Martin v. Herzog

126 N.E. 814 (N.Y. 1920)

N.E. = Northeast Reporter.  Decided in New York, in 1920

Courts:

New York Trial Court (Jury sided with plaintiff)

Appellate Division of New York (court reversed the jury's decision and remanded case for a new case)

New York Court of Appeals (Sided with Defendent or Herzog)

Facts Summary:

Martin = Plaintiff, Appellant

Herzog = Defendent, Appellee

The Martin's (husband and wife) were in a horse drawn buggy, Herzog in car.  Herzog struck buggy and killed husband.

Martin said Herzog was negligent for driving on wrong side of road, Herzog said Martin was negligent for not having headlights on buggy.

Judge told jury to view the fact that there were no lights on the buggy in accordance with the law as a negligible act.  But the simple act of no lights on the buggy is not considered negligent per se (meaning inherently by itself).  This is because no lights can either be viewed as an act of innocense or an act of negligence.  So the judge must inform the jury as to how to view it before making any decisions.

Procedure:

Jury decided that the driver was acting negligent by not staying on the correct side of the road and that the victim was blameless.  The appellate division of New York reversed this decision and remanded it for a new trial.  The appellate division reversed the decision of the judge who told the jury to view the issue-of-facts as negligence.

Issues: 

Can the jury be lenient on the duty of headlights that one traveler owes another while on the road (breaking of a statute)?  Can pure negligence of the driver be considered worthy of a court decision against him or does negligent conduct need to show just cause of the injuries occurred?

Holding:

No, jury cannot ignore the negligence of Martin who did not have headlight and the jury cannot relax that duty.

Also, negligence is only considered an unlawful offense if it is the cause of another's injury.

Reasoning:

Defendant won.  Because the plaintiff admitted to not having headlights on the buggy and that constitutes the plaintiff as being contributorily negligent.  The reason it is a negligible action is because it resulted in injury.

Someone driving without lights is not forced to pay damages that are his fault, but if the absence of the lights directly causes the accident, then he must.

Court ruled the accident was caused by pure lack of lighting on the buggy.

Impact:

Showed that violation of a statue (regulation) is considered negligence per se.  (doctrine of negligence per se).  Where yes once you violate a statute you are considered negligent but you are not at fault to pay anything unless it was your negligence that caused whatever injury.

Also illustrates the doctrine of contributory negligence. It applies to cases where the plaitiff, through his own negligence, contributed to the harm he suffered.

Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California

(1976)

17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14

Located in 3 different reports (Cal. Reporter 3rd edition, Cal. Reporter and Pacific Reporter 2nd edition)

Courts (same name in every case):

California Trial Court

California State Appeals Court

California Supreme Court (1974)

California Supreme Court (1976)

Famous Quote from Case:  "The protective privilege ends where the public peril begins."

Facts Summary:

Male Poddar and Female Tarasoff were in romantic relations.  As the relationship worsened, Poddar visited his psychologist (Moore) and said he wanted to buy a gun and kill Tarasoff.

Moore contacted campus police and informed them of the issue, Poddar was detained briefly and then let go.

Tarasoff was never told of threats Poddar had made and later he stalked and stabbed her to death.

Procedure:

Tarasoff's parent's sued health services, campus police, and the regents of the University of Cali for failing to warn them that their daughter was in danger.

In trial court: case was dimissed saying there was no cause of action because the doctor had no obligation to the third party, only to her patient.

California State of Appeals Court: court upheld decision made by the state trial court.

California Supreme Court (1974):  Court sided with Tarasoff saying "a therapist bears a duty to use reasonable care to give threatened persons such warnings as are essential to avert forseeable danger arising from a patient's condition."  Decision known as Tarasoff I.

California Supreme Court (1976): under pressure from policeman and psychiatrists, the supreme court decided to hear the case again.  Known as Tarasoff II.

Issues:

Does a psychiatrist, or someone of similar profession, have an obligation to inform a third party if they are potentially in danger, or do they maintain the privacy agreement they have with their patient?

Holding:

Justice Tobriner stated the Cali. Supreme Court sided with Tarasoff again.  He stated that when a therapist, or someone of similar profession, determines that his or her patient is a danger to another person, they have an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the intended victim against the danger (calling police, telling victim, whatever necessary under current circumstances).

Reasoning:

Precedent was the fact that doctor's have been held liable for negligent failure to diagnose a contagious disease or warn family members of it.  The court's reasoning for their decision was that public peril takes priority over patient privacy.

Abbot Laboratories v. Gardner

387 U.S. 136 (1967)

Know it's a decision made by U.S. Supreme Court

Courts:

U.S. District Court (Abbott wins)

U.S. Court of Appeals (Gardner wins)

U.S. Supreme Court

Facts Summary:

Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act required that pharmaceutical companies included the brand name as well as the generic name of the product that they were selling on all printed material.  After congress had passed this act, the Commissioner of the FDA decided to add onto this and said that the generic name must be printed everywhere the brand name was printed.  Abbott as well as 36 other drug manufacturers were the plaitiffs, who believed that Gardner (commissioner of FDCA) was not entitled to enforece this regulation upon the basis of ultra vires (more than their authority allows).  The key in this case is the fact that this part of the act had not yet been enforced in anyway.

Procedure:

Trial court sided with Abbott, appellate court sided with Gardner, then sent to supreme court.

Issues:

Originally it was if Gardner and the FDCA have the right to determine the packaging and display of the pharmaceutical companies?

Then in appellate court it turned in to the issue of is this a valid case although no persons or organizations have been harmed in anyway? 

Then, did Congress, by its Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, intend to forbid pre-enforcement review of the sort of regulations promulgated by the Commissioner? Were the issues ripe for judicial decision? Would withholding court consideration result in hardship to the parties?

Holding:

7-1 in favor of Gardner.  Manufacturers must print the established name "prominently and in type at least half as large as that used thereon for any proprietary name or designated for such drug".

Reasoning:

Trial court sided with Abbott because they ruled that it was not up to him to enforce this and it was beyond the scope of his authority.

Appellate court said the case was not ripe because there seemed to be no substantial controversy.  However this was why Abbott had brought it up in the first place, b/c the new labels and advertisements would be costly to manufacturing companies.

The Supreme Court found this case to be "ripe".  Also stating that no where in the Act did the FDA try to preclude (prohibit) pre-enforcement review.  The Act was supposed to be an in addition to not a substitution for the origianal Act passed by congress.  Also, stated that withholding information would have cause hardships and penalties.  If the manufacturers didn't get a decision then they would face more costs for their labels and could be sued for not following regulations.  So remanded and sent back to Appellate court to decide on whether or not the Commissioner had the right to regulate manufacturer's labels.  The Appellate court sided with Gardner.

Impact:

B/c of this case, the U.S. was able to identify the term "ripeness".  To define it, the Court said, "The problem is best seen in a twofold aspect, requiring us to evaluate both the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration".  This case was deemed ripe for adjudication b/c no matter what Abbott would be affected, through hardship and penalties.  If this Act would have been ambiguous to the point where the hardship was contingent upon events that may or may not occur then it would not have been ripe for adjudication.

This case set the precedent of pre-enforcement review.  Now most cases require a lawsuit to be brought up within a limited time after a rule, such as the FDCA is put into place.  Pre-enforcement review ensured that there must be an actual controversy for the Supreme Court to be presented with a case.  Seen in 2004 case Baxter Healthcare Corporation v Denton.

Doe v. Unocal

248 F. 3d 915 (9th Cir. 2001)

Courts:

U.S. District Court decided to hear the case in 1997, which was considered a landmark decision at the time.  The plaintiff Doe wanted the defendant Unocal and its officials to be held responsible for the crimes committed against the Karen people of Burma based on the Alien Tort Claims Act.  Court agreed with plaintiff in that companies and their executives CAN be held accountable legally for their actions in foreign nations under the act.  Also stated American courts had the ability to rule on claims such as these.  Despite extensive evidence of the atrocities, the case was dismissed based on the fact that "Unocal could not be held liable unless Unocal wanted the military to commit abuses, and that plaintiffs had not made this showing."

Appealed to U.S. Court of Appeals in 2001.

Facts Summary:

Unocal was an oil company.  Wanted to expand.  Decided to move to "Yadana Field" in Burma.  This location was chosen due to the large supply of oil and other resources, the inexpensive, but fairly educated labor force, a steady political scene, and most importantly, an opportunity to get involved in other Southeast Asia markets.  However, there was a drawback to the situation in that there was sufficient evidence that human rights violations were taking place by the country's military dictatorship.  Unocal decided to invest in the project in 1992 despite this risk, purchasing a stake in a pipeline build by French company Total S.A.  The pipeline would cross through and area occupied by the ethnic minority, the Karen.

As construction began a number of human rights groups kept a close eye on the progress.  Their findings indicated the Burmese army was treating the Karen people poorly by "using forced labor and brutalizing the Karen population to provide 'security' for Unocal workers and equipment."  These groups along with Greenpeace met with Unocal in L.A. to talk about the violations, and as a result Unocal hired someone to look into the matter.  His observations confirmed the attrocities.  Unocal took it upon itself to begin implementing programs to help benefit groups such as the Karen.  However, 15 members of the minority group under the alias "John Doe" brought forth a suit against Unocal in U.S. Fed. District Court under the Alien Tort Claims Act for their treatment in Burma.

Issues:

Can a company be held liable for the treatment of workers abroad under the Alien Tort Claims Act of 1789?

Holding:

3 judges presiding over the case reversed the decision of the District Court stating they were incorrect in making the plaintiffs (now appellants) prove that "Unocal controlled the Burmese military's actions in order to establish Unocal's liability."

Reasoning:

Courts ruled against Unocal, stating that the appellant (Doe) only needed to show enough evidence to demonstrate Unocal was cognizant of their assistance of the Burmese army in the atrocities committed.  Doe had done that and the law suit was allowed to move forward.

Impact:

Never made it to Supreme Court because Unocal settled the dispute outside of the court system.

But in 2004 the Supreme Court did rule it legal for foreigners to use the Alien Tort Claims Act in U.S. courts to acquire damages for crimes committed worldwide.  Also, it now hold U.S. companies to higher standards when they are doing business outside of the U.S. and it allows those hurt by any irresponsible actions to be properly compensated.

Espinosa v. Graco Children's Products

2009 WL 137526 (E.D. Tex. Jan 20, 2009)
(NO. 2:07-CV-517)

Tort case.  Decided in United States District Court

Facts Summary:

Espinosas were involved in a car accident.  Sued Graco along with GM, the person driving the other car, the driver's mother, etc.  In this case it deals with Graco.   The Espinosas' (plaintiffs) sued Graco because they had purchased the Graco Snugride Child Restraint.  They claimed that it was not designed with enough wing depth, because there is no EPS (Energy Absorbing Foam) and/or padding in the wing to protect Gloria (daughter who was killed in accident) in a side impact collision.  The defendants want to transer the venue to the Sherman District, where the accident actually occurred.  The plaintiffs had originally picked the Marshall District (located in the Eastern District of Texas).

Issues:

Should the trial be held in the Sherman District, the district in which the accident occurred?

Is the transferee venue more convenient?

Holding:

Motion to transfer venue denied.

Reasoning:

The judge rules in favor of the plaintiffs in this case on the basis that the court is in between the site of the accident and the Plaintiffs' home in Louisiana.  Both the Marshall and Sherman courts are familiar with Texas law, which governs this case.  Also, the defendants cannot prove that the venue is of no disposition to Graco.  Finally, the Marshall District venue is more convenient to plaintiff in this case.  Defendant's couldn't prove there was any inconvenience for them and plaintiffs could, so no transfer.

Courts:

Texas State Trial Court (Bates Plaintiff), Dow moved it to Federal District Court

Went to Federal Court of Appeals (Bates Appellant)

Went to U.S. Supreme Court (Bates petitioner)

Facts Summary:

Dow had herbicide called Strongarm that was supposed to control the growth of weeds and other harmful plants in peanuts.  However, it really just stunted the growth.  There was an act passed called Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) and the product had been registered within it by the EPA.  Farmers in Texas got pissed, and alleged Dow was in violation of Texas Labeling Requirements.  They claimed Dow knew or should have known that the herbicide would stunt the growth of peanuts in their soil.

Issues:

Can FIFRA prohibit the farmers' state law claims that Dow's herbicide damaged crops?

Does FIFRA preemt (block) the state law claims made by the farmers and trump state laws that either directly or indirectly impose different labeling requirements?

Holding:

7-2 in favor of Bates and 29 other peanut farmers.  The court concluded that FIFRA does not preemt and prohibit the farmers from suing Dow for crop injuries in state court.

Reasoning:

The court saw that FIFRA only pre-empted state labeling requirements that are different then FIFRA's labeling standards.  It does not pre-empt against defective manufacture and breach of warrantly claims.  The Court found it to be clear that the rules underlying causes of action for defective design, defective manufacture, and breach of warranty did not require manufactures to label Strongarm in a particular way.  The court went on in saying claims premised upon text in the products label such as failure to warn claims are subject to FIFRA, however they are not always pre-empted.  FIFRA only prohibits state law different from its own labeling requirement, so as long as a common law claim imposes labeling requirements similar to FIFRA, they may avoid pre-emption challenges.  It was stated " Moreover this history emphasizes the importance of providing an incentive to manufactures to use the utmost care in business."

Impact:

This case will have a dramatic effect on pesticide manufacturers ability to use FIFRA pre-emption as a defense.  The case clears the way for protection against dangerous pesticides, but it also is a big blow to reform against civil lawsuits through the use of pre-emption.  This case should allow other areas outside of pesticides to be able to avoid losing lawsuits from the use of pre-emption and in turn penalize manufacturers that offer bad products.  Also restores some power back to the states from the federal government.

Schneckloth v. Bustamonte

412 U.S. 218 (1973)

Courts:

Began in California Trial Court.  The California trial judge denied the motion to suppress, and the checks were considered evidence at Bustamonte's trial. 

Bustamante was convicted and then appealed to the California Court of Appeal.  The court agreed that the search and seizure process was constitutionally valid and found that Alcala even attempted to aid the search.

Case then went to the California Supreme Court, which denied the review.  The respondent sought a writ of habeas corpus (I think the kid meant certiori ha..not too smart) to go to the U.S. Supreme Court, which was again denied.  The Court of Appeals vacated the order denying the writ and remanded that case for further proceedings.  The court then granted certiorari to determine whether the 4th and 14th Amendments require the showing thought necessary by the Court of Appeals.  So it goes to Supreme Court.

Facts Summary:

Police officer James Rand pulled over a car with 6 men in it at 2:40 a.m.  Only one person had identification (Alcala).  He pulled them over because one healight was out and the license plate light was burnt out.  Officer asked the 6 men to get out of the car and asked if he may search the car (legal by constitution).  Alcala (it was his brother's car) said yes it was oaky.  Alcala helped the officer search the car by opening trunk, and all compartments within the vehicle.  Officer found 3 checks, which were stolen from a car wash.

Issues:

Does consent give authority to police to seach as an exception to the requirements of probable cause and search warrants?

Must consent be voluntary before it can be valid, and is it ascertained by the "totality of the circumstances"?

Does this search violate the legal searches and seizures of the 4th Amendment of the United States Constitution?

What must the prosecution prove to demonstrate that a consent was "voluntarily" given?  And, is there a conflict of views between the state and federal courts that have reviewed the search involved in the case?

Did Alcala know that he had the right to refuse and remain silent?

Main Issue: If the respondent voluntarily allowed the search of the vehicle?

Holding:

This consent to search the vehicle did not violate the 4th and 14th Amendments of the U.S. Constitution.  The court reviewed the totalitiy of the circumstances and tested if the person (Alcala) voluntarily consented to a search of his brother's vehicle.

Reasoning:

Based on the totality of the circumstances, the first thing is to test for voluntariness, which would be the characteristics of ther person being accused and the details of the interrogation.  In this case, the court ruled that "when the subject (Bustamonte) is not in custody and the State attempts to justify a search on the basis of his consent, the 4th and 14th Amendments require that it demonstrates that the consent was in fact voluntarily given, and not the result of duress or coercion, express or implied."

Also, in this case, the Due Process Clause (in 14th Amendment) does not require California to prove that the defendant knew he had a right to refuse the questions given by the police officer.  Some factors that may play into this case is that the police failed to advise the people in the car of their rights and that they do not have to answer any questions.  But once they answered, anything can be held against them. 

While Alcala's knowledge of the right to remain silent is a factor that plays into this case, the state and police officer were not required to demonstrate such knowledge.  So in this case, there is no evidence that supports inherently coercive tactics.

Disposition:

The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the decision.  Bustamonte was convicted by the U.S. Supreme Court of possessing a check with intent to defraud (this was evidence held against him).

Impact:

"The California courts have followed the rule that voluntariness is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances, and that the state of a defendant's knowledge is only one factor to be taken into account in assessing the voluntariness of a constent."

U.S. v. Mendenhall

446 U.S. 544 (1980)

Courts:

Federal District Court: U.S.-Plaintiff, Mendenhall-Defendent

Federal Court of Appeals: Mendenhall-Appellant, U.S. Appelle

U.S. Supreme Court:  U.S.-Petitioner, Mendenhall-Respondent

Facts Summary:

Ms. Mendenhall was at the airport.  She had flown from L.A. to Detroit and upon arriving two DEA agents observed supsicious behavior typical of a narcotics smuggler.  Her identification did not match that which was printed on her ticket so they asked her back to the DEA's office.  At the office they asked for consent to search Ms. Mendenhall's "person and handbag", informing her of the right to decline such a search.  She responded "Go ahead".

Inside the handbag was a receipt for the airplane ticket and it was purchased by yet another party. 

Another officer performed a body search in which Ms. Mendenhall had to disrobe.  She again requested consent, which was subsequently granted by the respondent. During the search they found 2 bags of heroin like substance.  She was then arrested for possession of heroin, with intent to distribute.

Issue:

Did the DEA agents violate the respondent's rights under the 4th amendment, which provides that "the right of the people to secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated?"

Holding:

The court voted 5-4 in favor of the Petitioner, reversing and remanding the ruling of the Court of Appeals.

Reasoning:

The court reasoned that no actual "seizure" occurred since the initial questioning happened in a public place.  Further, there was no "seizure" of the respondent because agents did not threaten with force or display their weapons.  Dressed in plain clothes, the DEA agents requested, but did not demand Ms. Mendenhall's identification.  Additionally, the respondent voluntarily went to the airport DEA's office.

Ms. Mendenhall's "suspicious" actions warranted the initial questioning.  The conflict between her ID and the name on her plane ticket was substantial reason to question her further.  She was twice asked for permission to search her person, both time consenting.

The notion that complying with the police may be to Ms. Mendenhall's benefit does not indicate coercion on the part of the agents.

Evaluation

The court's ruling is important because it affirms one of the nine criteria for legal searches and seizures, "consent to the search."

Hudson v. Palmer

468 U.S. 517

Courts:

Starts in U.S. District Court--Accepted the allegations but ruled on precedence from Parratt v. Taylor, that destruction of a prisoner's property is not a violation of the Due Process Clause under the 14th Amendment and the alleged harassment was not a Constitutional issue.

Then U.S. Court of Appeals--Affirmed what the District Court's holding was but reversed and remanded in regards to the unreasonable shakedown claim.  In this claim the court held, "that an individual prisoner has a "limited privacy right" in his cell, entitling him to protection against searches conducted solely to harass or to humiliate."  If Hudson violated Palmer's privacy and was truly destructive, then a trial court would have to decide on the matter because Palmer would recover damages from his destroyed property and violation rights.  So Hudson appealed to Supreme Court

Then U.S. Supreme court

Facts Summary:

Palmer is an inmate at Bland Correctional Center in Bland, Virginia for forgery, grand lareny (theft), and bank robbery convictions.  Hudson was the petitioner and a corrections officer at the facility.  Hudson and another officer did a "shakedown" of Palmer's cell and locker area.  A shakedown occurs when officers perform a search of an inmate's cell without prior notice, in an attempt to find contraband, which can be things such as weapons, drugs, or alcohol.

During the shakedown, Hudson found a ripped pillow case in Palmer's trashcan and because the pillow case was the person's property he reported it and Palmer was charged with destroying state propert.  Palmer was found guilty and was required to pay for the pillow case along with having the incident placed on his prison record.

Palmer filed a lawsuit against Hudson saying that the shakedown occurred to harass him and during the search Hudson destroyed some of his personal belongings.  Palmer said that the search and harassment was a violation of his Constitutional rights and he sought to recover his damages.

Issue:

Were Palmer's Constitutional rights under the 4th Amendment violated during the shakedown and were his rights under the 14th Amendment violated due to the deprivation and destruction of property that occurred?

Most importantly:  Whether or not the 4th Amendment protects inmates from unreasonable searches and seizures?

Holding:

5-4 in favor of Hudson.

Reasoning:

Chief Justice Burger addressed the court by saying that prisoners do not give up all of their Constitutional rights when they are incarcerated, however they do give up some of them because of the fact that prisons need to have a ruling order over the prisoners.

Went on to say, "The unpredictability that attends random searches of cells renders such searches perhaps the most effective weapon of the prison administrator in the fight against the proliferation of weapons, drugs, and other contraband."   In this scenario the court made the decision that, “privacy was fundamentally incompatible with the maintenance of prison security and surveillance.”  The court also ruled that the alleged destruction of property was not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because Palmer had sufficient time to file claims for destruction of personal property under Virginia law and receive remedies for it.

Impact:

After the ruling any prisoners who are treated unfairly or harassed during shakedowns and searches of their cells and property, they are required to sue under state law to recover their damages rather than federal law.  The ruling also set a precedence for all other similar cases where an inmate is arguing that their 4th amendment rights have been violated in a cell search.

California v. Trombetta

467 U.S. 479 (1984)

Courts:

Started in State Municipal Court--Municipal Court denied the motion to suppress Intoxilyzer results.  So California won.

Moved to California Court of Appeals where all the cases consolidated into Trombetta v. California.  This court reversed the Municipal Court decision and held that the Due Process Clause within the 14th Amendment did in fact require law enforcement agents to preserve breath samples.  California filed writ of certiorari and it was denied by State Supreme Court so another written and accepted by U.S. Supreme Court. (Cali. v. Trombetta)

Facts Summary:

People were getting pulled over in the state of California under the suspicion of drunk driving.  Prior to trial, each respondent filed a motion to have the intoxilyzer results suppressed on grounds that the arresting officer did not preserve a sample of th respondents' breath.  Respondents' claimed that if the breath samples would have been preserved, it would have allowed them to impeach the incriminating intoxilyzer test results.  Although technically feasible, police officers wre not required to do so under California law or normal operating procedures.

Issue:

Do breath samples constitute potential exculpatory (tending to clear from a charge of fault or guilt) evidence?  If so, did the State violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and the due process requirement of Brady v. Maryland?

Holding:

The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Cali. Court of Appeals in favor of Cali.  They ruled breath samples do not constitute exculpatory evidence and hold no exculpatory value.  Thus, the State was not in Constitutional error.

Reasoning:

The court decided that the results from the Intoxilyzer were the evidence itself, whereas, the breath sample was merely raw data to obtain evidence.  The breath itself was not to be presented in trial as evidence and therefore could not be seen to have any exculpatory value.  Also, the law enforcement agents were acting in good faith and took no calculated effor to circumvent the requirements established by Brady v. Maryland.  The Intoxilyzer is deemed to be accurate enough that breath is not needed after it is analyzed.

Impact:

If the Supreme Court did not reverse this decision then the ability for police to prosecute DUI's throughout the nation would have been considerably hampered.  This case also kept breath analysis as a viable means of collecting evidence for a DUI or in modern terms an OVI.

Vosburg v. Putney

50 NW 402 (1981)

Facts Summary:

Two kids attend same school in Wisconsin way back in 1889.  Andrew Vosburg is 14 and George Putney is 11.  They are sitting across from each other one afternoon in class and George decides to gently kick Andrew in the shin, just below the knew (George was not being playful).  Moments later Vosburg began to cry out in extreme pain.

Unknown to Putney, Vosburg was recovering from a sledding accident in which he was injured in the same spot that George kicked him.  George's kick aggravated the recovering knew; this led to Andrew needing multiple surgeries and eventually losing the use of his limb as a result of deterioration of his tibia (leg bone).

Vosburgs filed a common law battery complaint against George Putney.  In the first trial the Vosburgs were awarded $2800.  The Putneys appealed arguing that Andrew Vosburg had a pre-existing condition and George may have sped the process up with his kick but he was not the direct cause of the bone deterioration; in the appeal the Vosburgs were awarded $2500.  They kept suing back and forth until both sides gave up.  At the end of the families' suits against each other, the Vosburgs ended up owing the Putneys $770.

Issues:

Was the defendant liable for damages despite the plaintiff's pre-existing condition that the defendant was unaware of?

Holdings:

The court decided that George Putney was guilty of battery because he intentionally kicked Ander Vosburg during class time.  The defendant is liable for the damages that occurred from the unforeseen injuries.

Reasoning:

The court found that the defendant's intention was to harm the plaintiff (mens rea--guilty mind).  Additionally, the incident occurred in the classroom instead of on the playground; if the incident had occurred while the boys were at recess then the Vosburgs would have not been able to sue the Putneys, since at that time in history it was expected that students would be injured on the playground and therefore no one was liable for any injuries occurring while the children were at play.

Impact:

The impact of this case was the Eggshell Skull Rule.  The Eggshell Skull Rule says if someone assaults another person, the assaulter is liable for any damage(s) caused by their actions, even if the person had a pre-existing condition that was irritated by the assault.

Philip Morris v. Williams

549 U.S. 346 (2007)

Courts:

Started in Multnomah County Circuit Court, as Williams v. Phillip Morris USA Inc.  Philip Morris was found liable for negligence and misrepresentation.  The Williams estate was awarded $821,000 in compensatory damages and $79.5 million in punitive damages.  Philip Morris appealed.

Next was Oregon Trial Court, (case called Williams v. Philip Morris USA Inc.) the punitive damages were reduced.  Both Philip Morris and Williams appealed.

At Oregon Court of Appeals, (case entitled Williams v. Philip Morris USA Inc.) the punitive damages were reinstated.  Philip Morris argued the trial court could not punish the corporation for nonparty damages, and thus the punitive award was "grossly excessive".

The case appeared at the Supreme Court of Oregon as Williams v. Philip Morris USA Inc.  Here the punishment for effects on non-parties through Due Process Clause and the "grossly excessive" award were debated.  Damages were found to be punishment, and therefore, constitutional.  Appealed to U.S. Supreme Court

Facts Summary:

Smoking 3 packs of cigarettes each day for 47 years, Jesse Williams, 67, died of lung cancer.  His widower, Mayola Williams, sued the makers of Marlboro, Philip Morris USA Inc., for negligence, strict product liability and fraud.  She stated that for approx. 40 years, Philip Morris knew smoking cigarettes caused cancer, and despite the millions addicted, the company had withheld or denied the knowledge of this info. to consumers.

Issues:

1. Were the punitive damages awarded by the State of Oregon excessive?  Were these in violation of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment?

2. Had Oregon unconstitutionally permitted punishment for the harm against nonparty victims?  Had Oregon disregarded the requirements by the Constitution to have punitive damages reasonably related to harm?

Holdings:

1.  The punitive damages were excessive, bud did not violate the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment.

2.  Oregon did not unconstitutionally permit punishment for the harm to nonparty victims.  The sought certiorari only answered the first question and focused instead on reprehensibility

Reasoning:

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1.   The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment allows a defendant to provide every available defense prior to receiving punishment.  It further permits punishment for injuries incurred by strangers to the litigation: adding a standard-less dimension to punitive damages.  Additionally, there is not authoritative support regarding the use of punitive damage awards with the purpose of punishment to the defendant for the harm of others.  However, considering damage is potentially seen as harm caused by the plaintiff.  Therefore, a jury’s verdict resulting in punitive damages, may not consider harm to third party members.

Impact:

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The decisions of this case hold the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not allow damages to non-party members to be considered in the determination of punitive damages