Term
|
Definition
| If there is a question of credibility, it MUST go to the jury. |
|
|
Term
Slocum v. NY Life Ins. Co. (1913)
(JMOL) |
|
Definition
| OLD JMOL STANDARD - once a TC has denied a D's DV motion and allowed the case to go to jury, the court could not order a judgment contrary to the jury verdict but could only order a new trial. |
|
|
Term
Baltimore & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman (1935)
(JMOL) |
|
Definition
| Because the judge had reserved ruling on a motion for directed verdict, the court could take the jury verdict SUBJECT TO the judge's decision on the motion. |
|
|
Term
Lundeen v. Cordner (1966)
(MUST BELIEVE WITNESS) |
|
Definition
| Opposing party cannot force a trial in order to cross examine a disinterested, unimpeached, uncontradicted party who gave an affidavit when there is only a "vague supposition" that something might turn up at trial. |
|
|
Term
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc. (2000)
(JMOL/SJ) |
|
Definition
Court should give credence to evidence favoring nonmovant and evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached, at least to the extent that evidence comes from disinterested witnesses.
*Can directed verdict be granted when burden of proof is based on witness testimony? Yes, because of required belief in witnesses. |
|
|
Term
Purcell v. Watherman SS Corp. (1955)
(WITNESS CREDIBILITY) |
|
Definition
| Testimony of witnesses need not necessarily be accepted just because they are not contradicted and their credibility is not impeached. |
|
|
Term
Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Havana Madrid Restaurant Corp. (1949)
(WITNESS CREDIBILITY) |
|
Definition
| P's witness uncontradicted, unimpeached, and not inherently improbable but court not obliged to accept it as true. |
|
|
Term
Lavender v. Kurn
(JMOL/SJ) |
|
Definition
Substantial Evidence Rule.
It is not for the judge to say that the inferences are of equal weight; it must be left to the jury and cannot be taken away by a JMOL.
Goes to no juror can testify as to what went on in the jury room. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Don't give the case to the jury when they can't find for the plaintiff for any rational reason, but let the jury decide questions that the judge cannot decide with certainty. |
|
|
Term
Roy v. Inhabitants of City of Lewiston
(JURY) |
|
Definition
| Juries cannot go so far as to impose different standards on special defendants (such as a police officer with official immunity.) This is an example of protecting the law where jurors might not understand the deference we give to certain parties (like the police.) |
|
|
Term
Rogers v. Missouri Pacific Railroad (1957)
(JURY AND CAUSATION) |
|
Definition
The jury can contribute to causation questions; it is like fact finding. Overruled Slocum, which said the only remedy for a wrong jury verdict is a new trial.
The only basis for a 50b motion is what was expressed in the 50a motion. |
|
|
Term
Unitherm v. Swift-Eckrich, Inc. (2006)
(JMOL) |
|
Definition
The party moved for 50a but failed to renew the motion after the jury verdict under 50b or move for a new trial under 59. Therefore, it cannot have the court review the sufficiency of the evidence under 50 and is left with the jury verdict.
Why? Want TJ's opinion because he saw the whole thing.
***RULE 50 on its face says that the court can move on its own after a 50a motion, however doesn't seem to be the trend. |
|
|
Term
Neely v. Martin K. Eby Construction Co.
(JMOL) |
|
Definition
| There is no constitutional bar to an appellate court granting judgment n.o.v. |
|
|
Term
Weisgram v. Marley Co. (2000)
(JMOL) |
|
Definition
COA entered JNOV after an expert witness' testimony was thrown out on the basis of underqualification.
"Entering judgment for the verdict loser when all of the evidence was properly before the jury is scarcely less destructive of the jury's verdict than is entry of such a judgment made insufficient by the removal of evidence the jury should not have had before it."
P already had a chance to put out her best expert during trial so she doesn't need another chance to to do now. |
|
|
Term
Dyer v. MacDougall (1952)
(JMOL) |
|
Definition
| When deciding a directed verdict the judge may not take into account his belief or disbelief of the evidence. However, when deciding to grant a new trial the judge does weigh the credibility of the witnesses and evidence. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Talking about standard of review for a new trial order: If there is any substantial evidence in the case supporting the trial court's action then we should not interfere with its order granting said motion. |
|
|
Term
Rush v. City of Maple Heights (1958)
(CLAIM PRECLUSION) |
|
Definition
| A single tort can be the basis of just one action - transactional test. |
|
|
Term
Mathews v. NY Racing Association, Inc. (1961)
(CLAIM PRECLUSION) |
|
Definition
"the plaintiff cannot be permitted to splinter his claim into a multiplicity of suits and try them piecemeal at his convenience."
P had previously brought a separate action on the same set of facts - claim preclusion is based on the facts surrounding the occurrence, not the legal theory asserted. |
|
|
Term
Jones v. Morris Plan Bank of Portsmouth (1937)
(CLAIM PRECLUSION) |
|
Definition
| If the same evidence will support both actions there is but one cause of action. |
|
|
Term
United States v. Heyward-Robinson Co. (1970)
(COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIMS) |
|
Definition
| Compulsory counterclaims defined by the logical relationship test (update to the transactional test.) Two contracts entered at the same time for the same services by the same parties pass. |
|
|
Term
Southern Construction Co. v. Pickard (1962)
(COUNTERCLAIMS) |
|
Definition
| Counterclaims only barred so as to prevent a new case from being entered where the counterclaim is the basis for the case. |
|
|
Term
Jacobson v. Miller
(DEFENSE PRECLUSION) |
|
Definition
| 5 year lease; second action to collect second year's rent. Can raise a defense you didn't raise in the first one. |
|
|
Term
Mitchell v. Federal Intermediate Credit Bank (1932)
(DEFENSE PRECLUSION) |
|
Definition
| Once you start asking the court to measure YOUR injury, you are splitting the claim and you lose the parts that you did not make. |
|
|
Term
Case v. State Farm Mut. Auto Insurance (1961)
BUT SEE Bautista v. Los Angeles County (2000)
(PLEADINGS) |
|
Definition
1. Courts are under no obligation to create a claim where there is none in the pleadings.
2. Trial court abused its discretion by not telling plaintiffs what they could've done to improve their complaint. |
|
|
Term
Bell v. Twombly (2007)
(PLEADINGS) |
|
Definition
| Need to assert a claim that is plausible on its face. Parallel vs. purposeful behavior. |
|
|
Term
Iqbal v. Ashcroft (2009)
(PLEADINGS) |
|
Definition
Expands Twombly standard to issues outside of antitrust law.
1. Legal conclusions are not entitled to assumption of truth.
2. Only a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss. |
|
|
Term
Ingraham v. United States (1987)
BUT SEE Taylor v. United States
(PLEADINGS) |
|
Definition
Avoidance rule: the allegation or statement of new matter, in opposition to a former pleading, which, admitting the facts alleged in such former pleading, shows cause why they should not have their ordinary legal effect." --must be pleaded timely.
Said it wasn't avoidance but was a California state case. |
|
|
Term
Garcia v. Hilton Hotels, Inc (1951)
(PLEADINGS) |
|
Definition
It is possible to plead too much under R8a2. Defendants can make a 12e motion for a more definitive statement, but these motions are disfavored because many issues can be clarified and resolved through discovery.
Here, court strikes all but one paragraph of the complaint. |
|
|
Term
Beeck v. Aquaslide n Dive Corp. (1977)
(PLEADINGS) |
|
Definition
Mistaken identity of waterslide manufacturer.
Allowance to amend pleadings lies solely with trial court and is only reviewable if there is an abuse of discretion. Don't want to prejudice parties in amending the reply. |
|
|
Term
Worthington v. Wilson (1993)
(RELATION BACK) |
|
Definition
"three unknown police officers" - P waits until end SOL to file and then doesn't know which of 12 police officers caused his injuries; relation back is precluded because he did not perform his due diligence.
Rule requires that defendants "knew or should have know that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party, the action would have been brought against the party."
Application here: you need to actually name someone and correct it later, not just say it was someone unnamed and then add the name in later. |
|
|
Term
Krupski v. Costa Crociere (2010)
(RELATION BACK) |
|
Definition
Two cruise companies (ship and mother company) with almost identical names, P sued for injuries. P sued wrong plaintiff but since "in light of these facts, Costa Crociere should have known that P's failure to name it as a defendant in her original complaint was due to a mistake concerning the proper party's identity."
**This case says that diligence is not a concern. Why? Here, party actually named someone. |
|
|
Term
In re Petition of Sheila Roberts Ford (1997)
(PERPETUATION OF TESTIMONY) |
|
Definition
| Ford's father killed by police, she seeks to perpetuate Sheriff's testimony so she can figure out which policeman killed him. She can't do this because the rule isn't meant to help discover or uncover evidence, just perpetuate in case witness is going out of the country or close to death. |
|
|
Term
Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons
(PROTECTIVE ORDERS) |
|
Definition
P wants to see confidential files evaluating him for membership in a professional association.
Judge's options other than a protective order when a party requests discovery of sensitive information:
In camera examination of the files, Remove names of deliberators, Judge actually entered a protective order – “draws on each party’s submission by parallels neither” – court doesn’t like because it allowed plaintiff’s to read own files and allowed P to discuss the contents of the files and people on them anyway. |
|
|
Term
Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart
(PROTECTIVE ORDERS) |
|
Definition
| Protective orders are sometimes necessary to prevent abuse of discovery, especially if it could affect third parties. If courts didn't have this option then parties might not litigate for fear of publication of confidential info. |
|
|
Term
Upjohn Co. v. United States (1981)
(ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE) |
|
Definition
Oral witness statements (as related by the attorney of the other party) are protected under work product because it goes into the thought process of counsel.
Underlying rules of attorney-client privilege from Upjohn:
“(1) the communication must be one that would not have been made but for the contemplation of legal services;
(2) the content of the communication must relate to the legal services being rendered;
(3) the information-giver must be an employee, agent, or independent contractor with a significant relationship to the corporation and the corporation’s involvement in the transaction that is the subject of legal services;
(4) the communication must be made in confidence; and
(5) the privilege may be asserted either by the corporation or by the information-giver." |
|
|
Term
Hickman v. Taylor (1947)
(WORK PRODUCT) |
|
Definition
| Request for discovery of witness statements taken by opposing counsel's attorney is denied because there was no showing of necessity of justification (could've subpoenaed that witnesses.) |
|
|
Term
Cummings v. General Motors Corp. (2004)
(AUTOMATIC INITIAL DISCLOSURE) |
|
Definition
Suit for injuries from an automobile accident. GM argued that injury was not due to defectiveness of seat, but to the position that plaintiff was sitting in at the time of the accident. Defendants moved to protective orders in response to motion to compel by the Plaintiffs and court found for Defendants.
Plaintiff relied on Rule 26 to say that Defendants had to disclose certain safety testing videos. However, new standard is that “initial disclosure obligation has been narrowed” so that parties need only disclose information they will use at trial. |
|
|
Term
Arnstein v. Porter
Cross v. United States
(SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND WITNESS EVALUATION) |
|
Definition
Arnstein: Crucial test of credibility is cross examination.
Cross: Traveling professor carries burden of proof on whether he inappropriately expensed a trip to Europe. Since he was the only witness on his own behalf, court says he is an interested witness and jury needs to evaluate him. |
|
|
Term
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. (1970)
COMPARE
Celotex Corp. v. Catret (1986) |
|
Definition
“Kress did not carry its burden because of its failure to foreclose the possibility that there was a policeman in the Kress store while petitioner was awaiting service, and that this policeman reached an understanding with some Kress employee that petitioner not be served.” (p. 971)
COMPARE: Movant may negate essential element of the parties claim or the movant may show that the other party lacks sufficient evidence to prove the issue. Celotex points to using only the second one. Adickes tried to do both. |
|
|
Term
THE BIG THREE SUMMARY JUDGMENT CASES:
Celotex Corp. v. Catret (1986)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Bell, Inc. (1986)
Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. (1986) |
|
Definition
Celotex: Moving party can motion for SJ by offering its own proof negating P’s claim OR can attack the sufficiency of plaintiff’s proof.
Anderson: Libel. SCINTILLA TEST: Party needs more than a scintilla of proof to support its claim and avoid SJ.
Matsushita: Sometimes applicable law (here, antitrust) precludes nonmoving party’s evidence and party will not survive SJ motion. [Higher evidence standard under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act since some inferences are not allowed for the jury to make.] |
|
|
Term
Scot v. Harris (2007)
(SUMMARY JUDGMENT) |
|
Definition
Court compares plaintiff's version of a police chase with video of the scene and it becomes clear that plaintiff is lying.
"When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment." |
|
|
Term
Texas Employer's Insurance Association v. Price (1960)
(JURY MISCONDUCT) |
|
Definition
| Juror giving his opinion on hiring practices for injured workers was misconduct because juror was basically offering additional testimony for P. |
|
|
Term
(JUDGE AND JURY QUESTIONS)
Compare:
Markman v. Westview Instruments (1996)
Davis v. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company |
|
Definition
Markman: A patent dispute over a device to track dry-cleaning inventory.
"We hold that the interpretation of the word inventory in this case is an issue for the judge not the jury, and affirm the decision of the Court of Appeals for the Federal District."
--> While Markman claims that this issue is an issue of credibility of expert witnesses, the court says that they would review those considerations as a part of their decision process. They also say that it is important to preserve uniformity in patent law proceedings, and leaving those issues up to a jury might cause discrepancies and evidentiary questions for the next case to have to resolve.
Davis: pay because they said they don’t pay for death that results from (1) any infection/infirmity existing before the accidental injury or (2) self inflicted harm that results in death. They say that a heroin overdose is a result of a disease and is self-inflicted. Court turns to jury for interpretation of this assertion because it is important for jury to decide because they represent the normal population and they will interpret the contract in a way that a normal person would. |
|
|
Term
Alderman v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. (WV 1953)
(SUMMARY JUDGMENT and JUDGE/JURY ISSUE) |
|
Definition
• Alderman had a free trip pass to ride on the railroad company’s trains (she was not a fare-paying customer.) Her pass had a liability disclaimer printed on the back (see p. 42.) She was riding a train near Adrian, WV when it derailed. She sued to recover damages for her injuries.
• Originally, Alderman alleged negligence but after a pretrial meeting where the disclaimer was discussed, she amended her complaint to wilful or wanton conduct. The defendant then filed a motion for summary judgment, which the Court sustained.
• “I am of opinion that the complaint fails to state sufficient facts to substantiate a charge of wilfullness. It is clear that P has stated a charge of negligence; but that is not the test in this case.” – 43
• Rule – if not reasonable jury could find liability, the judge will decide. |
|
|
Term
Kennedy v. Southern California Edison Co. (2000)
(JURY INSTRUCTIONS/INVITED ERROR DOCTRINE) |
|
Definition
Usually, if you asked for a jury instruction you are stuck with it and the court won't correct a faulty instructions.
Here, a wrongful death lawsuit with newly minted model instructions on wrongful death.
In this case, however, the law was pretty new and it was not a harmless error not to correct the instructions. |
|
|
Term
Diniero v. US Lines Co. (1961)
(WITHDRAWAL OF JURY INSTRUCTIONS) |
|
Definition
| Court withdrew written questions after jury couldn't reach a consensus on one of them since they didn't understand it. *** |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
Nollenberger v. United Air Lines, Inc. (S.D. Cal. 1963) Verdict inconsistent with interrogatories
-Wrongful death case with general verdict with written answers in which answers were not consistent with the general verdict.
-P argued for either giving additional questions or calculate general verdict award based on the answers given.
-Rule 49(b) does not allow for additional questions (not provided for in specific remedies to inconsistency). You can change only the general verdict if the answers are consistent with each other but inconsistent with general verdict.
-Court took over and recalculated the damages.
-Decision reversed by Court of Appeals because jury not required to calculate damages using the formula established by the written answers, there were more factors that went into damages aware than reflected in the written answers.
Duk v. MGM Grand Hotel, Inc. (9th Cir. 2003) Resubmission verdict inconsistent with questions
-Issue: 1. Does Rule 49(b) allow for resubmission of questions to the jury in the case of an inconsistency in special verdicts? 2. Is it an abuse of discretion to resubmit right after the inconsistency is noticed?
Plaintiff drank too much and was detained my MGM casino staff. While in custody he suffered a heart attack and was not given the proper care, which resulted in massive damage that necessitated a transplant.
-Jury in the first trial attributed 65% negligence to Duk, but instead of stopping there they went on to award Duk $3.5M in damages. The court sent the jury back with instructions to correct their error. They changed the figure to 49%. MGM motioned for a new trial.
-Holding: 1. Yes. 2. No. “We now hold that where the jury is still available, a district court’s decision to resubmit an inconsistent verdict for clarification is within its discretion.”
Robb v. John C. Hickey, Inc. (NJ 1941) Verdict inconsistent with jury fact findings
Solution is a new trial. |
|
|
