In this case, Weichert v. Ryan, 608 A.2d 280 (1992), the court held that Weichert could recover under the doctrine of quasi-contract. The court rejected Weichert’s claim that an implied contract was created, because Ryan’s conduct suggested that he did not agree to the terms submitted by Tackaberry. Substantial evidence proved that Tackaberry had obtained the deal, however, that the court found that justice required some compensation. Moreover, Ryan himself admitted that he had always intended to provide some compensation for the brokerage services. Consequently, Weichert is entitled to the fair value of its services, but not necessarily ten percent. This case was a relatively close call—a court might have reasoned that Weichert foolishly provided the services without first obtaining a contract and should bear the consequent risk.

Samuel Nichols, Inc., a brokerage firm, signed an exclusive brokerage agreement with Molway to find a purchaser for Molway’s property within ninety days. Nichols would receive a commission for brokering a sale of the property within this time. Nichols began advertising the property and showing it to prospective buyers. Then, before the ninety days were up, Molway sought to cancel the agreement. Molway maintained that the contract was unilateral, that Nichols had not yet performed its act (finding a buyer), so the contract could be canceled. Nichols disagreed. What sort of contract was this, and did Molway lawfully cancel the contract?

In this case, Samuel Nichols, Inc. v. Molway, 515 N.E.2d 598 (1987), the court held that the contract was bilateral. The court reasoned that Nichols had promised to use its best efforts to market the property in exchange for Molway’s promise to give a ninety-day exclusive arrangement. Thus, the contract was binding for ninety days. Even if the contract had been deemed unilateral, the court might still have ruled for Nichols, because that company had acted in justifiable reliance on Molway’s promise.

The Changs read an advertisement from First Colonial Bank regarding saving certificates. The advertisement stated that a depositor could deposit a certain amount, receive a gift, and receive a certain amount at the certificate’s maturity in three and one half years. The Changs made a deposit of $14,000 as the advertisement specified, and they received the promised gift. After maturity, however, the bank gave them only $18,823, rather than the $20,136 promised in the advertisement. First Colonial explained that the advertisement contained a typographical error, so that a $15,000 investment was required to receive the greater sum. The Changs filed suit to recover the difference, claiming that the parties had a binding contract. Explain whether the Changs should prevail on this claim.

In this case, Chang v. First Colonial Savings Bank, 410 S.E.2d 928 (1991), the court ruled for the Changs. Although an advertisement ordinarily does not constitute an offer that can be accepted for a binding contract, in this instance the advertisement was clear, definite, and explicit. The court also emphasized that the bank had not informed the Changs about the typographical error until after it had used their money for more than three years. In these circumstances, the court would hold the bank to fulfill the terms of the advertisement.

Marino Consultants sent Delpaq Computer Corporation a purchase order for 100 computers at the advertised price, and this order made no mention of warranties. Delpaq responded with a confirmation that accepted the order and contained detailed terms, including one that stated that the company made “no warranties of any kind.” Marino representatives did not closely read the corporation and did nothing further. Soon after the purchase, twenty of the computers suffered major hard drive failures. Marino sought to recover damages, but Delpaq sought to rely on the absence of warranties. Did the parties have a contract, and if so, what are its terms?

Although Delpaq’s confirmation contained additional terms, this fact does not make it a counteroffer. Assuming that the parties intended to make a deal, there is a contract. The additional terms, including the disclaimer of warranties, presumptively become part of the contract, since Marino did not promptly object. However, such additional terms do not become part of the contract if they make a material alteration in the offer. Elimination of all warranties is so substantial that it would probably be held to be such an alteration, so the disclaimer would not become part of the contract. Thus, the contract contains no warranty term, but Marino may rely on the implied warranties contained in the Uniform Commercial Code.