Term
| What major issues did the Court not fully resolve in the D.C. v. Heller (2008)? |
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Definition
Does this apply to states?
What types of restrictions are applicable today?
What is the Legal Standard?
Can the government license handguns?
What types of weapons?
Can the weapon leave the house?
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Term
| Describe the limits of the "no prior restraint" doctrine in NY Times v. US |
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Definition
| There is one instance where prior restraint can be instantiated. When our nation is at war and "no one would question but that a government might prevent actual obstruction to its recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports or of the number and location of troops." |
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Term
| Describe the libel standards for a "private" versus a "public" person in NY Times v. Sullivan |
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Definition
-Public persons have to prove "actual malice." -Private individuals only have to claim that statements were false and damagin (a lower standard). |
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Term
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Definition
| "actual malice" is defined as "knowledge that the information was false" or that it was published "with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." |
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Term
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Definition
| It is the most stringent standard of judicial review used by United States courts reviewing federal law. |
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Term
| What are the two foremost instances when the principle of strict scrutiny arises? |
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Definition
1.when a "fundamental" constitutional right is infringed, particularly those listed in the Bill of Rights and those the court has deemed a fundamental right protected by the liberty provision of the 14th Amendment. 2.when the government action involves the use of a "suspect classification" such as race or national origin that may render it void under the Equal Protection Clause. |
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Term
| What is the first prong that a law must satisfy in order pass strict scrutiny? |
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Definition
| First, it must be justified by a compelling governmental interest. While the Courts have never brightly defined how to determine if an interest is compelling, the concept generally refers to something necessary or crucial, as opposed to something merely preferred. Examples include national security, preserving the lives of multiple individuals, and not violating explicit constitutional protections. |
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Term
| What is the second prong a law must satisfy in order to pass strict scrutiny? |
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Definition
| Second, the law or policy must be narrowly tailored to achieve that goal or interest. If the government action encompasses too much (over-inclusive) or fails to address essential aspects of the compelling interest (under-inclusive), then the rule is not considered narrowly tailored. |
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Term
| What is the third (and final) prong a law must satisfy in order to pass sctrict scrutiny? |
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Definition
| Finally, the law or policy must be the least restrictive means for achieving that interest. More accurately, there cannot be a less restrictive way to effectively achieve the compelling government interest, but the test will not fail just because there is another method that is equally the least restrictive. Some legal scholars consider this 'least restrictive means' requirement part of being narrowly tailored, though the Court generally evaluates it as a separate prong. |
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Term
How does Sandra Day O'Connor define the usage of undue burden? What case does this principle first arise in? |
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Definition
"If the particular regulation does not 'unduly burden' the fundamental right, then our evaluation of that regulation is limited to our determination that the regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (1983) |
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Term
| What are the 4 prongs of the "Central Hudson test" |
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Definition
- Is the expression protected by the First Amendment? For speech to come within that provision it must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
- Is the asserted governmental interest substantial?
- (if yes to 1 and 2) Does the regulation advance the governmental interest asserted?
- Is the regulation more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest?
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Term
| Run Central Hudson Gas and Electric Corp v. Public Service Commission of New York through the 4 prong Central Hudson Test. |
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Definition
"The energy commission order to supress speech that in no way impairs the State's interest in energy conservation, the Commission's order violates the First and Fourteenth Amendments. It does serve a state interest but the Commission's request is unnecessarily restrictive; they could require that an ad about conservation be displayed alongside Hudson's ad. |
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Term
| According to the Authors Central Hudson (1980) clarify commercial expression cases? |
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Definition
| If the commercial expression concerns a lawful activity and is not misleading, it merits First Amendment Protection. The state may still regulate that expression, however, if the regulation serves a substantial government interest, and is no more extensive than necessary to acheive it. |
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Term
| What are two subsequent cases that use the Central Hudson test? |
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Definition
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network (1993) (struck down city ordinance requiring the removal of newsracks) 44 Liquormart v. Rhode Island (1996) (struck down a law that prohibited advertising alcoholic beverage prices) |
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Term
| What is the Roth standard for obscenity after Roth v. US (1957)? |
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Definition
| Whether to the average person applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material, taken as a whole, appeals to prurient interests. |
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Term
| What is the Roth standard for obscenity after Jacobellis v. Ohio (1964)? |
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Definition
| Whether to the average person applying the standards of society at large, the material is utterly without redeeming social importance. |
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Term
| What is the Roth standard after Memoirs v. Massachusettes (1966)? |
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Definition
| Whether to the average person applying the standards of society at large, the material is utterly without redeeming social importance, possessing not a modicum of social vlaue. |
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Term
| What does the court say about child pornography in New York v. Ferber (1982). |
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Definition
1. The government has a very compelling interest in preventing the sexual exploitation of children.
2. Distribution of visual depictions of children engaged in sexual activity is intrinsically related to the sexual abuse of children. The images serve as a permanent reminder of the abuse, and it is necessary for government to regulate the channels of distributing such images if it is to be able to eliminate the production of child pornography.
3. Advertising and selling child pornography provides an economic motive for producing child pornography.
4. Visual depictions of children engaged in sexual activity have negligible artistic value.
5. Thus, holding that child pornography is outside the protection of the First Amendment is consistent with the Court's prior decisions limiting the banning of materials deemed "obscene" as the Court had previously defined it. For this reason, child pornography need not be legally obscene before being outlawed. |
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