Term
Barron v. Baltimore (1833) |
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Definition
- Barron owned a wharf, city development had lowered its value, claimed he was owed just compensation under fifth amendment
- Court decided that the Bill of Rights are restrictions on the federal government alone.
- Marshall: first ten "amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply them to the State governments. This court cannot so apply them."
- Established need for incorporation in 20th century
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Term
Palko v. Connecticut (1937) |
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Definition
- Palko had his murder charge upgraded to 1st degree in CT appeals court
- Palko claimed Double Jeopardy applies to states
- OPINION: No, using selective incorporation, did not see double jeopardy as a "fundamental right"
- New standard for incorporation:
- Fundamental rights
- inextricable from "system of ordered liberty"
- Criticized for judicial flexibility
- Later overturned
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Term
Adamson v. California (1947) |
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Definition
- CA law allowed juries to view refusal to testify as an admission of guilt (against 5th amendment)
- Court once again elects not to incorporate 5th
- Followed Cardozo's selective incorp from Palko
- Later overturned
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Term
Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) |
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Definition
- Duncan tried for simple battery, misdemeanor
- Doesnt require jury trial
- Sued for 6th amendment rights against LA
- He won
- New Test:
- Jury trials are a "deep commitment" in "American scheme of justice"
- Justice Black dissent: Still wants Total Incorp.
- Harlan: La followed procedural protocol
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Term
The Slaughterhouse Cases (1873) |
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Definition
- Louisiana grants statewide slaughterhouse monopoly
- Butchers/cattle-owners claim violation of 14th amendment
- Privileges and Immunities: court holds these are limited, don't include BOR, states are guarantors of rights
- Feared it would open door for Congress to import anything into Privileges and Immunities
- Removed P&I from incorporation options, went to SDP
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Term
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Definition
- Munn built grain elevator on his property, Illinois makes a price cap on grain elevators
- Munn sues, claiming cap deprives him of property
- Munn loses
- Opinion: business interests (private property) used for public good could be regulated by government
- Private companies can be regulated for public good, if they serve a public interest
- Dissent made early case for SDP
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Term
Lochner v. New York (1905) |
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Definition
- Minimum hours/wages law
- Economic SDP
- Court finds right to personal "liberty to contract"
- law removes this liberty
- holds this violates SDP
- Criticism: Court giving itself power to veto power over state govs on basis of "reasonableness"
- Harlan: This should be handled in legislature
- Now nullified
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Term
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937) |
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Definition
- Denied "absolute" liberty of contract
- Ended SDP for economic regulations
- Because FDR/New Deal super popular
- Ended "Lochner Era" of economic SDP
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Term
Williamson v. Lee Optical Company (1955) |
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Definition
- Optometrists, opticians, opthamalogists
- Law: you need opthamalogist/optometrist prescription before opticians can make new glasses/lenses
- Upheld
- Opinion:
- where a legitimate governmental interest lies--as reasoned by the Court--the law can survive a Due Process challenge.
- state laws regulating business will only be subject to rational basis review
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Term
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance v. Campbell (2003) |
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Definition
United States Supreme Court held that the due process clause usually limits punitive damage awards to less than ten times the size of the compensatory damages awarded.
incorporated another part of fifth amendment...excessive fines/bail etc. |
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Term
United States v. Carolene Products Company (1938) |
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Definition
- Justice Harlan Stone, writing for the Court, found that the law, being "presumptively constitutional" was essentially a legislative judgment
- not for the courts to overrule.
- Applying rational-basis review, the Court held that the law was not arbitrary or irrational.
- Footnote Four
- Strict Scrutiny for facially unconstiutional laws that adversely affect "discrete and insular minorities"
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Term
Griswold v. Connecticut (1965) |
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Definition
- Douglas: the Constitution protected a right to privacy
- In penumbras or emanations from BOR
- Right to privacy inheres in marriage relationship, which is integral to liberty and private life.
- Strikes down anti-contraception law
- Concurrences also offer 9th amendment and SDP as possible rationales for right to privacy
- Precursor to Roe v. Wade
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Term
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Definition
- Abortion
- Blackmun:
- Individual right to privacy
- State interest in potential life doesnt come into play until 2nd trimester
- No fetal personhood under 14th
- No abortion bans, but can regulate a little in later trimesters
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Term
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services (1989) |
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Definition
- upheld Missouri law that imposed restrictions on the use of state funds, facilities, and employees in performing, assisting with, or counseling on abortions.
- O'Connor: law does not give occassion ot overturn Roe v. Wade, but...
- allowed for states to legislate in an area previously been thought to be forbidden under Roe v. Wade.
- The court did not need to consider the constitutionality of the law's preamble
- The prohibitions on the use of public employees, facilities, and funds did not violate any of the Court's abortion decisions, as no affirmative right to the use of state aid for nontherapeutic abortions existed.
- Provisions requiring testing for viability after 20 weeks of pregnancy were constitutional, but those limiting abortions in the second trimester of pregnancy were unconstitutional.
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Term
Planned Parenthood of SE Pennsylvania v. Casey (1992) |
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Definition
- 5 provisions restricting/regulating abortion
- O'Connor plurality:
- uphold "Roe's central holding"
- Abortion protected under 14th (not penumbras)
- major focus on stare decisis, role of SCOTUS
- Rule of law requires consistency
- Focus on weight of precedent
- entire generation grew up with Roe
- Can't politicize SCOTUS
- Rehnquist dissent: This guts Roe in practice
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Term
Gonzales v. Carhart (2007) |
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Definition
- upheld the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003
- did not impose an undue burden on the due process right of women to obtain an abortion
- "Ethical and moral concerns", including an interest in fetal life, represented "substantial" state interests, and could be basis for legislation post-viability
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Term
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Definition
- Start of Takings Jurisprudence
- DC beautification
- Douglas:
- private property could be taken for a public purpose with just compensation
- judicial restraint
- expanded the definition of "public use" to include "public purpose" based on physical, aesthetic, and monetary benefits
- Foundation for Hawaii Housing Authority and Kelo
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Term
Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) |
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Definition
- held that a state could use theeminent domain process to take land overwhelmingly concentrated in the hands of private landowners and redistribute it to the wider population of private residents.
- Hawaii's act to regulate the oligopoly was seen as a classic exercise of the State's police powers, and a comprehensive and rational approach to identifying and correcting market failure
- Judicial deference to legislatures
- takings to correct concentrated property ownership was a legitimate "public purpose".
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Term
Kelo v. City of New London (2005) |
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Definition
- Stevens: general benefits a community enjoyed from economic growth qualified private redevelopment plans as a permissible "public use" under the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment
- leaned heavily on Midkiff
- Judicial deference again
- O'Connor: decision eliminates "any distinction between private and public use of property
- Thomas: Originalist dissent...meaning of "use", role of court, reverse robin hood, etc.
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Term
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987) |
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Definition
- California Coastal Commission required a lateral public easement along the Nollans' beachfront lot as a condition of approval of a permit to demolish an existing bungalow and replace it with a three-bedroom house.
- Scalia: “The lack of nexus between the condition and the original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other than what it was...Unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but an out-and-out plan of extortion"
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Term
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992) |
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Definition
- established the "total takings" test for evaluating whether a particular regulatory action constitutes a regulatory taking that requires compensation.
- Deprivation of all economically beneficial use is, from the perspective of a property owner, deprivation of the property itself.
- Regulations that restrict all economically beneficial use may often be a guise of pressing that land into public service.
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Term
Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (2002) |
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Definition
- found that the moratorium on home building did not constitute a taking.
- It reasoned that there was an inherent difference between the acquisition of property for public use and the regulation of property from private use.
- The majority concluded that the moratorium at issue in this case should be classified as a regulation of property from private use and therefore no compensation was required.
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Term
Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994) |
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Definition
- served to establish limits on the ability of cities and other government agencies, to use zoning and land-use regulations to compel property owners to make unrelated public improvements
- Dolan applied for a permit to expand her store and pave the parking lot. The city planning commission granted conditional approval, dependent on Dolan dedicating land to a public greenway and developing a pedestrian pathway.
- Rehnquist: a government agency may not require a person to surrender constitutional rights in exchange for discretionary benefits, where the property sought has little or no relationship to the benefit conferred.
- two-prong test was applied:
- "essential nexus" between the permit conditions and legitimate state interest
- whether or not the exactions required by the permit condition bears the required relationship to the projected impact of the proposed development.
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Term
Gitlow v. New York (1925) |
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Definition
- Socialist Benjamin Gitlow, was charged under New York's Criminal Anarchy Law for publishing the "Left Wing Manifesto"
- upheld Gitlow's conviction on the basis that the government may suppress or punish speech that directly advocates unlawful overthrow of gov
- Schenk/Brandeis Dissent: No immediate danger here, should stick with "Clear and Present Danger"
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Term
Schenk v. United States (1919) |
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Definition
- Charles Schenck was the Secretary of the Socialist Party of America and was responsible for printing, distributing, and mailing material to prospective military draftees during World War I, including 15,000 leaflets that advocated opposition to the draft.
- Speech that constitutes "Clear and Present Danger" is not protected
- the circumstances of wartime permit greater restrictions on free speech than would be allowed during peacetime.
- "Shouting fire in a theater"
- Conviction upheld
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Term
Dennis v. United States (1951) |
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Definition
- Dennis was president of the Communist party
- Ruled that Dennis did not have the right under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution to exercise free speech, publication and assembly, if the exercise involved the creation of a plot to overthrow the government.
- Vinson: reject the contention that success or probability of success is criterion
- Looser application of "clear and present danger"
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Term
Brandenburg v. Ohio (1969) |
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Definition
- KKK fucker arrested under Ohio's criminal syndicalism act
- Says stuff about "revengeance" on POTUS
- Court held that government cannot punish inflammatory speech unless that speech is directed to inciting, and is likely to incite,imminent lawless action.
- struck down Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute because it broadly prohibited the mere advocacy of violence.
- Did away with Dennis v. United States
- "imminent lawless action" test
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Term
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Definition
- Johnson burned a flag in protest, violating Texas law
- Brennan: "burning of the flag constituted expressive conduct, permitting him to invoke the First Amendment"
- No disturbance of peace or likely disturbance of the peace
- Did not pass "imminent lawless action" test
- Rehnquist dissent: "uniqueness" of the flag "justifies a governmental prohibition against flag burning in the way respondent Johnson did here."
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Term
RAV v. City of St. Paul (1992) |
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Definition
- Teenagers burn a cross in someone's yard
- unanimous Court struck down St. Paul, Minnesota's Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance
- content-based regulations are presumptively invalid
- Scalia: even though the law reached only "fighting words", it banned only "fighting words" used to or against certain types of people, and therefore it was not viewpoint or content neutral.
- Lets one side of a debate use slurs but not the other
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Term
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Definition
- Court ruled 6-3 that the First Amendment right to free speech was not violated by a Colorado law limiting protest, education, distribution of literature or counseling within eight feet of a person entering a health-care facility.
- Stevens: valid state interest because:
- Even though speakers have a right to persuade, this cannot extend to unwilling listeners because people also have a right “to be let alone.”
- content neutral because it does not regulate speech, just one arena for speech. No matter what message a person is trying to convey, this statute would apply.
- Narrowly tailored
- Dissents:
- This law is not content neutral as it is obviously only being applied to abortion clinics and anti-abortion messages.
- Protecting citizens from unwanted speech is not a compelling state interest.
- The amount of places actually being covered by this statute is very large if one considers the extensive amount of healthcare facilities there are. So, speech is being restricted very significantly.
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Term
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Definition
- NAACP gets contempt of court for refusing to release its member list to Alabama
- Harlan: they don't have to release it under Freedom of Association
- 1st/14th amendments
- Involves a certain right to privacy
- to do otherwise would allow a chilling effect on political organizations
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Term
Roberts v. United States Jaycees (1984) |
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Definition
- Minnesota Human Rights Act upheld
- Brennan: 2 types of Freedom of Assoc.
- intimate (families, lovers, etc.)
- expressive
- jaycess are a large, unselective org
- not particularly expressive
- Brennan: because Jaycees aren't expressive, state interest in reducing discrimination wins out
- Admission of women won't "substantially" affect character/expressive functions of org
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Term
Hurley v. Irish-American GLIB of Boston |
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Definition
- Gay-rights group wants to participate in Boston parade
- Court: Parade is privately funded/organized and is expressive
- Court: private citizens organizing a public demonstration may not be compelled by the state to include groups who impart a message the organizers do not want to be included in their demonstration
- Effectively, the Council could not be forced to endorse a message against its will.
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Term
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000) |
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Definition
- BSA kicks out scoutmaster for being gay rights activist
- Rehnquist finds for BSA:
- freedom of association allows a private organization to exclude a person when "the presence of that person affects in a significant way the group's ability to advocate public or private viewpoints."
- opposition to homosexuality is part of BSA's "expressive message" and that allowing homosexuals as adult leaders would interfere with that message.
- Gov "not free to interfere with speech for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one"
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Term
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Definition
- Minnesota tried to stop a newspaper from publishing material critical of public officials' handling of organized crime, accusing corruption, etc.
- Prior restraint not allowed under freedom of press
- Minnesota nuisance law's suppression of newspapers was prior restraint
- exceptions for military secrets, obscenity, sedition
- Incorporated 1st amendment, ruled that prior restraint violates that
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Term
New York Times Co. v. United States (1971) |
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Definition
- Pentagon papers case
- Black: security is too broad and vague to justify suppression of the press
- (freedom of the press is absolute in context of national security)
- Press must be able to hold gov accountable
- Stewart: "responsibility is where the power is", executive has power/responsibility to determine what should be kept secret. (How does this support NYT?)
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Term
Branzburg v. Hayes (1972) |
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Definition
- Branzburg subpoenaed to testify about confidential sources before grand jury
- White: invalidated the use of the First Amendment as a defense for reporters summoned to testify before a grand jury.
- Gov only needs a compelling state interest: the government must "convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest."
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Term
New York Times v. Sullivan (1964) |
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Definition
- Freedom of the press
- New standard for libel directed at public officials:
- Show it's false
- Show "Actual Malice"
- allowed free reporting of the civil rights campaigns in the southern United States
- actual malice standard requires proof that the publisher of the statement in question knew that the statement was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or falsity.
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Term
Miller v. California (1973) |
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Definition
- Miller was mailing out pornographic materials
- Court: obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment and established the Miller test for determining what constituted obscene material.
- Miller Test:
- "Average person applying community standards"
- Depicts/defines sexually explicit conduct in patently offensive way
- lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific merit
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Term
Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Assoc. (2011) |
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Definition
- Struck down CA law that made it illegal to sell violent video games to minors
- Court: video games are protected speech under the First Amendment.
- Scalia: "speech about violence is not obscene,"
- no "compelling" link between violent video games and its effects on children
- current self-moderated industry standards like the ESRB are operated effectively to regulate the sale of more mature games to minors,
- We let kids read violent books and such
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