Term
A. Authority for Judicial Review
a. Marbury v. Madison – |
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Definition
i. Constitution has a binding effect on the government
ii. Congress cannot increase federal jurisdiction under Art. III
iii. SCOTUS can review executive conduct for constitutionality
iv. SCOTUS can review legislative conduct for constitutionality |
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Term
A. Authority for Judicial Review
b. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee |
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Definition
| declared authority to review state court judgments |
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Term
A. Authority for Judicial Review
c. Cohens v. Virginia |
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Definition
| reiterated authority to review state court judgments; criminal defendants can seek review when they claim conviction violates the Constitution |
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Term
a. Methods of interpretation
i. Originalism |
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Definition
explicit in the text or implicit in the meaning
1. limits what the court can review
2. limits when the Constitution is controlling |
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Term
a. Methods of interpretation
ii. Modified Originalism |
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Definition
| takes into account there are situations the framers could not have considered |
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Term
a. Methods of interpretation
iii. Tradition |
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Definition
| maintains restraint but allows for evolution |
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Term
a. Methods of interpretation
iv. Process-based Theory |
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Definition
| create a fair process of government but leave the substantive issues to the legislature |
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Term
a. Methods of interpretation
v. Aspirationalism |
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Definition
| allows the least constraint and most discretion |
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Term
| b. Hierarchy of interpretation: |
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Definition
i. Text – if it expressly mentions one thing thereby excluding another, no need to look further
ii. Original understanding – when statute is ambiguous, its meaning must be determined by looking at other statutes on the matter
iii. Precedent
iv. Tradition
v. Social norms |
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Term
| c. Doctrines of Judicial Restraint |
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Definition
i. Actual case or controversy
ii. No advisory opinions
iii. Standing
iv. Ripeness
v. Mootness
vi. Political Question |
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Term
C. Congressional Limits on the Scope of the Judicial Power
a. Ex Parte McArdle |
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Definition
| Court is not concerned with the motives of Congress, but the Constitutional authority to divest jurisdiction |
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Term
Congressional Limits on the Scope of the Judicial Power
b. United States v. Klein |
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Definition
| Congress cannot enact legislation to make decision for the Court or to infringe on the constitutional ability of the president |
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Term
Congressional Limits on the Scope of the Judicial Power
c. Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society |
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Definition
| Congress violates separation of powers when it directs the judiciary as to decision making under an existing law and does not apply when Congress adopts a new law |
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Term
a. Prohibition of Advisory Opinions
i. Hayburn’s Case |
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Definition
| duty of making recommendations regarding pensions is not of a judicial nature |
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Term
a. Prohibition of Advisory Opinions ii. Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc
May congress create legislation to reopen cases that have been setled? |
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Definition
| cannot make legislation to retroactively reopen cases that have been settled – would make judicial opinions advisory instead of final |
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Term
D. Justiciability Limits
b. Nashville, C & St. L. Ry. V. Wallace |
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Definition
| – case is justiciable if it has the essentials of an adversary proceeding |
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Term
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Definition
i. Actual injury
ii. Defendant caused the injury
iii. Favorable ruling is the remedy
iv. No third-party standing
v. No generalized grievances |
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Term
E. Standing b. Allen v. Wright
Was an injury claiming that the IRS funding a segregated school show causation for damages to parents of black public school children? |
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Definition
| held lack of standing for actual injury where parents of black schoolchildren brought suit against IRS alleging that failure to deny tax-exempt status to private schools stigmatizing damages |
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Term
E. Standing
c. Massachusetts v.EPA |
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Definition
| where MA sued EPA for failing to comply with Clean Air Act, court held standing because MA had a cognizable injury caused by the EPA for refusing to regulate emissions that contribute to greenhouse gases |
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Term
E. Standing
d. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons |
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Definition
| by suing for an injunction to change a policy, Lyons lacked standing because he could not prove a future harm to himself |
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Term
E. Standing e. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife
Was a complaint that the modified Endangered Species Act would not effect foreign projects overseas enough to justify standing? |
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Definition
| Endangered Species Act did not apply to foreign projects overseas, plaintiffs did not have standing because they had no concrete plans to go study animals overseas |
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Term
E. Standing
f. U.S. v. Hays |
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Definition
| no standing because plaintiffs did not live in any of the alleged gerrymandered districts |
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Term
E. Standing g. Federal Election Commission v. Akins
Why were citizens determined to have standing in this case? |
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Definition
| citizens were denied information from the FEC so they had standing |
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Term
E. Standing
h. Linda R.S. v. Richard D. |
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Definition
| plaintiff did not have standing because prosecution would not redress the issue of failure to pay child support |
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Term
E. Standing i. Warth v. Seldin
How did the redressibility requirement for standing prevent justiciability of a case for plaintiffs complaining that a statute prevent construction of housing? |
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Definition
| plaintiffs lacked standing because they could not prove that appropriate housing could be constructed without the exclusionary zoning ordinances |
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Term
E. Standing
j. Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. |
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Definition
| patients lacked standing to challenge denial of care by tax-exempt hospitals because court ruling would not result in plaintiff’s receipt of medical care |
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Term
E. Standing k. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group
Can future injuries satisfy standing requirements? |
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Definition
| held standing for possible future injuries |
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Term
| l. Organizational or associational standing |
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Definition
| an exception to third party standing that an organization can sue on behalf of its members if individuals would have standing |
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Term
| m. Exceptions to third party standing |
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Definition
1. Relationship of litigant to the person whose right he seeks to assert
2. Ability of the third party to assert that right |
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Term
m. Exceptions to third party standing i. Singleton v. Wulff
Is a Doctor-Patient relationship a close relationship for the purpose of third-party standing? |
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Definition
| Physicians had standing to sue on behalf of pregnant patients regarding Medicaid compensation for abortion services |
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Term
m. Exceptions to third party standing ii. Barrows v. Jackson
Can a white member of a owners of a racially discriminatory covenant hold standing for a 3rd party claim representing black renters? |
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Definition
| standing of property owner to bring suit regarding violation of a racially restrictive covenant by renting to African Americans, asserting rights of potential renters because the renters would have no way to bring issue with the covenant |
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Term
m. Exceptions to third party standing iii. Craig v. Boren
Was the bartender - patron relationship enough to grant the bartender third party standing? |
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Definition
| bartender had standing for customers because age differential drinking law between men and women caused him actual injury in sales |
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Term
m. Exceptions to third party standing
iv. Gilmore v. Utah |
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Definition
| mother could not seek habeas relief for son on death row |
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Term
m. Exceptions to third party standing
v. Elk Grove Unified School Disrtict v. Newdow |
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Definition
| father lacks standing to sue school district for reciting the Pledge of Allegiance because it is not in child’s best interest and his parental rights are in dispute |
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Term
n. Rule against generalized grievances
vi. U.S. v. Richardson |
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Definition
| cannot use taxpayer status to air a general grievance |
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Term
| n. Rule against generalized grievances |
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Definition
| cannot sue as a taxpayer or citizen aggrieved by some unlawful conduct |
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Term
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Definition
| determination of whether federal court can grant pre-enforcement review |
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Term
F. Ripeness b. Poe v. Ullman
Is a case ripe if issue involves a ban that is not being enforced? |
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Definition
| court stated the case was not ripe because ban on contraceptives was not enforced |
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Term
F. Ripeness
c. Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner |
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Definition
where new law was made requiring brand name drugs to print established name on the labels, Court found issue was ripe because:
1. Issue was fit for judicial determination
2. Hardship involved by withholding consideration |
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Term
F. Ripeness
d. United Public Workers v. Mitchell |
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Definition
| not ripe because the opinion sought was advisory where federal employees sued regarding |
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Term
F. Ripeness e. International Longshoreman’s & Warehouseman’s Union
Is a case for the ability to return to the United States ripe, if they have not been barred from returning? |
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Definition
| case was not ripe where aliens wanted to be sure they could return to U.S. after going to work in Alaska (before statehood) |
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Term
F. Ripeness
f. Regional Railroad Reorganization Act Cases |
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Definition
| where inevitability of a statute working against certain individuals is patent, it is irrelevant that there where be a time delay before disputed provision come into effect; there is ripeness |
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Term
F. Ripeness
g. Lake Carriers Assn. v. MacMullen |
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Definition
| inevitability of enforcement of a law makes a case ripe |
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Term
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Definition
| the controversy no longer exists (time, death, settlement, repeal of law) |
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Term
G. Mootness
b. Exceptions: |
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Definition
1. Wrongs capable of repetition but evading review
2. Voluntary cessation – if the defendant voluntarily ceases the allegedly improper conduct but is free to return to it at anytime
3. Class action |
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Term
G. Mootness c. Moore v. Ogilvie
Is a case based on an election practice rendered moot because the election has ended? |
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Definition
| where suit was based on an election practice, fact that election was over did not render case moot because it could be repeated |
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Term
G. Mootness
d. Roe v. Wade |
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Definition
| termination of pregnancy did not render the case moot |
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Term
G. Mootness
e. DeFunis v. Odegaard |
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Definition
| white male alleged that affirmative action violated equal protection for admission in to law school, but because he would finish school regardless of any court decision, the case is moot |
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Term
G. Mootness
f. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services – |
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Definition
| Court did not dismiss case of pollution due to voluntary cessation because defendant could begin activity again |
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Term
G. Mootness
g. U.S. Parole Commission v. Geraghty |
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Definition
| class action does not become moot when named petitioner claim on the merits has expire |
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Term
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Definition
| a. All the justiciability requirements are met, but Court feels it is a subject best left to another branch of government |
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Term
H. Political Question
b. Baker v. Carr |
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Definition
| it is up to the judiciary to decide whether an action by the state legislature violates the 14th Amendment |
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Term
H. Political Question d. Vieth v. Jubilirer
Is political gerrymandering justiciable by the Supreme Court? |
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Definition
| made political gerrymandering a political question by plurality |
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Term
H. Political Question
e. Powell v. McCormack |
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Definition
| issue of unseating a member of Congress is a political question where people elected the member and Congress had to oust by 2/3 majority |
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Term
H. Political Question
f. Goldwater v. Carter |
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Definition
| nonjusticiable when Senator challenged presidential rescinding of treaty |
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Term
H. Political Question
g. Nixon v. U.S. |
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Definition
| Court refused to get involved on how the Senate impeaches its members |
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Term
| A. Types of authority invested in the Executive |
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Definition
a. Inherent presidential power – not specifically enumerated
b. Express presidential power – enumerated power |
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Term
III. EXECUTIVE POWER
B. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer |
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Definition
| Where president issued an executive order to Secretary of Commerce to take control of steel mills to avoid a strike, Court said president did not have this power and was usurping a legislative act |
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Term
III. EXECUTIVE POWER
B. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer –
a. Jackson’s concurrence - three categories of power: |
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Definition
1. When president acts pursuant to express or implied authorization of Congress –authority is at its maximum
2. When president acts in absence of congressional grant or denial and relies on independent powers – test depends on inertia of congress and facts of the situation
3. When president acts are incompatible with express or implied will of congress- power is at its shakiest |
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Term
III. EXECUTIVE POWER C. U.S. v. Nixon
regard the scope and extent of executive privilege and how much control the president has over the executive branch |
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Definition
| a. There is executive privilege from the nature of enumerated powers b. Court decides the scope of the privilege c. Need to investigate criminal activity outweighs privilege |
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Term
III. EXECUTIVE POWER
D. Clinton v. City of New York |
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Definition
| Congress gets to decide the law, the president cannot line item veto to change the law |
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Term
III. EXECUTIVE POWER
E. Zones of importance: |
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Definition
a. Where Congress and the president are explicitly on the same page
b. Congressional silence
c. Where Congress and the president are explicitly at odds |
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Term
III. EXECUTIVE POWER
F. Three aspects of foreign policy |
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Definition
a. Should foreign policy and domestic affairs be treated differently?
b. How should treaty making power be allocated?
c. How should war making power be allocated? |
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Term
H. Political Question
G. U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp |
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Definition
| non-delegation doctrine does not apply in the realm of foreign affairs, president has to be given a great deal of discretion in this area |
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Term
H. Political Question
H. Dames & Moore v. Regan |
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Definition
| president has power to enter into executive agreements without congressional approval; where president issued an executive order to create Iran-U.S. Claims tribunal |
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Term
H. Political Question I. Nixon v. Fitzgerald
What branch of government has oversight on official acts of the president? |
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Definition
| president has absolute immunity for official acts as president |
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Term
H. Political Question
J. Clinton v. Jones |
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Definition
| president does not escape litigation by executive privilege; courts can deal with any national security concerns |
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Term
IV. WAR ON TERROR A. Ex parte Quirin
Are non-citizens afforded non-constitutional guarantees? |
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Definition
| military tribunals are ok; constitutional guarantees are not afforded to non-citizen detainees |
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Term
IV. WAR ON TERROR B. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
When can the president detain someone on his authority alone without allowing an individual to contest the detention? |
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Definition
| a. Executive wanted the court to stay out of the affair in order to prevent release of enemy combatants b. Court held that a citizen has to have some measure of due process |
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Term
IV. WAR ON TERROR C. Boumediene v. Bush
Do federal courts have jurisdiction over habeas writs? |
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Definition
| habeas for Gitmo detainees after Military Commission Act stripped federal courts of jurisdiction for habeas writs |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
a. McCulloch v. Maryland: |
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Definition
1. Ratification of the Constitution binds the states to give power to Federal government
2. There have to be at least some inherent or incidental powers
3. Maryland does not have the authority to tax a national bank
4. Necessary and Proper Clause |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
b. When are the state’s rights important?\ |
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Definition
1. Protecting states from federal intrusion
2. States are closer to the people and thus more likel to be responsive to public needs and concerns
3. States are laboratories for experimentation |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
c. Congress has the power to regulate commerce: |
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Definition
1. What is commerce?
2. What does “among the several states” mean?
3. Does the 10th Amendment limit Congress? |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
d. Gibbons v. Ogden |
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Definition
| Where monopoly conflicted with federal statute, monopoly was invalid; Commerce Clause touches on intrastate commerce when there is a commercial connection with another state |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
a. U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co. |
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Definition
Congress does not have the power to suppress a monopoly because it occurs at the point of manufacture
b. 10th Amendment |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
c. Carter v. Carter Coal Co. |
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Definition
| the fact that commodities are being sold out of state does not mean that the production or manufacture is subject to federal regulation under the Commerce clause |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
d. A.L.A Schlechter Poultry Corp v. U.S. |
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Definition
| once the production stops within the stream of commerce, it can no longer be regulated no connection to interstate commerce when transaction are confined to NY |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
B. Second Era
e. Houston East & West Texas Railway Co. v. U.S. |
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Definition
| - (Shreveport Rate) – regulation of intrastate carriers was permissible because of the nature of trains as instruments of interstate commerce |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
B. Second Era
f. Champion v. Ames |
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Definition
| Lottery tickets are not articles of commerce so they are subject to interstate regulation |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
B. Second Era
g. Hammer v. Dagenhart |
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Definition
| Cour struck down a statute that prohibited interstate transport of articles produced by children younger than certain ages or under certain conditions |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
C. Third Era
a. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. |
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Definition
upheld NLRA because of substantial effect on interstate commerce
b. Three theories of interstate commerce:
1. Substantial economic effect
2. Cumulative effect
3. Commerce-prohibiting protective technique (prohibitions) |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
C. Third Era
c. Wickard v. Filburn |
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Definition
| cumulative effect principle where quota on consumption of homegrown wheat was upheld |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
C. Third Era
e. Heart of Atlanta Motel v. U.S. |
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Definition
| significant effect on ability of African Americans to travel - permissible use of Civil rights Act legislation |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
C. Third Era
f. Katzenbach v. McClung |
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Definition
| cumulative effect by discrimination, hook into commerce was buying of food across interstate lines |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
C. Third Era
g. Hodel v. Indiana – |
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Definition
| upheld a federal law that regulated strip mining and required reclamation of strip-mined land |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER
C. Third Era
h. Perez v. United States – |
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Definition
| dealt with loan sharking as having an effect on interstate commerce and not being a local activity only |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF POWER
D. Modern Era
a. Two types of activity and how they are treated under the Commerce Clause: |
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Definition
1. Commercial and economic activity
2. Non-commercial |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF POWER
D. Modern Era
b. Three categories of regulation |
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Definition
1. Channel of interstate commerce
2. Instruments of interstate commerce, or person or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come from intrastate activities
3. Those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce (where most disputes arise) |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF POWER
D. Modern Era
c. U.S. v. Lopez |
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Definition
| struck down regulation of intrastate activity that was non-economic in nature (Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990) |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF POWER
D. Modern Era
d. U.S. v. Morrison |
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Definition
| struck down Violence Against Women Act of 1994 on the basis there was no substantial effect on interstate commerce |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF POWER
D. Modern Era
e. Gonzales v. Raich |
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Definition
| regarding Compassionate Use Act in California; defers to the rational basis of Congress to regulate, personal growth of marijuana for personal use is non-economic, but Congress is trying to reach the national market, cumulative effect like Wickard |
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Term
V. SCOPE OF POWER
D. Modern Era
f. Pierce County, Washington v. Guillen |
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Definition
| since this program involved channels of interstate commerce, it was within the purview of Congress to regulate release of information from studies regarding need of highway funds |
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Term
E. Tenth Amendment as a Limitation on Congress
a. New York v. United States |
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Definition
| regarding disposal of radioactive waste; Federal government cannot compel the states to enact or administer a federal regulatory program |
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Term
E. Tenth Amendment as a Limitation on Congress
b. Printz v. United States |
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Definition
| challenge to the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act where Court held that compelling the LEO to perform the backgrounf check was similar to New York v. United States |
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Term
E. Tenth Amendment as a Limitation on Congress
c. Reno v. Condon |
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Definition
| law of general applicability as opposed to a direct mandate to the states; state just has to refrain from allowing strangers to obtain private information – upholding Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 |
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Term
VI. TAXING AND SPENDING POWER
A. Article I, Section 8, clause 1 – Interpretations |
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Definition
a. It is its own substantive power not hooked into other enumerated powers
b. It is limited by the enumerated powers |
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Term
VI. TAXING AND SPENDING POWER B. Tax versus penalty c. United States v. Butler
Are taxing and spending within congresses enumerated powers? |
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Definition
| taxing and spending go beyond enumerated powers |
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Term
VI. TAXING AND SPENDING POWER
B. Tax versus penalty
d. Chas. C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis |
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Definition
| upheld Social Security Act which provided employers with a set-off against a federal tax if they were paying into a qualified state unemployment program |
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Term
VI. TAXING AND SPENDING POWER B. Tax versus penalty e. Sabri v. United States
The necessary and proper clause in conjunction with taxing and spending power are under what branch of government? |
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Definition
| Federal employees are stewards f federal funds, thus necessary and proper clause in conjunction with taxing and spending power is within the power of Congress |
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Term
VI. TAXING AND SPENDING POWER B. Tax versus penalty f. South Dakota v. Dole
Limitations on Congress's ablity to achieve a regulatory effect by making conditions on reciept of federal funds. |
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Definition
| Congress can achieve a regulatory effect by making conditions on receipt of federal funds (highway safety by raising drinking age); Gave limitations: 1. Pursuit of general welfare 2. States have to make decision knowingly 3. Relation to federal interest on particular national programs or projects 4. Other constitutional provisions may provide and independent bar to the conditional grant of federal funds |
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Term
VI. TAXING AND SPENDING POWER
B. Tax versus penalty
g. Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius -(Obamacare)
1. Individual mandate |
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Definition
minimum essential healthcare coverage; those who don’t comply and are not exempt have to make a shared responsibility payment
a. Commerce clause – cannot be regulated for abstention from an activity, BUT
b. Power to Tax – operationally the IM is a tax because there is a monetary payment as consequence or not having health insurance |
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Term
VI. TAXING AND SPENDING POWER
B. Tax versus penalty
g. Nat’l Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius -(Obamacare)
2. Medicaid expansion |
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Definition
Congress stated that if states didn’t take new Medicaid conditions, all Medicaid funding would be cut
a. This is coercive
b. However, expansion not struck down, states just have to comply with new conditions to receive new funds, will still get old funds |
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Term
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Definition
a. 13th Amendment – ended slavery
b. !4th Amendment – due process
c. 15th Amendment – right to vote |
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Term
a. Who can Congress regulate?
state action and/or private conduct? |
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Definition
1. Civil Right Act of 1875 – acknowledges that private conduct can be regulated but cannot extend to discriminatory conduct generally
2. 14th Amendment applies to state conduct and cannot be used by Congress to regulate private behavior
3. Congress can pass legislation to end slavery |
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Term
| b. What is the scope of the enforcement authority? |
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Definition
1. Rights creating/expanding view – Congress can interpret the 14th Amendment and can go beyond what SCTOUS has said is constitutionally required
2. Narrow view – remedial in nature; Congress can only provide remedies for rights recognized by the courts |
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Term
C. Test for challenge of Equal Protection:
a. Strict scrutiny |
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Definition
applies to any statute regarding race or national origin – when statute is narrowly tailored to achieve some compelling government purpose is the only time this kind of statute is upheld
1. Katzenbach v. Morgan & Morgan – New York’s voting law requiring English literacy is discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause; Congress can overturn state legislation without judicial determination if it violates equal protection |
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Term
C. Test for challenge of Equal Protection:
b. Intermediate scrutiny |
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Definition
based on gender – still hard for the government to justify the burden – must be narrowly tailored to serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to those objectives
1. U.S. v. Morrison – struck down Violence Against Women Act – 14th Amendment cannot reach purely private conduct, the remedy must come from the states themselves |
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Term
C. Test for challenge of Equal Protection:
c. Mere rationality |
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Definition
| rational relation between the means selected by the legislature and a legitimate legislative objective |
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Term
D. Congress cannot redefine the scope of constitutional guarantees a. Employment Division of Oregon v. Smith
When can the free excercise clause not be used to challenge a law? |
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Definition
When the law is neutral and of general applicability. The law was not motivated by a desire to interfere with religion and it was a law of general paplicability becauseit applied to everyone.
state was concerned about drug consumption as part of religious observance opening a floodgate; this case was different because Smith broke the law, which was not designed to interfere with religious practice |
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Term
D. Congress cannot redefine the scope of constitutional guarantees b. City of Boerne v. Flores
Can congress use its 14th Amendment remedial power to prevent local governments from burdening individual's freedom? |
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Definition
| Congress cannot use its 14th Amendment remedial powers to prevent local governments from unintentionally burdening individual’s freedom in certain ways; Religious Freedom Restoration Act declared unconstitutional – Congress has the power to enforce, but not the power to determine what makes a constitutional violation |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued?
a. Sovereign immunity |
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Definition
1. Law simply does not apply to the state
2. Law may apply to the state, but the state as a governmental entity cannot be hauled into court to answer a charge
d. States cannot be sued by citizens of other states
1. Diversity jurisdiction does not apply
2. Subject matter jurisdiction – federal question |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued?
a. Sovereign immunity
e. Exceptions: |
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Definition
1. Can sue state officials in their official capacity for injunctive relief
2. States may waive their immunity and consent to be sued in federal court
3. Congress, pursuant to Section 5 of the 14th Amendment may authorize suit against state government |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued? a. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer
How can Congress authorize lawsuits against a State? |
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Definition
| Congress may authorize suits under Section 5 of the 14th Amendment that are normally impermissible in another context |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued?
b. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas |
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Definition
| Congress can override sovereign immunity by clear intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity |
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Term
| A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued? c. Seminole Tribe v. Florida |
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Definition
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act required states to negotiate in good faith, and Seminole Tribe alleged that FL was not acting in good faith and sued for injunctive and monetary relief 1. Court held that sovereign immunity could not be abrogated under the 11th Amendment 2. This is the current state of the law
a state officer cannot be sued to enforce a federal law that contains a comprehensive enforcement mechanism. |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued?
d. Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank |
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Definition
| College Savings argued a property interest in patent on college savings plan, but Court stated it cannot force a state to defend a private patent damage suit in federal court |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued?
e. Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents |
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Definition
Age Discrimination in Employment Act – age is not enough of a suspect classification to warrant heightened scrutiny; as long as there is a rational basis for the discrimination, it is not subject to equal protection
1. State governments cannot be sued under ADEA
2. If means are rationally related to a state interest, discrimination is legitimate
3. Statutory remedy under Section is not congruent with any pattern constitutional violation |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued? f. Board of Trustees, University of AL v. Garrett
Can state employees recover damages for violation of ADA? |
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Definition
| employees of the state cannot recover monetary damages for violations of ADA; under rational basis review |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued?
g. Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs |
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Definition
claimed violation of FMLA and sued Nevada, Court ruled:
1. FMLA is a valid abrogation of 11th Amendment
2. Sex discrimination is evaluated using intermediate scrutiny – government has to purport of an important governmental interest rather than a rational basis
3. What looks like generous benefits to women actually perpetrate the stereotype |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued? h. Tennessee v. Lane
Is access to courtroom a fundamental right? |
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Definition
| involved ADA and access of disabled people to courts, Court found access to court is a fundamental due process right |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued? i. U.S. v. Georgia
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Definition
| prisoner asserted violation of ADA, Court held Congress can create private remedies against the state for actual violations of Section 5 |
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Term
A. 11th Amendment – When can State be sued? j. Alden v. Maine
When do states have immunity from a private suit for damages? |
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Definition
| states have full sovereign immunity from any private suit in the state’s own courts seeking damages for state’s violation of federal law |
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Term
| A. Preemption comes from the Supremacy Clause a. Express preemption – Congress expressly preempts the law |
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Definition
| 1. Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly – MA state regulations were preempted by Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act 2. If Congress has the authority to regulate a particular area, then it can preemept |
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Term
A. Preemption comes from the Supremacy Clause b. Implied preemption – where preemption is implied by Congressional intent
What are the two types of implied preemption? |
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Definition
| 1. Conflicts preemption – state law is invalidated by its conflict with federal law 2. Federal Goal preemption (field preemption) – state law impedes the achievement of a federal objective |
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Term
| A. Preemption comes from the Supremacy Clause c. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, Director, Dept. of Agriculture of CA |
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Definition
| when two laws can successfully co-exist, the there is no preemption |
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Term
A. Preemption comes from the Supremacy Clause
d. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commn |
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Definition
| Allowing states to require adequate storage and disposal of hazardous waste does not conflict with the purposes behind the federal regulatory scheme |
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Term
A. Preemption comes from the Supremacy Clause e. Hines v. Davidowitz
What is Area of field preemption? |
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Definition
| area of field preemption – Congress intends to occupy the entire field of immigration so PA alien registration act is preempted |
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Term
A. Preemption comes from the Supremacy Clause
f. Arizona v. United States |
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Definition
Arizona’s “Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act” –
1. Section 3 – Arizona cannot enforce federal law on its own, so this is preempted
2. Section 5 – 5(c) – not Arizona’s place to make a law imposing penalties on immigrants seeking work
3. Section 6 – cannot provide state officers greater authority than immigration officers
4. Section 2(b) – “show me your papers” provision is inappropriate without interpretation by state courts that this conflicts with federal law |
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Term
| a. Reasons for dormant commerce clause – |
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Definition
1. Free trade rationale – state boundaries should not be used to prohibit the flow of goods in interstate commerce
2. National unity
3. Process-based – generally the idea that residents of a state are disadvantaged by acts of a state that they have no say in |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause b. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond
Why was New York barred from preventing out of state business from buying New York milk and selling it out of state? |
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Definition
| a state cannot promote its economic interests by denying a right to operate in interstate commerce |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
c. Cooley v. Board of Wardens |
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Definition
involved fine to use non-local pilots on ships
1. Court found this touched on matters of local concern even though it had incidental bearing on interstate commerce
2. Not much guidance on how one is supposed to know whether a state statute is permissible because it touches on local interest |
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Term
| d. Contemporary Test for Dormant Commerce Clause |
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Definition
| 1. If it does discriminate against out of state commerce – legitimate local purpose and cannot be done by any other means 2. If law does not discriminate – balance burdens on interstate commerce with benefits to the state |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
1. South Carolina State Highway Dept. v. Barnwell |
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Definition
| requirement for trucks traveling on SC roads are within state power for safety interest even if there is an incidental burden on interstate commerce |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
2. Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona |
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Definition
| Arizona Train Limit Law of 1912 – imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce because longer trains are standard practice |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
3. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey |
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Definition
| allowed state to limit the market of landfills to out of state providers |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
5. United Haulers Assn. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Management Authority |
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Definition
| rule from Carbone does not apply when government owns facility – government can have monopoly |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
6. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Commn. – |
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Definition
| NC statute requiring imported apples to bear a U.S. grade or standard is discriminatory in effect and purpose (increase cost to WA growers to put their product in NC) |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 7. Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland
Is a law prohibiting a producer of gas from operating retail service station within their state in violation of the dormant commerce clause?
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Definition
| fact that statute fell on some out of state companies was insufficient to establish that “interstate commerce” was discriminated against because there is no showing that it effects on the cost of interstate goods or distinguishes between in and out of state companies in the retial market. |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
8. West Lynn Creamery v. Healy |
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Definition
| pricing order unconstitutionally discriminates against out-of-state farmers |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
9. State of Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery |
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Definition
| statute was enacted for environmental reasons, so burden on interstate commerce to change packaging to not plastic is slight |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
10. Dean Milk v. City of Madison |
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Definition
| prohibition that it is unlawful to sell milk that hasn’t been pasteurized within five miles of the city is specific to discriminate in favor of local business |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 11. Maine v. Taylor
When is a facially discriminatory law enforced? |
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Definition
| facially discriminatory law to prevent importing of baitfish served purpose to protect environment from non-native species, no other way to protect the environment that ban |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 12. Pike v. Bruce
Dormant Commerce clause balancing Test |
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Definition
| balancing test of state interests versus burden on interstate commerce – interest of enhancing reputation of Arizona cantaloupes outweighed by national interest in unencumbered commerce |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 13. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines -
local mud flap requirement |
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Definition
| local mud flap requirement that is nondiscriminatory placed undue burden on interstate commerce because most states have straight mudflap requirement |
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Term
B. Dormant Commerce Clause 14. Consolidated Freightways v. Kassel –
Did the Dormant Commerce clause overrule the states requirement to have shorter trucks than the average freight truck? |
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Definition
| shorter truck requirement is a heavy burden on interstate commerce |
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Term
| f. Exceptions to Dormant Commerce Clause |
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Definition
1. Congressional Approval
2. Market Participant |
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Term
f. Exceptions to Dormant Commerce Clause 1. Congressional Approval a. Western & Southern Life Ins. . V. State Board of Equalization of California
Why was a California Tax on out of state insurance companies allowed under the Dormant Comerce Clause? |
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Definition
| CA imposed a state tax on out-of-state insurance companies, not a violation because Congress removed commerce clause restriction on power to tax insurance companies |
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Term
f. Exceptions to Dormant Commerce Clause
2. Market Participant |
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Definition
| state can preferentially treat its own citizens when it acts as a participant in the market |
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Term
f. Exceptions to Dormant Commerce Clause
2. Market Participant
a. Reeves Inc. v. Stake |
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Definition
| because SD is the business and not a regulator, they can favor their own citizens in supplying cement |
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Term
f. Exceptions to Dormant Commerce Clause
2. Market Participant
b. White v. Mass. Council of Construction Employers, Inc. – |
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Definition
| local statute that required city funded construction projects must be half worked by residents was allowed because government funded construction projects as a market participant |
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Term
f. Exceptions to Dormant Commerce Clause
2. Market Participant
c. South Central Timber Development v. Commissioner, Dept. of Natural Resources of Alaska |
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Definition
| downstream regulation is beyond the scope of market participant where purchasers of state owned timber were required to have it processed in AK before being shipped out-of-state |
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Term
X. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
State discrimination against non-citizens |
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Definition
| A. States cannot discriminate against non-citizens in fundamental rights and economic securities B. If there is a differentiation based only on citizenship, it must be justified |
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Term
X. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
1. Toomer v. Witsell |
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Definition
| where out of state residents were required to pay $2500 to fish for shrimp and residents $25, was discriminatory because it prevents noncitizens from accessing state resources to earn a living |
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Term
X. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES 2. United Building & Construction Trades Council v. City of Camden
Is a rule requiring a percentage of the work force to be locals on city funded projects protected under the Market Participant Exception? |
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Definition
| Clause is not subject to market participant exception where local ordinance required 40% of work force on city finded projects to be city residents because preference of state citizens to work is a type of impermissible discrimination |
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Term
X. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
1. Baldwin v. Fish & Game Commn. Of Montana |
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Definition
| the right to recreationally hunt is not fundamental to national unity, so higher charge for non-resident hunting license does not violate P&I |
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Term
X. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
2. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper |
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Definition
| required residency to be admitted to state bar, privilege to practice law is a fundamental right not limited to state residents |
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Term
A. Bill of Rights Applicable to the States
1. Selective incorporation |
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Definition
| – fundamental liberties should be incorporated to the extent the individual liberties are to be applicable to the states are to be decided by the Court on a case-by-case basis |
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Term
A. Bill of Rights Applicable to the States
a. Barron v. Mayor & City Council of |
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Definition
| where plaintiff argued city took his wharf by making the water too shallow, Court held that 5th Amendment only applies to federal government and purpose is not to place restrictions on state or local legislation |
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Term
A. Bill of Rights Applicable to the States b. Slaughterhouse cases
Does a grant of a Monopoly violate right to practice trade? |
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Definition
| Monopoly to one facility in New Orleans did not deprive butchers of equal protection of the law to practice their trade |
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Term
A. Bill of Rights Applicable to the States c. Saenz v. Roe
May a state treat new citizen's differently? |
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Definition
| right to travel embraces a citizen’s right to be treated equally in a new place of residence, so CA law limiting welfare benefits to individuals in residence less than 12 months violate Constitution |
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Term
A. Bill of Rights Applicable to the States
2. Total incorporation – |
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Definition
| all of the Bill of Rights should apply to the States, but problem is that state and local governments can not do a lot things they used to do |
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Term
B. Bill of Rights and Old Law on Criminal Cases
1. Twining v. New Jersey |
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Definition
| allowed jury to draw an unfavorable inference from Defendant’s failure to testify, self-incrimination not a fundamental right applicable to the states even if state cannot deny due process under 14th Amendment |
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Term
B. Bill of Rights and Old Law on Criminal Cases
2. Palko v. Connecticut |
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Definition
| specific interest against double jeopardy is not a fundamental right |
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Term
B. Bill of Rights and Old Law on Criminal Cases
3. Adamson v. California |
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Definition
| prosecutor can comment on a defendant’s failure to testify |
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Term
B. Bill of Rights and Old Law on Criminal Cases 4. Duncan v. Louisiana
Right to Jury Trial? |
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Definition
| guaranteed right of jury trial only for capital cases – right of jury trial prevents oppression |
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Term
| 1. Public function doctrine – |
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Definition
| if a private individual or group is entrusted by the state to perform functions that are traditionally viewed as governmental in nature, the private individual or group becomes an agent of the state |
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Term
| 2. State involvement doctrine – |
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Definition
| the state is entangled with the private actor |
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Term
B. Cases dealing with state action
1. Civil Rights cases |
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Definition
| Court held anti-discrimination law was unconstitutional because Constitution only applies to the actions of the state |
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Term
B. Cases dealing with state action 2. Marsh v. Alabama
Can a privately run city limit freedom of religion? |
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Definition
| – free exercise outweighs whatever the interests are of the owner of the town; operation of the town is a public function |
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Term
B. Cases dealing with state action
3. Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co. |
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Definition
| not a sufficiently close nexus between state and challenged action of regulated entity so that the action of the regulated entity can be treated as state action; where PA not connected enough with utility company in terminating service |
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Term
B. Cases dealing with state action
4. Evans v. Newton – |
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Definition
| where park is administered by the state, it cannot be segregated |
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Term
B. Cases dealing with state action
5. Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc. – |
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Definition
| private shopping center is the functional equivalent of the business district in Marsh, center’s owner could not constitutionally use state trespass law to bar peaceful union picketing of a store in the center |
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Term
B. Cases dealing with state action
6. Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner |
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Definition
| barred anti-war activists from distributing leaflets at shopping center |
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Term
B. Cases dealing with state action
7. Hudgens v. NLRB |
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Definition
| Lloyd overruled Logan Valley, and 1st Amendment did not guarantee free speech at privately owned shopping centers, whether or not the speech relates to the business |
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Term
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Definition
| private conduct must comply with the constitution if the government has authorized, encourage, or facilitated the unconstitutional conduct |
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Term
1. Voting Action
a. Terry v. Adams – |
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Definition
| state action where state permitted pre-primary elections to usurp the role of the official primary |
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Term
| 1. Voting Action b. Reitman v. Mulkey |
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Definition
| voter initiative was unconstitutional when it repealed open housing laws and prevented the enactment of future anti-discrimination laws |
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Term
2. Running and Regulating Schools –
a. Rendell-Baker v. Kohn |
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Definition
| there was no state action when a private school that received almost all of its funding from the government fired a teacher because of her speech |
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Term
2. Running and Regulating Schools –
b. Brentwood Acad. V. Tennessee School Athletic Association |
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Definition
| private entity regulating high school athletics was a state actor based on the governments entwinement with |
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Term
C. Entanglement
3. Judicial and Law Enforcement Actions
c. Two –part test: |
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Definition
1. Deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the state, or a rule of conduct imposed by a person for whom the state is responsible
2. The party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor because he is a state official, acted with or obtained aid from state officials, or because conduct is otherwise charged to the state |
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Term
3. Judicial and Law Enforcement Actions
a. Shelley v. Kraemer |
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Definition
| courts cannot enforce racially restrictive covenants - action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is action of the state within the meaning of the 14th Amendment |
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Term
3. Judicial and Law Enforcement Actions
b. Lugar v. Edmonson Oil Co. |
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Definition
| found there was state action when a creditor obtained a writ of prejudgment from a court – involvement of the court and sheriff for enforcing it was sufficient for state action |
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Term
3. Judicial and Law Enforcement Actions d. Flagg Brothers v. Brooks
Is resolution of a dispute a public function requiring due process? |
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Definition
| private creditor’s self-help repossession did not constitute state action and due process was not required prior to the sale of belongings |
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Term
3. Judicial and Law Enforcement Actions
e. Edmonson v. Lessville Concrete Co. |
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Definition
| Batson challenges apply in private civil litigation |
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Term
4. Government licensing and regulation
a. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority |
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Definition
| government was so entangled with the restaurant that there was a symbiotic relationship enough to create state action (where restaurant refused to serve African Americans) |
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Term
4. Government licensing and regulation
b. Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis |
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Definition
| state grant of a liquor license to a private club was not sufficient government entanglement – liquor board has no control over membership or guest policies of the lodge |
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Term
5. Government subsidies a. Norwood v. Harrison
Does the Government giving free text books to private schools enaged in discrimination count as state action? |
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Definition
| there was state action when the government gave free text books to private schools that engaged in racial discrimination |
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Term
5. Government subsidies
b. Blum v. Yaretsky |
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Definition
| no state action because it was the decision of the private nursing home to transfer the patients – neither the extent of state regulation nor the size of state funding is a basis for finding state action – state financial incentive for transfer are insufficient for state action |
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