In Royer, the POs seized then searched D's luggage (taking 15 minutes) rather than running a drug dog past it, and was held not miminally intrusive, as a result.
In Place, the Gov's prior knowledge of D's travel/suspicion should have yielded more preparedness wrt Place's seizure/search. As a result, it was more intrusive than it needed to be.
In Sokolow, the Court found that the POs needn't forego a Terry stop/search just b/c there are less intrusive means available; put differently, just b/c POs may have other ways to investigate that are less intrusive, does not make Terry stop/seizure unreasonable. |
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Term
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Definition
Neither the warrant req nor PC applies to public school searches.
Warrant no applicable--it will unduly interfere with the maintenance of the swift and informal disciplinary procedures necessary in schools.
PC inapplicable--A balancing of the interests/harms suggests a standard less than PC is appropriate
Teachers can search a student with less than a warrant when
(1) there are reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or rules of the school and
2) once initiated, the seatch is not excessively intrusive in light of the age/sex of the student and the nature of the offense. |
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Term
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Definition
| A reasonableness balancing test--as was used in Terry, border search cases, and TLO) is permissible only in those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and PC requirement impracticable. |
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Term
| Checkpoint Analysis WRT individualized suspicion (or not) |
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Definition
Is the checkpoint (search and seizure) conducted for criminal investigatory purposes or for another purpose? If crim. invest. purpose, needs some type of individualized suspicion (whether it be PC or RS). If the roadblock's primary programmatic purpose is for, say, community safekeeping, no individualized suspicion is needed.
Find the primary purpose of the roadblock-->if for general/normal criminal investigatory purposes, then POs need some quantum of individualized suspicion. If for some other purpose (like community safekeeping), individualized suspicion is not always necessary.
****Further, under certain circumstances, say abnormal/unique/emergency situations involving crime control/investigation (like a specific terrorist threat), it may be permissible to conduct roadblocks w/out some quantum of individualized suspicion. |
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Term
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Definition
| Roadside Sobriety Checkpoints conducted for the purpose of enhancing roadway safety are constitutionally permissible, even when they are based on no particularized suspicion--so long as they are minimally intrusive |
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Term
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Definition
Roadblocks whose primary purposes are normal criminal investigation (like Drug Checkpoints) are not constitutionally permissible without particularized suspicion.
The Gravity of the threat alone (and the drug problem is weighty) is not dispositive of what means (w/ or w/out particularized suspicion) POs can use to combat that threat.
If the stop is conducted for general crime detection purposes, POs need individualized suspicion. |
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Term
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Definition
Court set out Prophylactic Rule to protect custodial suspects' 5th AM rights:
POs must give specific warnings regarding a custodial suspect's constitutional rights to counsel/freedom from self incrimination before they may interrogate her. Absent such procedural safeguards, any statements by the custodial D cannot be a product of his free choice. |
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Term
| Miranda Prophylactic Rule |
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Definition
Miranda Prescription
In Statements stemming from
1) custodial
2) interrogation
Those statements may not be used to prove guilt without
3) Warnings
(a) Right to remain silent
Know that anything said can and will be used against D in courtroom proceeding
(b) Right to have a lawyer present/right to consult with a lawyer
If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed to represent you prior to any interrogation, if you so desire.
4) Waiver of Warnings
Knowing, intentional, and voluntary
OR
5) Other fully effective procedural safeguards |
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Term
| What is the Miranda trigger? Put differently, under what circumstances does Miranda apply? |
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Definition
(1) Custodial
(2) Interrogation |
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Term
| What is "custody" under Miranda and its progeny? |
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Definition
This is not the same analysis as 4th Am seizure--
Custody occurs when
(1) Formal Arrest
(2) Functional Equivalent of Arrest
Functional Equivalent: when a reasonable person in the D’s position would conclude that his freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way, to a degree associated with formal arrest |
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Term
| What is the harm Miranda is thought to counteract? |
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Definition
| The level of psychological compulsion inherent in incommunicado interrogation, which effectively implicate a custodial suspect's privilege against self-incrimination. |
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Term
| What is interrogation under Miranda? |
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Definition
Interrogation=
(1) Express questioning
(2) Its functional equivalent
(a) Words or Actions by the Police (Other than those normally incident to arrest and custody—anything when you are asking about the crime is not within this exception)
(b) that they should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response |
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Term
In determining what is functional interrogation, what is the focus of the analysis?
Likewise, in determining if a functional arrest has occurred, what is the focus of the analysis? |
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Definition
Functional interrogation (PO focus)--Did, or Should, the POs know the words/actions used are reasonably likely to illicit an incriminating response?
Functional Arrest (Obj suspect focus)--Would an objective, reasonable, person in D's shoes conclude they were free to leave (this analysis takes into account age/sex/mental state/etc? |
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Term
| When are Miranda warning NOT required? |
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Definition
| Public Safety Exception (Quarles)--If there is an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from an immediate danger, Miranda warnings may be foregone. Put differently, there must exist an exigency requiring immediate action by the POs beyond the normal need expeditiously to solve a serious crime. The questions asked must also be reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety. |
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Term
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Definition
There exists a public safety exception to Miranda.
If there is an objectively reasonable need to protect the POs or the public from an immediate danger beyond the need of crime intervention, the POs may forego and interrogate suspects--SO long as the questions asked are reasonably prompted by a concern for public safety. |
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Term
| Does Miranda apply to misdemeanors? |
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Definition
| Yes. In Berkemer v. McCarty, the Court held that Miranda warnings are required before custodial interrogation for ANY criminal offense. |
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Term
| Does Miranda apply to Terry-type stops? |
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Definition
| No. A person is NOT in custody for purposes of Miranda if he has only been seized in a Terry sense. In Berkemer, the Court held that a D stopped/questined during a roadside Traffic stop was not in custody wrt Miranda |
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Term
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Definition
| Miranda is a constitutional decision--it cannot be overruled by an Act of Congress. |
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Term
| Is the sole fact that questioning/statements were done/made at a PO station dispositive in determining whether a suspect was in "custody" for purposes of Miranda? |
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Definition
| No. When a suspect comes voluntarily to a PO station in response to an invitation by POs, he will NOT NECESSARILY be in custody for purposes of Miranda (OR v. Mathiason) |
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Term
| Is a PO's subjective motivations concerning questioning a (non)suspect determinative to whether that suspect is in custody for purposes of Miranda? |
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Definition
| No. An officer's subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment of whether the person is in custody. (Stansbury v. CA) |
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Term
| Is there a constitutional remedy for a Miranda violation, apart from the exclusionary rule? |
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Definition
| Naw, playa. Chavez v. Martinez says a PO's failure to comply with Miranda does not violate an individual's 5th Am privilege and yields no damages claim. |
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Term
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Definition
Interrogation, for the purposes of Miranda, refers not only to PO questioning, but also its functional equivalent. This functional equivalent is any words or actions on the part of the PO that the PO should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.
In this case, the PO did not have any specific knowledge that the D was particularly susceptible to pleas for handicapped children, so this was not the functional equivalent of interrogation. But see Brewer, where the POs exploiting a suspect's known religious beliefs was the functional equivalent. |
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Term
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Definition
| Miranda warnings are unnecessary when the suspect is unaware that he is speaking to a PO and gives a voluntary statement. |
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Term
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Definition
A suspect who has once responded to (unintentionally) unwarned, yet uncoerced, questioning is not thereby disabled from waiving his rights and confessing after he has been given the requisite Miranda warnings.
Absent (1) actual compulsion/coercion or (2) improper tactics, Miranda's exclusionary rule is not applicable.
Miranda violation is different than a constitutional 5th Am violation--Actual coercion is a 5th violation, so there IS fruit-of-the-poisonous doctrine here.
D needn't know and appreciate ALL the potential consequences of his decisions to speak to POs.
In situations like elstad, Miranda's twin rationales are not present (deterrence and trustworthiness)
Once warned, analysis should merely turn on whether the statements were voluntarily and knowingly made.
This refusal to suppress fruits that are secondary statements also applies to physical fruits, such as guns (so long as the statements leading to the physical fruits are still voluntary) |
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Term
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Definition
When the POs purposefully--by policy--forego Miranda warnings, conduct custodial interrogation, secure an inadmissible confession, then give Miranda warnings, and then immediately lead suspect through a second round of questioning to obtain the same confession, those second confessions/statements will be held inadmissible--Unless other curative measures are employed.
Curative measures include: break in time, break in questioning, break in personnel. Basically, if the questioning is separated into two distinct phases of questioning--pre and post miranda.
Miranda warnings, when part of the question-first-mirandize-later practice, do not effectively apprise the suspect of their constitutional rights, therefore they are not able to give an effective waiver.
Factors whether Siebert applies: completeness and detail of the initial questioning; the overlapping content of the two phases of questioning; the timing and setting of the questioning; the continuity of the police interrogation |
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Term
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Definition
Verbal Evidence, can be fruit of the poisonous tree, however, it is likely a different class than physical evidence. Therefore, it is less likely to be suppressed.
This is due to live testimony witnesses ability to come forward of their own free will--as such, they should be treated diffently. Also, excluding live witness testimony is a greater harm/more severe, so there needs to be a greater link to the PO illegality for exclusion. |
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Term
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Definition
| Because the Payton rule is designed to prevent unlawful entries in the home to arrest, properly mirandized statements voluntarily given as a result of that arrest are not subject to suppression. Payton only prevents against/deters unlawful entry! |
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Term
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Definition
5th Am only applies to testimonial evidence in trial--not physical evidence.
Also, the only remedy for a miranda violation is not admitting the statements IN TRIAL.
Therefore, physical evidence cannot/should not be excluded as a sole result of Miranda violation. |
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Term
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Definition
Evidence obtained pursuant to a search warrant later declared to be invalid may be introduced at a D's criminal trial in the prosecutor's case in chief, IF:
(1) A reasonably well-trained officer
(2) would have believed that the warrant was valid
Good faith means more than the officer's subjective motivations. It is an OBJECTIVE standard focusing on the objective reasonable officer.
Leon does not excuse unreasonably executed search warrants |
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Term
| When does the good faith leon rule not apply? ie, when would a reasonably well trained officer NOT rely on a bad warrant? |
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Definition
1) If the magistrate relied on info supplied by a PO (even a different PO) that knew the statements in his affidavit were false.
2) Mag's behavior was so indicative of bias (not neutral) that PO should have known Mag wasn't functioning as neutral arbiter.
3) If PO relies on warrant based on an affidavit lacking in indicia of PC--as in a completely bare bones affidavit/warrant--that it is unreasonable to rely on.
4) If warrant is facially-deficient (not particularized) that a reasonable officer could not presume it to be valid. ie warrant says to seize "all contraband," or to search "an apartment" |
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Term
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Definition
Although the warrant was valid on particularity grounds, the evidence was admissible because (1) the PO relied on the magistrate's insistence that the unparticularized piece of the form warrant had been redacted, and (2) that reliance was deemed as reasonable.
In short, because the PO was assured by the mag. that the pieces of the warrant known to be deficient were cured by the magistrate, his reliance was objectively reasonable.
Question to ask: If not a right, does its underlying rationale work in relation to its costs? Look to an empirical analysis |
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Term
| Why the Good Faith Exception? |
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Definition
(1) Exclusionary Rule is Designed to deter POs, not magistrates and judges.
(2) Magistrates, unlike POs that are in the competitive business of ferreting out crime, are not inclined to subvert the 4th Am
3) The exclusionary rule will not deter Magistrates from screwing up warrants, as magistrates have no vested interest in the outcome of criminal trials.
4) Finally, lessening the rule will not have a counter-deterrent effect on POs--No magisrtate shopping will commence.
5) The Exclusionary rule is too harsh of a cost in these instances. |
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Term
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Definition
| If PO is acting objectively reasonable in reliance on a statute, which, in turn was repugnant to constitutional demands, the officer will not be deterred by the exclusionary rule. Therefore, evidence obtained in reliance on the statute is not subject to exclusion. |
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Term
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Definition
If an objectively reasonable PO relied on information, which was wrong due to a clerical error, that led to evidence, that evidence will not be subject to exclusion.
(1) ER is supposed to deter POs, not PO employees
(2) PO employees aren't known for subverting 4th
(3) ER won't adequately deter mistakes |
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Term
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Definition
Reasonably Mistaken, therefore unlawful, arrest (based on PO error)-->SILA (however unlawful)-->evidence
Because the PO error (in the database) was the result of isolated negligence in record keeping so attenuated from the arrest that deterrence would not yield from application of the ER, the ER should not apply.
Good faith exception does not apply if gross negligence, intentional illegality, recklessness, or systemic negligence.
***ER only applies if (1) appreciable deterrence will result, (2) the benefits of deterrence outweigh the costs of suppression, and (3) the PO conduct is capable of deterrence by way of the ER.*** |
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Term
| If a record keeping error led to the unlawful arrest of person, which led to an unlawful SILA, which led to evidence, could that evidence ever be suppressed? |
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Definition
Yes, if the error was the result of systemic PO negligence or gross recklessness, or the PO was known to make false entries--and was the one to make the mistake--in the system, or intentionality, then the ER might apply b/c PO conduct could be deterred by it.
In the case of isolated, mere negligence that causes the illegality, and the results are attenuated from the illegality, the ER will not apply and the good faith exception will. |
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Term
| Can Miranda Waiver be implied? |
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Definition
Yes, in Butler, the court held that an explicit waiver is not necessary to find a valid waiver. Some waiver cases can be implied from the circumstances--but the burden is on the PO. In Butler, the D said "i'll make a statement, but I'm not signing no paper"
Waiver should be determined on the particular facts of the case, including the background, experience, and conduct of the accused. |
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Term
| Elements of a valid Miranda Waiver |
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Definition
Waiver valid if:
1) Voluntary--can't be coerced by police. individual, mental coercion is ok (such as religious coercion in own mind)
2) knowing and intelligent--must be aware of nature of the right and full awareness of the consequences of waiver (but see Oregon v. Elstad where D didnt need to know ALL consequences of his waiver--cat out of the bag case).
Also, D neednt know that his counsel wishes to see him, or that his family retained counsel for him, just that he has a right to counsel |
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Term
| Invocation of Right to Remain Silent |
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Definition
Michigan v. Mosely--After invocation, police may resume questioning, so long as the POs scrupulously honor the D's right to remain silent.
In MI v. Mosely, D was arrested, mirandized, invoked, put in jail cell for two hours, a different PO came back to question about another crime, remirandized, waiver= this was scrupulously honoring first invocation. |
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Term
| Invocation of the Right to Counsel |
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Definition
Once a person in custody requests counsel, it is as if a protective shild surrounds him. The police may not interrogate the suspect further about ANY crime, unless (1) the D's lawyer is present ; or (2) the D initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the police, after which the PO obtain a valid waiver.
Edwards v. Arizona: When a suspect invokes his right under MIranda to consult with an attorney before interrogation, the suspect cannot be subject to further interrogation until counsel has been made available to him--unless the accused initiates the further communication.
Very strict, bright line rule.
POlice-initiated questioning is barred without an atty present, even for offenses unrelated to the subject of the original interrogation.
Ds who open up communication in regards to the routine incidents of the suctodial relationship (such as requests for food and water) are not sufficient to reopen non-lawyered communication lines. |
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