Term
Offer has to be intended. Seller wasn't offering but supplying information |
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Definition
Harvey v Facey 1893
"""will you sell me a bumper hall pen?""
""lowest price 900 pounds""" |
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Term
Traditionally, a K occurs when acceptance of an offer has been communicated to the offeror |
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Definition
Tallerman & Co Pty Ltd v Nathan's Merchandise (1957)
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Term
The court determines the offeror's intention objectively , according to outward manifestations |
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Definition
* Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)
intention |
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Term
An offer must contain quid pro quo (this for that) in order to be binding; there cannot be a reward or conditional gift
Whether conduct amounts to an offer is to be calculated case by case |
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Definition
Australian Woollen Mills Pty Ltd v Cth (1954)
There was no consideration in the Cth's woolly situation |
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Term
Items displayed in a shop are an invitation to treat not offers |
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Definition
1) Fisher v Bell 2) Boots Cash Chemists' Case
I offer you to offer me drugs and boots, fish and bells
Goodwin's v Gurrey (Aus. case) - Courts less technical in determining if shop breached statute. See s35(2) ACL: corporations that advertise g/s for supply at a specified price must "offer such goods or services for supply" at said price for a reasonable time in reasonable quantities. Wallace v Brodribb: Spender J "offer to supply" should be given ordinary meaning, don't bother differentiating between offer and invitation to treat. |
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Term
Auction without reserve ≠ offer, just invitation to treat |
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Definition
AGC v McWhirter
Def gonna sell, lol jk no |
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Term
Tenderers have an obligation not to withdraw their tenders (=offers) |
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Definition
Ontario v Ron Engineering & Construction Eastern
You're going to stick with this, Ontario ('aren't you') |
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Term
vendors promise to accept the highest bid converted would would otherwise be an invitation to treat into an offer, which the highest bid was received, completed a contract |
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Definition
Harvela Investments v Royal Trust Co of Canada
" we bind ourselves to accept the highest offer" |
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Term
Complying tenders (=offers) must be considered |
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Definition
* Blackpool and Flyde Aero Club v Blackpool Borough Council
we must do a Borough (thorough) job considering those tenders |
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Term
Tender process must be carried out according to collateral k |
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Definition
Hughes Aircraft Systems International v Airservices Australia
Hughes (who's) responsible for this poor process? |
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Term
Terms on the back of a ticket are an offer, accepted by conduct |
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Definition
MacRobertson Miller Airline Services v Commissioner of State Taxation (WA) (1975) |
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Term
Counter offer revokes offer only if inconsistent with original. |
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Definition
Oriolo v Wolfram 2011
not any different |
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Term
inquiry for information is not a counter offer |
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Definition
Stevenson v Maclean
I was just asking a question, not making a counter offer, calm down! |
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Term
In unilateral K, the doing of the task is both acceptance and consideration |
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Definition
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co (1893)
Acceptance & Consideration |
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Term
At an auction: fall of hammer = A. Offer only binding after hammer |
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Definition
AGC v McWhirter
SOGA 1896 (Qld) s 59
Termination of offer must be communicated properly (Byrne v Von Tienhovan), no good just being like nah man
Until (MC) Hammer, "You can't buy this" |
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Term
Signature= acceptance. There is no need for a consensus as to the terms of the contract |
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Definition
Fitness First v Chong
* Toll v Alphapharm - unless misrepresentation |
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Term
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Definition
* Empirnall Holdings v Machon Paull
Affirmed by Kriketos v Livschitz [2009] in NSWCA
benefits + knowledge + opportunity to reject |
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Term
No acceptance if information given is in ignorance of reward. Held: a unilateral contract will only arise if the offeree performs the requested acts in RELIANCE of the offer. |
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Definition
R v Clarke
Suspect didnt know about reward and turned someone else in, but when he found out about reward he tried to claim it. |
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Term
no contract if parties are not 'ad idem'- of one mind |
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Definition
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Term
instantaneous methods= acceptance communicated when and where it is received |
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Definition
Entores v Miles Far East
To the Far East in a flash |
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Term
faxes should be treated as instantaneous forms of communication |
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Definition
Reese Bros Plastics v Hamon-Sobelco Aust Ld
Faxing your Bro Reese from Australia |
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Term
acceptance must be communicated, silence is not acceptance |
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Definition
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Term
Battle of the forms: Acknowledgement slip was acceptance. (Conduct is key- Empirnall) |
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Definition
* Butler Machine v Ex-Cell-O Corp [1979]
Ex-Cellioramos!; contract wizard duel |
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Term
"- Offer can be revoked anytime before acceptance.
- Revocation must be communicated to offeree.
- Letter of revocation effective on receipt (not posting)." |
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Definition
Byrne v Van Tienhoven (1880)
Not until the fat lady sings |
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Term
Any method of revocation possible, though must be "reliable source". |
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Definition
Dickinson v Dodds (1876)
Reliable Dick, not Direct Dick |
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Term
can withdraw firm offer, not binding |
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Definition
Dickinson v Dodds (1876)
Firm Dick's not a binding Dick |
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Term
Option = Promise to hold offer open is binding if consideration given. |
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Definition
Goldsborough, Mort v Quinn (1910) |
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Term
An offeror who locks-out a competing offeror for a specified time has a potentially enforceable agreement. |
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Definition
Walford v Miles [1992]
No competition around for many Miles |
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Term
"Unilateral contract in performance progress cannot be withdrawn (unless some degree of notoriety?)
Implied promise not to revoke after performance commenced" |
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Definition
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Term
"Unilateral offer must be withdrawn with same notoriety.
Not self evidently unjust to allow revocation. Consider:
1. Knowledge offeree has commenced performance?
2. Offeree may know of risk of revocation?
3. ""Commencement"" is unclear - could be unjust.
4. Act may be of benefit to both (here) or only detriment of offeree.
5. Offeree not bound to continue; offeror does not know.
6. May be evidence of an intent." |
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Definition
* Mobil Oil Aus v Wellcome (1998)
KRCBDCI
"Ben know det continuing in-tent commences risk" |
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Term
If no predetermined period, offer will lapse after a "reasonable time" has passed - this depends on circumstances. |
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Definition
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Term
Implied condition that if circumstances of offer change it will lapse. |
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Definition
Financings v Stimson [1962] |
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Term
Restitutionary remedies apply for unjust enrichment. |
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Definition
British Steel v Cleveland Bridge [1984]
D must pay for preparatory work because he was unjustly enriched from it. |
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Term
No remedies available for expectation losses (eg. lost opportunity to receive more) |
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Definition
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Term
Term can be severed if meaningless. |
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Definition
Laybutt v Amoco (1974)
Meaningless butt |
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Term
Agreement will be found to be incomplete if contract refers to content that is too uncertain. |
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Definition
Scammell v Ouston (1941)
Uncertain stuff could be a scam |
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Term
Clause specifying 'reasonable' terms shows failure to agree. |
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Definition
Whitlock v Brew
Shell; "on such reasonable terms as commonly govern such a lease" |
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Term
If there is a previous course of dealing between parties, courts will generally uphold an agreement by filling in words which where not written down but parties must have agreed on. |
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Definition
Hillas v Arcos (1932)
Growing trees on Hill(as) |
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Term
If the uncertain issue has been raised before agreement and not settled, then it becomes difficult to say there is an actual agreement. |
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Definition
Geebung Investments v Varga Group Investments per Kirby P |
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Term
Where there is previous history of an agreement, then this previous history can be used to make the subsequent agreement work. |
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Definition
Ormwave Pty Ltd v Smith [2007]
Captain Cook Cruises; previous history |
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Term
When there exists no previous dealings, a contract to agree on price will be found uncertain.. |
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Definition
May & Butcher v R [1934]
The Butcher May not have the prices to be agreed from time to time |
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Term
A contract to agree on price is valid where there are previous dealings. (There was also an arbitration clause to resolve disputes, however not sure if this was necessary to uphold the agreement.) |
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Definition
Foley v Classique Coaches (1934)
3 years history; price to be agreed from time to time |
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Term
There is no uncertainty if choice is given to one party. |
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Definition
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Term
An agreement will be upheld where one party is able to choose from a list of options. No uncertainty. |
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Definition
Timmerman v Nervina [1983]
Is Nirvana an option? |
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Term
There will be no contract if the parties fail to stipulate a price or an effective method or mechanism for determining the price. |
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Definition
Hall v Busst (1960)
An example of a court at the opposite end of the spectrum to Hillas v Arcos.
Land price formula = price + improvements - deficiencies |
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Term
Court will operate machinery if necessary. |
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Definition
Sudbrook v Eggleton [1983]
Court appoint valuer - machinery. |
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Term
No general duty to negotiate in good faith. |
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Definition
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Term
There can be no express agreement to negotiate (when parties agree to agree), where the language is too illusory, vague and uncertain. |
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Definition
Coal Cliff v Sijehama (1991)
Agreement to agree - language uncertain |
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Term
An express condition to act in good faith to resolve disputes coupled with mechanisms to do so will be upheld. |
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Definition
Aiton Australia Pty Ltd v Transfield (1999)
Dispute resolution procedure |
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Term
Agreements that expressly require parties to deal with each other in good faith in negotiating means: 1) parties must act honestly 'within the framework of fidelity to the bargain'; 2) parties are not required to act within the interests of the other; 3) parties must subject themselves to the process of negotiation; 4) parties must keep an open mind in the sense of being willing to consider proposals; 5) parties must put forward options for the resolution of any differences. |
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Definition
* Strzelecki Holdings v Cable Sands [2010]
Express good faith - 5 factors |
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Term
1. IMMEDIATELY BOUND: LATER WRITTEN RECORD - agreement already made and later document simply records the agreement (therefore document doesn't really matter) eg. MOU.
2. COMPLETE AGREEMENT: PERFORMANCE CONDITIONAL ON LATER DOCUMENT - parties are immediately bound by the valid contract but some part of it (eg. payment), only gets triggered when condition occurs (eg. bank approves loan). It is a contract but the condition impacts performance.
3. NO AGREEMENT WITHOUT FORMAL DOCUMENT - requires a formal document for contract to be binding.
**This class later added!
4. BINDING NOW; LATER SUPERSEDE - parties are bound now but contemplate a later document that will supersede initial agreement by agreement on such a later document. |
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Definition
- CBA v Dean (1983)
- Niesmann v Collingridge (1921)
- Masters v Cameron (1954)
- Anaconda Nickel v Tarmoola (2000)
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Term
A contract that is subject to a condition subsequent, will be binding unless the condition is unable to be fulfilled. (Subject to Finance) |
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Definition
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Term
Objective test, did the parties manifest an intention to be bound |
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Definition
* Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc |
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Term
Court may look beyond K to determine if agreement was intended to be binding, incl. surrounding circumstances (actions + statements) |
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Definition
Air Great Lakes v K S Easter (Holdings) (1985) |
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Term
Presumption that family members do no NOT intend to make legal relations, therefore plaintiff must prove binding K. Where as in commercial situations there is a presumption that parties DID intend to be bound, and must prove that they didn't. |
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Definition
Jones v Padavatton (1969)
Ermogenous v Greek Orthodox Community of SA Inc: .... Justices thought it was wrong to presume legal intentions. Therefore: a person who claims that a k has been made bears the onus of establishing the elements of formation. Taudros v Taurdos talks about how textbooks are out of date on the issue of presumption |
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Term
Strong worded letter of comfort is binding |
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Definition
Banque Brussels Lambert SA v Australian National Industries (1989)
upheld by Gate Gourmet Australia v Gate Gourmet Holding (2004)
"ensure, gurantee" |
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Term
Gentleman's agreement, parties can exclude courts if not in a binding legal relationship (then why bother?) |
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Definition
Rose & Frank Co v J R Crompton & Bros |
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Term
Agreements between spouses are not binding |
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Definition
Balfour v Balfour (1912 KB)
approved in obiter by HCA in Magill v Magill (2006)
Merritt v Merritt
- Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) s 90B (agreements before marriage)
- s90C (agreements during marriage)
- s90D (agreements after marriage)
- Act details ways in which agreements between spouses may be binding (usually if k signed with legal advice)
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Term
Agreements between separated or separating spouses are binding |
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Definition
Merritt v Merritt (1970)
payback's a bitch |
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Term
Agreements within the family are not binding (or are they?) |
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Definition
Jones v Padavatton (1969)
Ermogenous: Court would have to look at relationship from a neutral point, not 'honourable' mummy-daughter viewpoint |
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Term
If agreement permanent or puts P at 'whim of D' it will be found binding. P relies on agreement to their detriment |
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Definition
1) Todd v Nichol (1975)
2) Wakeling v Ripley (1951)
I got Todd (told) that if I came to Australia Nichol would look after me |
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Term
If the plaintiff relies on a family member's promise they may seek remedies in proprietary estoppel |
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Definition
* Riches v Hogben (1986)
From the UK to Riches |
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Term
Intention element easy to satisfy if family agreements are commercial in nature |
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Definition
Roufos v Brewster
In Roufos there was "intermitted hostility" and the setting was "commercial, rather than social or domestic". What if it was a loving family agreement?
Brewster's bruise truck |
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Term
To determine the intention of governments:
1) was an authority set up to make payments?
2) was the scheme announced by those able to bind the crown?
3) does the crown have a commercial interest in being bound?
4) has the Cth expressly reserved the right to vary its terms? |
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Definition
Australian Woollen Mills v Cth
Placer Developments Ltd v Cth: legal language, commercial character, appropriated funds enough to "rescue" the agreement "from the unenforceability which a purely political arrangement has, and to give it a commercial character" |
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Term
Agreement to agree binding if terms are made unilaterally by a third party |
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Definition
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Term
"An act or forebearance of one party, or the promise thereof, is the price for which the promise of the other is bought, and the promise thus given for value is enforceable" |
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Definition
Dunlop v Selfridge, most used in Aust |
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Term
" any act of the plaintiff from which the defendant derives a benefit or advantage, or any labour, detriment, or inconvenience sustained by the plaintiff..." |
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Definition
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball |
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Term
"1 pound a year is good consideration
Also, consideration is not the 'will'/will of the party but the actual cost" |
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Definition
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Term
"consideration requires a bargain= quid pro quo
the facts must show a necessary relation between an act and a promise- that the act was really done in consideration of a potential promise inherent in the statement or announcement." |
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Definition
Australian Woollen Mills v Commonwealth
Beaton v McDivitt |
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Term
consideration must "move" from promisee |
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Definition
Coull's v Bagot's Executor
husband owns business not wife. only husband can give consideration |
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Term
a promise to uphold an obligation to a third party will be sufficient consideration |
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Definition
Pao On v Lau Yiu Long
past consideration |
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Term
"Consideration just has to be of some value to party
the court will not enquire into the adequacy (value) of the considerationmust however, be sufficient to the terms " |
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Definition
Chappell v Nestle
Candy Bars |
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Term
there may be consideration where there is no way to enforce the duty |
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Definition
Popiw v Popiw
Wife basher and dirty deeds
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Term
no frivolous or vexatious claims? ( I have this as my principle in learning guide but Anthony's interpretation of the case is different... will come back to this) |
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Definition
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Term
CATEGORIES OF EXISTING DUTY CASES
Category 1: An existing duty which is owed as a matter of law.
Category 2: Existing Contractual duties to a 3rd party
Category 3: Existing contractual duty to promisor, asking for more
Category 4: Existing contractual duty to promisee, hoping to pay less
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Definition
1a.) Collens v Godefroy
1b.) Glaskbrook v Glamorgan County Council
2. Pao On
3a.) Stilk v Myrick 1809
3b.) Hartley v Ponsoby"
3c.) Musumeci v Windadell
4. Pinnel's case |
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Term
Consideration is good if there is a practical benefit from it |
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Definition
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Term
duress = no consent = no contract |
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Definition
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Term
economic pressure may amount to economic duress= contract is voidable |
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Definition
North Ocean Shipping v Hyundai Construction
need more money for ship |
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Term
First modern statement of doctrine of promissory estoppel |
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Definition
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Term
Words or conduct preventing a person from going back on a promise or representation, where P has acted in reliance and it would be inequitable to allow D to go back on the promise.
First application in Australia - REJECTION OF NO DETRIMENTAL RELIANCE FOUND IN UK. In Aus the plaintiff must have acted to their detriment |
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Definition
Je Maintiendrai v Quaglia (WA) 1980
No repayment of past rent
Affirmed by HCA in Legione v Hateley 1983
Representer estopped from exercising contractual rights (terminating contract) because a relying party was led to believe they would not be enforced.
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Term
Promise must be clear and unambiguous representation |
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Definition
Legione v Hateley 1983
THIS PRINCIPLE WAS ONLY EXPRESSED BY MASON AND DEANE JJ AND IS NOT CONSISTENT WITH LATER CASES |
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Term
Promissory estoppel can apply even if no pre-existing contract = using estoppel as a sword not a shield.
"Brennan J: to establish an equitable estoppel P must prove:
(1) Assumption
(2) Induced Assumption
(3) Reliance
(4) Knowledge/Intention
(5) Detriment
(6) D fails to act to avoid detriment/Unconscionability" |
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Definition
* Walton Stores v Maher 1988 |
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Term
Degree of certainty of promise |
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Definition
EK Nominees v Woolworths 2006 |
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Term
Promise to act equitably - "he who comes to equity must come with clean hands" |
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Definition
D & C Builders v Rees 1965 |
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Term
Estoppel remedies available:
2nd Promise: Nicholson J (Full Court) from Primary Judge: the sum which puts P in the position as though he owned the house on land which it was situated - but monetary?
- No order to transfer property as family issues, other son in house.
3rd Promise: Award monetary sum to represent value of equitable claim to Promised Lot (with interest, whole property value, no subdivision)
- Valuation flexible (plus lost profits for 12yrs on Lot and rent of house, left detail for judge when matter remitted)" |
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Definition
* Giumelli v Giumelli 1999 |
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Term
Estoppel Remedies: expectation and proportionality |
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Definition
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Term
Promissory estoppel is not enforced as a contract, but is an equitable restraint on the enforcement of the promisor's rights.
- Promisee does not have positive rights to recover deposit that they would have if the pre-contractual promise was enforced.
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Definition
* Saleh v Romanous 2010
Contrary to Hoyts v Spencer |
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Term
Express Terms - Factors indicating statement meant as a term |
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Definition
1) knowledge of parties;
2) time of statement;
3) importance of statement;
4) frequency of statement;
5) content of statement (precision and commitment);
6) reliance;
7) Relationship to 'written' contract - was intention to have whole agreement in one document? |
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Term
A signed document is binding even if unread, in the absence of fraud, misrepresentation or duress. |
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Definition
1) L'Estrange v Graucob [1934];
2) Toll v Alphapharm (2004) |
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Term
Misrepresentation of the EXTENT of a document may mean that the 'signature rule' does not strictly apply. |
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Definition
Curtis v Chemical Cleaning & Dyeing [1951]
Beads and sequins for Curtis. |
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Term
Misrepresentation of the EFFECT of a document may mean that the 'signature rule' does not strictly apply ie. contractual document vs receipt. |
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Definition
Hill v Wright [1971]
Delivery receipt not Wright |
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Term
The effect of a signature may be overridden if non est factum can be proved. The requirements are that P needs some sort of disability; the document that was signed must be radically different from that which P expected and; P had taken reasonable care. |
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Definition
Petellin v Cullen [1975]
Saunders v Anglia Building Soc. [1971] |
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Term
A collateral promise that induces P to sign a contract can form part of the agreement providing it does not contradict the main agreement. |
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Definition
Shepperd v Municipality of Ryde (1952) |
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Term
A mere statment of opinion does not form part of a contract. |
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Definition
Savage v Blakney [1970]
What's your opinion on the speed of the boat? |
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Term
Statements regarding one's own experience are not considered promissory and therefore do not form part of a contract. |
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Definition
Ross v Allis Chalmers (1987)
30 acre experience |
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Term
Parole Evidence Rule - no evidence may be allowed if it subtracts, adds to or contradicts the language of a written instrument. |
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Definition
Codelfa v State Rail Authority NSW (1982) |
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Term
If a document is found to be complete then the PER applies. |
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Definition
Thorne v Borthwick (1956)
The temperature of the oil doesn't matter. |
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Term
A written document will be binding and override previous oral agreements, where the oral agreement would be inconsistent with the written agreement. (PER applies) |
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Definition
Equuscorp Pty Ltd v Glengallan Investments (2004)
A written document on horses. |
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Term
If a written agreement is not considered to be complete, then informal conversations can be used as part of the contract. |
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Definition
County Securities v Challenger Group (2008)
Written document not complete and Secur(ities) |
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Term
Easier to say a contract is partly oral, partly written if prior oral agreement is consistent with later written document. |
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Definition
Skyrise Consultants v Metroland [2011]
2 idential skyrise(s) |
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Term
Entire contract clauses shows an intention that document contains all terms, but it's effectiveness is subject to factors such as:
1) an argument that parties intended for the agreement to be part oral, part written;
2) if the contract was affected by misrepresentation;
3) 'rectification' of document cannot be prevented;
4) implied terms still operate;
5) clause can't exclude liability in consumer contracts ie. ACL;
5) if contract was later varied orally;
6) contract subject to promissory estoppel in negotiations. |
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Definition
Nemeth v Bayswater Road [1988]
**Not referred to as decisive by the HCA; just another factor that may persuade court that document was decisive.
50 planes crash in Bayswater |
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Term
Statements made immediately before signing are likely to constitute a collateral contract and therefore be binding. |
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Definition
Van Den Esschert v Chappell (1960)
White ants in the Chappell |
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Term
In order to escape the PER, collateral contracts must be consistent with the main contract. |
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Definition
Hoyt's v Spencer (1919)
Cinemas Contradictory Collateral Contract (4 C's) |
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Term
If a party signs an agreement 'knowing' it has inconsistent terms, that party cannot say the agreement doesn't reflect the common intent. (However, doesn't undermine estoppel) |
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Definition
Maralinga v Major Enterprises (1973) |
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Term
Estoppel prevails over the PER. |
|
Definition
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|
Term
D must take reasonable steps to notify P of existence of terms (and where they may be considered). |
|
Definition
Parker v South East Railway (1877) |
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Term
When dealing with the incorporation of terms, consider:
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|
Definition
1) nature of referring document;
2) access to incorporated document;
3) identification of applicable terms;
4) time of incorporation;
5) nature of clause - is it unusual? |
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Term
Incorporating document must be contractual in nature and appearance. |
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Definition
Chapelton v Barry Council [1940]
Deck chair receipt |
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Term
P must have reasonable access to terms. |
|
Definition
Oceanic Sun Line v Fay (1988)
Baltic Shipping v Dillon (1991) |
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Term
Terms must be incorporated before acceptance. |
|
Definition
Olly v Marlborough Court Hotel [1949]
Olly's hotel door |
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Term
D must give general notice of terms plus, the more unusual a clause, the greater notice must be given to that clause. |
|
Definition
Thornton v Shoe Lane Parking [1971]
Unusual Shoe Lane |
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Term
The requirement of unusual terms requiring more notice applies to any onerous clause not just exemptions of liability. |
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Definition
Interfoto v Stiletto [1989] |
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|
Term
Terms must be available to P before acceptance occurs. |
|
Definition
Oceanic Sun Line v Fay (1988)
Ticket not part of Fay's Greek contract. |
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|
Term
Unusual terms must be given necessary notice and P must be given an opportunity to to decline to contract on upon specified terms. |
|
Definition
Baltic Shipping v Dillon (1991)
Baltic's declining unusually |
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|
Term
4 types of implied terms:
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|
Definition
1) custom Hutton v Warren (1836)
2) fact/specific Moorcock 1889
3) law/generic Liverpool CC v Irwin
4) universal MacKay v Dick (1881) |
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Term
It is NOT enough that the implied term is reasonable |
|
Definition
Codelfa v State Rail Authority
unreasonably loud Codelfa |
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Term
Implying a law by Custom:
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|
Definition
1) the custom must be a question of fact, not law
2) it is "so well known and acquiesced in that everyone making a k in that situation can reasonably be presumed to have imported that term into the k"
3) it is not contrary to express terms of k
4) the plaintiff may be bound notwithstanding their actual knowledge of it
Con-Stan Industries v Norwich Winterthur Insurance (Australia)
I Con-Stan (Can't Stand) liquidation
f.a.c.k.! |
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Term
"Implication of the term is not an addition to the instrument. It only spells out what the contract means." |
|
Definition
Attorney General of Belize v Belize Telecome |
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Term
|
Definition
1) reasonable and equitable
2) necessary for business efficacy (k otherwise ineffective)
3) so obvious it "goes without saying"
4) capable of clear expression
5) not in contradiction to express K terms
BP Refinery (Westernport) v Hastings Shire Council
Approved by HCA in Byrne v Australian Airlines Ltd (1995) 185 CLR 411
Informal K, reasonableness or efficacy is (probably) enough for an implied term. Hawkins v Clayton (approved by HCA in Byrne v Australian Airlines. Obviousness still important (McHugh & Gummow) |
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Term
Implied Fact: Officious Bystander Test |
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Definition
Shirlaw v Souther Foundries (1926)
Recently: Gwan Investments v Outback Health Screenings
If parties were asked of the implied term during the making of the K both would just yell "of course" |
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Term
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Definition
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Term
Term Implied by Law: to imply a term in law the term must be |
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Definition
1) applicable to a definable class of K
Scally v Southern Health and Social Services Board (1992 AC)
2) Term must be suitable for it to be recognised as implied in all K of that class
Liverpool City Council v Irwin, Byrne v Australia Airlines, UWA v Gray
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Term
Implying a term by Law: 'necessity' includes not just efficacy but justice, policy and social consequences |
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Definition
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Term
Implying a term by Universal: HCA "yeah we're not going to figure that out now" |
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Definition
Royal Botanic Gardens and Domain Trust v South Sydney City Council (2002)
Implied good faith in performance - ACT Cross Country Club v Candy (2010)... IN QUEENSLAND: Laurelmont v Stockdale & Leggo - a case where there was a duty of good faith within a K |
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Term
Implying a term in Universal: K must be executed in good faith |
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Definition
Burger King v Hungry Jacks [2001] NSWCA |
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Term
Implying a term by Universal: parties in K must cooperate (not make sure the other fails) |
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Definition
Secured Income Real Estate v St Martins Investments |
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Term
Implied condition that seller has the right to sell |
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Definition
GUARANTEED BY ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s51
SOGA 1896 (Qld) s15 a)
51 - 'fifty one' - 'trust me, I'm the only one'
15a - 'fifteen A' - 'I'm selling it today' |
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Term
Implied warranty that the buyer will have quiet possession |
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Definition
GUARANTEED BY ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s52
SOGA 1896 (Qld) s15 b)
52 - 'fifty two' - 'this belongs only to you'
15b - 'fifteen bee' - 'don't mind me' |
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Term
Implied warranty that goods are free of 3rd party charge |
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Definition
GUARANTEED BY ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s53
SOGA 1896 (Qld) s15 c)
53 - 'fifty three' - 'wait I thought this was free'
15c - 'fifteen cee' - 'wait I thought this was free' |
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Term
Implied warranty that goods will correspond w/ description |
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Definition
Lockhart v Osman (1981)
GUARANTEED BY ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s56
SOGA 1896 (Qld) s16
56 - 'fifty-six' - Osman and liers are dicks
16 - 'sixteen' - 'I didn't know that's what that means' |
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Term
No implied condition of quality except when
a) purpose described
b) description given |
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Definition
Grant v Australian Knitting Mills (1936)
QUALITY GUARANTEED BY ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s54, FIT-FOR PURPOSE GUARANTEED BY s55
SOGA 1896 (Qld) s17
55 - 'fifty five' - 'as we decribed',
17 - 'seventeen' - 'now lies are just mean' |
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Term
Goods will be exactly like the sample or model |
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Definition
ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s57
57 - 'fifty seven' - 'that model looks like heaven' |
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Term
Defective goods WILL be repaired |
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Definition
ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s58
58 - 'fifty eight' - 'Come on be a mate' |
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Term
there IS an express warranty |
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Definition
ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s59
59 - 'fifty nine' - 'please fixy mine' |
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Term
Services will be done with due care and skill |
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Definition
ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s60
60 - 'sixty' - 'sexty skills' |
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Term
Guarantee as to fitness for purpose |
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Definition
ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s61
61 - 'sixty one' - 'fitness is fun' |
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Term
Things WILL be supplied within a reasonable time |
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Definition
ACL PART 3-2, DIV 1 s62
62 - 'sixty two' - 'here's one for you' |
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Term
For interpretations to admit evidence,
a) the issue/expression "must be susceptible of more than one meaning"
b) cannot take account of later conduct to interpret what term meant when agreed |
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Definition
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Term
meaning of terms what a reasonable person would have understood them to mean. |
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Definition
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Term
Intention is found objectively |
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Definition
Reardon Smith v Hansen Tangen
exactly same design, different ship= deal with it |
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Term
Lord Hoffman summarises developments, but main principle:
the circumstances surrounding the transaction are relevant because the meaning of the language will typically be shaped by the contest in which is used |
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Definition
Investors Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society
1) Ascertain meaning of document to reasonable person with background knowledge of parties at time
2) Background is 'factural matrix': "" anything which would have affected the way in which the language of the document would have been understood by a reasonable person.
3) Law excludes previous negotiations and subjective intent
4) Meaning of words= dictionaries. Meaning of document= what parties reasonably understood them to mean
5) Natural and ordinary meaning is commonsense view that people do not make linguistic mistakes, especially in formal documents. |
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Term
courts will reject "detailed and syntactical analysis of words in commercial contract if it leads to result which flouts business common sense" |
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Definition
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Term
Not court function to attribute to the parties an intention to do something which their express words do not provide |
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Definition
ABC v Australian Performing Rights Association
Gibbs J: if language is open to 2 constructions, choose one that avoids result which is capricious, unreasonable, inconvenient or unjust, even if not the most obvious or grammatically accurate. |
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Term
the more unreasonable the result, the more unlikely it is that the parties can have intended it |
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Definition
Wickman Machine Tool v L Schuler |
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Term
words may be supplied, ommitted or corrected in an instrument where it is clearly necessary in order to avoid absurdity or inconsistency |
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Definition
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Term
if there is a mistake which doesn't reflect the common intentions of the parties, then we can correct a technical error in the document |
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Definition
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Term
expressio unius exclusio alterus: if expressly mention one thing, that excludes other things |
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Definition
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Term
ejusdem generis: of a like kind |
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Definition
Tillman v Knutsford
ice isn't political |
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Term
interpret contract so as to avoid defeating main purpose and intent of contract. |
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Definition
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Term
Construe exclusion clause according to its 'natural and ordinary meaning' in 'context' of 'whole contract'. If in doubt 'contra proferentum' them. |
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Definition
* Darlington Futures v Delco 1968
ordinary meaning applied in:
Selected Seeds v QBEMM 2010
contra proferentum applied in:
Wallis Son & Wells v Pratt & Haymes 1911 |
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Term
Four Corners Rule: Protection of exclusion clause exists while party is performing authorised act of contract (not outside 4 corners of contract). |
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Definition
Sydney City Council v West 1965 |
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Term
A clearly worded exclusion clause may apply to exclude liability, even for events occurring in circumstances that would defeat the main object of the contract. |
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Definition
Nissho Iwai Aust v Malaysian Shipping 1989 |
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Term
"Exemption clause includes liability for negligence if:
(1) express reference to exclusion of negligence
(2) not express, but clear and expansive enough to cover negligence, e.g. ""howsoever caused"" or ""under no circumstances""
(3) expansive words can cover negligence + other basis, liability to apply to other basis" |
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Definition
Canada Steamship Lines v The King 1952 |
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Term
"Rule of Law Denning Doctrine of ""fundamental breach"" rejected in England.
Exemption clause is a 'Question of Construction'." |
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Definition
Photo Production v Securicor 1980 |
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Term
"Never doctrine of ""fundamental breach"" destroying an exemption clause.
- Construe language that the parties used, read in context and with any necessary implications based on their presumed intention." |
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Definition
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Term
Any term that excludes, restricts or modifies Consumer Guarantees will be void. |
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Definition
ACL Part 3-2 Division 1 s.64
64 - 'it's the kind of protection you'd hope for' |
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Term
Statutory guarantees apply but one can limit liability for GOODS and SERVICES provided not for personal/domestics/household use. However, cannot limit liability for 'title' in respect to GOODS. |
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Definition
ACL Part 3-2 Division 1 s.64A
64A - 'You'll have to protect your goods another way' |
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Term
Staturotory Limits not allowed if buyer proves it is not fair or reasonable for supplier to rely on limit. |
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Definition
ACL Part 3-2 Division 1 s.64A(3) & (4)
64A 3 & 4 - 'the supplier is being an A to me and the poor' |
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Term
Statutory protection; Must be a business-consumer contract = supply of goods/services to an individual for personal, domestic, or household use/consumption. |
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Definition
ACL Part 2-3 Division 1 s.23(3)
23(3) - 'I swear, it's for me and only me' |
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Term
Statutory protection; Must be a standard form contract. |
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Definition
ACL Part 2-3 Division 1 s.23(1)b
23(1)b - 'Can't be a standard form wannabe' |
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Term
Statutory protection; Definition of 'standard form contract' - business must prove not a standard form contract. |
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Definition
ACL Part 2-3 Division 1 s.27
27 - "This sounds like business suppression!!" |
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Term
Some contracts excluded from relying on UCT (mainly shipping/boats). |
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Definition
ACL Part 2-3 Division 1 s.28
28 - "boats and shit we don't tolerate" |
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Term
Term is unfair if it: causes significant imbalance in rights and obligations (onus on P); is not reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate interests of D (onus on D) and; causes detriment to consumer (onus on P). |
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Definition
ACL Part 2-3 Division 1 s.24(1)
(4) - D must prove otherwise
24(1) - "come on D, those terms are good for no one" |
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Term
Court MUST consider transparency and the contract as a whole to determine if term is unfair and can also take into account other relevant factors. |
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Definition
ACL Part 2-3 Division 1 s.24(2)
24(2) - "Courts can't just consider what ever they want to" |
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Term
Court cannot review main terms of the contract or terms which set the upfront price. |
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Definition
QFT v Abbey National [2009] *UK case
ACL Part 2-3 Division 1 s.26
26 - "we can't stop your banks from being dicks" |
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