Term
R v White [1910]
The ‘but for’ test |
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Definition
D wished to kill his mother, so he put poison in her drink
V (mother) didn’t die from the poison, but died from an unrelated heart attack
D was acquitted for murder (however he was charged with attempted murder)
But for – ‘but for’ the D, she would still have died |
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Term
R v Dalloway [1847]
The consequences must be caused by the defendant’s culpable act |
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Definition
D was driving a horse and cart without holding the reins tightly
A child ran in front of the cart, was run over and killed
Expert evidence claimed that even if he had been holding the reins tightly, he would not have been able to stop the cart in time
Therefore, the ‘culpable element’ of his act (negligently not holding the reins tightly) was not in fact the legal cause of the consequence |
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Term
R v Benge [1865]
The defendant’s act need not be the only cause of the prohibited consequence |
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Definition
D was the foreman for some railway truck layers
D misread the train timetable, and thinking that no more trains were due for several hours, ordered the track to be taken up
D sent a ‘red flag man’ down the track to stop any trains, however the ‘red flag man’ did not go far enough
D entirely omitted to place fog signals
A train crashed, killing several people
It also appeared that the train driver was not paying enough attention
In spite of all of D’s mistakes, the accident would not have happened if other servants of the company had done their job properly (and not also have been negligent)
However, D was convicted of manslaughter |
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Term
R v Pagett [1983]
The D’s act must be the ‘substantial’ cause of the prohibited harm (Substantial = more than negligible)...
Intervention of third parties – there will only be a break in the causal chain linking to the D if ‘the actions of the 3rd party are free (independent from D), deliberate and informed’
o INTERVENTION OF A 3RD PARTY DOESN’T BREAK CHAIN OF CAUSATION IF THE ACT IS -
i. Involuntary – ie acting under compulsion/ duress
ii. Reasonable act performed for the purpose of self preservation/defence
iii. Act done in the performance of a legal duty |
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Definition
The police were trying to arrest D
D pulled out a shotgun and started firing at the police
The police returned fire and D used his girlfriend as a shield
The girlfriend was shot dead
D was convicted of her manslaughter
Ratio decidendi – ‘the judge directing the jurors on causation, stated that they had to be sure that the appellant had fired first at the officers and that that act caused the officers to fire back with the result that the girl was killed. The jurors also had to be satisfied that in doing so, the police acted reasonably... if so, then there is a causal link to the D’... on appeal... ‘there may only be a break in the chain of causation if the actions of the 3rd party were free deliberate and informed’
Self-defence = an involuntary act |
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Term
R v Hayward [1908]
Thin skin rule |
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Definition
D was in a rage, threatened his wife and chased her into the road
Wife was suffering from an abnormal thyroid condition, such that any combination of physical exertion and fear might lead to her death
Wife collapsed and died because of thyroid condition
D was found to be responsible for her death, nuff said |
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Definition
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Definition
| The consequences must be caused by the defendant's culpable act |
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Term
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Definition
| The defendant's act need not be the only cause of the prohibited consequence |
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Definition
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Term
R v Roberts [1972]
If V’s response to a threat from D results in V sustaining injuries... D is responsible provided that the rational man would identify V’s response as having been foreseeable and proportionate. |
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Definition
V accepted a lift from D
Whilst they were driving, D made sexual advances on V
V escaped the attack by jumping out of the moving car and subsequently injured herself
D was found to be responsible, because ‘it could reasonably have been seen that V would jump out of the car as a consequence of D’s actions’. |
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Term
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Definition
| Acts of the victim - V's response = proportionate and foreseeable... sexual assault & moving car |
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Term
R v Williams & Davis [1992]
V’s response must be proportionate to threat + thin-skin rule |
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Definition
D’s picked up a hitchhiker (V)
D’s attempted to rob V
V jumped out of the moving car and died
Judge applied rule from R v Roberts, and also directed the jury to consider the mental psyche of the V, thin-skin rule |
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Term
| R v Williams & Davis [1992] |
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Definition
| V's response must be foreseeable and rationl + thin-skin rule |
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Term
R v Blaue [1975]
V’s refusal of medical treatment does NOT break the chain, D = still liable
+ thin skin rule |
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Definition
D attacked and stabbed V after she refused to shag him
Doctor recommended that V should have a blood transfusion
V was a Jehovah Witness and therefore declined the transfusion
D was held to be liable
Ratio decidendi – ‘it has long been he policy of law that those who use violence on other people must take their victims as they find them. This in my judgement means the whole man, not just the physical man’ |
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Term
R v Dear [1996]
Where the victim has died from the ORIGINAL wound caused by D, the acts or omissions of the V will not break the chain of causation... D still = culpable |
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Definition
V was accused of sexually assaulting D’s 12year old daughter
D slashed V with a knife
V’s wounds healed slightly, but then worsened and V died
D claimed that V had purposefully re-opened his wounds
Ratio decidendi – whether or not the resumption or continuation of that bleeding was deliberately caused by the deceased, the jury were entitled to find that the defendant’s conduct made an operative and significant contribution to the death’ |
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Term
R V Kennedy [2007]
If D provides V with drugs & V subsequently overdoses, causal chain is broken, D = not culpable |
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Definition
D provided V with Drugs
V overdosed
D was not culpable
Ratio decidendi – ‘in such circumstances the chain of causation is broken by the voluntary and informed decision to act. The court refused to apply a test of reasonable foreseeability’ |
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Term
R v Smith [1959]
Medical negligence (or negligence of others) does not break the chain of causation |
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Definition
Soldier colleague carried V to medical station, but dropped him on the way
At the medical station they did not recognise the severity of V’s case, and so provided him with inappropriate & positively harmful treatment
V died
D was convicted of his murder |
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Term
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Definition
| Medical negligence (or the negligence of another) does not break the link in the causal chain. D still = guilty |
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Term
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Definition
| Unlawfully killing a reasonable who is in being, and under the King's peace |
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Term
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Definition
| It was held that substantial does not mean ‘really serious’. It means one that is not a ‘de minimus, trifling one’ |
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Term
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Definition
It was held that it is sufficient that the accused’s conduct was more than a minimal cause of the consequence
‘you do not have to be sure that Kimsey’s driving was a substantial cause of death, as long as you are sure that it was a cause and that there was something more than a slight or trifling link’ |
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Term
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Definition
D had stabbed V in the thigh and chest
V received surgery on the wounds & was then transferred to intensive care
V developed respiratory problems, and the doctors diagnosed this as anxiety attacks
V subsequently died from a blocked windpipe
D appealed against first instance finding that he was guilty of murder
Appeal found D guilty
Ratio decidendi – ‘even though negligence in the treatment of the victim was the immediate cause of death, the jury should not regard it as excluding the responsibility of the D unless the negligent treatment was so independent of his acts, and in itself so potent in causing death that they regard the contribution made by the D’s acts insignificant’
Obiter dictum – ‘treatment which falls short of the standard expected of the competent medical practitioner is unfortunately only too frequent in human experience for it to be considered abnormal in the sense of extraordinary... [Acts of a medical practitioner in treating wounds caused by a D may be so extraordinary that they are capable of being regarded as independent acts, thus breaking the chain of causation]... but it is unlikely that they will be’ |
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