Term
Cook's Pest Control v Robert and Margo Rebar
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Definition
· When renewing contract, Rebars submitted amendments to the contract,
o Cook's Pest Control accepted the new contract by depositing the check, continuing to provide pest control service, and by failing to alert the Rebars that they did not agree with the new amendments
· Rebars sued for a number of things including fraud, negligence, breach of contact, breach of warranty, breach of duty, unjust enrichment, breach of the duty to warn, negligent training, supervision and retention of employees, and bad-faith failure to pay and bad-faith failure to investigate a claim
-Cooks filed a motion to compel arbitration
-Rebars responded by saying the arbitration provision that Cooks referenced in its argument was not valid after the new amendments canceled it out
-cooks argues that the trial court incorrectly ruled, and that they were under contract to continue servicing the house, and that that should not count as acceptance of the new contract
-Cook had 3 options when rebars submitted new contract
1. Reject
2. Respond w/ counteroffer
3. Accept
-they didn’t do the 1st two, therefor the third choice was selected by default
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Term
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Definition
-appellant was awarded the equitable remedy of rescission of a contract for the sale of property on the ground of mutual mistake
- also sought money damages for fraud, but the judge refused the request.
- appealed to the supreme court of Arkansas
-appellee cross-appealed, contending that the only basis for rescission is fraud, not mistake and, thus, the appellee argued that the chancellor had erred in granting rescission.
- state supreme court affirmed the decision of the lower court on all grounds.
-a mutual mistake of fact is a legal basis for rescission, and that because the appellant could not prove reliance on the appellee's misrepresentations, the denial of money damages was not clearly erroneous
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Term
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Definition
Haley was convicted of stealing a calculator and had previously been accused of 2 previous crimes, so he was declared a habitual offender and given several extra years in prison. After a failed appeal to the Texas appellate court, Haley filed a state habeas application in the trial court, arguing that his past crimes did not qualify him as a habitual offender and that his attorney had provided ineffective counsel when he failed to object to the extended sentence. The court dismissed his claims on procedural grounds, because he had not raised the issue during his trial and therefore could not raise it in the habeas petition. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied his habeas application based on the trial court's findings.
Haley then filed for habeas corpus relief in federal district court. Pointing to the procedural-default doctrine, Texas argued that Haley's claim was procedurally barred from federal habeas review. Under the procedural-default doctrine, federal courts cannot grant habeas relief if the last state court rejected the appeal for procedural violations of state law; the only exception is if the petitioner is actually innocent.
The district court held that Haley showed he was "actually innocent" of earlier violations on which his sentence enhancement was based. The court ruled that Haley's sentence was therefore improperly extended. It never reached his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, having already found grounds for overturning the extended sentence. The U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting Texas's argument that the actual-innocence exception applies only to cases involving capital offenses.
The Court declined to answer the question presented, ruling instead that the district court should have first considered the ineffective assistance of counsel claim before reaching the question of whether the "actual innocence" exception applies to non-capital cases. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, for a seven-member majority, wrote that the ineffective assistance of counsel claim would accomplish the same thing - the reduction of the sentence - without burdening the state with the need to prove the existence of all prior convictions beyond a reasonable doubt |
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Term
US v Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez- Lopez
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Definition
Cuauhtemoc Gonzalez-Lopez hired Joseph Low, an attorney, to represent him in a federal criminal trial. The district court judge refused to allow Low to represent Gonzalez-Lopez, however, because the judge ruled that Low had violated a court rule in a previous case. Gonzalez-Lopez was subsequently convicted. On appeal, he argued that his Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of his own choosing had been violated and that the conviction should therefore be overturned. The Eighth Circuit agreed, holding that the trial judge had misinterpreted the court rule and that Low's conduct had been acceptable under a proper understanding of the rule. The decision to not allow him to represent Gonzalez-Lopez was therefore wrong, and resulted in a violation of Gonzalez- Lopez's Sixth Amendment rights significant enough to warrant overturning the conviction.
The Supreme Court held that a denial of the Sixth Amendment right to paid counsel of one's own choosing is "structural" error. Unlike some other kinds of errors in which a defendant must also prove that the result would likely have been different had his rights not been violated, structural errors must result in automatic reversal of the conviction.
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Term
Illinois v Roy I Caballes
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Definition
During a routine traffic stop, a drug-detection dog alerted police to marijuana in Roy Caballes' car trunk. An Illinois court convicted Caballes of cannabis trafficking. Caballes appealed and argued the search violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures. The state appellate court affirmed the conviction. The Illinois Supreme Court reversed and ruled police performed the canine sniff without specific and articulable facts to support its use, "unjustifiably enlarging the scope of a routine traffic stop into a drug investigation."
Justice John Paul Stevens delivered the Court's 7-2 opinion that Caballes' Fourth Amendment rights were not violated. The Constitution did not require police to have reasonable suspicion to use a drug-detection dog on a car during a legal traffic stop. No legitimate privacy was at risk, the Court argued, because the dog only alerted to an illegal drug.
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Definition
Detroit police executing a search warrant for narcotics and weapons entered petitioner Hudson’s home in violation of the Fourth Amendment ’s “knock-and-announce” rule. The trial court granted Hudson’s motion to suppress the evidence seized, but the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on interlocutory appeal. Hudson was convicted of drug possession. Affirming, the State Court of Appeals rejected Hudson’s renewed Fourth Amendment claim. The judgment is affirmed.
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Term
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Definition
Dickerson was indicted for bank robbery, conspiracy to commit a robbery, and using a firearm. He claimed he wasn’t given his Miranda warnings so a statement he gave at the FBI shouldn’t be admissible. The decision by the Court of Appeals is reversed and his statement remains suppressed.
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Term
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Definition
Without a warrant, a federal narcotics agent (agent) arrested the Petitioner, Draper (Petitioner), as he disembarked a train. Probable cause for the arrest was based on an informant’s tip, which was corroborated with an accurate, predictive description of the facts surrounding the Petitioner’s return.
Held. The informant’s past reliability, accurate description of the Petitioner’s clothing, bag, and date of arrival gave the agent probable cause to arrest the Petitioner without a warrant. Yes. Hearsay is an evidentiary rule dealing with guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Excluding facts that are hearsay from probable cause confuses the common sense standard of probable cause from the technical, legal standards of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Definition
Scott was found guilty of conspiracy to make and one count of producing meth. He wanted an appeal because the judge denied him right to use the defense of coercion. He claimed that he only did this because he was in fear that he or his family would be killed if he didn’t act as directed. Coercion is not an admissible defense if there was a reasonable alternative to committing the crime, like running away or contacting the police, so the judgment is affirmed.
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Term
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Definition
Berggren was charged with motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation of a motor vehicle so as to endanger public safety. A police officer died in pursuit of the defendant, who was trying to escape the cop on his motorcycle. The accused is only responsible for consequences that are reasonably foreseeable, so he is not guilty of homocide.
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Term
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Definition
Gordon was charged with armed robbery and found guilty and the appeal was denied. He claimed that his stealing of a car while escaping from authorities and later assaulting an officer and participating in a high speed car chase and shoot out was not a armed robbery because he told the man he stole it from he would return it. The jury found that since he in fact abandoned the car and had abandoned the car stolen before it and he admitted that he just said he would return it to get out of there, it was still armed robbery since he never intended for the owner to get his car back.
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Term
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Definition
The defendant, was a passenger in a car along with her boyfriend and two others accidentally drove onto private property that did not have an illuminated sign instead of a park across the street. They were charged with trespassing. Since there was no actus reus, she was found not guilty.
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Term
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Definition
- Action: 1984, Steve and Roxanne Macomber filed a complaint against the Def. Carter F. Dillman and the Webber Hostpital. (alleged INTER ALIA) Roxanne had been in-completely sterilized, resulting in unwanted child.
- Facts: Roxanne was not sterilized completely. Resulting in her child Mazie May. This was her 6th child. Def. filed motion for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff’s complaint did not state a claim for which damages could be granted.
- Issues:
1. Did the superior court deny the DEF.’s motion to dismiss the plaintiff’s complaint for failure to a state a claim against the DEF. For which relief can be granted? YES
2. Did the Superior Court properly set forth the damages that the plaintiffs could recover should they prevail in their action against the DEF. (loss of consortium) YES
- Reasoning:
1. The court referred to prevalent historical Common law of Maine. The remedy for medical mistreatment lies in the complaint of negligence.
2. Historical precedence of husbands right to recover damages for the loss of consortium.
- Holding: Relief was granted, and limited to the scope of this case, recovery was rewarded.
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Term
John C. Wilen v. William Faulkenstein
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Definition
- Action: Appeal arises from a trespassing suit brought by Appellee Faulkenstein against neighbor John Wilen, for causing a tree service to trim a tree on Faulkenstein’s property.
- Facts: A trial court had awarded Faulkenstine 5300 $ in actual damages; 18000$ in exemplary damages and 29,700 $ in attorney’s fees. Wilen’s trespassing was performed with malice, instructing TLS Landscaping to enter Faulkenstein’s land and trim 5 foot of branches from a tress. Wilen assumed Story (the Tree man) had permission from Faulkstein, which we later found was a lie.
- Issues: Wilen argued that the evidence is insufficient to support the exemplary damages award because his conduct was not MALICIOUS.
- Reasoning: The court agreed with the 18,000 $ in exemplary damages, was well within the cap of 200,000$ and well within Wilen’s financial means.
- Holding: Trial court erred in awarding Attorneys Fee’s to Faulkenstien, b/c he did not contractually prove entitlement
the superior court removes the 29,000$ Attorneys fee awarded to Faulkenstein, yet affirms the trials court judgment on the 18,000$. |
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Term
Department of transportation v. Ronlee, Inc. |
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Definition
- Action: Ronlee, INC. filed suit against DOT seeking reformation of the contract. Ronlee was awarded 317,463 & 60,000 in prejudgment intersts and costs.
- Facts: Ronlee, INC. was the lowest bidder at almost 16 million, winning the DOT contruction job of State Road 826. Runner up bidder exceeded Ronlee’s bid by 600,000$. 5 days after start of construction, Ronlee informed DOT of a ‘Stupid Mistake’ in the Amount of 317,463$. Ronlee employee had written $5.25 instead of $525 for the unit price of concrete culvert.
-Issues: is the successful bidder for a government construction contract entitled to reformations of the contract to increase the price based on a ‘Unilateral’ mistake, where the new contract price would still be lower than the second lowest bid.
- Reasoning: A government unit is not required to act for the protection of a contract’s interest; it is entitled to the price bargained upon. And, Ronlee forfeited any right it may have had to reformation or recession by waiting 10 days to inform DOT.
-Holding: Court Reverses, and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the DOT |
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Term
Campbell Soup Comp. v. Wentz |
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Definition
Action: Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court Denying equitable relief to the buyer under a contract for the sale of carrots..
-Facts: Written contract, purchasing all the Chantenay red-cored Carrots to be grown on 15 acres of Wentz land, for 30$ a ton. Wentz refused to sell, b/c the market price was 90$ a ton. Wentz withheld the 100 tons grown. These carrots at the time were UN-OBTAINABLE!
-Issues: Can a party have specific performance of a contract for the sale of chattels if the legal remedy is inadequate?
-Reasoning: The reason the court affirmed is found in the contract itself.
-Holding: No. Equity does not enforce unconscionable bargains.
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Term
Isbell v. Brighton Area School |
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Definition
Plaintiff Isbell was denied her high school diploma at Brighton High School due to the fact that she violated the school's unexcused absence policy. Isbell brought a suit in equity, and the trial court allowed her motion for summary disposition and ordered Brighton to award her a diploma. Brighton appealed to the Michigan Court of Appeals. The Appeals Court reversed the decision of the lower court holding that Isbell was precluded from seeking equitable relief due to the maxim of "unclean hands." The court reasoned that because Isbell came before the court with unclean hands (i.e. Isbell admitted to the forgery of excuse notes), an equitable remedy is inappropriate. Isbell is left to pursue her usual remedies at law. |
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Term
Iacomini v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company |
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Definition
Iacomini, the plaintiff, contracted with Zadlo to tow, store, and repair a Mercedes- Benz automobile. Zadlo had represented himself as the owner of the car. The car, however, had been stolen, and Liberty Mutual had obtained title to the vehicle by paying the true owner's insurance claim. Upon locating the car, Liberty Mutual sought to take possession, but Iacomini refused until his storage and repair fees were paid. Liberty Mutual brought a replevin action against Iacomini. The court granted the motion but ordered Liberty Mutual to retain possession and ownership of the car for ninety days to allow Iacomini time to initiate an action against the company for reimbursement. |
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Term
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Definition
1.) Facts- Plaintiff and Defendant were married on April 3, 1971 and at the time both were employed as teachers. Plaintiff relinquished opportunity to obtain permanent certification while plaintiff pursued further education. In 1973 the parties moved to Mexico and plaintiff became a full-time medical student while defendant held several teaching and tutorial positions and contributed her earnings to joint expenses. In 1976 parties returned to New York and plaintiff completed last two semesters of med school and internship training. Plaintiff was licensed to practice medicine in October of 1980, and commenced divorce 2 months later.
2.) Overview- Defendant is attempting to states that the husbands medical license is marital property. She showed that she had worked and contributed to the husband’s ability to obtain medical license, and that it would have contributed to their standard of living. The court found that this was correct and that the wife had contributed to husbands ability to get medical license
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Definition
1.) Action- Stepfather is petitioning district court to adopt children without father’s consent because father had failed to provide adequate child support for the children. The district court denied the petition, finding the stepfather failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that father willfully failed to pay child support
2.) Facts- The children’s mother and father were divorced in 2001, and the divorce decree awarded custody of children to mother and for the father to pay 527.46 a month in child support. The mother married the stepfather in January 2003 and the stepfather assumed responsibility of supporting the children. Father did not comply with child support payments and on Feb 2, 2004 filed to adopt children without fathers consent. The district court held a hearing on stepfathers petition. Father argues that he was unable to pay child support, because he was in prison. The stepfather argues that the father was responsible for not paying because his actions lead to his incarceration. Stepfather also argues that father chose to spend money on drugs and alcohol instead of paying child support.
3.) Reasoning- The Record does not have evidence supporting that father’s use of drugs and alcohol contributed to father’s difficulties in paying child support. Father stated that when not in jail attempted to find work, but was unable, and did not make money while in jail therefore could not pay. And the right of parents to associate with children is essential and fundamental. The due process requires court to stringently guard this right. Stepfather did not prove that father willfully disregarded his child support obligation.
4.) Holding- Stepfather is not allowed to adopt.
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Term
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Definition
1.) Action- Dorothy Riddle is appealing a decision which awarded the primary physical custody of the parties’ minor child to Michael Riddle.
2.) Facts- Dorothy and Michael Riddle were married in August 1986 and their child was born on January 1987. In July 1990, Dorothy filed a petition for dissolution of marriage, and the petition was not served on Michael until November 1991. In January 1992 the district court awarded temporary physical custody of Lauren to Dorothy. In August 1992, following a hearing, the district court issued a dissolution decree, and the court determined that primary physical custody of Lauren goes to Michael. Dorothy states the court erred in 1.) Finding Laurens long term best interests were best served by awarding primary physical custody to Michael and 2.) separating Lauren from her half-sister Ashley
3.) Issue- “The critical issue in determining the best interests of the child is which parent will do better in raising the child….Gender is irrelevant, and neither parent should have a greater burden than the other in attempting to gain custody in a dissolution proceeding
4.) Reasoning- The record supports that Michael being award primary physical custody is in Laurens best interest in that while Dorothy was working and obtaining her degree, Michael became Lauren’s primary caretaker. Also, witness testimony affirmed the fact that Michael and Lauren shared very close bond. Court also found that the separation of Lauren from her half-sister, Ashley, was gave Dorothy an unfair advantage under the law, because Michael had no claim to having custody of Ashley, because she was from Dorothy’s prior marriage.
5.) Holding- Affirmed decision to give Michael primary physical custody.
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Term
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Definition
1.) Facts- Charles Mulle fathered Melissa Alice Matlock as the result of extra-marital affair with Helen Nash in 1981, but has not since had anything to do with the child. The court ordered him to pay 200 dollars in child support each month. In 1990, Helen Nash filed an action to increase the amount of child support because of Mulle’s dramatic increase in income. The court the ordered Mulle to pay 3,092.62 with 1,780.17 reserved for a college fund. The court of Appeals reversed this decision and limited the award to 1,312 dollars per month and disallowed the trust finding that it improperly extended the parental duty of support beyond the age of majority.
2.) Holding- They say that an educational trust is acceptable, but it is sent back to the juvenile court for an adequate amount to be awarded with regards to decision.
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Term
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Definition
1.) In this case two unmarried women, Susan and Helen, filed a petition to the Probate and Family Court Department to adopt their child Tammy, a minor who is Susan’s biological daughter.
2.) The Probate and Family Court entered a memorandum of decisions containing findings of fact and conclusions of law and that Tammy’s best interest should be adopted by both, the case was taken to the Appeals Court on their own motion.
3.) They found that Tammy’s best interest was served by the adoption. The father does not participate in parenting, and signed an adoption surrender and supports the joint adoption. The adoption is important for Tammy to receive inheritance from Helen. Helen is beneficiary of 3 irrevocable family trusts, and if Helen is not allowed to adopt Tammy then the trusts may go to others.
4.) The statutes regarding adoption in the states is to promote the best interest of the child, and the adoption is affirmed
5.) Tammy is allowed to be adopted by Helen and Susan
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Term
John Langan v. St. Vincent’s Hospital
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Definition
1.) Action- Plaintiff is bringing action against hospital based on wrongful death and is seeking damages.
2.) Facts- After years of living together in exclusive relationship, Neil Conrad Spicehandler, and John Lanegan endeavored to formalize their relationship by traveling to Vermont in November 2000 and entered into a Civil Union. They returned to New York and continued their relationship. In February 2002, Conrad was hit by a car and required hospitalization at St. Vincent’s Hospital of New York, and after two surgeries Conrad died. Langan is bringing action against the hospital for wrongful death and is seeking damages. Defendant states that it should be dismissed because the plaintiff and deceased are of same sex and were incapable of being married and therefore the plaintiff has no standing as surviving spouse to bring such action. Supreme Court denied the motion and the appeal ensued.
3.) Reasoning- “Unlike the court, which can only rule on the issues before it, the legislature is empowered to act on all facts of the issues of the solemnization and creation of such relationships, the dissolution of such relationship and the consequences attendant thereto, and all other rights and liabilities that flow from such a relationship. Any contrary decision, no matter how circumscribed, will be taken as judicial imprimatur of same-sex marriages and would constitute a usurpation of powers expressly reserved by our Constitution to the legislature. Accordingly the order must be reversed insofar as appealed from…”
4.) Holding- The order is reversed insofar as appealed form…and the cause of action to recover damages for wrongful death is dismissed”. Logane loses.
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Term
Loving V. Commonwealth of Virginia
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Definition
1.) Facts- June 1958 Mildred Jeter, an African American woman, and Richard Loving, a white male were married in the District of Columbia pursuant to its laws. Shortly after they were married they returned to Virginia and established a Marital abode in Caroline County. A grand jury then issued an indictment charging them with violating Virginia’s ban on interracial marriage. They pleaded guilty and were sentenced to one year in jail, however the trial judge suspended the sentence for a period of 25 years on the condition that the Lovings leave the state and not return for 25 years. Case eventually went to US Supreme Court
2.) Issues- “This case presents a Constitutional question never addressed by this Court: Whether a statutory scheme adopted by the State of Virginia to prevent marriages between persons solely on the basis of racial classification violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
3.) Reasoning- “There can be no question but that Virginia’s miscegenation statutes rest solely upon distinctions drawn according to race. The statues proscribe generally accepted conduct if engaged in by members of different races. Over the years, this court has consistently repudiated ‘distinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry’ as being ‘odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of equality’”.
a. “There can be no doubt that restricting freedom to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the equal protection clause”
b. “To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality at the heart of the 14th amendment is surely to deprive all the state’s citizens of liberty without due process of law.
4.) Holding- The Loving’s convictions are reversed and the freedom to marry or not marry a person of another race resides with the individual and can’t be infringed by the state
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Term
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio
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Definition
1.) Action- Inez Moore is appealing conviction by the City of East Cleveland on the grounds that their housing ordinance that restricts occupancy of a dwelling unit to a single family is unconstitutional
2.) Facts- Inez Moore lives in her home with her son, and two grandsons. She was convicted of violating the city’s housing ordinance and having “illegal occupants” with her. She moved to dismiss stating that the law was constitutionally invalid on its face and was overruled and convicted. Sentenced to five days in jail and 25 Dollar fine. Her case went before the US Supreme Court
3.) Issues- Issue is whether or not Inez Moore is whether the ordinance violates Inez Moore’s constitutional rights.
4.) Reasoning- The ordnance did not meet the goals it was established to do, and was too restrictive. For example, a married couple could live with twelve unmarried children, but a brother and sister could not live together under one roof. “Our decisions establish that the Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the family is deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition. It is through the family that we inculcate and pass down many of our most cherished values, moral, and cultural”.
5.) Holding- The court reversed the decision, and stated that Inez Moore should not have been jailed for having her grandson living with her.
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Term
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Definition
- 2 soldiers in the ntnl guard who opposed being deployed again to (iraq or afghanistan)
-tried to seek injunction ro recind orders of deployment
-motion denied, court did not want to interfere in a political issue
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Term
Jose padilla vs c.t. hanft |
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Definition
-padilla designated enemy combatant
-he filed a writ of habeous corpus after being imprisioned by military
-then transfered to civilian system
-didnt have the proper standing to grant cert |
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Marybeth Atkins v. Jiminy Peak, Inc. |
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Definition
This case involved a personal injury action brought by an injured skier against a ski area operator, who plaintiff claimed rented her defective ski equipment. The complaint was filed December 5, 1984, and the accident occurred March 20, 1982. The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. The trial court granted the motion, and the case was transferred to the state supreme court on its own motion.
The plaintiff argued on appeal that because her suit was brought against the defendant in his capacity as the rentor of equipment, not as the operator of a ski resort, the one-year statute of limitations did not apply. The state supreme court affirmed the lower court's ruling. It stated that the one-year statute of limitations applied to all personal injury actions brought by skiers against ski area operators arising out of ski injuries.
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Term
lawrence a kruckenberg v. paul s harvey |
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Definition
granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Paul S. Harvey, dismissing plaintiff Lawrence A. Kruckenberg's action alleging trespass and conversion and seeking a declaratory judgment regarding the location of the boundary line between their respective properties.
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solomon v auburn hills police department |
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Definition
-took kids to movie theater
-didnt get the right ticket, theater said she was tresspassing bc she had tickets to the other movie
-police came, one tried to restrain the mom and injured her even though she didnt resist
-she tried to charge him with injuring her
-he claimed police immunity
-court ruled in favor of the plaintiff (unjustified force) |
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Term
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Definition
Appellant brought suit against her husband for injuries that occurred to her while the husband was driving. She brought suit in South Carolina, but because the injury occurred in Georgia, Georgia’s interspousal immunity law was applicable. |
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Term
JEWELERS MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY v. FIRSTAR BANK ILLINOIS
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Definition
At issue is whether the exculpatory clause in defendant Firstar Bank's safety deposit box rental agreement is enforceable under the facts of this case. We hold that it is not. |
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