Term
| Grubart v. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock |
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Definition
| use Sisson factors for adm jurisdiction—you’ll need adm jurisdiction to use Lim. Act. Of 1851 |
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Term
| Three Buoys Houseboat Vacations v. Morts |
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Definition
| to have adm jurisdiction, there has to be interstate commerce allowable—a land locked lake doesn’t count |
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Term
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Definition
| supertanker has oil spill from steering problems. Owner for limitation purposes s the one who has possessory, managerial, & operational control over the vessel (§30505(a)) |
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Term
| In re Chesapeake Shipping |
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Definition
| a managing agent, which by K has virtually all of the responsibilities of a SO, may petition to LOL as a co-plaintiff with the owner of record. |
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Term
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Definition
| In order to obtain status of pro hac vice owner sufficient to invoke LOL, the vessel tech. manager needed to show that it had specific responsibilities related to the vessel’s manning, providing for navigation, maintenance/repair of computers/nav equipment, communication with owner |
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Term
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Definition
| recognizing expanding owner pro hac vice status under LOL but refusing to expand to a crewing company |
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Term
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Definition
| management companies or companies providing other services with out owning or operating the vessel may not limit liability under LOL. |
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Term
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Definition
| a semisubmersible drilling rig is a vessel under 1 USC 3 |
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Term
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Definition
| a jet ski is a vessel under 1 USC 3 |
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Term
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Definition
| vessel sinks under rig. Master’s negligence was imputed to the owner for p/k purposes because he had “authority and supervision over the phase of the operation out of which the casualty arose.” |
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Term
| Moore-McCormack Lines v. Aramco Steel |
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Definition
| Cape Hatteras shifting cargo case—master should have looked at the cargo & recognized it was not properly stowed (imputed for injury & death claims, but not for cargo claims—operational failure outside control of SO) |
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Term
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Definition
| : ferry boat on ice—master took trip in clear violation of company policy. Plant manager at fault—he didn’t personally make inquiry on day of accident. Employee whose actions are imputed must have managerial authority and supervision over the phase of the operation in which the casualty took place. Negligent enforcement of clear procedures can prevent limitation. |
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Term
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Definition
| pipeline damage from drifting spud barge. Here, master did not have sufficient managing authority, so his actions were not imputed |
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Term
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Definition
| (expansive and claimant friendly definition of P/K) – SO just needs prior action or inaction that set forth in motion a chain of circumstances which may be a contributing cause even though not proximate or immediate cause of incident. |
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Term
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Definition
| : (narrow and SO friendly definition of P/K) – SO must act reasonably in ordinary circumstances to escape privity finding. Hindsight burden too great and unacceptable. As long as SO took reasonable steps no P/K found. |
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Term
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Definition
| SO liable because ARPA – master and pilot didn’t know how to use the nav. equipment. Found P/K. |
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Term
| In re Ocean Foods Boat Co |
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Definition
| SO delegated job of finding crew to master (who did horrible job). P/K denied because SO failed in his duty to find competent crew |
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Term
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Definition
| the limitation act leaves an owner responsible for his own fault, neglect and contracts |
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Term
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Definition
| warranty of seaworthiness deemed personal contract, so no limitation. An express warranty of an owner in a charter party is a personal contract and that makes the owner completely responsible |
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Term
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Definition
| collision between tug & tow, court focused on involvement of owner in the breach. Negligence of master didn’t involve owner so no PCD (“breach rule”) |
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Term
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Definition
| tried to say breach warranty of seaworthiness was breach of personal contract doctrine. Court didn’t buy it. |
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Term
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Definition
| collision, fire, sinking, then wreck salvaged and brought back to port. Court found the value of the vessel for limitation was the value at the end of the voyage→when the vessel was sunk |
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Term
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Definition
| june 16 collision, then June 28 explosion. The court finds that the second even might be a “distinct occasion” for personal injury, requiring a separate fund |
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Term
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Definition
| the vessel had a collision, then continued, then wrecked and ran aground on the coast. Court found that the voyage ended when the vessel stranded. Both incidents go in same limitation, with value at the end of running aground |
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Term
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Definition
| tug had lots of mishaps along its route, necessitating an intermediate repair stop, and it was a total wreck at end of voyage. Court found that the voyage ended when total wreck so value was total wreck. Claimants, including repair guys, out of luck. |
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Term
| Providence & NY SS Co v. Hill |
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Definition
| loss of cargo by fire, Ps sue in state court, D filed answer and lim. Defense, but then filed LoL in fed court. This is OK—DC should have been able to sustain federal proceeding to protect SO against harassment of multiple proceedings |
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Term
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Definition
| single claimant gets to proceed outside the limitation proceeding |
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Term
| Bowlden Limitation Proceeding |
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Definition
| injured worker. Court decides there’s only one claim, not four. The worker and wife were one claim, and the indemnity claims were derivative of P’s claim. This is a Washington District Court case—but 5th circuit has said differently |
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Term
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Definition
| safety drill, people in capsule fall into ocean. Oil co and manufacturer refuse to stipulate to decrease liability to under fund. In multiple claim inadequate find situation, all claimants must agree to stipulation and must agree not to see damage award higher than limitation fund until limitation fund is set or you can’t get out of concursus. |
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Term
| SE Shipping v. Chesapeake & Ohio RR |
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Definition
| 6th cir: plaintiff run over by a train, wife sues. DC lifts stay: all claims are derivative of a single claim BUT 6th circ reverses—RR claim for atty fees counts as #2, so you need a concursus |
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Term
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Definition
| tug & tow collide with yacht. To get out of the fund, the plaintiffs reduced claims so that they would be less than the limitation fund, then DC released stay. SCOTUS approved: concursus itself not needed to protect SO’s limitation |
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Term
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Definition
| 5th cir. Stipulation need not have a $ amount to be valid. The limitation judge will decide it. You just agree that the federal court has jurisdiction over limitation fund and they’ll determine it. |
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Term
| In re Dammers & Vandereide |
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Definition
| 2nd circuit. Different courts require different things for stipulation |
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Term
| In the Matter of Tidewater |
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Definition
| collision, where each vessel filed sep. lim. proceeding & they were consolidated. Injured people wanted stay lifted. Tidewater argued not everyone had filed claims yet & they might (and future claimants hadn’t agreed to stipulation)—court said no. Only people reasonably included in stipulation need agree |
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Term
| Complaint of Poling Transp. Corp |
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Definition
| plaintiffs can get jury trial on non-limitation proceedings in federal court. Only reason to have concursus is to distribute the limitation fund. As long as that happens, a jury can decide other parts |
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Term
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Definition
| 1 personal injury claimant in state court—P hadn’t requested jury trial. Savings to suitors doesn’t automatically mean jury trial. It’s not a right to jury trial in state court—it’s a right to the forum of your choice |
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Term
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Definition
| 5th cir. Court tired to use the jury trial findings of fact from a Jones Act claim to determine limitation. Court said no: SO has burden to prove lack of P/K, not jury. Prior actions don’t have preclusive effects. |
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Term
| Liverpool, Brazil, & River Plate |
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Definition
| tug pushing car float & disabled tug—collision. The limitation fund was only the value of the tug because the tug itself was the only offending vessel. This is the floatilla rule applied to a pure tort situation |
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Term
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Definition
| harter act case. This is a breach of contract obligation, so the tug and tow were valued together for limitation. This is the floatilla rule applied to a breach of contract situation |
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Term
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Definition
| tug notched into stern of barge when barge collided with pilings at platform, causing damage to platform. There is no floatilla rule here, so only value of tug counts. There’s no real contract obligation, more like pure tort. Remember, floatilla is a factual determination |
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Term
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Definition
| tug notched into stern of barge when barge collided with pilings at platform, causing damage to platform. There is no floatilla rule here, so only value of tug counts. There’s no real contract obligation, more like pure tort. Remember, floatilla is a factual determination |
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Term
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Definition
| tug notched into stern of barge when barge collided with pilings at platform, causing damage to platform. There is no floatilla rule here, so only value of tug counts. There’s no real contract obligation, more like pure tort. Remember, floatilla is a factual determination |
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Term
| Standard Dredging v. Kristansen |
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Definition
| : flotilla doctrine, under K cases, started as not needing common ownership for towed vessels but the usual rule now is that the vessels must be under common ownership. |
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Term
| Agrico Chemical v. Atlantic Forest |
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Definition
| the lash vessel case. There existed a contractual relationship between cargo owner and carrier, so floatilla doctrine applies—whole set of LASH vessels & barges = value of limitation fund |
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Term
| Maryland Casualty Co v. Cushing |
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Definition
| concursus is at the heart of the federal limitation proceeding. A direct action conflicts with the concursus. To protect the owner’s right to limitation, suits against the insurer must be protected by the stay |
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Term
| Grubbs v. Gulf International |
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Definition
| Marine P&I policies are subject to direct action in Louisiana |
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Term
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Definition
| recognizes indemnity in P&I insurance. Pay to be paid provision upheld. This would NOT work in Louisiana: direct action problem |
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Term
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Definition
| insurers are allowed to write their own limitation clauses in their insurance policies. Language in this one: “when a member for whose account a ship is entered in this class is entitled to limit his liability, the liability of the insurer shall not exceed the amount of such limitation.” |
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Term
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Definition
| you can get the benefits of a Crown Zellerbach clause without using the wording verbatim. Just need to clearly establish the concept. Here: “We will pay all claims you are legally required to pay.” |
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Term
| Magnolia Marine v. LaPlace Towing |
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Definition
| a stipulation between plaintiffs to lift concursus doesn’t have to include the right of the federal court to interpret the insurance policy. But lifting the stay doesn’t defeat insurer’s protection under the Crown Zellerbach clause. |
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Term
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Definition
| this is the 1934 accident involving a cruise ship that changed LoL→Sirovich Amendments for PI & death claims |
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Term
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Definition
| collision involved personal injury & death, claims greatly exceeded limitation. Tank vessels don’t include big ships—just inner-harbor type vessels. Look at purpose of vessel to determine if seagoing |
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Term
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Definition
| accident on jack-up drilling rig. Not self-propelled. Seagoing? Inquiry=whether the vessel does or is intended to navigate beyond Boundary Line (at this time, 12 miles) in regular course of operations |
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Term
| Moore-McCormack v. Aramco Steel |
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Definition
| ship capsizes, cargo improperly stowed. Owner unable to limit for personal injury & death. No supplemental fund was necessary because fund was unlimited |
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Term
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Definition
| this illustrates the rule of divided damages. It doesn’t exist after Reliable Transfer |
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Term
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Definition
| limitation fund is not increased for liens, they just get a pro rata distribution of the fund |
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Term
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Definition
| if a limitation claimant settles, the limitation fund is reduced on a pro rata basis, based on the size of the claim—not just fewer people running after the same amount of money |
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Term
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Definition
| collision on the high seas between an American vessel and a British vessel. The foreign shipowner could seek limitation under the U.S. limitation act. The case establishes in dicta the four situations in which different substantive law applies |
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Term
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Definition
| English flag vessel, where the owners bring limitation in the U.S. A foreign vessel has access to the U.S. court for limitation even when the collision is on the high seas and there was only 1 vessel and it was foreign. This is still good law, but exceptions have been carved out |
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Term
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Definition
| collision in Belgian territorial waters, 1 American vessel, one British vessel. Exception to Titanic Rule: is the foreign limitation law considered procedural or substantive? If substantive, then comes in. It’s substantive if the limitation applies to the rights of the parties rather than the remedy |
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Term
| Complaint of Seiriki Kisen Kasiha |
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Definition
| collision on high seas on western end of Cuba between two vessels with different flags but both parties to Brussels Collision convention → common body of law to determine liabilities |
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Term
| Petition of Chadade Steamship Co |
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Definition
| fire on cruise ship at sea. Court finds Panamanian limitation law=substantive, so it applied and there was a bigger limitation fund. |
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Term
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Definition
| cargo loss due to fire at sea—panamanian vessel on high seas. Here, court says Panamanian limitation law is procedural, so American limitation applies. Directly contrary to Chadade |
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Term
| Matter of Bethlehem Steel Corp |
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Definition
| U.S. vessel strikes dock in Canada. 2 limitations: 1 Canada, 1 U.S. (that’s ok because limitation filing doesn’t have extraterritorial effect). court finds that Canadian limitation law is procedural |
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Term
| Complaint of Geophysical Service, Inc |
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Definition
| Toney hates this case. oceanographic research vessel in Canada sinks. Court finds that the amount of limitation fund in Canada is procedural, but the right to invoke limitation is substantive. This is HIGHLY criticized. |
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Term
| Complaint of KS Line Corp |
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Definition
| D.C. of Alaska. Collision on the high seas, both vessels=Korean. Korean substantive law applies, but limitation =U.S. Korea uses Brussels Convention, and there are no procedural rules, so it must be substantive. Crazy decision |
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Term
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Definition
| bill of lading provided that COGSA applied, which was U.S. substantive law. This is U.S. substantive law, so apply U.S. limitation law. Limitation cases are an exception to choice-of-law analysis in Lauritzen |
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Term
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Definition
| class action filed after grounding, and court didn’t certify class. Class actions and limitation proceedings are INCONSISTENT. Filing of a class action doesn’t toll timing for limitation proceeding |
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Term
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Definition
| pleasure boat, attorney’s didn’t understand LOL – under F(2), narrative should be full and complete. The faults of the other parties and other vessels are to be alleged in detail |
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Term
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Definition
| Under F(4), SO limitation dismissed for failing to mail copy of the notice to a known claimant |
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Term
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Definition
| federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear a petition for LOL |
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Term
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Definition
| 6th cir. shipowner raises limitation in answer in state court, allows more than 6 months to go by, then files federal court limitation. Raising defense doesn’t create tolling for federal limitation. You must file limitation proceeding in federal court within 6 months. Limitation proceeding dismissed: didn’t fit in time bar |
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Term
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Definition
| 5th cir. Said same thing as Cincinnati Gas. If you have a reason to wait, file limitation and then get an order to stay, but always file in 6 months. |
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Term
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Definition
| 1993, SC of TN. A state court is empowered to decide the applicability and merits of a §30305 limitation defense when it is raised by way of an affirmative defense in an answer and there is no companion §30511 proceeding in federal court |
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Term
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Definition
| Louisiana 4th circuit agrees with Mapco. |
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Term
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Definition
| Supreme Court of Oregon 1966. Said that state court had no jurisdiction to decide issue of limitation |
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Term
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Definition
| P files suit, asserts amount of damages substantially less than limitation would be. More than 4 years later, expanded the $ requested in damages. When it is clear that the total damages claimed are substantially less than the value of the fund, a SO is not obligated to institute a lim. proceeding within 6 months of notice of claim. This is the Morania Exception—read really narrowly .need specific allegation of total damages. |
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Term
| Exxon Shipping v. Callieteau |
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Definition
| barge sinks, then towboat hits sunken barge. Receives written notice for collision, not explosion—and these were distinct occasions for PI&D. The court judicially creates this distinction in inland situation and says that the different elements each required separate notice to start time |
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Term
| In re Okeanos Ocean Research Foundation |
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Definition
| attorney writes letter after accident on whale watching vessel. This didn’t count as a notice of claim—no indication that the vessel may be held liable. To count, it would (1) provide details of the situation giving rise to the claim (cause, type, and severity of the injuries) and (2) set forth that the vessel may or will be held responsible |
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Term
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Definition
| Bangladeshi seaman injured and initated state court suit. The owner institutes federal limitation. Injunction lifted—and state court proceedings find no personal jurisdiction in LA state court. Filing for limitation & posting bond gives the court jurisdiction over the fund posted. The fact that the state court lacks in personam jurisdiction doesn’t deprive the federal court of its in rem jurisdiction |
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Term
| In re St. George Packing Co |
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Definition
| Florida company, accident in South Texas. Court found venue proper because the vessel wasn’t arrested or attached, no lawsuits had been brought yet, and the vessel itself was not in a particular location. The case was heard in Fort Meyers, FL. This was a shipowner acting quickly to get out of having to go to the P-friendly south Texas |
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Term
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Definition
| claimant filed suit in Madison County (super P friendly) and SO files lim. in E.D. Missouri. P challenged because lawsuit had already been filed. ED Mo proceeding dismissed, and then more than one year later, filed for lim in S.D. IL. If you are sued in state court and you want to bring a limitation proceeding, it must be brought in the geographical district where the state court is located. ALSO, filing a limitation proceeding in an improper venue does not toll the six month time period |
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Term
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Definition
| P files 2 suits: one in SD Texas, other in Plaquemines Parish. The word district means “geographical area,” not federal district court |
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Term
| In re Kingston Shipping Co |
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Definition
| serious accident in Tampa. The typical 6% interest bearing account in statute was really low (because in 1981, interest rates were high). Shipowner put up bond with 6% interest, but the court used its discretion to require cash and not accept bond. An option to post a bond, cash, or other security is not a choice. Nothing in the rule precludes a court from requiring SO to deposit value of vessel in cash |
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Term
| In re Sobodna Plovidba (M/V JABLANCA) |
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Definition
| oceangoing vessel on Lake MI overtaking fishing vessel, fishing vessel makes huge unexpected turn. SO offered a letter of undertaking from UK P&I Club. Court has discretion to determine what is an “approved security.” Using this discretion, court held that a letter of undertaking is an acceptable form of security to meet the requirements of F(1). NOT at discretion of claimants: at discretion of COURT |
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Term
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Definition
| allision, where the vessel owner said vessel’s value was $75,000. Claimants challenged amount of fund, court found real value was $135,000. To keep limitation, made vessel owner add extra $ at prevailing market rate—this is within judge’s discretion. |
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Term
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Definition
| foreign injunction from limitation proceeding doesn’t work in the U.S. (and vice versa) |
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Term
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Definition
| collision on high seas, one ship filed for lim in EDLA, cargo suit in NY, other ship had separate collision proceeding in England against ship 1. A potential claimant who has not filed a claim in the U.S. limitation proceeding has a right to pursue his claim in a foreign court—BUT a if a foreign claimant appears and becomes subject to court’s jurisdiction, the injunction against the party can be enforced |
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Term
| In re Hawaiian Eugenia Corp |
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Definition
| labor agreement provided for arbitration to determine some information. The court didn’t enforce arbitration for those facts, so then there was no reason for it. It’s really unpredictable what courts will do when arbitration may affect limitation. |
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Term
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Definition
| some claims in the limitation fund were subject to arbitration, others not. It would be impossible to be fair to do some court, some arbitration. Court didn’t like it because it would lead to an inconsistent result |
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Term
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Definition
| arbitration clause between cargo and shipowner. SO waived arbitration when limitation was initiated |
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Term
| Complaint of Southwind Shipping |
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Definition
| freight contract provided for arbitration, SO filed limitation. Court allowed arbitration, as long as they got to decide limitation after arbitration. Court essentially delegated factfinding to arbitration (opposite of Ballard Shipping) |
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Term
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Definition
| carrier had waived forum selection in contract of carriage with cargo when entering claim in shipowner limitation proceeding. |
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Term
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Definition
| 5th cir. fishing vessel in shallow water, lawsuit filed against the master, who was listed as an additional assured on insurance policy. §30512 allows suit against master/owner/seaman independent of vessel→without limitation. (opposite of outcome in 9th cir) |
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Term
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Definition
| P filed suit against non-maritime insurers and corporate officers. Actions against corporate officers stayed. §30512 refers to ship officers, not corporate officers |
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Term
| Petition of Bloomfield Shipping Co |
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Definition
| English case moved faster and reached decision for comparative fault. The court had discretion to bar re-litigation of the issue of liability already decided in a foreign court |
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Term
| Danos Marine v. Certain Primary P&I |
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Definition
| post-Katrina casualty of vessel, moves in Rita. Insurance didn’t want to remove wreck because it wasn’t required by law. Removal is compulsory when a reasonable owner, fully informed, would conclude that failure to remove would likely expose him to liability imposed by law sufficiently great in amount and probability of occurrence to justify expense of removal |
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Term
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Definition
| 7th cir. Vessel damages lock wall because of “Burrs” in lock chamber. No liability if government is solely at fault: failure or causation by vessel |
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Term
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Definition
| 6th cir.: barge and lock case. Comparative fault principles apply in allocating government liability for barge damage, but not to government structure damage. Government liable fo 50% of barge damage, vessel owner liabile for 100% of lock damage. |
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Term
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Definition
| In 9th circuit, owner must first prove that it exercised due diligence to make vessel seaworthy before fire statute applies (2nd and 5th: fire statute applies if there is a loss by fire) |
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Term
| Earle & Stoddart v. Ellerman’s Wilson Line |
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Definition
| coal fire, owner pleads fire statute. In fire statute, the claimants have the burden of showing that the owner had privity/knowledge (opposite of lim act). If crew negligence renders the ship unseaworthy before the voyage begins, no exoneration under Harter. BUT owner’s breach of a non-delegable duty is not necessarily neglect warranting denial of Fire statute exoneration. |
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Term
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Definition
| ship sinks in fair weather and calm seas. Problem: vessel susceptible to brittle fracture. No limitation because of p/k: people sufficiently high in management hierarchy were involved in and fully knowledgeable of repairs. No COGSA protection: owner didn’t exercise due diligence to provide a seaworthy vessel—can’t delegate to others. |
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Term
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Definition
| CHICKASAW grounds—all directional equipment fails. Limitation fails because owner should have checked. |
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Term
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Definition
| ran aground, oil spill off Nantucket. Owner made no attempt to correct problems it could have learned from reviewing logs from other voyages→no limitation |
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Term
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Definition
| 3 Kings day in PR, drunken sailors, tug and barge, towing wire breaks, big oil spill. Rule F limitation doesn’t work for oil pollution claims: venue and timing are different |
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Term
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Definition
| a collision creates a maritime lien as soon as it takes place |
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Term
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Definition
| bareboat charterer where owner had to get insurance. Personification doctrine: the vessel itself is to be treated in some sense as a principal and as personally liable for the negligence of anyone who is lawfully in possession of her, whether as owner or charterer |
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Term
| Transorient Navigators v. M/S Southwind |
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Definition
| collision in MS river, government wanted contribution from vessel. Couldn’t get it because the U.S. never secured arrest against the vessel to get in rem. Also, there was no liability on the part of the owner because the compulsory pilot was solely at fault. If you want to recover from a vessel, you have to arrest it (or get equivalent with letter of undertaking) |
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Term
| Belcher v. M/V MARTHA MARINER |
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Definition
| proceeding in the Netherlands is not the same as U.S. in rem proceeding. We’re special |
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Term
| Mount Washington Tanker Co v. Wahyen Shipping |
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Definition
| pilotage case. Pilot was not negligent here. The pilot has to be the exclusive cause to limit liability to just in rem. |
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Term
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Definition
| unmanned barges have no brain and can’t be liable. Tug is responsible for the navigation of the tug and unmanned barges and is solely liable for damages caused by a third party |
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Term
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Definition
| tug moving unmanned barge. The tug is charged with full responsibility for floatilla’s maneuvers because the tug was in sole control of the operation (the dominant mind). |
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Term
| Ryan Walsh Stevedoring Co v. James Marine SVC |
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Definition
| tug pulled barge with crane under bridge and crane fell off (collided with bridge). Tug solely liable for failing to overcome presumption that a tug towing her tow into collision, especially with stationary object, is at fault. The tug was the dominant mind. |
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Term
| Canal Barge Co v. China Ocean Shipping Co |
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Definition
| point-bend rule case. customs of navigation must be pleaded and clearly proved in each case as a matter of fact—court is not required to take judicial notice |
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Term
| Hal Antillen v. Mount Ymitos |
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Definition
| starboard to starboard passing—not a custom in this part of MS river. Customs of navigation will be given effect only if they are well established and do not conflict with statutory navigation rules, federal regs, and local ordinances |
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Term
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Definition
| a violation of the Bridge-to-Bridge Radiotelephone Act triggers the Pennsylvania Rule |
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Term
| Alkmenon Naviera v. M/V MARINA |
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Definition
| 2 Greek vessels in collision off coast of CA. Greek law applies |
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Term
| In re Seiriki Kisen Kaisha |
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Definition
| Japanese and Cayman flagged vessels. Both flags subscribe to Brussels Convention of 1910—applied Brussels Convention for substantive law |
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Term
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Definition
| collision in Brazilian waters. Liability for tort caused by collision in the territorial waters of a foreign country is governed by the laws of that country |
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Term
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Definition
| when multiple defendants caused the same damage, pretrial settlements don’t really matter for everyone else—trial judge at trial determines liability of all settling and non-settling parties |
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Term
| Philtankers v. M/V DON CARLOS |
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Definition
| ship sheered off bank & sheering was a known problem. Sheering and the presence of another vessel were conditions, not cause. The cause was the negligent attempt to pass another vessel. This may not be so important now that we have comparative fault. |
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Term
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Definition
| : 2 unseaworthy barges pulled by 2 unseaworthy tugs. Tugs were unseaworthy because there were no radios—even though common practice was to not use radios. Common practice for a whole calling may be unseaworthy (not reasonably fit for intended purpose) |
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Term
| Afran Transport v. The BERGECHIEF |
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Definition
| had radar, but didn’t use. Failure to use radar was negligence. Not having radar would have been unseaworthiness. |
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Term
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Definition
| mooring system failure off Hawaii coast, grounded. The proximate cause of the grounding was not the mooring system failure (cause in fact), but negligent navigation afterward. This was a superseding intervening fault. |
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Term
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Definition
| inevitable accident. This is on its way out |
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Term
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Definition
| party pleading inevitable accident must not only disclose what went wrong, but also prove what was done to avoid and what would have been necessary to prevent |
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Term
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Definition
| Hurricane Betsy causes vessels to become unmoored. Vis major must be overwhelming force, all reasonable precautions must be taken |
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| the judgment of a competent sailor in extremis can’t be impugned (error in extremis) |
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| wrong reaction caused solely by another vessel’s fault is error in extremis—the Oregon Rule applies. |
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| tug in extremis caught between ship and dock, dropped lines of barge. Oregon Rule applied |
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| Harbor Tug & Barge v. Belcher Towing |
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| in a sole fault collision, whoever is at fault is responsible for everything |
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| Otto Candies v. Madeline D |
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| no licensed operator on either vessel actually operating vessel. Under Pennsylvania Rule, if both vessels violate a statutory rule, the burden falls on both parties to rebut the presumption |
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| Candies Towing v. B&C Esserman |
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| the Pennsylvania Rule is not limited to collision cases—this was a grounding |
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| City of Boston v. SS Texaco Texas |
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| ship allides with bridge. The Oregon rule is a substantive rule of admiralty law and not governed by FRE 301 |
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| a vessel under its own power that collides with an anchored Bessel or fixed structure has the burden of proving absence of fault (could include force majeure) |
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| defective dock. The Oregon Rule presumption does not apply if the contract force is less than the minimum level separating collisions from expected docking forces or the wharf is defective |
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| bridge without reflective tape. It’s possible that if you collide with a stationary or fixed object, the stationary object may be at fault and the Pennsylvania Rule may apply |
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| barges fastened to bank, but drifted and caused collision. When a drifting Bessel causes damage, the custodian of the vessel is presumed at fault and bears the burden of disproving fault by preponderance of the evidence. Custodian is the master or maybe the operator of a barge fleet—the Louisiana Rule |
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| Neptune Marine v. ESSI CAMILLA |
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Definition
| Christmas day three vessel collision. A vessel that drags anchor and collides with another vessel is presumed at fault (and has burden of proving no fault). Prudent vessels must be ready to operate endine even when anchored |
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| NO Steamboat Co v. M/V HELLESPONT GLORY |
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Definition
| passing vessel partially at fault, but also bad gangway design for dock. A passing vessel that causes damage to a properly moored vessel is presumed at fault |
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| banana carrier sheers collision course into another vessel, can’t overcome presumption. A vessel that sheers or veers into another vessel or a fixed object is presumed at fault |
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| pencil had no eraser, but log was erased and edited. logbook alterations or the failure to produce logs creates a presumption that the original or missing entry was adverse. |
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| AE Staley Mfg Co v. Porto Rico Lighterage |
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| notes put in logbook every day. Failure to produce notes did not create presumption here. |
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| : didn’t put officers and crew on the stand even though they could. Failure to call a material witness creates the presumption that the testimony would have been adverse |
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| helmsman in a mental hospital after a nervous breakdown and the lookout no longer in the employ of the vessel. Witness presumption may be rebutted by an adequate explanation |
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| Beech Aircraft Corp v. Rainey |
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| navy training aicraft crash. Lets government agency reports in—this was probably wrong |
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| Petition of Cleveland Tankers |
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| conclusions and opinions of NTSB and USCG reports not admissible |
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| navigational rules “are not mere prudential regulations, but binding enactments obligatory from the time that the necessity for precaution begins and continuing so long as the means and opportunity to avoid the danger remains.” |
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| Allied Chemical Corp v. Hess Tankship |
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Definition
| in fog, ship hits barge and tug where tug engine was on still and the barge was grounded—ct finds it was still underway. A vessel lying in a river pushed against the bank and holding herself against the current by using her engines is underway (the RUTH). Aground requires that the vessel be unable to move freely without additional assistance grom other vessels or tide changes. |
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| Self Towing v. Brown Marine Services |
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Definition
| tug & tow collided with moored vessel. Moored and at anchor are two separate things. Moored vessels are at an expected place in a permanent location |
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| Getty Oil v. PONCE DE LEON |
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Definition
| dense fog, vessel anchored in middle of navigation fairway→collision. In view of traffic and heavy fog, anchored vessel had burden to exercise greater precautions than normal for anchored vessel. |
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| Juno SRL v. S/V ENDEAVOUR |
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| sailing yachts on 2 different scouses, but 1 marker the same. International Sailing Rules applied, COLREGS waived. Private agreement is OK as long as accident happens between the vessels in the race. If outside vessel was involved, COLREGS would still apply |
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| cite this case when you’re trying to excuse your vessel’s lookout problems. Vessel won’t be held liable for failure to post a lookout where the casualty could not have been avoided by use of a lookout or where lack of a lookout had nothing to do with the casualty (this is where old rule 29 and not new rule 5 applied for lookout rule) |
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| Supreme Court states the opposite of The Farragut, “duty of the lookout is of the highest importance” and “in the performance of this duty the law requires indefatigable care and sleepless diligence.” |
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| Trinidad Corp v. SS KEIYOH MARU |
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Definition
| lookout is an affirmative statutory duty under Rule 5 and failure to have one is a violation of the Pennsylvania Rule. |
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fishing boat made crazy turn into oceangoing vessel, evidence that fishing boat was on autopilot with no one on bridge. An autopilot equipment CANNOT replace lookout. Failure to comply with Rule 5 will be excused only when the information that a lookout would have provided was already available to navigational crew aboard ship
ALSO - RULE 13 - must maintain course and speed if you are overtaken vessel in Rule 13. |
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| Arabian American Oil v. Hellenic Lines |
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Definition
| vessel hits oil platform in Middle East. An ineffective lookout is just as bad as no lookout at all under Rule 5. |
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| Union Oil Co v. The SAN JACINTO |
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| tanker vessel collided with tow of tug in Columbia River—one vessel gets confused about where it is, turns right in front of the other. Supreme Court finds sole fault and suggests that half distance rule doesn’t work in all circumstances. |
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| dense fog, tug and tow collided with moored vessel. Vessel’s continued navigation under low to no visibility violated Rule 6. |
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| Bernert Towboat v. USS CHANDLER |
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Definition
| navy destroyer at 21 knots→caused wake and damaged tug and tow. The wake violated Rule 6. |
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| Alamia v. Chevron Transp. Corp |
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Definition
| wake and swell damaged shrimp boat. Tanker argued speed was essential for steerage. Court says this argument fails: should have hired tugs for steering. Violated Rule 6 |
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| Hellenic Lines v. Prudential Lines |
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| lazy watchman doesn’t radar plot, uses “parallel indexing.” That’s not the same thing. Failure to properly use radar violates Rule 7b |
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| oceangoing vessel and fishing vessel collide, where guy steering fishing vessel was not a qualified navigator and didn’t know about CBDR. At some point, the navigational error is so gross it’s incompetence. Incompetence of the deckhand to determine risk of collision violates Rule 7 |
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| Tokio Marine and Fire Insurance |
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Definition
| 2 vessels collide. Question of Rule 8(c)—violation of 8(c) doesn’t invoke Pennsylvania Rule→it’s not a requirement, just a suggestion |
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| : downbound vessel must stay to starboard and generally pass port-to-port in COLREGS 14(a), unless otherwise agreed under Inland Rule 9(A)(ii) – which, preserves the river-bend rule on the MS river |
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| Burma Nav v. Reliant Seahorse |
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Heavy fog, offshore supply vessel proceeding outbound from SW Pass of MS River collided with a cargo vessel proceeding inbound where MS River only 600 feet wide.
Rule 9 is conditional! Downbound vessel, who did not maintain contact, must have proposed a manner and place for passage and initiate maneuvering signals so upbound must hold up. |
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| Nebus v. Alaska Marine Towing, Inc |
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Definition
T/t collided with moored fishing vessel in narrow channel (9(g)) in Alaskan waters. Tug argued violated R9(g) and 33 USC 409.
Rejected - 9g and 33 USC 409 dont prohibit mooring vessels in navigable waters but only prevents anchorage or mooring in a which which would monopolize the channel. |
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| Intercontinental Bulktank v. M/S SHINTO MARU |
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Definition
| Daylight and good visibility, cargo vessel collided with T/t on Columbia river while overtaking. Cause was suction (overtaking at 13 knots and T/t at 9 knots). Violation of Rule 13 and Rule 6. |
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| Cole v. Sabine Towing and Transport |
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Definition
| Merely incidental changes in speed that are expected in the normal course of navigation do not violate Rule 13 on the part of the overtaken vessel. |
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| Alaska Packers Ass'n v. OS EAST POINT |
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Definition
| You dont get to Rule 2 easily - rules are created and meant to be followed as to avoid collisions. Strict adherence is necessary. |
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| 5th Cir muffed this one in a Rule 14 case - looked only at point of collision and did not consider the Williamson Leasing language of from when danger is first discovered/arises. |
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| Partenreederi MS Bernd Leonhardt v. US |
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| Rule 17 case with stand on vessel (aircraft carrier) making all sorts of crazy turns and collides with give way vessel. Carrier at fault. |
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| Zim Isreal v. Special Carriers |
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Definition
| Rule 17 case in crossing situation (Rule 15) - stand on vessel turned starboard like he was supposed to and give way turned to port - violated his duties. |
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| Should have been like Zim Israel because of same facts but DCT pissed that Hal altered logbooks and only found violation of Rule 7 (avoid collision). |
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| Rule 19 restricted visibility case. Yacht violated rule 19(d)(1) with turn to port and found 75% at fault and cargo 25% at fault for R19 violation and Rule 6 safe speed (rules fed each other here). |
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| Potomac Transport v. Ogden Marine |
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Definition
| Stand on vessel proceeding SE and give way SW in a crossing situation (R17 violation) - stand on did not detect give way's turns to starboard and it turned to port. Give way 25% liable (Rule 8 - make turns clear!) and stand on 75% as it turned to port. |
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| Have to suffer physical damage to a proprietary interest to recover pure economic loss. |
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| Follows Robins Dry Dock - Bright Line Rule - physical damage to property or proprietary interest required. Followed in 1, 3, 11th Cir. |
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| Follows Robins Dry Dock with proximate cause analysis - negligent tortfeasor is liable only for indirect loss that is reasonably foreseeable. Cause in fact is not sufficient. Not a bright line - facts and circumstances. |
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