Issue: Sullivan was Commissioner of Montgomery, AL, that supervised police force who imprisoned/assaulted civil rights protesters.  New York Times published ad purchased by four black ministers that allegedly defamed Sullivan

Principals: Sullivan and New York Times Co.

Decision: Sullivan couldn't prove actual malice

Implications: Affects relationship between press and public officials/agencies.  Requirement to prove actual malice.  Allowance for human error.  Central and privileged place of press in representative democracy.

Public officials or public figures are owned by the public; public has right to know about public matters and activities of public officials. 

Issue: Bradshaw became a quadriplegic following car accident in which an intoxicated Rawlings was driving; Rawlings was drunk because of consuming alcohol purchased by university funds and university employee for a university sponsored activity.

Principals: Bradshaw (victim), Rawlings (driver) and Delaware Valley College

Decision: University has no duty to care for non-minors (no special relationship existed); not required to stop a third-party from harming another student.  

Implications: Colleges and universities are not insurers of students' safety or the safety of guests on their campuses (190); except in certain narrowly defined circumstances.  

Issue: Mullins was a student at Pine Manor, an all-female insitution, when an unidentified assailant entered her on-campus room, forced her to another unlocked building on campus, where he proceeded to rape her.

Principals: Mullins (victim) and Pine Manor (all-female institution in urban Boston) including vice president of operations

Decision: SCOTUS ruled that there was sufficient evidence to find the defendants negligent in providing protection from criminal acts by a third party

Implications: Duty to protect against 3rd party, required by special relationship (failure to provide reasonable care to prevent foreseeable harm); was crime foreseeable, and was Pine Manor negligent in exercise of duty to care/protect?

 Issue: Furek was a sophomore fraternity pledge at University of Delaware who received significant burns as result of hazing activities, permanently scarring him, and causing him to withdraw and forfeit a full football scholarship.  Fraternity had charter revoked by national organization and UD.

Principals: Furek (victim) against campus charter and national fraternity organization, UD, and Joseph Donchez

Decision: A jury awarded $30,000, apportioned 93% to UD, 7% to Donchez.  Delaware SP ruled that national fraternity was not liable, that UD was liable for breach of duty of supervision and protection; the university's failure to protect did not rise to the level that would have  justified an award of punitive damages (any new trial would thus be limited to issue of liability), and compensatory damages would be shared by the university and Donchez.  

Implications: Campuses must develop policies against hazing to protect students against dangers of injury or death and to avoid liability for damages resulting from negligence. A university is particularly vulnerable if officials have prior knowledge of hazing and fail to take precautionary measures that go beyond the distribution of disciplinary consequences for hazing infractions.  

Issue: Students objected to the mandatory fee because it was used to support RSOs engaging in political or ideological speech.

Decision: SCOTUS declared that mandatory activity fee was constitutional as long as the mechanism to determine what RSOs received funding was viewpoint neutral.

Implications: Fee is not for university-sponsored speech nor was it responsible for content of any of the RSOs speech; sole purpose of the activity was to facilitate "fee and open exchange of ideas by, and among, its students" (a legitimate government interest). Viewpoint neutrality standard ensures that universities protect their students' First Amendment interests; justifies both the institution of a mandatory fee and the disbursement of funds.  May also enact viewpoint neutral restrictions on RSOs off-campus expenditures.  Decision akin to objecting to unpopular ideas taught by faculty members funded through tuition dollars.

Issue: Law prohibited state agency employees use of state computers to view/download/store sexually explicit content, except as may be used for approved research projects.  Faculty filed suit under the the auspices of academic freedom (for research purposes) and First Amendment right of free expression.

Principals: Plaintiffs were six professors from various state institutions filed against Gilmore (who was...)

Decision: SCOTUS denied certiorari (affirmed 4th Cir. ruling); en banc ruling upheld constitutionality of law prohibiting  use of state owned computers to download sexually explicit internet sites.

Implications: Academic freedom belongs to the university not individual faculty members or students. Law did not regulate employee speech on matters of public concern and, therefore, was not entitled to First Amendment protection. Court used Pickering Balance (rights of employees vs. rights of employers) and found speech did not touch on matters of public concern (therefore not protectable), and that public employees' speech had been purchased via salaries (could not comment as private citizens).  First Amendment rights of academic freedom, which go beyond that given by First Amendment, accrued to the university not the individual professors.

Issue: Stanton was a high school student attending a summer athletic camp on the campus of the University of Southern Maine, when she was sexually assaulted by an acquaintance she met at a campus fraternity party in the dorm room she was occupying.  She and parents filed suit alleging failure of duty to warn, breach of implied contract, and foreseeable assault.

Principals: Stanton (high school student, camp attendee) and University of Southern Maine

Decision: Stanton was a business invitee, and entitled to protection from foreseeable danger. University's failure to do these things were proximate cause of her injury and institution was therefore liable.

Implications: Dealt with issue of business invitee (part of the framework for deciding if an institution has provided protection to which they were entitled under policy and law); one who is invited to the premises for transacting business and to whom a duty of care is owed (a student attending a college or university has the legal status of a business invitee). Also, institution is liable if negligent action is proven to be proximate cause of injury.