The Moral Status of Animals

• our moral response to cases reflect our Basic Moral Values
• seeks to preserve appearance that our case-responses reflect these Values
• all moral reasoning must accommodate these responses
• based on moral intuition
• defends the notion that "is" and "ought" are congruent
• no antecedent morally substantive aspect
• ex. preservationists will hold that when saving others from serious loss it is wrong to lie, cheat, and steal, even though no one will suffer much from doing any of those things

• case-responses do not reflect Basic Moral Values
• distortional tendencies prevent us from recognizing that our case responses do not reflect our Values
• seeks to liberate us from the appearance that these case-responses reflect our Values
• not based in moral intuition
• responses guided by substantive moral prepositions

Our Idea of Moral Progress

Obvious Sharp Conflict vs. No Apparent Conflict

Futility Thinking

Projective Separating

The Method of Several Options

Protophysics

• once a bad form of behaviour is taken to be surpassed, we give negative assessment to anyone who partakes in such behaviour after the time of surpassing
• by contrast, when someone has partaken in a bad form of behaviour before such behaviour has been taken by us to be surpasses, her conduct will receive positive assessment
• example, we see Thomas Jefferson as a good man although he had 277 slaves but only freed them after the death of himself and his wife
• Unger's Critique
• we underrate those who engage in bad behaviour after it has been surpassed
• we overrate those who engage in bad behaviour before it has been surpassed

• decisions can only be moral if they are grounded in rationality
• ex. rival heirs and the murder of a distant cousin
• although this is a rational decision it is not a moral one
• Unger believes morality must be grounded in certain moral truths
• if we didn't believe in certain moral truths we would have no foundation for morality

• when the suffering of others is salient and conspicuous to you there is an Obvious Sharp Conflict with your Basic Moral Values
• this makes it difficult not to intervene even when there is a cost to you
• ex. the Sedan
• When the suffering of others is not salient or conspicuous to you there is No Apparent Conflict with your Basic Moral Values
• this makes it easy to remain passive especially if there is a cost to you
• ex. the Envelope

• do not contribute to the serious suffering of innocent others
• Unger proposes: we must contribute to lessening the serious suffering of innocent others
• domain of Primary Values:
• knowing everything you ought to know about what really is the case morally
• knowing all that is relevant in your situation
• when you are morally motivated and deliberate about what morally you ought to do

• the application of our moral values
• epistemic responsibilities: what we ought to know about the nonmoral facts of our situation
• what we ought to know about our Values and what really is the case morally 
• ex. it is hard to reduce the number of people suffering to as small as you can manage -- you ought to know that it will be difficult to do this in situations
• secondary values are influenced by context and social location
• how we ought to be moved by knowing what the case is morally

Five Steps of Futility Thinking

• when you know others are in need you think there is a strong moral reason to help them
• you know no matter what you do, many greatly needy people will suffer anyway
• if the people you know are in need are presented as part of this larger group you will feel your behaviour is futile
• even if your behaviour is successful in meeting the needs of some, you still feel your actions were futile
• this leads to the conclusion that there isn't a strong moral reason to help those in great need
• ex. the Envelope

• using others as a means to save someone is morally objectionable
• however, as part of necessary means for preventing the loss of some, other might be harmed
• as a fully-foreseen result, or as a side-effect
• how we view these cases can depend on the above variations: foreseen result, or side-effect
• ex. the Yacht, the Account

• certain descriptions can separate people or things in your mind into manageable small groups
• these can be personal or impersonal
• this leads to projective separating

• we see the world as comprising of situations
• these situations include certain people
• other people are involved in other situations, separate from the first
• this leads us to see problems affecting one group to be the problem of that group only
• this distorts our response to moral cases
• we think it is wrong to involve others not considered to be a part of the problem
• ex. the Yard, the Small Missile

• trolly will kill six innocents trapped on the track
• if you flip a switch the trolly will be derailed and crash into a man's yard, killing him
• most respond conduct was wrong
• however in the similar case of the Trolly, (save 6, kill 1) most respond that your conduct was good
• projective separating accounts for this difference

• six innocents are trapped on a trolly track
• the army has accidentally launched a small missile that is heading for the six
• you can reroute the missile but only so that it kills the man in his yard
• most respond that your conduct was good
• the missile is not strongly associated with anyone on the ground
• no projective separating to distort response

First Order Intuitions

Second Order Intuitions

• First Order: response to cases
• Second Order: comparative assessment of cases

• rock and a hard place
• to lessen the serious suffering of some, you must increase the suffering of others
• ex. the Foot, the Trolly

• 60 neighbours have contracted a fatal disease through no fault of their own
• they will die in a few days
• a man in the park has a rare body chemistry that holds the antidote
• you need to cut off his foot to make the antidote
• he will not agree so you must render him unconscious, sever his foot, and save the 60
• most respond that your conduct is wrong

• six innocents tied to a train track 
• if you do nothing a trolly will crush them
• if you flick a switch the trolly will change lines and instead kill one woman who is tied to a different track
• most respond that your conduct was good

• regardless of consequences, responses will differ depending on the number of options presented
• in the Switches and the Skates there are 4 options, one resulting in the death of a fat man -- positive reaction
• in the foot there are two options one resulting in the loss of a foot -- negative reaction

• fanatical assessment of loss lessening
• leads to positive reaction when harming some to help others 
• this is in strong opposition with our Basic Moral Values
• our responses are influenced by morally disorienting material -- not liberating
• disorienting material has us be fanatical in our assessment of loss lessening
• this allows us to respond positively to harmful behaviour
• Unger argues against Fanaticism hypothesis in favour of Liberation hypothesis
• compare negative reaction to the foot and positive reaction to the heavy skater's foot

• explosive impulse towards any conduct that lessens serious suffering overall
• when this occurs we fail to be properly affected by moral considerations 
• this does not appear to be true in the Heavy Skater 
• best loss lessening option
• worst protophysical option
• caused negative assessment

• when confronted with two options the one with the most effective loss lessening is morally better
• when confronted with multiple cases pairwise comparisons cannot be managed
• morally relevant factors are distorted
• this causes our decisions not to reflect our Values
• in two versions of the Switches and the Trolleys the same option got a positive response when there were two other options and a negative response when there were three options

When serious loss will result it's harder to justify...

• moving a person into an object than moving an object into a person
• changing the object's speed than changing its direction
• speeding up an object than slowing down an object
• putting a resting object in motion than increasing the speed of an object
• imposing a force on an object than allowing a force already present to work the object

• must be followed to avoid living an immoral life
• typically well off person must give away most of her assets and income
• direct funds towards lessening the suffering of others

• if its all right to impose losses on some to save others
• it should be all right to impose losses on yourself to save others

• if it's okay to impose losses on yourself to save others
• then you cannot fail to impose even smaller losses on yourself when they will lessen the suffering of many more

• there is a limit to how many people can seriously suffer before it is made okay to impose a small loss upon one other individual to save them
• most believe however that there is no threshold at all
• ex. the enormously needed foot: a billion will die without the foot
• strength of projective separating

• epistemic focus deals with knowing who you are saving
• this contrast is demonstrated in the Envelope and the Sedan
• common moral sense tells us that just because we don't know whose suffering we are lessening or preventing, that doesn't change our moral obligation to do so
• ex. the Very Special Relations Fund, the Vintage Boat

• you receive a letter in the mail from UNICEF 
• if you do not donate $100 to aid, 30 more children will die
• you chose not to donate, 30 children die
• positive response to your conduct

• you are not rich, one luxury is your vintage sedan
• on a lightly travelled country road you find the cheating former med student on the side of the road
• his leg is inured from trespassing, if you do not take him to the hospital he will lose his leg
• you don't want his blood on your leather seating so you leave him
• most respond negatively 

• you hear the injured trespassing former med student on your CB radio
• he tells you you are 10 miles from him
• not wanting him to ruin your leather seating you drive in the other direction and he loses his leg
• most respond your conduct was wrong
• reflects on informative directness, experiential impact, physical proximity, social proximity

• you are not rich but you own a time share for a bungalow in Haiti
• you receive an envelope from UNICEF asking for $100 to save suffering children just beyond the compound wall
• you do not donate and children die
• you conduct receives positive response
• reflects on physical proximity, social proximity, experiential impact, informative directness

• you are on a road trip in your sedan to south america
• in Bolivia you find a Bolivian medical student at the side of the road 
• same deal, you don't want him to ruin your leather seats
• most respond your conduct was wrong
• reflects on social proximity

• physical proximity
• social proximity
• informative directness
• experiential impact
• casually focused vs. casually amorphous aid
• semantic conditions
• epistemic focus
• the thought of governments
• the thought of disastrous further future
• unique potential saviour vs. multiple potential saviours
• emergency
• money vs. goods and services

• you're employed on the waterfront estate of a billionaire
• you see a woman drowning and a hurricane is approaching
• to save her you must use the motor yacht which will be damaged on your return due to the hurricane and your need to use a special channel
• damage will be millions of dollars you don't have 
• most respond your conduct was good
• doctrine of double effect: harm was a side-effect

• your an accountant with a billionaire client
• you know he doesn't significantly contribute to charity
• you wire a million of his dollars to UNICEF without him knowing
• most respond your conduct was wrong
• doctrine of double effect: the harm was a fully foreseen result

• tycoon owns a valuable antique key
• in a nearby town a bomb is set to explode killing dozens
• if the key is used it will be damaged but it will open the door to defuse the bomb and save everyone
• the tycoon doesn't want his key to be damaged so you must steal it
• most respond your conduct was good

• all lives are equal
• all lives have absolute value
• regardless of quality or kind
• we only apply this rule to humans

• human being defined by biological characteristics
• persons are defined by characteristics that qualify them for moral consideration
• self-consciousness, rationality, self-control, sense of time, communication, ability to relate to others, biographical life

• moral language does not make statements that are true or false
• moral language has the emotive end of influencing behaviour

• refers to the empirical characteristics of the being in question
• can also refer to the ontological status being derived from a metaphysical interpretation 
• ex. human embryo 

• Sumner:
• being alive
• being conscious (sentient)
• being intrinsically valuable
• being rational
• others add potentiality

• denies them all moral consideration
• excludes them from moral community but concedes that we have certain duties towards them
• includes animals as moral patients

• membership of a species qualifies a being for the same moral consideration that is given to every member of that species regardless of individual variation
• the idea that humans have privileged moral status compared to nonhuman animals
• the current states of morality includes two moral communities defined by species membership: human beings are granted moral consideration, nonhuman animals are not granted moral consideration
• coined on the model of racism and sexism

• two sides
• inclusive: all humans are moral patients
• exclusive: only humans are moral patients

Rawl's "Natural Lottery"

David Richards 

• David Richards: since differences between beings are fortuitous they cannot be of fundamental weight in deciding what counts as moral principles
• suffers from circularity
• appeal to fortuitousness works for intraspecies conditions but not interspecies

• claim that there is a correspondence between certain biological characteristics and the presence or absence of capacities that are morally relevant
• Thomas Scanlon: moral status depends not on the capacities of the being, but the capacities that are typical of its kind
• Criticism:
• species membership is therefore relevant
• correspondence approach does not consider internal variation
• internal variation can lead to overlapping of capacities or lack thereof between species
• there is no mutual exclusion

• James Rachels
• treatment of individuals determined not by group membership but by individual characteristics
• argument for marginal cases must be considered

• it is not possible to infer matters of value from matters of fact
• is vs. ought

• satisfaction of a set of fundamental interests:
• not suffering
• not being disabled
• not being confined

Singer's Utilitarian Approach

Principle of Equal Consideration

• horizontal level of consideration: interests are compared to one another
• the suffering of any being must be taken into consideration
• kind of individual comes into play when considering the degree of similarity of interests
• equal weight should be given to equal interests 
• i.e. slapping a horse vs. slapping a baby
• criticism:
• how do we assess when interests are comparable

Deontological Approach

subject-of-life

• Regan
• vertical evaluation -- kind of being
• certain criteria make a being eligible as a subject-of-life
• this includes moral agents and moral patients
• after this evaluation becomes horizontal for those designated as a subject-of-life

Renee Descartes

Essentialist Dualism

• dichotomic worldview
• realm of the soul and realm of brute matter
• humans were a bridge that comprised of these two realms
• animals belonged only to the realm of brute matter
• natural automata controlled only by cause and effect
• animals are therefore not subjects
• Descartes criteria for moral consideration is subjectivity
• Descartes asserts his theory is not so much cruel to animals as it is indulgent to men as it absolves them of cruelty to animals
• vivisection: dissection of live animals

• notion of subjectivity depends on the soul which is a metaphysical element and thus unverifiable
• soul is a deus ex machina
• does not explain the discontinuity of human and nonhuman rationality
• does not explain rationality as a necessary requisite for subjectivity
• evolution dismisses the idea that there is a ontological gulf between our species and others

the belief that there is a radical dichotomy between us and other species

see neo-Cartesian revival 

Neo-Cartesian Revival

Concept of animal machine

Carruthers

• nonhuman animal experiences cannot be subject to moral consideration because they lack self-awareness
• humans adapted the ability to:
• predict, explain, manipulate, and direct behaviour of others
• capacity for second-order thoughts (thoughts about thoughts)

Neo-Cartesian Revival

Concept of animal machine

Frey

• language is a prerequisite for believing and desiring
• to believe Jim is at the door, one must believe the statement "Jim is at the door"
• this does not stand as belief is based on perception, which nonhuman animals have

• take psychology back to hard sciences
• replaces consciousness with observable behaviour as the nonhuman mind could not be demonstrated this asserted its nonexistence
• behaviourism defined by stimuli and response
• maintains mentalistic explanations are not appropriate for humans or nonhumans
• what counts in suffering is the phenomenal aspect -- the way it is experienced

• Morgan's canon: no animal behaviour may be interpreted at a higher level when it may be interpreted at a lower one
• anthropomorphism: any interpretation of animal behaviour cannot make reference to human behaviour (as this attributes them more than their due)

Marginal Cases and Non-paradigmatic Humans

Carl Cohen

the Nature of Human Beings

• there is no overlap between non-paradigmatic humans and other species
• what humans retain when disabled animals never had
• appeal to the nature of human beings 
• capacity for moral judgement distinguishes humans from nonhuman animals
• humans are the kind of being that can only be subject to experimentation with consent
• Criticism
• little genetic difference between apes and humans
• natural selection eliminates categorical difference  
• pluralistic approach: capacities are multidimensional and gradational
• Cohen's argument relies on metaphysical assumptions 

Marginal Cases and Non-paradigmatic Humans

Pluralistic Approach

• capacities once thought to be distinctly human such as rationality, self-consciousness, autonomy, moral agency
• not exclusive to human species
• these capacities are not all-or-nothing but are multidimensional and gradational
• compatible with evolutionary continuity
• but still supports moral superiority of our species

Marginal Cases and Non-paradigmatic Humans

Robert Nozick

Relations

• members of any species can legitimately give preferential treatment to members of their own species
• appeal to relational rather than intrinsic characteristics
• agent-dependent reasoning often bias
• appeal to prejudice

• preference for those of our own species is a natural emotive tendency
• this violates Hume's law: is vs. ought

In Denfence of Marginal Cases

and Non-paradigmatic Humans

• if it was found that rape and male dominance was a naturally derived biological tendency
• would we still not see it as morally wrong?

Marginal Cases and Non-paradigmatic Humans

• morality is the result of a hypothetical contract between rational agents
• includes non rational humans because according rights to degree of rationality could be easily abused
• Criticism: slippery slope

Marginal Cases and Non-paradigmatic Humans

• we should not take steps that might lead to further steps at the end of which there is something we want to avoid
• based on empirical assumptions
• one step leading to another must be proven in each instance

Marginal Cases and Non-paradigmatic Humans

• all humans should be included in the moral community even if they lack the requisites at the risk of unduly excluding those who are endowed with moral capacity form the sphere of justice
• the risk to just institutions would be too great
• criticism: affect on institutions would have to be proven

Marginal Cases and Non-paradigmatic Humans

• marginal human beings are less endowed than others through no fault of their own
• it would be unfair to profit form their vulnerability
• appeal to fairness based on fortuitous circumstance works for intraspecies not interspecies relations
• nonhuman animals are directly introduced with a second-class status
• Criticism:
• circular argument
• an argument in support of speciesism cannot use speciesism as a premise

• animals have no moral status
• animals are a means to an end -- this end is man
• duty towards animals is indirect duty towards humanity
• duties towards animals as their nature is analogous to human nature
• such as our treatment of animals can rebound on our treatment of humans

• language require sophisticated cognitive patterns
• Darwin asserts human language is a natural extension of primitive systems of signs and signals used by others animals
• taught language use to apes, dolphins, parrots
• potential linguistic ability: imitative pretence, intentional deception, communication of nonnatural meaning

Potential Linguistic Ability

Imitative Pretence 

• Bateson: during play, beings can simulate its activities and render that simulation evident
• ex. when animals play-fight they convey they are simulating fighting and can convey to their playmate that this is simulation

Potential Linguistic Ability

Intentional Deception

• capacity for dual description:
• the ability to distinguish between reality and mental representation
• causing a mental representation that does not represent reality
• intentional deception in animals has been demonstrated in their competition for sex or food -- source of strategy

• Griffin: "groans of pain" natural response to physical state
• communication of nonnatural meaning  implies that the communicator believes others recognize her intention
• mechanism of attention: reciprocated attention
• often achieved through eye contact
• ex. animals often use silent communication when hunting or deciding meeting times and places

• it is right to preform an action when the consequences of the action will result in no less good than the consequences of any other action
• theory of the right designed to maximize good/value
• Bentham's original version: the greatest good for the greatest number of people
• Criticisms:
• not a decision procedure
• often goes against our moral intuitions

Rule Utilitarianism

Two Forms

• you ought to conduct yourself by a set of rules the compliance/adoption of which will result in consequences no less good than the consequences when complying/adopting any other set of rules
• adoption does not necessarily mean compliance
• adoption functions as a decision procedure
• compliance is more a theory of the right

• what matters is how equal people actually are
• outcomes
• people are better off when outcomes are equal than when they are less equal
• Criticisms:
• this can cause leveling down: bad outcomes that are equal
• too many people count, especially dead ones

• concerned with how resources are distributed
• resources should be distributed equally
• regardless of unequal benefit

• priority must be given to the less well off
• the value of increases to an individual's wellbeing is less the more wellbeing one has to start with
• in distributions, the total good is increased the most when you increase the wellbeing of the least well-off over the better-off
• compatible with utility and functions as a decision procedure

• function of wellbeing to value is concave
• large increases in wellbeing to those who are well off might outweigh small increases to those who are worse off

• maximin: ought to distribute so the least well off person's condition is the least bad
• no amount of improvement in the wellbeing of the well-off can outweigh even a small improvement to the wellbeing of the least well-off
• criticism:
• depends on their being meaningful non-comparitive measures of wellbeing

The Cognitively Impaired

Jeff McMahan

Species Norm Account

• various capacities and functions are essential to member ship in a species
• these are minimal conditions for the good life in any species
• opposed to biological species membership
• fails to distinguish between the cognitively impaired and nonhuman animals

• whether a being is well or badly off is determined by how its its capacities compare with the highest capacities it may have possibly been endowed with
• species fixes these potential capacities

• wellbeing is determined by comapring its actual levels of wellbeing with the rage of levels accessible to it when it posessed of the peak capacity for wellbeing it had achieved during its life
• ex. you get in an accident and become cognitively impaired 

• physical violence as been possible throughout human history so we have developed a strong moral intuition against it
• switches and train track however are recent inventions and we have not developed intuitions that would prevent us from flicking a switch to change a trolly line to save six and kill one
• globalization has made it easier to help those across the globe but this has not developed in our moral intuitions
• our moral intuitions are to help family who are close, not strangers far away