Term
| Maryland (P) enacted a statute imposing a tax on all banks operating in Maryland not chartered by the state. The statute provided that all such banks were prohibited from issuing bank notes except upon stamped paper issued by the state. The statute set forth the fees to be paid for the paper and established penalties for violations. |
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Definition
| Facts: McCulloch v. Maryland |
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Term
| Does Congress have the power under the Constitution to incorporate a bank, even though that power is not specifically enumerated within the Constitution? |
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Definition
| Yes. Congress has power under the Constitution to incorporate a bank pursuant to the Necessary and Proper clause (Article I, section 8). |
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Term
| Does the State of Maryland have the power to tax an institution created by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Constitution? |
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Definition
| No. The State of Maryland does not have the power to tax an institution created by Congress pursuant to its powers under the Constitution. |
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Term
A 1789 Act of Congress provided that the pilots of ships in the interior waters of the United States would continue to be regulated in conformity with the existing laws of the states, or with laws enacted by the states in the future, until Congress provided otherwise through legislation. In 1803 Pennsylvania enacted a law requiring ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia to engage a local pilot to guide them through the harbor and imposed a penalty for noncompliance.
The Board of Wardens (P) brought an action against Cooley for violating the Pennsylvania law. Cooley asserted that the Pennsylvania law was unconstitutional in light of the Commerce Clause (Article I, Section 8, Clause 3). He argued that Congress’ commerce power gave it exclusive jurisdiction over interstate commerce and Congress could not delegate or confer that authority to the States. The magistrate found for the plaintiff and the Court of Common Pleas and Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
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Definition
| Facts: Cooley v. Board of Wardens |
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Term
| Does the Commerce Clause deprive the States of all power to regulate interstate commerce such that Congress may not confer such power on the States through legislation? |
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Definition
| No. The Commerce Clause does not deprive the States of all power to regulate interstate commerce such that Congress may not confer such power on the States through legislation. |
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Term
| In what ways may the states regulate interstate commerce notwithstanding Congress’ exclusive authority to regulate it under the Constitution? |
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Definition
| States may regulate those aspects of interstate commerce that are so local in character as to require diverse treatment. |
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Term
The state of Virginia enacted legislation during the Revolutionary War that gave the State the power to confiscate the property of British Loyalists. Hunter was given a grant of land by the State. Denny Martin held the land under devise from Lord Thomas Fairfax.
In an action in ejectment, the trial court found in favor of Martin and the court of appeals (the highest Virginia state court) reversed. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed in favor of Martin, holding that the treaty with England superseded the state statute, and remanded the case to the Virginia court of appeals to enter judgment for Martin. The Virginia court refused, asserting that the appellate power of the U.S. Supreme Court did not extend to judgments from the Virginia court of appeals. |
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Definition
| Facts: Martin v. Hunter's Lessee |
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Term
| Does the U.S. Supreme Court have appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions involving federal law? |
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Definition
| Yes. The U.S. Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state court decisions involving federal law. |
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Term
| Did Congress, in passing Title II of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, exceed its Commerce Clause powers by depriving motels, such as the Heart of Atlanta, of the right to choose their own customers? |
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Definition
| The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate local incidents of commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed constitutional muster. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from governmental regulation. |
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Term
| Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forbade racial discrimination by places of public accommodation if their operations affected commerce. The Heart of Atlanta Motel in Atlanta, Georgia, refused to accept Black Americans and was charged with violating Title II. |
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Definition
| Facts: Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States |
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Term
| A New York state law gave two individuals the exclusive right to operate steamboats on waters within state jurisdiction. Laws like this one were duplicated elsewhere which led to friction as some states would require foreign (out-of-state) boats to pay substantial fees for navigation privileges. In this case a steamboat owner who did business between New York and New Jersey challenged the monopoly that New York had granted, which forced him to obtain a special operating permit from the state to navigate on its waters. |
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Definition
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Term
| Did the State of New York exercise authority in a realm reserved exclusively to Congress, namely, the regulation of interstate commerce? |
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Definition
| The Court found that New York's licensing requirement for out-of-state operators was inconsistent with a congressional act regulating the coasting trade. The New York law was invalid by virtue of the Supremacy Clause. In his opinion, Chief Justice Marshall developed a clear definition of the word commerce, which included navigation on interstate waterways. He also gave meaning to the phrase "among the several states" in the Commerce Clause. Marshall's was one of the earliest and most influential opinions concerning this important clause. He concluded that regulation of navigation by steamboat operators and others for purposes of conducting interstate commerce was a power reserved to and exercised by the Congress. |
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Term
| A state law required all vessels docking in New York City to provide a list of passengers and to post security against the passengers from becoming public charges. Miln, the master of the ship "Emily," refused to comply with the law. The city sought to collect a penalty for Miln's failure to file the report. |
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Definition
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Term
| Does the New York law violate the Commerce Clause which vests all power over interstate and foreign commerce in Congress? |
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Definition
| The Court upheld the state law. The justices ducked the Commerce Clause issue and invoked what was to become the state "police power" -- the right of a sovereign to take all necessary steps to protect the health, safety, and welfare of its citizens. According to Barbour, who wrote the majority opinion, a state is as competent "to provide precautionary measures against the moral pestilence of paupers, vagabonds, and possible convicts, as it is to guard against the physical pestilence, which may arise from unsound and infectious articles imported." The Court reversed Miln in 1941. |
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Term
In a proceeding pursuant to the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (NLRA), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB, plaintiff) concluded that Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation (D) had violated the Act by engaging in unfair labor practices affecting interstate commerce. Jones & Laughlin Steel was charged with discriminating against members of the union regarding hiring and tenure, and interfering with employees’ self-organization through coercion and intimidation in connection with the discharge of certain employees. The NLRB ordered the defendant to cease and desist from further discrimination and coercion, offer reinstatement to ten of the employees, compensate them for lost pay, and post notices that the defendant would not discharge or discriminate against members of the union or those desiring to become members.
Defendant failed to comply and the plaintiff petitioned the Circuit Court of Appeals to enforce the order. Defendant argued that the NLRB’s actions were unconstitutional because defendant’s plants were engaged in manufacturing and not interstate commerce, and Congress therefore had no power to regulate the activity in question under the Commerce Clause. The court of appeals found for defendant and denied the petition on the grounds that the order was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
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Definition
| Facts: NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp |
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Term
| Can Congress regulate activity related to manufacturing that significantly affects interstate commerce? |
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Definition
| Yes. Congress can regulate activity related to manufacturing that significantly affects interstate commerce. |
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Term
| Can Congress regulate relations between labor and management under the commerce power? |
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Definition
| Yes. Congress can regulate relations between labor and management under the commerce power. |
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Term
| What activity can be regulated by Congress pursuant to the commerce power? |
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Definition
| Acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the congressional commerce power, including labor disputes. It is no longer necessary to draw the distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ effects on interstate commerce. Congress can regulate any activity that has a significant effect on interstate commerce whether direct or indirect. |
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Term
The Agriculture Adjustment Act of 1938 (AAA) set quotas on the amount of wheat put into interstate commerce and established penalties for overproduction. The goal of the Act was to stabilize the market price of wheat by preventing shortages or surpluses. Filburn (P) sold part of his wheat crop and used the rest for his own consumption. The amount of wheat Filburn produced for his own consumption combined with the amount he sold exceeded the amount he was permitted to produce.
Secretary of Agriculture Wickard (D) assessed a penalty against him. Filburn refused to pay, contending that the Act sought to limit local commercial activity and therefore was unconstitutional because it exceeded the scope of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.
Filburn brought this lawsuit seeking to enjoin enforcement of the Act and a declaratory judgment that the wheat marketing provisions of the AAA were unconstitutional for exceeding the scope of Congress’s commerce power. The court below, a district court panel of three judges, entered judgment for Filburn and the Supreme Court granted cert. |
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Definition
| Facts: Wickard v. Filburn |
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Term
| Can Congress regulate trivial local, intrastate activities that have an aggregate effect on interstate commerce via the commerce power? |
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Definition
| Yes. Congress can regulate trivial local, intrastate activities that have an aggregate effect on interstate commerce via the commerce power, even if the effect is indirect. |
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Term
| The Korean war effort increased the demand for steel. Disputes arose between steel industry management and labor that culminated in an announcement of a strike by the union. President Truman authorized Secretary of Commerce Sawyer to take possession of the steel industry and keep the mills operating. |
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Definition
| Facts: Youngstown v. Sawyer |
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Term
| Does the President of the United States have executive power under the war powers clause of the U.S. Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation’s steel mills? |
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Definition
| No. The President does not have implicit or explicit executive power under the war powers clause of the U.S. Constitution, or any implied powers gleaned therefrom, to authorize the Secretary of Commerce to seize the nation’s steel mills. |
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Term
| Section 3 of the National Industrial Recovery Act empowered the President to implement industrial codes to regulate weekly employment hours, wages, and minimum ages of employees. The codes had standing as penal statutes. |
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Definition
| Facts: Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States |
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Term
| Did Congress unconstitutionally delegate legislative power to the President? |
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Definition
| The Court held that Section 3 was "without precedent" and violated the Constitution. The law did not establish rules or standards to evaluate industrial activity. In other words, it did not make codes, but simply empowered the President to do so. A unanimous Court found this to be an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. |
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Term
| Did the state-imposed rates deny the warehouse and elevator owners equal protection and due process under the 14th Amendment? |
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Definition
| No on both counts. Waite, for the Court, took a broad view of the state's police power. He argued that the states may regulate the use of private property "when such regulation becomes necessary for the public good." Waite resurrected an ancient legal doctrine to support his view: "When property is affected with a public interest, it ceases to be juris privati only." |
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Term
| Illinois regulated grain warehouse and elevator rates by establishing maximum rates for their use. |
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Definition
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Term
| •Does the Commerce Clause grant Congress the power to regulate the transportation in interstate commerce of goods that have been produced using child labor? |
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Definition
No. The Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the power to regulate the transportation in interstate commerce of goods that have been produced using child labor.
The power to regulate interstate commerce is the power to control the means by which commerce is conducted. It is the power to prescribe the rule by which commerce is governed.
The Court held that it had never sustained a right to exclude certain goods or activity under the commerce power, except for cases in which the nature of the excluded goods themselves brought them under the authority of the federal government. Exclusion had only been permitted where it was in effect merely a regulation of interstate transportation, necessary to prevent the accomplishment through that means of the evils inherent in them.
The manufacture of goods is not commerce. The fact that the goods are intended for and shipped in interstate commerce does not make their production a part of that commerce subject to the control of Congress.
The commerce power was not intended to allow Congress to equalize the economic conditions in the States to unfair competition among them by forbidding the interstate transportation of goods made under conditions which Congress deems to produce unfairness. It was not intended to allow Congress to control the States in the exercise of their police power over local trade and manufacture which is expressly reserved to the States by the Tenth Amendment. |
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Term
The Keating-Owen Act of 1916, otherwise known as the Child Labor Act, prohibited the transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced at factories that violated certain restrictions on child labor. Roland Dagenhart worked in a cotton mill in Charlotte, North Carolina with his two minor sons, both of whom would be barred from employment at the mill under the Act. Dagenhart brought this lawsuit seeking an injunction against enforcement of the Act on the grounds that it was not a regulation of interstate or foreign commerce. The government asserted that the Act fell within the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause.
The district court held that the Act was unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. |
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Definition
| Facts: Hammer v. Dagenhart |
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Term
| Could the Supreme Court constitutionally issue an injunction directed against the President? |
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Definition
| In a unanimous decision, the Court held that it had "no jurisdiction of a bill to enjoin the President in the performance of his official duties...." The Court held that the duties of the President as required by the Reconstruction Acts were "in no sense ministerial," and that a judicial attempt to interfere with the performance of such duties would be "an absurd and excessive extravagance." The Court noted that if the President chose to ignore the injunction, the judiciary would be unable to enforce the order. |
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Term
| In 1867, Congress passed the Reconstruction Acts. Although President Andrew Johnson vetoed the Acts, Congress overrode the veto. In an attempt to delay or prevent Reconstruction, the state of Mississippi appealed directly to the Supreme Court. Mississippi asked the Court for an injunction preventing the President from enforcing the Acts on the ground that they were unconstitutional. |
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Definition
| Facts: Mississippi v. Johnson |
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Term
| Does the Civil Rights Act of 1875 violate the 10th Amendment of the Constitution which reserves all powers not granted to the national government to the states or to the people? |
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Definition
| The Fourteenth Amendment restrains only state action. And the fifth section of the Amendment empowers Congress only to enforce the prohibition on state action. The amendment did not authorize national legislation on subjects which are within the domain of the state. Private acts of racial discrimination were simply private wrongs that the national government was powerless to correct. |
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Term
| The Civil Rights Act of 1875 affirmed the equality of all persons in the enjoyment of transportation facilities, in hotels and inns, and in theaters and places of public amusement. Though privately owned, these businesses were like public utilities, exercising public functions for the benefit of the public and, thus, subject to public regulation. In five separate cases, a black person was denied the same accommodations as a white person in violation of the 1875 Act. |
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Definition
| Facts: The Civil Rights Cases |
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Term
| Did Lincoln act within his presidential powers defined by Article II when he ordered the seizures absent a declaration of war? |
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Definition
| The President had the power to act. A state of civil war existed de facto after the firing on Fort Sumter (April 12, 1861) and the Supreme Court would take this fact into account. Though neither Congress nor the President can declare war against a state of the Union, when states waged war against the United States government, the President was "bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself,without waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name." |
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Term
| Lincoln proclaimed a blockade of southern ports in April 1861. Congress authorized him to declare a state of insurrection by the Act of July 13, 1861. By the Act of August 6, 1861, Congress retroactively ratified all Lincoln's military action. These cases involved the seizure of vessels bound for Confederate ports prior to July 13, 1861. |
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Definition
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